National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
 | |
| National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Company | |
| Reference: 421 US 132 (1975) | |
| Term: 1974 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: January 14, 1975 Decided: April 28, 1975 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, remanded in part, and reversed in part | |
| Majority | |
| Byron White • Potter Stewart • Thurgood Marshall • Harry Blackmun • William Rehnquist • William Brennan • William Douglas | |
| Concurring | |
| Warren Burger | |
| Dissenting | |
| None | |
National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Company is a case decided on April 28, 1975, by the United States Supreme Court in which the court clarified whether certain types of agency memoranda are subject to the Freedom of Information Act. The case concerned a Freedom of Information Act request by Sears, Roebuck & Co. for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to disclose memoranda related to certain labor disputes.[1]
The United States Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that memoranda explaining decisions of the general counsel to file unfair labor practices complaints fell under exemption 5, while those explaining decisions not to file complaints did not qualify for the exemption. The court also clarified whether memoranda qualified for exemption 5 in several other circumstances. The court declined to rule on the question of exemption 7, remanding part of that question to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.[2]
Why it matters:
The ruling clarified the scope of the exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act.
Background
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Under the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947, complaints regarding unfair labor practices first came before one of the NLRB's 31 regional directors, who decided whether the case had merit. If the regional director found the charge without merit, the complainant could appeal the decision to the Office of Appeals in the Board's General Counsel's Office. A committee within that office would then prepare an official appeals memorandum explaining its decision to approve or deny the complaint. To account for situations in which that appeal process was inadequate, and to promote "fair and uniform administration of the Act," the general counsel sometimes required regional directors to consult its Advice Branch. Directors could also consult the Advice Branch in other cases. A committee within the Advice Branch would then reply with an official advice memorandum containing its decision to approve or reject the complaint.[2]
On July 14, 1971, Sears, Roebuck & Co. filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the NLRB to disclose all of the advice and appeals memoranda issued by its general counsel within the previous five years related to "the propriety of withdrawals by employers or unions from multi-employer bargaining, disputes as to commencement date of negotiations, or conflicting interpretations in any other context of the Board's Retail Associates rule." The NLRB refused, claiming those memoranda fell under exemptions to the act.
The NLRB argued that the requested memoranda fell under the exemptions detailed in Section 552(b)(5) and (7) of the Freedom of Information Act, which read as follows:
| “ | (b) This section does not apply to matters that are--
... |
” |
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on January 14, 1975. The case was decided on April 28, 1975.
Outcome
In its 8-0 decision, the United States Supreme Court distinguished between memoranda that explained decisions of the general counsel to file a complaint, which fell under exemption 5, and those that explained its decision not to file a complaint, which did not fall under that exemption. The court also clarified several other circumstances in which memoranda would or would not fall under exemption 5. For technical reasons, it declined to rule on whether any of the memoranda fell under exemption 7. It also remanded the question of whether reference materials previously covered by exemption 7 but later incorporated into the memoranda should lose their exempt status to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Justice Byron White wrote the majority opinion and joined by Justices Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, William Brennan, and William Douglas.
Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred in the judgment.
Justice Lewis Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.[4]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for the court, Justice Byron White identified the scope of FOIA exemptions 5 and 7 as the principal objects of the Court's investigation. As the general counsel conceded, exemption 5 could not apply to any documents that constituted a final opinion. White argued that since any rejection of a complaint by the general counsel's office stopped the progress of that complaint, and since those decisions were unreviewable, any decision by the general counsel to reject a complaint constituted a final decision in that case.
| “ | The practical effect of this administrative scheme is that a party believing himself the victim of an unfair labor practice can obtain neither adjudication nor remedy under the labor statute without first persuading the Office of General Counsel that his claim is sufficiently meritorious to warrant Board consideration.[2][3] | ” |
Thus, exemption 5 did not cover any memoranda used by the general counsel in a decision to reject a complaint. Conversely, exemption 5 did cover memoranda that contributed to a decision by the general counsel to approve a complaint.
| “ | Applying these principles to the memoranda sought by Sears, it becomes clear that Exemption 5 does not apply to those Appeals and Advice Memoranda which conclude that no complaint should be filed and which have the effect of finally denying relief to the charging party; but that Exemption 5 does protect from disclosure those Appeals and Advice Memoranda which direct the filing of a complaint and the commencement of litigation before the Board.[2][3] | ” |
With regards to exemption 7, which dealt with "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes," White noted that the general counsel had not raised the issue in the original district court case, but had done so in the court of appeals. Since that appeal, Congress had amended exemption 7 and reduced its scope, while also expressing disapproval in its legislative sessions of the earlier rulings the general counsel had used to make its claim. In light of these developments, the Supreme Court declined to rule on whether the memoranda fell under exemption 7, instead remanding the question to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court also declined to rule on questions related to exemption 2, since they had not been raised in the district court or the court of appeals.
Justice White concluded the majority opinion as follows:
| “ | In summary, with respect to Advice and Appeals Memoranda which conclude that a complaint should not be filed, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals subject to its decision on remand whether the Government is foreclosed from pursuing its Exemption 7 claim. With respect to documents specifically incorporated therein, we remand for a determination whether these documents are protected by Exemption 7, as amended. Insofar as the judgment of the Court of Appeals requires the General Counsel to supply documents not expressly incorporated by reference in these Advice and Appeals Memoranda, or otherwise to explain the circumstances of the case, it is reversed; and with respect to Advice and Appeals Memoranda which conclude that a complaint should be filed, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is likewise reversed.[2][3] | ” |
Concurring opinions
Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred in the judgment.
Dissenting opinions
There were no dissenting opinions.
Impact
The decision in this case contributed to the body of jurisprudence related to government privacy and transparency. Disclosure of government documents and the privilege to withhold documents from publication had become an important topic in the years during and after the Nixon administration. The release of the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, and other such events fueled public interest in increasing government transparency. In the majority opinion, the court identified the spirit of exemption 5 with the concept of executive privilege, which President Nixon had invoked in his defense during the Watergate hearings. The court acknowledged the function of this concept, since government employees afraid of future publication could potentially refrain from speaking their minds, to the detriment of the decision-making process. The court concluded, however, that the potential for that effect in this case was slight, and that the types of documents which they had placed outside exemption 5 in the ruling were ones that the public had a strong interest in viewing.
See also
- Freedom of Information Act
- Separation of powers
- Rulemaking
- Administrative law
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full Text of the Case via Justia
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Department of Justice, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5 U.S.C. § 552, AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW NO. 104-231, 110 STAT. 3048, accessed December 4, 2017
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 FindLaw, NLRB v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., accessed December 4, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Oyez, National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, accessed December 4, 2017
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