Take the good with the bad, and the bad with the good? An experiment on pro-environmental compensatory behaviour

Sophie Clot (), Gilles Grolleau () and Lisette Ibanez ()
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Sophie Clot: EDHEC - EDHEC Business School - UCL - Université catholique de Lille
Gilles Grolleau: ESSCA - ESSCA – École supérieure des sciences commerciales d'Angers = ESSCA Business School
Lisette Ibanez: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: This study investigates the extent to which people are subject to moral licensing in the environmental domain by examining moral dynamics at a disaggregated level. Using Giving and Taking games with environmental NGOs, we found that aggregate results hide important heterogeneity. Half of the participants engaged in compensatory behavior, with highly environmentally concerned individuals compensating more frequently. Men were more consistent than women, but when they adopted moral licensing, their compensation was significantly greater than that of women. These findings suggest opportunities for improving environmental policy effectiveness.

Keywords: taking game; moral in(consistency); licensing; dictator game; cleansing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published in Bulletin of Economic Research, inPress

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05148018

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