South Africa-Russia Ties: A U.S. Response?
INSIGHTi
South Africa-Russia Ties: A U.S. Response?
June 27, 2023
Since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine in 2022, indications of South Africa’s support for Russia and,
by implication, Russia’s war aims, have increasingly roiled U.S.-South African relations. Prior to the
war’s outbreak, South Africa-Russia ties had garnered fairly limited U.S. attention and concern. South
Africa’s stance as of mid-2023—notwithstanding its stated policy of non-alignment with global powers—
could jeopardize U.S.-South African relations on trade and other matters; intensify local economic
headwinds; and tarnish South Africa’s democratic, pro-human rights reputation.
South African ties with Russia, which include a bilateral “strategic partnership,” focus on trade, politics,
defense, and other matters. These ties, which are delineated in bilateral agreements, are rooted in Soviet-
era military, training, and other assistance for the anti-apartheid struggle led by the African National
Congress (ANC), South Africa’s current governing party. Both countries also belong to the multi-focal
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), an alternative to similar Western-dominated
country groupings.
The United States and South Africa—a significant African regional player—also maintain a multifaceted
strategic partnership and a bilateral defense committee, which last met June 7-8, 2023. The United States
has provided over $8 billion in bilateral assistance to South Africa since 2003 to counter HIV/AIDS,
alongside other development aid. High-level contact occurs regularly, and the Biden Administration
launched its 2022 Africa Strategy in South Africa. Bilateral trade and investment ties, which U.S.
programs seek to expand, are substantial. The United States is South Africa’s largest source of foreign
investment, and for a decade has been its third-largest trade partner, with trade value 16 times larger than
that between South Africa and Russia.
Notwithstanding these ties and reportedly positive South African public opinion of the Unites States
relative to Russia and China, the ideologically leftist ANC has long displayed a skeptical disposition
toward the United States and U.S. foreign policy. Contributing factors include the Reagan
Administration’s designation of the ANC as a terrorist group and pursuit of “constructive engagement”
with the apartheid regime, prior to Congress’s 1986 enactment, overriding a presidential veto, of
comprehensive anti-apartheid sanctions.
As on multiple other issues, U.S. and South African responses to Russia’s war on Ukraine have diverged,
increasingly straining bilateral ties. In contrast to official U.S. statements characterizing Russia’s invasion
as “unprovoked and unjustified,” President Cyril Ramaphosa, while emphasizing South Africa’s non-
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aligned status, has attributed the war to NATO’s “eastward expansion.” This characterization reflects the
stance of the governing ANC, which has received political financing from a firm linked to U.S.-
sanctioned Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg. U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety has
called the ANC’s position “outrageous [and] patently false.”
South Africa-Russia Ties Amid Russia’s War on Ukraine
South Africa abstained on multiple U.N. General Assembly votes critical of Russia’s 2022-2023 aggression in Ukraine, citing a
greater need for peace diplomacy and mediation. Toward that end—and in a stated effort to ensure African access to
Russian grain and fertilizer exports—in June 2023 Ramaphosa led a delegation of African leaders to Ukraine and Russia to
propose a peace initiative, which Russia and Ukraine’s presidents largely rejected.
While that outcome may reflect the two belligerents’ military concerns and current unwil ingness to negotiate, prior to the
trip, some observers had questioned South Africa’s neutrality on the war, citing indications of its favor for Russia, including
its:
•
Hosting of a joint naval exercise with Russia and China, Operation Mosi II;
•
Hosting of separate military-aided stopovers by U.S.-sanctioned Russian vessels: the Lady R, a ship onto which Brigety
asserted arms for Russia’s military were loaded, and an aircraft reportedly delivering Russian diplomatic mail.
•
Dispatch of high-level delegations to Russia to deepen military, intelligence, and political ties. An ANC-led delegation
discussed a “recalibration of the global order,” echoing arguably anti-Western BRICS objectives, and committed
President Ramaphosa to share with global leaders President Putin’s demands for ending the war.
•
Invitation to President Putin to attend the August 2023 BRICS summit in South Africa in person, notwithstanding an
International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for Putin for war crimes in Ukraine—and despite South Africa’s obligation,
as a party to the ICC’s Rome Statute, to arrest Putin if he enters South Africa. To avoid that outcome, South African
officials announced planned legal changes, since abandoned, to ostensibly enable South Africa to skirt its obligation, and
have since proposed a virtual summit or moving the summit to another country.
•
Hosting of bilateral and BRICS cooperation visits by Russia’s foreign minister and other Russian officials.
U.S.-South African tensions escalated in mid-May 2023, after Brigety’s assertion that South Africa had
loaded weaponry onto the Lady R (see textbox), thus “arming” Russia, which he called “fundamentally
unacceptable.” South Africa officials denied Brigety’s remarks—which were reportedly unvetted and
spurred internal State Department diplomatic concerns—but President Ramaphosa appointed an
independent panel to investigate.
Congressional and Administration concern over South African-Russian ties appears to have grown.
H.Res. 145, introduced in February 2023, critiques deepening South Africa-Russia ties and military
cooperation, and calls on South Africa to “publicly oppose Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked invasion
of Ukraine.” Should South Africa fail to demonstrate that it does not support Russia, some Members have
called for a strong signal of U.S. displeasure. In June 2023, a group of House and Senate committee
leaders asserted in a letter to the Administration that South Africa’s Russia policies may make it ineligible
for duty-free trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)—as Senator Todd
Young asserted during a March 2023 hearing. The signatories also questioned South Africa’s suitability to
host the U.S.-Africa AGOA Forum in November 2023.
Whether Members may act to counter South Africa-Russia cooperation—as by legislatively removing
trade benefits or imposing sanctions, a risk some South African officials have raised—remains to be seen,
but it may be risky for South African officials to assume that such prospects are unlikely. However, while
perceived U.S. retaliation could deter South Africa’s government from further pro-Russia actions, it might
instead alienate the government and spur it toward greater cooperation with Russia or China.
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Author Information
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
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