gary's choices

Iran regime change, 1986 to the present. Not much change

In the article below, Politico describes the advice being given to President Trump on Iran by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy (FDD); the following passage appears:
   
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/25/trump-iran-foreign-policy-regime-change-239930
   
    Trump allies push White House to consider regime change in Tehran
   … .   
   The case for political subversion in Iran has also been pressed to the
   White House by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a hawkish
   Washington think tank that strenuously opposed Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal
   with Tehran and which has close ties to many key Trump officials.
   
   Soon after Trump’s inauguration, FDD’s CEO, Mark Dubowitz, submitted a
   seven-page Iran policy memo to Trump’s National Security Council. The
   memo — which was circulated inside the Trump White House and recently
   obtained by POLITICO — included a discussion of ways to foment popular
   unrest with the goal of establishing a “free and democratic”  Iran.
   
   “Iran is susceptible to a strategy of coerced  democratization because it
   lacks popular support and relies on fear to sustain its power,” the memo
   argued. “The very structure of the regime invites instability, crisis
   and possibly collapse.”
   
   I thought the phrase “coerced democratization,” which is essentially a contradiction in terms, sounded familiar. After a bit of searching, I found this:
   
   In a Top Secret memo [now declassified] from national security adviser John Poindexter to President Reagan on January 17, 1986, he described the rationale  for selling arms to Iran, in concert with Israel. This later came to be called the Iran-contra affair. Poindexter wrote:
   
   “The Israelis are convinced that the Iranians are so desperate for military materiel, expertise and intelligence that the provision of these resources will result in favorable long term changes in personnel and attitudes within the Iranian government. Further, once the exchange relationship has commenced, a  dependency would be established on those who are providing the requisite resources, thus allowing the provider(s) to coercively influence near-term results.”
   
   It was the coercive element in the last line that stuck in my mind.    Although the circumstances are different, Poindexter thought that    positive inducements (arms) would put the US in a position to    exercise coercive influence over developments in Iran. Mark Dubowitz    argues that negative inducements (threats and sanctions) will put    the US in a position to exercise coercive influence    (democratization?) in Iran. It is not a new idea.
   
   The idea of coercing a nation of the size and sophistication of Iran to do your bidding has never had any serious validity. (Just look at the the problems Saudi Arabia is having with tiny Qatar.) But the idea is alive and well and being peddled today to the White House by American proponents of regime change in very much the same form as thirty years ago.
   

The Death of Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in Iran

From Gary Sick

Based on my own observations over the years here are a few comments that seem worth adding to the flood of commentary.

First, Rafsanjani was truly a pragmatist. He seemed to believe genuinely that Iran’s revolutionary system would survive only if it engaged with the outside world. There was never any doubt about his devotion to the system that he had done so much to shape. But he was willing to go beyond stale dogma in pursuit of rescuing a system that he recognized was performing very badly.

He was a businessman, and his solutions always seemed to involve deal making. His attempt to bring in the US and others involved making them an offer they could not refuse. Hence the Conoco offer, or the trade of hostages for Bush’s “good will.” However, the US always found it could refuse the offer whenever the time came to pay up. It was one of his great disappointments.

Rafsanjani was the master at leading from behind. He seemed to be uncomfortable out in front, leading a fight or a principled crusade. Instead, he preferred to work behind the scenes, manipulating events. This gave his leadership an ambiguous quality.

People in the west tended to see him as a reformer, and that seems to have been correct at least in his later years. But he liked to let others lead the charge, while he stayed back out of the limelight to push the levers. This was not a lack of courage, in my view, but rather an accurate appreciation of his own strengths and weaknesses.

As a consequence, he won the smaller battles but lost the war. When he finally came out to do battle on his own, he was repeatedly defeated, even humiliated. His loss to Ahmadinejad was a catastrophe.

Over the past eight or ten years, despite his undeniable presence, he was unable to win the election for Moussavi and Karrubi. He was not able to keep them out of house arrest. In fact, he was not able to keep even his own children out of jail.

The strategic voting of the 2013 election was clever and classic Rafsanjani tactics. But I would argue that Rafsanjani has had very little impact on policy, even after the Rouhani election. He favored the nuclear deal with the west, but the reason it was adopted was because Khamenei supported it, regardless of his body language. Rafsanjani had become a back bencher – an important commentator but not a policymaker.

Contrary to some of my colleagues, my guess is that Rafsanjani’s departure will have very little actual impact on the course of developments from here. If I were in Rouhani’s shoes, I would certainly be sorry to lose an ally with such sterling revolutionary credentials. After all, the centrists need all the friends they can get.

However, the outcome of the next election will depend on Rouhani’s ability to persuade Iranians that they are better off with the nuclear agreement and that he is capable of defending Iran’s interests better than any alternative choice. Having Rafsanjani behind him would no doubt have had its appeal, but Rouhani would have been foolish to depend on Rafsanjani to win that battle.

