lynx   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-05233957.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Simon Finster

    (FAIRPLAY - IA coopérative : équité, vie privée, incitations - CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - Criteo AI Lab - Criteo [Paris] - Centre Inria de l'Institut Polytechnique de Paris - Centre Inria de Saclay - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that defines cost interdependence to express these preferences. This facilitates the use of linear programming to characterize Walrasian equilibrium prices. Firstly, we show that equilibrium prices are uniform, anonymous, and linear in packages. Prices and marginal gains exhibit a nested structure, which we characterize in closed form for complete graphs. Secondly, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of package-linear competitive prices using an ascending auction implementation. Our framework of partition preferences ensures fair and transparent dual pricing and admits preferences over the concentration of allocated bundles in the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Finster, 2025. "Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs," Post-Print hal-05233957, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05233957
    DOI: 10.1145/3736252.3742522
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05233957v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-05233957v1/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1145/3736252.3742522?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05233957. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.
    Лучший частный хостинг