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Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay

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  • Ahlin, Christian
  • Bose, Pinaki
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  • Ahlin, Christian & Bose, Pinaki, 2007. "Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 465-486, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:84:y:2007:i:1:p:465-486
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Arnott & Bruce Greenwald & Ravi Kanbur & Barry Nalebuff (ed.), 2003. "Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262012057, December.
    2. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1987. "Asymmetric information in competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 153-156.
    3. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
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    6. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1990. "Corruption and allocation efficiency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 153-164, July.
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    8. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    9. Berkowitz, Daniel & Li, Wei, 2000. "Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 369-397, June.
    10. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "The dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 427-443, March.
    11. Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 489-504, April.
    12. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October.
    13. Arnott, Richard J. & Greenwald, Bruce & Kanbur, Ravi & Nalebuff, Barry, 2003. "Joseph Stiglitz and Economics for an Imperfect World," Working Papers 127202, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    14. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
    15. Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Government in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 385-410, April.
    16. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    17. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
    18. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
    19. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986. "A note on competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 337-341.
    20. Beck, Paul J. & Maher, Michael W., 1986. "A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5.
    21. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 2000. "Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 109-124, May.
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