One should always be cautious talking about legacies so close to the event. Rafsanjani will without question be seen as one of the towering figures of the revolutionary era. His place in history, however, will depend very much on the fate of the very system that he helped to put in place but then came to criticize for its anemic performance, and especially its self-destructive rivalries, corruption, and discord.

He wanted to cure those problems, and he failed. RIP

This election is effectively over.

This election is effectively over.

Donald Trump ran the first convention in history where more people came out saying they would NOT vote for the candidate than they did going in. The governor of the home state of his convention, a member of his chosen party, refused to attend and offered some choice comments about the nominee and his antics. Virtually all major figures in his party either did not come to the convention or else offered the most tepid possible words of praise. One key figure, a former opponent, conspicuously used his speech in prime time to make clear that he would not endorse the nominee.

That was just last week.

In the days since the convention, Trump has managed to offend families of those who lost relatives in US wars. To women who experience harassment in the work place, he says just get a new job. His daughter intimates that when dealing with harassment it really helps to be the boss’s daughter.

His fundraising has lately improved, with an influx of small donations from his devoted followers. But it is very little and very late. The Koch brothers, yes the dark money guys, have said that they are washing their hands of the presidential election and will focus only on holding on to the Senate and House. A couple of unquestionably successful businessmen who could buy Donald Trump in a heartbeat – Michael Bloomberg and Warren Buffett – have made it unmistakably clear that Trump is terribly flawed not only as a candidate but as a businessman. His refusal to release his tax returns speaks volumes.

The senior party officials who bit their tongues and endorsed him during the convention in the name of party unity have been forced to criticize him for his comments, and he, in turn, says he can’t endorse them for reelection. His VP candidate disagrees. The entire Republican establishment of security experts, who brought us the policies of Bush and Cheney, have officially withdrawn their support. One of those has bemoaned in the NY Times that he now finds himself in the Dumb Party. The most senior Republican pundit has ostentatiously left the Republican Party after a lifetime. A Republican congressman has proclaimed he will vote for Hillary Clinton. Defections are beginning to cascade.

There seems to some reluctance to draw the obvious conclusion from these facts – that Trump is certain to lose this election.

There is dismay that Trump supporters forgive all and denounce criticism as a conspiracy. But that thirty percent of the US electorate are firmly with him and would never be swayed. In Trump’s own words, they would vote for him if he committed murder on the street in broad daylight. They are angry at the changes in this country, and they rightfully feel betrayed by decades of politicians (mostly Republican) who promised them everything but delivered almost nothing. They are also aware of the utter inaction on the part of the Tea Party and others to deal with their issues. Instead, they have seen nothing but gridlock in Washington. The denunciation of Tea Party candidates in the Republican primaries yesterday in Kansas makes it clear that this is not just a partisan issue.

Trump supporters are really concerned with only one thing: throw the bums out – all of them – and shake the government to its very foundations. They are fed up, and on the basis of hard experience they have concluded that politicians of all stripes are not to be trusted. They don’t care that Trump is offensive and outrageous. They don’t always like it, but it is a price they are willing to pay for the kind of clean sweep that they believe is the only answer. They do not like Muslims, immigrants, non-whites generally, and they reject the comfortable elites in their ivory towers who keep patronizing them and telling them they don’t know what they’re talking about. They distrust government, period.

Given their experience with successive administrations, they do know what they’re talking about. But the answer to their problems is not Donald Trump, and even the committed core is likely to have some doubts by the time we get to election day. Their numbers are not growing.

The 100-day delay between the conventions and the elections is a blessing. It works against a candidate whose instant appeal is riveting but whose staying power, when examined more closely, fades. The erosion of Donald Trump has only just begun. It scarcely matters what Hillary Clinton does between now and then, so long as she doesn’t get in the way of Trump’s implosion. In my view, she might offer some programs specifically designed to respond to the disaffected minority on the right – and then follow through with them even when they don’t vote for her.

But this election is all about Trump. He is on full display, all day, every day. And he is not gaining ground with the ten or twenty percent of the uncommitted voters in the center who are the ultimate target in this or any American election. If those in the middle were dubious before, they will become grievously offended as time goes on. Trump has been told by his family and advisers what he has to do to win this group. And he is simply incapable of doing it. He won’t. And he won’t win.

In fact, at some point it may begin to become clear that his brand, which is the very essence of who and what he is, is being irretrievable tarnished. After this, who is going to do a deal with Trump? Who is going to risk not being paid? Who will pay a premium to rent his name for a building or a golf course? Who will hire him to perform on reality TV?

At that point, Trump will have to decide what is more important: his campaign or his brand?

The possibility that he will withdraw, no doubt claiming the system is irredeemably rigged against him, cannot be dismissed. That would send us into truly unexplored territory.

