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Majority rule when voters like to win

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Ding Huihui, 2018. "Conformity Preferences and Information Gathering Effort in Collective Decision Making," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-18, January.
  2. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
  3. Antoine Loeper & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2014. "Influential Opinion Leaders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(581), pages 1147-1167, December.
  4. Rune Midjord & Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2019. "Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting," CESifo Working Paper Series 7713, CESifo.
  5. Emilio Barucci & Marco Tolotti, 2012. "Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 7(1), pages 79-98, May.
  6. John Morgan & Felix Várdy, 2012. "Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 986-1026.
  7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Marina Agranov & Jacob K Goeree & Julian Romero & Leeat Yariv, 2018. "What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 825-856.
  9. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2011. "Seeking Harmony Amidst Diversity: Consensus Building with Network Externalities," ISER Discussion Paper 0826, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
  10. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2019. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  11. Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2020. "Voting and Contributing When the Group Is Watching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 246-276, August.
  12. Yves Breitmoser & Justin Valasek & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2023. "Why Do Committees Work?," CESifo Working Paper Series 10800, CESifo.
  13. Dino Gerardi & Margaret A. McConnell & Julian Romero & Leeat Yariv, 2016. "Get Out The (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design For Greater Participation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1963-1979, October.
  14. Elena Panova, 2011. "A Passion for Democracy," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-47, CIRANO.
  15. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2023. "Why do committees work?," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 18/2023, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
  16. Yves Breitmoser & Justin Valasek, 2024. "Strategic communication in committees with expressive payoffs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(1), pages 33-54, March.
  17. Marco Faravelli & Kenan Kalayci & Carlos Pimienta, 2020. "Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 468-492, June.
  18. Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393121, HAL.
  19. Panova, Elena, 2015. "A passion for voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 44-65.
  20. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
  21. Murali Agastya & Jorge Rojas-Vallejos, 2023. "The “desire to conform” and dynamic search by a committee," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 737-756, September.
  22. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
  23. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2021. "Pendular Voting," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 21/350, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  25. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2013. "Over-caution of large committees of experts," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-313, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  26. Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  27. Balankin, Alexander S. & Martínez Cruz, Miguel Ángel & Martínez, Alfredo Trejo, 2011. "Effect of initial concentration and spatial heterogeneity of active agent distribution on opinion dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(21), pages 3876-3887.
  28. Dana Sisak & Philipp Denter, 2024. "Information Sharing with Social Image Concerns and the Spread of Fake News," Papers 2410.19557, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
  29. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Steve Alpern & Vic Baston, 2017. "The Secretary Problem with a Selection Committee: Do Conformist Committees Hire Better Secretaries?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1184-1197, April.
  31. Paulo Barelli & Sourav Bhattacharya & Lucas Siga, 2022. "Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2161-2185, September.
  32. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A ‘state of the art’ model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 430-443.
  33. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2021. "When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  34. Ambrus, Attila & Greiner, Ben & Sastro, Anne, 2017. "The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 34-48.
  35. Alvaro J. Name-Correa & Huseyin Yildirim, 2018. "A capture theory of committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 135-154, October.
  36. Dillenberger, David & Raymond, Collin, 2019. "On the consensus effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 384-416.
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