|
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74
REPORT
ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
...continued
E.
THE COUP D'ETAT OF JUNE 20, 1988 a.
The Attempt by President Manigat to Consolidate
195.
Mr. Leslie Manigat, after he wad deposed by the military as President of
Haiti, stated that the main reason for his ouster was the resistance of the army
and police to his efforts to curb corruption and drug trafficking to the United
States.
196.
Mr. Manigat revealed that several weeks before the coup he had started an
investigation into the role of army officers and the police in drug smuggling
and other criminal activities. "My
effort was resisted", Mr. Manigat was quoted as saying, "I knew I took
a risk to confront people who were engaged in corrupt activities, contraband and
drugs".63 He
said that when he tried to remove them from power they ousted him.
197.
Col. Jean-Claude Paul, commander of the Dessalines Military barracks, was
indicted on federal drug charges by a Miami grand jury on March 10, 1988.
He was charged with conspiring in 1986, with his brother and ex-wife to
introduce a shipment of more than 900 pounds of cocaine into the U.S. from a
secret airstrip on his Haitian ranch. If
tried and found guilty in a United States Court he could receive a maximum
sentence of 45 years in prison and a fine of up to US$375,000.
198.
On April 5, 1988, Mr. Osvaldo Quintana, a Miami businessman and drug
informer, testified before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics
and International Communications, and stated that Col. Jean-Claude Paul had
asked him to help smuggle the 900 pounds of cocaine into de U.S.64
Mr. Quintana testified that Col. Paul once passed through Haitian
customs inspection with a handbag containing his pistol and cocaine destined for
the U.S. and when the metal detector went off customs officials recognized the
Colonel and everyone saluted him as he went right through.65
199.
According to reports from another Senate subcommittee hearing held on May
21, 1988, the drug connection reaches high into the Haitian government,
including Gen. Williams Regala, who until September 17, 1988 was both the
Minister of Interior and Defense, and his liaison officer to the Drug
Enforcement Administration".66
One witness, Mr. Fritz Pierre Louis, a former lieutenant in the Haitian
army who later defected, stated that "he personally turned over cocaine
confiscated in raids to Col. Paul only to have it disappear".
He estimated that 70% of the Colonel's powerful Dessalines barracks
forces are involved in the trafficking".67
According to the .S.
Drug Enforcement Agency "Haiti sits astride a natural drug-smuggling route
from Colombia, providing planes and boats with a staging area for the last leg
of the run into the Bahamas and Florida".68
200.
Without providing a reason for the action, on June 14, 1988 Lt. Gen.
Namphy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian armed forces, transferred Col.
Paul from his position to Army General Headquarters, naming him Assistant Head
of the General Staff, G-2, replacing Col. Morton Gousse who had been promoted to
Brig. General. Lt. Col. Guy Franois,
second in command of the Dessalines barracks, became the new commander. Lt. Gen. Namphy reportedly summoned Col. Paul and nine other
officers on Tuesday, June 14, 1988, and gave them their new assignments.
Col. Paul then reportedly telephone President Manigat and indicated his
refusal to accept the reassignment.69
He reportedly also had the support of the 700 soldiers of the
Dessalines barracks.70
201.
On Wednesday, June 15, 1988, President Manigat issued a communiqu
stating that the decisions taken in connection with the reshuffle within the
Haitian Army were taken without the prior knowledge of the President of Haiti,
who s constitutionally the head of the Haitian Armed forces even though he does
not command them personally. In the
communiqu the President: ordered
the reestablishment of the status quo ante - i.e., orders
this decision withdrawn - as the measure of conservation most in keeping with
the national interest, while awaiting a definitive solution which, in keeping
with the policy of change of the constitutional government of Haiti, has as its
objective the democratization and modernization of the Haitian Armed Forces, to
place them at the service of the nation's development.71 202. In the opinion
of President Manigat, what was at issue was not the fate of Col. Paul, but the
principle of the supremacy of civilian power over military power.
