Vermont Yankee II

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Vermont Yankee II is a metaphor used by scholars and commentators of the administrative state to describe potential rulings from the United States Supreme Court that would stop undue lower court interference in the administrative process. The name comes from the Vermont Yankee case where the Court held that lower courts could not impose procedural requirements on administrative agencies beyond those specified in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Later observers of the administrative state have speculated about the Court issuing a "Vermont Yankee II" to rein in lower courts more and provide further guidance about how to conduct judicial review of agency actions.[1]

Background: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council

Vermont Yankee v. NRDC was a 1978 case involving the ability of courts to impose additional procedural requirements on government agencies beyond what the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) required. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the court had exceeded its authority under the APA.[2][3]

The U.S. Supreme Court set a clear and definitive precedent that courts could not impose additional procedural requirements on agencies, they could only evaluate existing procedures. Furthermore, judicial review could only concern itself with the agency's success or failure to conform to the established procedures, it could not invalidate an action simply because the court was "unhappy with the result reached."[3]

Usage of term Vermont Yankee II

First use

Scholar Paul Verkuil first discussed the possibility of a "Vermont Yankee II" in a 1981 Tulane Law Review article. He argued that the first Vermont Yankee was influential, but too vague to settle fundamental questions about judicial review of agency actions. He argued against courts imposing hard look review because that level of review would have similar adverse effects to those remedied in the original Vermont Yankee case.[4][5]

No matter how many times one reads the case, the Court's discussion of the appropriate standards for judicial review of rulemaking remains inadequate. The conclusion is inescapable that Vermont Yankee can live up to its reputation as a watershed decision only if it is followed by a second decision that resolves the complicated issue of the appropriate scope of review of informal rulemaking.[4][6]

Even if the Court decided how strict reviewing courts may be toward informal rulemaking, Verkuil claimed that a "Vermont Yankee III" might then be necessary to determine the scope of review for nuclear power regulation. He pointed to the political context of the decision and the Court's reluctance to allow lower courts to interfere:[4]

Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it may not. But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy, establishing a reasonable review process in which courts are to play only a limited role. The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action. Time may prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the States within their appropriate agencies which must eventually make that judgment.[7][6]

Richard J. Pierce calls for Vermont Yankee II

Two decades after Verkuil made his original case, law professor Richard J. Pierce argued for his own "Vermont Yankee II." He argued that the Supreme Court should overrule the First Circuit Court of Appeals' presumption that hearings require formal process, including cross-examination. Using Vermont Yankee as a model, Pierce contends:[8]

[The] First Circuit's presumption in favor of formal adjudication and its application of that presumption to the NRC's procedures for licensing power plants has severe adverse effects and is legally indefensible. All that remains is to suggest the outline of a Supreme Court opinion that would hold the presumption unlawful and to suggest a means of getting the issue.[8][6]

Disagreement with prior calls for Vermont Yankee II

Jack M. Beermann and Gary Lawson, professors at the Boston University School of Law, opposed the way Verkuil and Pierce advocated a Vermont Yankee II ruling.[9]

These prior calls for a Vermont Yankee II were not actually attempts to extend the reasoning and holding of Vermont Yankee. Rather, Professors Verkuil and Pierce were using Vermont Yankee as a broad symbol-a metaphor of sorts for Supreme Court intervention to rein in undue lower-court interference with agency discretion and autonomy. The reasoning and holding of Vermont Yankee, as interpreted according to conventional norms of case analysis, do not go nearly that far. Hard-look review and a presumption of adjudicatory formality may or may not be bad ideas, but they are not strictly inconsistent with Vermont Yankee.[9][6]

Beermann and Lawson go on to say that Verkuil and Pierce's arguments might not flow from the logic of Vermont Yankee, but other potential Supreme Court rulings might:[9]

[We] identify a range of administrative law doctrines that seem to us to be either in tension or flatly inconsistent with the natural understanding of Vermont Yankee. Some of those doctrines, such as the prohibition on ex parte contacts or agency prejudgment in informal rulemakings, could be discarded at little or no cost. Rejecting others, such as the modern requirements concerning notices of proposed rulemaking and statements of basis and purpose, would send shock waves throughout the administrative law system.[9][6]

Verkuil stops waiting for Vermont Yankee II

After decades, Verkuil made the case that the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council constituted a stealth version of his anticipated Vermont Yankee II. Much of what he wanted the Court to clarify was addressed in Chevron and subsequent cases.[10]

So the wait for Vermont Yankee II should have ended with Chevron. My article written in 1981 could not have considered this possibility. But the deference message of Chevron, transferring to the executive branch the power to interpret statutes, suggests that agency actions are meant to be given careful, but ultimately deferential, review-something less than the hard look State Farm endorsed.[10][6]

See also

Supreme Court Cases

External links

Footnotes

  1. Administrative Law Review, "Waiting for Vermont Yankee II," 2005
  2. Oyez, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., accessed August 9, 2018
  3. 3.0 3.1 FindLaw, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. v. NRDC, accessed November 12, 2017
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 Tulane Law Review, "Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II," 1981
  5. George Washington Law Review, "Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V - A Response to Beermann and Lawson," 2007
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
  7. Oyez, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., accessed August 16, 2018
  8. 8.0 8.1 Administrative Law Review, "Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, accessed August 16, 2018
  9. 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 George Washington Law Review, "Reprocessing Vermont Yankee," 2007
  10. 10.0 10.1 George Washington Law Review, "The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II," 2007