Arnett v. Kennedy
 | |
| Arnett v. Kennedy | |
| Reference: 416 US 134 (1974) | |
| Term: 1973-1974 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: November 7, 1973 Decided: April 16, 1974 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reversed | |
| Majority | |
| William H. Rehnquist • Warren E. Burger • Potter Stewart • Lewis Powell • Harry Blackmun | |
| Dissenting | |
| Byron White • William O. Douglas • Thurgood Marshall • William J. Brennan | |
Arnett v. Kennedy is a case that was decided on April 16, 1974, by the United States Supreme Court in which the court held that existing for-cause removal procedures satisfied procedural due process for a terminated federal employee. The decision ran counter to the court's expanding interpretation and application of the due process clause during the 1960s, which had broadened to include conditional property rights, such as federal employment, and statutory entitlements, such as welfare assistance. Instead, the court found that, though federal law prevented the employee from being terminated from his position except for cause, the prevailing statute limited his procedural protections and did not entitle him to a pre-termination hearing.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The United States Supreme Court upheld existing adverse action procedures for civil service employees. The decision functioned as a check on the court's broadening interpretation and application of the due process clause at the time with respect to statutory entitlements. The court held that the prevailing statute in the case did not entitle Kennedy to a pre-termination hearing. Thus, the procedural protection that Kennedy sought (a pre-termination hearing) in order to maintain his federal employment, or property interest, was not permitted under the statute that governed the conditions of his employment.[3][2]
Background
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- See also: Civil service
Wayne Kennedy worked as a nonprobationary employee for the federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The agency dismissed Kennedy from his position for cause following allegations that he had made recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though OEO and Civil Service Commission (CSC) regulations permitted Kennedy to reply to the charges in person and in writing, Kennedy only responded in writing. He then sued OEO for violating his freedom of expression under the First Amendment through vague regulations as well as for violating his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment by not holding a pre-termination hearing.[4][5]
Civil service employees at the time had certain employment protections under the Lloyd-La Follette Act, but the act only called for discretionary, rather than mandatory, termination hearings. The OEO and CSC regulations supplemented the statutory requirements by entitling employees to a post-removal evidentiary trial-type hearing at the appeal stage. If the employee was reinstated on appeal, he or she would receive full backpay.[1][4][5]
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois sided with Kennedy, finding that the failure to provide a trial-type pre-removal hearing violated Kennedy's due process rights and that the civil service regulations were unconstitutionally vague because they failed to stipulate the type of speech that would constitute removal for cause.[1][4][5]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on November 7, 1973. The case was decided on April 16, 1974.[1]
Decision
The United States Supreme Court held 5-4 to reverse the lower court's decision. The majority opinion was written by Justice William H. Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Potter Stewart. Justice Lewis Powell filed an opinion, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the result in part. Justice Byron White filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice William O. Douglas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Thurgood Marshall also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and William J. Brennan.[1]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the court found that the existing for-cause removal procedures satisfied procedural due process. Rehnquist argued that the governing statute had provided a mechanism to remove employees as a means to "promote the efficiency of the service." Thus, Kennedy's property interest with respect to his position and associated due process procedures were subject to the statutory limitation. In sum, the court found that due process in the case did not require a pre-termination hearing. The court also found that the speech regulations were not unconstitutionally vague:[5][6]
| “ | In sum, we hold that the Lloyd-La Follette Act, in at once conferring upon nonprobationary federal employees the right not to be discharged except for 'cause' and prescribing the procedural means by which that right was to be protected, did not create an expectancy of job retention in those employees requiring procedural protection under the Due Process Clause beyond that afforded here by the statute and related agency regulations. We also conclude that the post-termination hearing procedures provided by the Civil Service Commission and the OEO adequately protect those federal employees' liberty interest, recognized in Roth, supra, in not being wrongfully stigmatized by untrue and unsupported administrative charges. Finally, we hold that the standard of employment protection imposed by Congress in the Lloyd-La Follette Act is not impermissibly vague or overbroad in its regulation of the speech of federal employees, and therefore unconstitutional on its face.[1][7] | ” |
Justice Powell authored a concurrence, joined by Justice Blackmun. Powell claimed that Kennedy had a valid property interest in retaining his position and that the lack of a pre-termination hearing violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. However, Powell argued that the provision of a post-removal evidentiary hearing with the potential for reinstatement and backpay satisfied due process.
Dissent
Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. While he agreed with the majority's position that the statutory speech regulations were not overly vague, he disagreed with the majority's due process findings. White argued that "when a person is given employment subject to his meeting certain specific conditions, due process requires, in order to insure against arbitrariness by the State in the administration of its law, that a person be given notice and a hearing before he is finally discharged."[1]
Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Kennedy was unjustly penalized by the federal government for exercising his freedom of speech under the First Amendment:
| “ | The result is a great leveling of employees. They hear the beat of only one drum, and march to it. These days, employers have psychological tests by which they can separate the ingenious, off-beat character who may make trouble from the more subservient type. It is, of course, none of a court's problem what the employment policies may be. But once an employee speaks out on a public issue and is punished for it, we have a justiciable issue. Appellee is, in my view, being penalized by the Federal Government for exercising his right to speak out. The excuse or pretense is an Act of Congress and an agency's regulations promulgated under it in the teeth of the First Amendment: 'Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...' Losing one's job with the Federal Government because of one's discussion of an issue in the public domain is certainly an abridgment of speech.[1][7] | ” |
Justice Marshall also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. Marshall cited Goldberg v. Kelly, Perry v. Sindermann, and Morrissey v. Brewer as precedent arguing that Kennedy's due process rights entitled him to a pre-termination hearing. Marshall argued that the agency must hold a termination hearing at a meaningful time for the employee:
| “ | A discharged federal worker in the competitive service is, in fact, guaranteed a full evidentiary hearing before an impartial decisionmaker whose report is entitled to considerable weight. But the timing of the hearing is discretionary with the employing agency, and, in many agencies, such as the OEO, the hearing comes long after the employee has been removed from the Government service and payroll. In a sense, then, the real issue is not whether appellee must be accorded an evidentiary hearing, but only whether that hearing should have been afforded before his discharge became effective. Although the nature of the hearing required by due process is determined by a balancing process, that hearing must be held at a meaningful time. Accordingly, the Court has embraced a general presumption that one who is constitutionally entitled to a hearing should be heard before the deprivation of his liberty or property takes place.[1][7] | ” |
See also
- Due process
- Nondelegation doctrine
- Executive agency
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Ballotpedia's administrative state coverage
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 Justia, "Arnett v. Kennedy," accessed November 3, 2018
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Legal Information Institute, "The Procedure That Is Due Process," accessed November 3, 2018
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Justia, "Procedural Due Process Civil," accessed December 18, 2018
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Quimbee, "Arnett v. Kennedy," accessed November 3, 2018
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Oyez, "Arnett v. Kennedy," accessed November 3, 2018
- ↑ Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, "Arnett v. Kennedy," accessed November 3, 2018
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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