In testimony presented to the Commission the deposed President explained
the situation in the following terms: I was the constitutional
head of the army. () and we were
determined to defend the basic principle of the supremacy of the civilian power
over the military. ()
We presented and promoted the principle of the supremacy of the civilian
power over the military institution. This
is the heart of the problem. 203. Following the
comuniqu72 on June 15,
1988, the armed forces issued a press release withdrawing the reassignment order
"temporarily" and reaffirming the military's loyalty to the
government, without mentioning President Manigat.
The press release stated in relevant part that: it
was decided, following a meeting between the President of the Republic and the
Ministers of national Defense, Armed Forces, Military Service, and Civil
Service, to temporarily rescind the said measures.
The Haitian Armed Forces High Command wishes to reaffirm the
institution's unreserved loyalty to the nation's government within the framework
of the dispositions of the Constitution and the law, as well as its
determination to participate in the overall development program of the
government of the Republic.73
204.
On Thursday, June 16, 1988, President Manigat held a press conference
with foreign and domestic reporters at the National Palace concerning recent
events. He announced publicly the
latest success of the forces of order against "certain persons"
committing acts of violence and creating the state of insecurity which
prevailed.74 He
stated that eleven persons had been captured, only one of whom was a civilian,
and that the capture was carried out by the Dessalines Barracks forces.
205.
In deposed President Manigat's testimony presented to the Commission he
stated that Lt. Gen. Namphy had organized the insecurity prevailing in the
country and that Lt. Gen. Namphy had transferred Col. Paul in order to have
these eleven persons set free.
206.
President Manigat, at this June 16, 1988 press conference, considered the
crisis to have been superseded thanks to a four-hour dialogue he held with the
Army command and the resultant press release which annulled the transfer.
207.
On Friday, June 17, 1988, President Manigat "retired" Lt.
General Henri Namphy for having ordered the transfer of certain officers on June
14 in violation of "constitutional norms," and placed him under house
arrest. President Manigat name Col. Morton Gousse the acting
Commander-in-chief and promoted him to brigadier general.
General Carl Michel Nicolas, Army Chief of Staff, and General Wilthan
Lherisson of the General Staff, were retired for "insubordination"
because they had begun to implement certain measures that had been annulled by
President Manigat, such as the transfer to Army Headquarters of Col. Jean-Claude
Paul.75
208.
In testimony presented to the Commission, President Manigat stated that
Lt. General Namphy had been preparing a coup against his government, which had
been planned to take place at a later date, and that it was not sufficient for
him to place Namphy under house arrest, - he had to move against the other
plotters as well.76 Consequently,
on Sunday, June 19 198 General Morton Gousse, with the approval of President
Manigat, reassigned more than 30 officers in the Haitian police and armed
forces. Col. Grgoire Figaro, the
Chief of Police was ordered into retirement and replaced by a moderate within
the army who was formerly in charge of the traffic department.
Capt. Ernest Ravix, port director of St. Marc, was reassigned to a post
in the remote Southern end of Haiti. Col.
Prosper Avril, who was inspector of the Presidential Guard and former member of
the provisional government that replaced jean-Claude Duvalier, was appointed
Chief of the Haitian Army General Headquarters Office of Military Attaches.77
The reshuffling of certain powerful officers set the stage for the
coup. b.
The Coup of June 20, 1988
209.
More than one observer predicted that the outcome of this divide and
conquer policy towards the military might result in the ouster of President
Manigat.78 Lt.
Gen. Namphy was freed at approximately 4 p.m. on Sunday by an officer and other
supporters, who then proceeded to seize the National Palace.
At 1:20 a.m. Monday, June 20, 1988, Lt. General Namphy appeared on
Haitian television wearing a steel helmet and carrying a machinegun and
announced that the army had taken power.
210.
The deposed President, Leslie Manigat, described his ouster to the
Commission and stated that the State Residence where he lived was attacked with
tanks and shot at it at 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, after Lt. Gen. Namphy's declaration
on television, causing the destruction of the upper part of the State Residence.
President Manigat surrendered in the presence of 20 people, among them
his wife and parents and subsequently, was taken to an aviation camp where he
was kept in custody until a military plane flew him to the Dominican Republic.
Mr. Manigat testified to the Commission that: ()
my house was attacked by guns and tanks. At
2:00 a.m. they shot at my house. Three
officers - Col. Prosper Avril, Maj. Henri-Robert Augustin and Maj. Marc Charles
- organized the take over as the presidential guard took Haiti's only armored
tanks and freed Lt. Gen. Namphy from his house arrest and brought him to the
National Palace.79 Mr.
Manigat, stated that the crucial element in the success of the coup was
possession of the armored tanks. c.
The Installation of a Military Government
211.
Lt. Gen. Namphy seized power in a bloodless group and declared himself
President, with Col. Jean-Claude Paul at his side, and announced that "it
is not just the Army. Everybody is
now in the Army because it is this Army that is going to lead this country as it
has to be led."80
212. On June 20th,
1988 Lt. Gen. Namphy announced the formation of a new government consisting of
eleven ministers - all of whom are military officers.
He also reshuffled the military to annul the measures taken by Manigat. Gen. Carl Michel Nicolas and Gen. Lherisson, who had both
been retired by Manigat, were reinstated and appointed Commander and Assistant
Commander-in-Chief of the army; Col. Figaro was promoted to Brigadier General
and reinstated as Chief of Police and Col. Prosper Avril was promoted and
appointed Armed forces Adjutant General. Mr.
Manigat's supporter, Brig. Gen. Charles Louis, chief of the Presidential Guard
was retired, but neither Gen. Regala nor Col. Jean-Claude Paul were removed;
Gen. Regala was re-appointed to the post that he held during the period of the
National Governing Council as the Minister of Interior and National Defense.
213.
Lt. Gen. Namphy explained that it was the Armed Forces' "duty to
once again seize the reins of power" because Mr. Manigat had been "set
upon a path that was leading him irrevocably to the most brutal form of
dictatorship".81 Manigat's great flaw had been to attempt to
divide the military and to subordinate it to civilian control. In an interview given to the French newspaper Liberation,
Lt. Gen. Namphy stated that President Manigat failed to abide by the
Constitution and military regulation by refusing to approve the administrative
transfer of col. Paul - a decision made by the commander-in-chief.
Lt. Gen. Namphy stated that: We
could not allow him to destabilize the Army. The
Col. Paul affair and the decision to retire me were aimed at doing that.
We took action to ensure that the Army was not divided, and I think that
the coup was the best solution for the Army which emerged from it with a better
image and more unity.82 d.
The Political Agenda of lt. General Namphy
214.
In Lt. Gen. Namphy's interview (supra) with Liberation, he
stated that "the time is not right for elections in Haiti".83
According to the General "it has now been proved that there
cannot be elections or an elected president in present conditions.84
215.
Although the military take-over was justified in the name of democracy85
and Manigat's alleged violations of the Constitution, Lt. Gen.
Namphy announced that no elections would be held and that the 1987 Constitution
was abolished.
216.
Mr. Hubert de Ronceray, president of the Mobilization for National
Development (MDN) party was the first political figure to comment on the coup.
Mr. De Ronceray in his interview with the Commission stated that on
February 11, 1988 his party decided not to recognize the Manigat-Celestin
government, which it considered illegitimate and that the MDN, on June 13, 1988
invited the Army to intervene. In
Mr. De Ronceray's opinion, a few military men put Manigat into power and then
removed him. He expressed the hope
that the military government would restore the democratic process.
217.
Rev. Sylvio Claude, head of the Haitian Christian Democratic Party (PDCH)
also called upon the military to remove Manigat from power.
In the light of Lt. Gen. Namphy's declarations that the military intended
to remain in power indefinitely, he appealed to the Commission to call upon the
international community to isolate Haiti and to cut off all aid, including
humanitarian aid, until the military government falls.
218.
In his first major address on the nation's future, on July 8, 1988 Lt.
General Namphy announced that the military government was committed to the
"democratic process," which would be advanced by setting in place
credible political institutions that all sectors of society will join in
establishing.86 In
order to organize the government, the 1987 Constitution, which "strayed too
far from our moves," would be replaced by "a new, equally democratic
charter" which will be submitted to the people for approval.87
The "struggle against corruption" is to continue and
"no effort will be spared to create the environment for private initiative
to blossom".88 Lt.
Gen. Namphy called upon all sectors of society to participate at our side, in
the efforts to bring the nation to a normal life that is indispensable for a
felicitous outcome to the process of democratization.
Political solutions will take shape along the way, as this normalization
occurs".89
219.
Political figures, such as Mr. Marc Bazin, leader of the Movement for the
Establishment of Democracy in Haiti (MIDH), in a public address on July 28,
1988, urged that Lt. Gen. Namphy be taken at his word and that the different
sectors of society participate in a dialogue, since the hard fact is that it is
the Arm which is holding the reins of power.90
Other political figures, such as Rev. Sylvio Claude reject the idea
of dialogue with Lt. Gen. Namphy, stating that a dialogue is not possible
without the Constitution of 1987 and that the result of dialogue with the CNG
which Lt. Gen. Namphy headed, were the events of November 19, 1987 and January
17, 1988. On August 5, 1988, Lt.
General Namphy stated that he was ready to dialogue with the opposition as long
as it did not question his authority. "The
train has room for everyone," he said "but everyone who decides to get
aboard must be ready to accept the conditions of the conductor".91 F.
THE COUP WITHIN THE COUP OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1988 a.
The Attack on the St. jean Bosco Church
220.
On Sunday, September 11, 1988, a large group of assailants attacked the
approximately 1,000 parishioners in St. Jean Bosco church while Father
jean-Bertrand Aristide was officiating at the morning mass.
The brutality of the attack, led by men armed with guns and machetes,
resulted in the killing of at least a dozen persons and approximately 77 were
injured badly enough to be hospitalized. The
assailants, dressed in plainclothes but with red armbands, entered the church
screaming "Communists, communists" and targeted Father Aristide (an
outspoken opponent of the military government) and parishioners dressed in
white. The assailants sought out
persons wearing white clothing because the opposition groups had called for
Haitians to wear white or display white flags on Sunday to protest the plans of
the Namphy government to rewrite the 1987 Constitution.
In spite of the fact that there was a military compound across the street
from the church and three others nearby, the police and soldiers according to
eyewitnesses merely looked on rather than coming to the aid of the victims.
At the conclusion of the three-hour rampage the church was burned down
thereby making it impossible to verify the total number of deaths since some
remains are believed to have been consumed by the flames.
The attack was the third attack in a week involving Father Aristide and
St. Jean Bosco Church. The priest's
bodyguards disarmed a gunman September 4 as he tried to enter the church during
mass and attackers surrounded and stoned the church on Tuesday, September 13,
1988.
221.
Mr. Franck Romain, the mayor of Port-au-Prince and the former chief of
police during the Duvalier regime, stated publicly that Father Jean-Bertrand
Aristide had been "justly punished".
According to an interview given to Radio Metropole, Mr. Romain stated
that "Father Aristide has always preached violence and that he who sows
the wind, reaps the whirlwind". Eyewitnesses
to the event identified city hall employees among the assailants.
Mr. Romain responded to questions by saying "If (city hall)
employees were involved I don't see how I am concerned".
On Monday, September 12, 1988 five men and one woman appeared on the
government controlled television station (Tl Nationale) and admitted their
participation in the attack on the church.
They threatened a "heap of corpses" at any future mass
celebrated by Aristide Many people
were outraged that these individuals could appear on television, without any
disguise, confess their participation in these events and threaten future
criminal acts with no fear of being arrested by the authorities.
On Wednesday, September 7, 1988, the same assailants reportedly raided
the maternity ward of the Port-au-Prince General Hospital, ripping sheets off
the patients, looking for a pregnant woman who had been stabbed in the church
attack. They said that they wanted
to kill her but were not able to find her.
b.
The ouster of Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy
222.
Reportedly a group of non-commissioned officers of Haiti's 1,000 man
Presidential Guard were outraged at the attack against the parishioners of the
St. Jean Bosco Church and the failure of Gen. Namphy to condemn the attack
attributed to the Tontons Macoutes, and feared that if left unchecked, the
Macoutes would eclipse the Army as the premier force in the country.
Consequently, these officers seized power from Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy
after ten hours of sporadic fighting which began Saturday afternoon, September
17, 1988. In a brief prepared
statement read in the name of the Presidential Guard at 2 a.m. Sunday morning,
Sgt. Joseph Heubreux explained the coup as an attempt by non-commissioned
officers to restore honor to Haiti's Armed Forces and to end a period of random
violence and confusion in the army chain of command under General Namphy. Sgt. Heubreux introduced the new head of state, Prosper Avril,
as "the most honest officer" in the Haitian Armed forces.
Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril stated that he accepted the nomination as
President to "save the country from anarchy and chaos".
Lat. Gen. Namphy was escorted to the international airport and deported
to the Dominican Republic in the same manner that he had deported deposed
President Leslie Manigat almost two months earlier.
223.
The departure of Lt. Gen. Namphy has led to a renewal of the dechoukaj,
as several Macoutes who were involved in the attacks on the Church were seized
and burned to death on the streets. Other
well known Macoutes are being pursued and their homes looted.
Prominent Macoutes such as Franck Romain and Claude Raymond are
reportedly in hiding. The absence
of institutional justice has resulted in the people, once again, applying a
justice of their own.
224.
The younger officers, - and this is reportedly a "grassroots
coup", - intend to retire officers who have completed 30 years of service.
They have stated that they do not need so many generals for such a small
army. They have called for a
clearer division between the police and the Army and for the restoration of the
1987 Constitution which needs to be amended, but they insist that Article 291
(the anti-Duvalierist provision) be maintained.
225.
It is too early (September 20, 1988) and Haitian politics are too
unpredictable to be able to predict how the political situation will evolve.
It may not evolve and a counter-coup might occur tomorrow. But this "revolution", from the base line,
apparently from the lower ranks of the Army offers, at least, the hope for
optimism as regards the restoration of the 1987 Constitution, control over the
Macoutes and a return to the democratization process.
The Commission has come to the conclusion that the military government in
Haiti has perpetuated itself in power as a result of violence instigated by
elements of the Haitian Armed Forces resulting in the massacre of Haitian voters
on November 29, 1987, the manipulation of the elections held on January 17,
1988, and the ouster of President Manigat on June 20 1988, when President
Manigat attempted to subordinate the military to civilian control, and the
substitution of Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril for Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy by a coup
within the coup on September 17, 1988.
Whether the military "seized" power on February 7, 1986, as it
claimed, or was placed in power by other forces, the National Governing Council
(CNG) during its period in power demonstrated no vocation for democracy.
The CNG was reorganized on March 21, 1986 following the resignation of
Mr. Grard Gourgue, and three of its members were removed as a result of the
continuing demonstrations calling for their dismissal.
One of the members who was removed due to his having been considered a
strong supporter of the Duvalier regime was then Colonel Prosper Avril.
The result of the almost three-year old democratization process led by
the military in Haiti has been the entrenchment of the military in power.
Lt. Gen. Namphy, who proclaimed himself Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces in 1987, in open defiance of the dictates of the Constitution, and in
prejudice to the yet-to-be-elected President, has now proclaimed himself
President sine die, expelled the civilian President, suppressed
the Legislature, abrogated the 1987 Constitution, and in effect, established a
military dictatorship. Lt. Gen.
Prosper Avril, who has been placed in power by a group of non-commissioned
officers is considered by them to be "the most honest officer in the
Haitian Armed Forces". His
vocation for democracy is yet to be tested.
The key element in this analysis is that the Haitian people, by means of
the 1987 Constitution, sought to put Duvalier and Duvalierism behind them.
