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Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "On the limits of communication in multidimensional cheap talk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 545, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2013. "Optimal Arbitration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 769-785, August.
  3. John M. de Figueiredo & Charles M. Cameron, 2006. "Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-156, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  5. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  6. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  7. Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "Communication and bargaining in the spatial model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 251-266, January.
  8. Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David, 2012. "Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1850-1881.
  9. Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
  10. Killian J. McCarthy & Florian Noseleit, 2022. "Too many cooks spoil the broth: on the impact of external advisors on mergers and acquisitions," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 1817-1852, August.
  11. Valsecchi, Irene, 2008. "Learning from Experts," International Energy Markets Working Papers 36756, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  12. Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
  13. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  14. Lu, Shih En, 2017. "Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 177-208.
  15. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  16. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  17. Alonso, Ricardo, 2009. "Strategic control and strategic communication," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58682, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  18. Wang, Guocheng & Wang, Yanyi, 2018. "Herding, social network and volatility," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 74-81.
  19. Kollenberg, Sascha & Taschini, Luca, 2016. "Emissions trading systems with cap adjustments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 20-36.
  20. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  22. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 419-441.
  23. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
  24. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
  25. Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Efficient Communication in Organizations," FEEM Working Papers 329583, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  26. Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet & Renou, Ludovic, 2024. "Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  27. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
  28. Dilmé, Francesc, 2022. "Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 1-19.
  29. Esra E. Bayindir & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-22, April.
  30. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Strategic Information Transmission in Networks," Economics Discussion Papers 2974, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  31. Kailin Chen, 2025. "Communication with Multiple Senders," Papers 2505.14639, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2025.
  32. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Information Aggregation in Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Working Papers 169, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  33. Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
  34. Sumner, Scott, 2015. "Nominal GDP futures targeting," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 65-75.
  35. Ronny Razin & Gilat Levy, 2004. "Multidimentional Cheap Talk," 2004 Meeting Papers 184, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  36. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
  37. Jun, Jooyong & Yoon, Kyoung-Soo, 2012. "Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 619-623.
  38. Jackson, Aaron L., 2010. "Policy futures markets with multiple goals," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 45-54, March.
  39. Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
  40. Scott A. Beaulier & William J. Boyes & William S. Mounts, 2008. "The Influence of Economists on Public Attitudes toward Government," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 52(2), pages 65-71, October.
  41. Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
  42. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
  43. Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2016. "The (Human) Sampler's Curses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 115-148, November.
  44. Yuk-fai Fong & Peter Eso, 2008. "Wait and See," 2008 Meeting Papers 303, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  45. Moritz Drupp & Mark Freeman & Ben Groom & Frikk Nesje, 2015. "Discounting disentangled: an expert survey on the determinants of the long-term social discount rate," GRI Working Papers 196a, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  46. Rubanov, Oleg, 2025. "Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 191-196.
  47. Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2020. "Vagueness in multidimensional proposals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 307-328.
  48. Thomas König & Bernd Luig & Stephan Marc Solomon, 2010. "Sachverständige und der Einfluss von Expertise auf Reformen: Eine räumliche Analyse der Föderalismusreform II," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(3), pages 307-323, August.
  49. Junghun Cho, 2006. "Multiple Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp314, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  50. Randall Holcombe & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2010. "Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 37-51, July.
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