But for those of you lying awake at night worrying about a Trump presidency, turn over and get a good night’s sleep. This election is a moment of truth like nothing we have seen in our lifetimes. It is a unique opportunity to shape the future of our country in the direction of more democracy and more justice. Yes, Hillary needs to be pushed in that direction. Let her hear your voice.

Use your vote. Don’t waste it.

But this is no moment for despair.

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Regional Implications of the JCPOA

What are the regional implications of the Iranian nuclear deal (the JCPOA)?

A good place to start may be to ask what has NOT happened since the JCPOA was signed:

(1) The regional states have not rushed to acquire independent nuclear capability. You may recall that this was widely predicted at the time. I am aware of no evidence that any of the states who have expressed skepticism about the agreement have changed their nuclear policies or even hinted at their intention to develop a nuclear capability beyond the peaceful nuclear power plants that are in various stages of planning.

(2) Iran has not dramatically increased its activities in Syria, Iraq, Yemen or elsewhere, despite the fact that they now have access to $50b or more in frozen assets. Again, you will recall that there were predictions that Iran would use these funds to enhance its support of Hezbollah, Assad or other regional surrogates and allies.

(3) By the same token, however, Iran has not shown any signs of changing its fundamental policy objectives in the region. Iran continues to support the Assad regime, it continues to rely on Hezbollah as an important proxy force, it has not changed its rhetoric in opposition to Israel, and it makes no secret of its opposition to Saudi Arabia’s policies in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria.

The JCPPOA was about one thing – Iran’s nuclear program. It made no attempt to influence Iran’s behavior with regard to human rights or its foreign policy. There were hopes that an agreement with Iran would lead to a gradual moderating impact on its domestic and foreign policies.

There is no question that President Rouhani wants to portray Iran in the most positive light possible, if only because he wants to attract desperately need foreign direct investment to reinvigorate the Iranian economy. That is also linked to his reelection campaign, with a national vote in June 2017, less than a year from now. He needs to show progress.

But the Iranian hardliners are determined to demonstrate that they are still very much in charge, despite their loss on the nuclear issue. The Supreme Leader reluctantly validated the JCPOA against the wishes of the hardline conservatives in the Revolutionary Guards and in key domestic positions. But he is now giving those forces leeway to make life difficult for Rouhani and the reformist elements.

So the long-term implications of the JCPOA for Iranian policy are being fought out by rival forces in Iran. We won’t know the outcome for some time. The first real marker will be the Iranian presidential election next year. Rouhani will be opposed by his hardline opponents, and the outcome will be a test of strength.

To return to my list of things that have not happened since the signing of the JCPOA, there is very little talk today in the region about rising nuclear threat – from Iran or anyone else. That is a real change.

In the years preceding the JCPOA, the so-called nuclear threat was at the center of almost all foreign policy discussion. You will all recall PM Netanyahu’s appearance before the UNGA with a cartoon drawing of an Iranian bomb. It showed an impending red line that at least implied that Israel or others would be forced to take military action.

There is no such talk today.

In fact, if you listen to the pronouncements of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, you would never know that their primary concern just a year or two ago was the Iranian nuclear threat.

But as you know, this has not silenced their concerns about Iranian actions. On the contrary, they are now concerned that Iran’s successful negotiation of the nuclear agreement with all the major world powers has empowered it to play a much more influential role in the region, to the detriment of the other regional states.

In the past, Saudi Arabia and its Sunni Arab allies relied on the United States to keep Iran contained. That began to break down when the Bush administration invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq, thereby eliminating two of Iran’s worst rivals – the Taliban and Saddam Hussein – and leaving it essentially unchallenged.

That was reinforced by the Obama administration’s decision to pursue a nuclear agreement with Iran. As a result of those negotiations, the top leadership of both Iran and the United States have become accustomed to direct contact. John Kerry and Javad Zarif email back and forth, and they meet regularly.

This new level of contact has had some positive impact, since it lets both countries maintain contact during periods of tension, such as the US Navy boat that strayed into Iranian waters and was taken prisoner by Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

But these contacts have also stoked fears on the part of many regional states that the United States and Iran are returning to the days of the shah, when Iran was America’s leading ally in the Gulf.

When these fears are combined with U.S. statements about rebalancing or pivoting away from the Middle East, there is something like hysteria that U.S. traditional allies are being abandoned.

In my view, those views are hugely exaggerated. The United States may reduce our military footprint in the area, but we are not going away from the Gulf. Nor is there any likelihood of a new Iran-U.S. alliance. Just listen to the voices in Washington, on both sides of the aisle, if you have any doubt about that.

So the bottom line, I guess, is that the JCPOA has effectively removed the so-called nuclear threat from the headlines in the Middle East. But those headlines have been replaced by fears about Iranian hegemonic ambitions and U.S. betrayal.

So the tone of the foreign policy debate in the Middle East has shifted due to the JCPOA, but it turns out that plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose – the more it changes, the more it looks just the same.