The departure of president-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier did not signify
the end of the Duvalier era. The
slogans of the opposition - dechoukaj in 1986 and again in 1988, and rache
manyok in 1987 - called for the extirpation of Duvalierism and the Army from
the national political scene. The
structure of the Duvalierist state, however, by means of the use of brute force,
has remained intact. It is premature to be able to predict how the current political situation will evolve. The situation, at best, reflects anew the starting point of February 7, 1986 when the Haitian people looked to the Armed forces to assist them in the democratization process. This group of young officers, unlike the military brass which as "ruled" Haiti since Duvalier's departure, appears to be a microcosm of Haitian society, which, like the Haitian people, "aspires to restore honor to Haiti's Armed Forces".
[ Table of Contents | Previous |
Next ]
63.
"Haitian Says Drive on Drugs Led to His Ouster as Leader",
George Volsky, New York Times, June 26, 1988.
64.
"Haitian Military Official Implicated in '86 Drug Plot". Joe
Pichirallo, The Washington Post, April 6, 1988.
65.
Id.
66.
"Haiti is Becoming a Growing Hub of the Narcotics-smuggling
Trade," New York Times, May 23, 1988.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
"Haiti's President Rejects Military Order", Joseph Treaster,
New York Times, June 16, 1988.
70.
See, "Dessalines Soldiers Interviewed" DBIS, June 15, 1988.
71.
President Manigat's Communiqu of June 15, 1988.
FBIS 16 June 1978. Also, Le
Nouvelliste, June 15, 1988.
72.
The complete testimony is in the files of the Commission.
73.
"Armed Forces 'Temporarily Rescind' Measures" test of press
release issued by the Armed Forces General Headquarters on June 15, 1988, FBIS
17 June 1988. See also, Le
Nouvelliste, June 16, 1988.
74.
See, Chapter III regarding the campaign of violence and insecurity which
characterized the latter months of the Manigat government.
75.
"Namphy, Others forcibly Retired," President Manigat's
communiqu of June 17, 1988. FBIS
20 June 1988. Reportedly Lt. Gen. Namphy was "rebuffed" when he
asked col. Abelard of the Leopards to use force in implementing his order.
See, "Haiti's President Rejects Military Order", Joseph
Treaster, New York times, June 16, 1988 and "Haiti's President Shuffles
Military on a Broad Scale," Joseph Treaster New York Times, June 20, 1988.
76.
See, Note 72.
77.
"More on Army Reshuffling" FBIS 20 June 1988.
78.
See, for example, "Military Split Could Shake Haiti," E.A.
Wayne, The Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 1988.
79.
See, Note 72.
80.
"Top Commander Declares Himself President of Haiti" Joseph
Treaster, New York Times, June 21, 1988.
81.
"Explains Power Seizure", Message to the Nation by Lt. Gen.
Henri Namphy from the National Palace on June 20, 1988.
FBIS 21 June 1988. Also, Le
Nouvelliste, June 21, 1988. See
also, "Haiti Army Officer" No
Apologies for Brutal Military Rule", Clara Germani, The Christian Science
Monitor, July 11, 1988.
82.
"Namphy on Coup Reasons, Elections, Army Role", Interview with
President Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy by Christian Lionet on June 24, 1988; FBIS 30
June 1988. Also reprinted in Le Nouvelliste 28 June 1988.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. In this interview Lt.
General Namphy states that "Only the Haitian Army can bring democracy to
this country. I state that
categorically. The Haitian Army is
the only institution which can bring human rights to this country.
I am not afraid to say it. Lt.
Gen. Namphy is the champion of human rights in this country because he does not
send people out into the streets to be killed.
Instead, I protect them. Only
the Haitian Army can support development, which is the only way to establishing
democracy in Haiti".
86.
"Namphy address on New 'Democratic Charter'", Message to the
Nation by Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy, President of the Military Government from the
National Palace, July 8, 1988. FBIS
11 July
1988. Also in Le Nouvelliste,
July 11, 1988.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
"MIDH'S Bazin:
Dialogue 'Absolute Necessity'", Message of Marc Bazin over Tele
Haiti's Channel 2 on July 28, 1988. FBIS
2 August 1988. "Further on
Dialogue Call". FBIS 2 August
1988.
91.
AP Press release, August 5, 1988.
|