Pulsifer v. United States

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Supreme Court of the United States
Pulsifer v. United States
Term: 2023
Important Dates
Argued: October 2, 2023
Decided: March 15, 2024
Outcome
Affirmed
Vote
6-3
Majority
Elena Kagan • Chief Justice John RobertsClarence ThomasSamuel AlitoBrett KavanaughAmy Coney Barrett
Dissenting
Neil GorsuchSonia SotomayorKetanji Brown Jackson

Pulsifer v. United States is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 15, 2024, during the court's October 2023-2024 term. The case was argued on October 2, 2023.

In a 6-3 ruling issued on March 15, 2024, the Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit ruling, holding, "A defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U. S. C. §3553(f)(1) only if he satisfies each of the provision’s three conditions—or said more specifically, only if he does not have more than four criminal-history points, does not have a prior three-point offense, and does not have a prior two-point violent offense."[1] Justice Elena Kagan penned the majority opinion. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) and the First Step Act of 2018. Specifically, the Court is asked to interpret the meaning of the word and in the provision.
  • The questions presented: "Whether a defendant satisfies the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) as amended by the First Step Act of 2018 in order to qualify for the federal drug-sentencing “safety valve” provision so long as he does not have (a) more than four criminal history points, (b) a three-point offense, and (c) a two-point offense, or whether the defendant satisfies the criteria so long as he does not have (a), (b), or (c)."[2]
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit ruling.

  • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    Pulsifer v. United States is a case involving the First Step Act of 2018 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). The justices were asked to interpret the federal sentencing laws that allow some nonviolent offenders convicted of drug crimes to avoid mandatory minimum sentences. The provision of the sentencing law requires that a convicted defendant “does not have — (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”[3][4] In order to calculate a defendant's criminal history points, the United States Sentencing Commission adds points using the following guidelines:[5]

    • 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month
    • 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a)
    • 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 points for this subsection
    • 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status
    • 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above because such sentence was treated as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 points for this subsection

    Pulsifer has asked whether a defendant is ineligible for relief under the sentencing guidelines if the defendant’s criminal history includes any of the disqualifying criteria or if they are ineligible only if all criteria are included.[3]

    The provision has been reviewed by the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits found that the and in the provision meant or, so any disqualifying criteria in a convicted defendant’s criminal record would render them ineligible for relief. The Ninth Circuit found that and meant and, requiring all disqualifying criteria in a convicted defendant’s criminal record to be present to render them ineligible for relief. The Eleventh Circuit Court will also review the provision.[6]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:

    Questions presented:
    Whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point

    offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the “and” means “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense.[2] [7]

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[8]




    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[9]

    Outcome

    In a 6-3 ruling issued on March 15, 2024, the Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit ruling, holding, "A defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U. S. C. §3553(f)(1) only if he satisfies each of the provision’s three conditions—or said more specifically, only if he does not have more than four criminal-history points, does not have a prior three-point offense, and does not have a prior two-point violent offense."[1] Justice Elena Kagan penned the majority opinion. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson.

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Elena Kagan wrote:[1]

    The “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law exempts certain defendants from mandatory minimum penalties, thus enabling courts to give them lighter prison terms. To qualify for safety-valve relief, a defendant must meet various criteria, one of which addresses his criminal history. That criterion, in stylized form, requires that a defendant “does not have A, B, and C”—where A, B, and C refer to three ways in which past criminality may suggest future dangerousness and therefore warrant a more severe sentence. In brief (with details below), A, B, and C are“more than 4 criminal history points,” a “3-point offense,”and a “2-point violent offense.”


    The question presented is how to understand the criminal-history requirement. The Government contends that the phrase “does not have A, B, and C” creates a checklist with three distinct conditions. On that view, a defendant meets the requirement (and so is eligible for safety-valve relief ) if he does not have A, does not have B, and does not have C.Or stated conversely, a person fails to meet the requirement(and so cannot get relief ) if he has any one of the three. The petitioner here instead contends that the phrase “does not have A, B, and C” sets out a single, amalgamated condition for relief. On his reading, a defendant meets the requirement (and is eligible for relief ) so long as he does not have the combination of A, B, and C. Or put conversely, he fails to meet the requirement (and cannot get relief ) only when he has all three. Today, we agree with the Government’s view of the criminal-history provision.

    ... In sum, Paragraph (f)(1)’s criminal-history requirement sets out an eligibility checklist. A defendant is eligible for safety-valve relief only if he satisfies each of the paragraph’s three conditions. He cannot have more than four criminal-history points. He cannot have a prior three-point offense. And he cannot have a prior two-point violent offense. Because Pulsifer has two prior three-point offenses totaling six points, he is not eligible. It makes no difference that he does not also have a prior two-point violent offense. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[7]

    —Justice Elena Kagan


    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson.

    In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch wrote:[1]

    The First Step Act of 2018 may be “ ‘the most significant criminal justice reform bill in a generation.’” Brief for Sen. Richard J. Durbin et al. as Amici Curiae in Terry v. United States, O. T. 2020, No. 20–5904, p. 9. Through the 1980s and 1990s, Congress adopted an ever-increasing number of ever-longer mandatory minimum prison sentences. In part due to these policies, the federal prison population grew by more than 100% in less than a decade. In the First Step Act, Congress sought to recalibrate its approach. It did so by promising more individuals the chance to avoid one-size-fits-all mandatory minimums and receive instead sentences that account for their particular circumstances and crimes.


    This dispute concerns who is eligible for individualized sentencing and who remains subject to mandatory minimums after the First Step Act. Before the Act, a defendant seeking to avoid a mandatory minimum had to satisfy five stringent statutory tests. After the Act, all those tests remain, only the first is now less demanding. As revised, it provides that a defendant may be eligible for individualized sentencing if he “does not have” three traits: (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point violent offense. In lower court proceedings, the government admitted that this new test is “most natural[ly]”read to mean what it says: A defendant may be eligible for individualized sentencing unless he possesses all three listed traits—A, B, and C. Brief for United States in No. 19–50305 (CA9), p. 7 (Government CA9 Brief ); id., at10–11; accord, Brief for United States in No. 21–1609(CA8), p. 11 (Government CA8 Brief ). Despite its admission, however, the government urges us to adopt a different construction. It asks us to read the First Step Act as promising a defendant a chance at individualized sentencing only when he does not have any of the three listed traits—A, B, or C.

    If this difference seems a small one, it is anything but.Adopting the government’s preferred interpretation guarantees that thousands more people in the federal criminal justice system will be denied a chance—just a chance—at an individualized sentence. For them, the First Step Act offers no hope. Nor, it seems, is there any rule of statutory interpretation the government won’t set aside to reach that result. Ordinary meaning is its first victim. Contextual clues follow. Our traditional practice of construing penal laws strictly falls by the wayside too. Replacing all that are policy concerns we have no business considering. Respectfully, I would not indulge any of these moves.
    ... Today, the Court indulges each of these moves. All to what end? To deny some individuals a chance—just a chance—at relief from mandatory minimums and a sentence that fits them and their circumstances. It is a chance Congress promised in the First Step Act, and it is a promise this Court should have honored. Respectfully, I dissent.[7]

    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.


    October term 2023-2024

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2023-2024

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 3, 2023. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[10]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes