Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha
 | |
| INS v. Chadha | |
| Reference: 462 U.S. 919 | |
| Term: 1982 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: February 22, 1982 Reargued: December 7, 1982 Decided: June 23, 1983 | |
| Outcome | |
| Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Chief Justice Warren Burger • Harry Blackmun • William Brennan • Thurgood Marshall • Sandra Day O'Connor • Lewis Powell • John Paul Stevens | |
| Concurring | |
| Lewis Powell | |
| Dissenting | |
| William Rehnquist • Byron White | |
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha is a case decided on June 23, 1983, by the United States Supreme Court in which the court held that the legislative veto was an unconstitutional violation of the United States Constitution's separation of powers. The case concerned a legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that permitted one house of Congress to invalidate deportation rulings.[1][2][3][4]
Why it matters: The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha declared legislative veto provisions to be unconstitutional. Prior to this decision, Congress had passed a variety of laws containing legislative veto provisions that granted one house of Congress, both houses of Congress, or a congressional committee the authority to vote to invalidate a particular action by the president or an executive agency without requiring presidential approval. Some of these provisions gave Congress oversight powers over specific agency rulemaking actions.
Background
| Administrative State |
|---|
| Five Pillars of the Administrative State |
| • Judicial deference • Nondelegation • Executive control • Procedural rights • Agency dynamics |
| Click here for more coverage of the administrative state on Ballotpedia |
- See also: Legislative veto
Kenyan-born Jagdish Rai Chadha was a graduate student at Bowling Green University in the United States in 1972 when his student visa expired. Chadha's parents had been British subjects in Kenya, but Kenya had gained independence from Britain by the time his student visa expired. As a result, although the United States ordered Chadha's deportation, Kenya would not accept him as a citizen. Following a hearing, an immigration judge suspended Chadha's deportation.[2][3][4]
Under Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress had given either chamber the power to invalidate deportation rulings of the U.S. attorney general, a process known as a legislative veto. In 1975, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to deport Chadha and five others. Chadha sued both houses of Congress and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The case eventually reached the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, which held that the legislative veto provision Congress applied to order Chadha's deportation was unconstitutional. Although the INS had joined Chadha in arguing that Section 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional, the agency appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court.[2][3][4]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on February 22, 1982, and again on December 7, 1982. The case was decided on June 23, 1983.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 7-2 in favor of Chadha. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Warren Burger and joined by Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, and John Paul Stevens. Justice Lewis Powell authored a concurring opinion. Justices William Rehnquist and Byron White authored dissenting opinions.[2][1]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Warren Burger argued that the one-house legislative veto established by the Immigration and Nationality Act violated the separation of powers doctrine and circumvented the framers' intended structure of government:[2]
| “ | Since it is clear that the action by the House under § 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that action was subject to the standards prescribed in Art. I. The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. ... We hold that the congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act, and that it is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.[5] | ” |
| —Chief Justice Warren Burger, majority opinion in INS v. Chadha (1983)[2] | ||
The court held that the legislative veto was effectively an exercise of Congress' legislative authority and, therefore, unconstitutional because the action was not approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the president.[6]
Concurring opinions
Justice Lewis Powell concurred with the court's judgment but argued that the court should have limited its decision to the case at hand rather than ruling on the constitutionality of all legislative vetoes:[2]
| “ | The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, 7, cls. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause. Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds of statutes, dating back to the 1930's. Congress clearly views this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation of power to administrative agencies. One reasonably may disagree with Congress' assessment of the veto's utility, but the respect due its judgment as a coordinate branch of Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive than necessary to decide these cases. In my view, the cases may be decided on a narrower ground. When Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country, it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment.[5] | ” |
| —Justice Lewis Powell, concurring opinion in INS v. Chadha (1983)[2] | ||
Dissenting opinions
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Byron White argued that the court should have limited its decision to the case at hand, rather than ruling on the constitutionality of all legislative veto provisions:[2]
| “ | Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.' For this reason, the Court's decision is of surpassing importance. ... It reflects a profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that held by the courts which sanctioned the modern administrative state. Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history. I fear it will now be more difficult to insure that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official, but by the body immediately responsible to the people.[5] | ” |
| —Justice Byron White, dissenting opinion in INS v. Chadha (1983)[2] | ||
Justice William Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Byron White, in which he argued that the legislative veto provision was not severable from the rest of the Immigration and Nationality Act and thus could not be invalidated without altering the effect of the law as a whole and undermining the original intent of Congress:[2]
| “ | A severability clause creates a presumption that Congress intended the valid portion of the statute to remain in force when one part is found to be invalid. ... A severability clause does not, however, conclusively resolve the issue. ... Because I believe that Congress did not intend the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable, I dissent.[5] | ” |
| —Justice William Rehnquist, dissenting opinion in INS v. Chadha (1983)[2] | ||
Impact
Removal of legislative veto provisions
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in INS v. Chadha, Congress amended a number of statutes to delete legislative veto provisions and replace them with joint resolutions. In other statutes, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, legislative vetoes have remained in the law but are no longer exercised.[7]
Continued use of the legislative veto
Despite the court's ruling in INS v. Chadha, Congress has continued to pass legislative veto provisions and presidents have continued to sign them into law, though often accompanied by statements declaring that the provisions are unconstitutional and non-binding. For example, upon signing the Treasury-Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of fiscal year 1992, President George H.W. Bush (R) stated that the bill's legislative veto provisions "constitute legislative vetoes similar to those declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha. Accordingly, I will treat them as having no legal force or effect in this or any other legislation in which they appear."[7][8]
From the time of the court's ruling in Chada through 2005, Congress enacted more than 400 new legislative vetoes, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The majority of these legislative vetoes require committee approval of executive agency actions. Non-statutory committee vetoes also operate as informal understandings between Congress and executive agencies, most often concerning committee oversight of agency spending. While presidents have effectively ignored legislative veto provisions since INS v. Chadha, executive agencies have continued to operate closely with their respective congressional oversight committees and honor committee veto provisions.[7][9]
Louis Fisher, a specialist with the CRS, provided the following summary of INS v. Chadha's impact on legislative vetoes—particularly committee vetoes—in a 2005 report to Congress:[9]
| “ | Chadha put an end to one-house and two-house legislative vetoes but it has had little effect on the legislative vetoes that operate at the committee and subcommittee level. Executive agencies and congressional committees have developed a variety of voluntary accommodation procedures over the years that result in a standard quid pro quo; Congress agrees to delegate substantial discretion to executive agencies if they accept a system of review and control by the committees of jurisdiction. These provisions remain an important mechanism for reconciling legislative and executive interests.[9][5] | ” |
See also
- Separation of powers
- Rulemaking
- Administrative law
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
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Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "INS v. Chadha," accessed October 23, 2017
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Legal Information Institute, "INS v. Chadha," accessed October 23, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 The New York Times, "Faces Behind Famous Cases," June 19, 1985
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Legal Information Institute, "Legislative Veto," accessed October 24, 2017
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ The New York Times, "Supreme Court, 7-2, Restricts Congress's Right to Overrule Actions by Executive Branch," June 24, 1983
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Law and Contemporary Problems, "The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, it Survives," 1993
- ↑ The New York Times, "IN SPITE OF THE COURT, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO LIVES ON," 1983
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 Congressional Research Service, "Legislative Vetoes after Chadha," May 2, 2005
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