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Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Benchekroun, H.
  • Ray Chaudhuri, A.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2012. "Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Other publications TiSEM 0cbd69ff-87b0-47c0-bbb9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0cbd69ff-87b0-47c0-bbb9-fc3ab62399e3
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    File URL: https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstreams/e8a0b18c-ca87-4df2-99e5-246037d4ae0a/download
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2006. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 247-263, May.
    2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 241-257, September.
    3. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    4. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March.
    5. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    6. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    7. Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2009. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 455-492, June.
    8. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    9. Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(1), pages 25-48, January.
    10. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
    11. Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January.
    12. Jorgensen, Steffen & Zaccour, Georges, 2001. "Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 1973-1987, December.
    13. Rubio, Santiago J. & Ulph, Alistair, 2007. "An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 296-310, November.
    14. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    15. Santiago Rubio & Begoña Casino, 2005. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 89-109, June.
    16. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
    17. van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Other publications TiSEM 5d08aa40-9b59-4bac-811a-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2023. "Climate Coalitions and their Persistent Ineffectiveness," Discussion Paper Series 2023_04, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Apr 2023.
    2. Michael Hoel & Aart de Zeeuw, 2013. "Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries," Working Papers 2013.07, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Eftichios Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2013. "International Environmental Agreements: An Emission Choice Model with Abatement Technology," Discussion Paper Series 2013_05, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Dec 2013.

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