1 periods and one other in which the bargaining proposals proceed endlessly."> 1 periods and one other in which the bargaining proposals proceed endlessly.">
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Multiplayer Bargaining with Delayed Agreement

Author

Listed:
  • Luís Carvalho
Abstract
The best known equilibrium strategies of multiplayer bargaining dene that the agreement is established at the rst moment. In this paper two new subgame perfect Nash equilibria strategies are proposed, one in which the agreement moment is delayed for T > 1 periods and one other in which the bargaining proposals proceed endlessly.

Suggested Citation

  • Luís Carvalho, 2015. "Multiplayer Bargaining with Delayed Agreement," Working Papers Series 2 15-03, ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL).
    • Handle: RePEc:isc:iscwp2:bruwp1503
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    File URL: http://bru-unide.iscte.pt/RePEc/pdfs/15-03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Chatterjee, K. & Sabourian, S., 1999. "N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity," Papers 5-99-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    4. Haller, Hans, 1986. "Non-cooperative bargaining of N [ges] 3 players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 11-13.
    5. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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