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Improving the Effort Concept: A Revision of the Traditional Approach in the Context of Controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments

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  • PROTOPOPESCU DAN
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision- maker in an evolving environment. In the classical analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach employes a continuum of effort levels. The pres- ence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provide a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. In the context of a principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to exert a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The dynamic incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not sufficiently incite the agent to allocate effort. This possible scenario explains why some efficient strategic incentive-compatible constraints that cover the entire period of contract do not generally exist. The proposed approach offers an elegant study of the close relationship between behavior, attitude and effort allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Protopopescu Dan, 2008. "Improving the Effort Concept: A Revision of the Traditional Approach in the Context of Controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 739.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 03 Dec 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:739.08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rational decision-maker; endogenous dynamic learning; adaptive effort management; optimal effort threshold; effort aversion; excessive effort behavior.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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