Imagination

Scientists recognize the necessity of imagination for solving tough problems. But how does the cognitive faculty responsible for daydreaming also help in solving scientific problems? Philosophers claim that imagination is informative only when it is constrained to be maximally realistic. However, using a case study from space science, we show that scientists use imagination intentionally to break reality-oriented constraints. To do this well, they first target low-confidence constraints, and then progressively higher-confidence constraints until a plausible solution is found. This paper (...) exemplifies a new approach to epistemology of imagination that focuses on sets of imaginings (rather than individual imaginings), and responsible (rather than reliable) imaginings. (shrink)

According to sentimental perceptualism, affect grounds evaluative or normative knowledge in a similar way to the way perception grounds much of descriptive knowledge. In this paper, we present a novel challenge to sentimental perceptualism. At the centre of the challenge is the assumption that if affect is to ground knowledge in the same way as perception does, it should have a function to accurately represent evaluative properties, and if it has that function, it should also have it in its future-directed (...) imaginative use. As the data on affective forecasting errors indicates, however, the affect system does not have that function. As a result, it is doubtful if affect can do the kind of knowledge-grounding work that sentimental perceptualism assumes it does. (shrink)

Recent literature on social movements assigns a central role to the imagination. One way for activists to further their aims is through dramatic, confrontational acts of protest. I argue that transcendent imagining is key to understanding what protest does qua act of speech. A common approach to protest sees it as a speech act of condemning some feature of the socio-political world and appealing for change. While this is a helpful general template for what vocal dissent is, it is insufficient (...) to explain what gives protests their political power. Specifically, it overlooks the fact that effective protests usually create a theatrical spectacle of norm breaking. Displays of defiance lift a constraint on how we imagine our socio-political world, and so allow us to begin reshaping it. (shrink)

The special issue deals with the connection between exemplarity and imagination in the context of human action and judgment, which has received little scholarly attention so far. The aim is to shed light on this aspect within practical philosophy and thereby to deepen existing debates. The contributions highlight both the theoretical potential and the challenges involved in dealing with examples – within philosophical reflection as well as in everyday contexts. The practical references range from the importance of personal role models (...) to the role of literature and social media to questions of technological and ecological transformation. Although the contributions take different theoretical and methodological approaches, what they all have in common is an interest in which examples can be considered exemplary against the backdrop of specific social and historical contexts and to what extent our imagination has a limiting or enabling effect in this regard. (shrink)

On the basis of Kant’s reflections on aesthetic judgement, we show why literature can be a special source of knowledge: Literature does not mediate discursively, but exemplarily. Because of its sensible-intellectual character, it encourages taking other standpoints and can initiate action. This not only harbours potential, but also perils. Yet, according to our exegetical thesis, Kant only recognises some of these, especially because he fails to consider the socio-political context of writing and reading. At the same time, Kant’s position on (...) exemplarity offers resources for further systematic thinking. Using these resources, we will argue that narrative literature bears the force to empower its recipients: it makes the invisible visible by disclosing new perspectives on what is and what could be. With regard to the former, it can evoke in its readers a deeper understanding of their own identity, their social location and its limitations, and act as a hermeneutic model. With regard to the latter, literary works are examples of imagination. They can provoke reflection on the possibility of shifting these boundaries towards other concepts of life and society. This is particularly true of works that express experiences, which are marginalised or considered taboo. However, literary works can also normalize existing social conditions by depicting them, as these very conditions define what is considered imaginable and what remains unspoken within the dominant interpretive framework. Literature can thus also contribute to the concealment of existing power relations and block the reader’s sense of what is possible by encouraging him or her to internalise prevailing social norms. Consequently, narrative literature must not only be diverse in order to be empowering, it must also be received in a certain way: not passively consumed and mentally reproduced, but in the mode of critical self-reflection and emulation. (shrink)

This article explores how Jean Kinyongo Jeki contributes to the development of an intrinsic heuristic dimension within African philosophy, viewed through the lens of hermeneutic rationality. Faced with the challenge of articulating a rigorous and methodologically grounded African philosophical discourse, Kinyongo undertakes a hermeneutic detour that ultimately becomes an epistemological necessity. This turn leads him to identify "elements of philosophical discursivity"—core components of the intelligible form of African philosophical discourse—and to assert that their articulation requires a hermeneutic paradigm. Hermeneutic rationality (...) thus emerges as a driving force for the authentic realization of African philosophy, anchored in a "philosophy of philosophical elements" pursued through a "discursive pathway." Through his effort to philosophically translate the concept of discursivity, framed within a hermeneutic epistemology, Kinyongo succeeds in rendering African philosophical thought heuristic—expressive of its internal dynamics of meaning. (shrink)

Imaginatively adopted attitudes and ways of thinking sometimes persist, bleeding into day-to-day thoughts and interactions. Such imaginative contagion is often reported in the context of theatrical acting, and is also observed among videogame players and virtual reality users. A first question is how imaginative contagion occurs. This paper distinguishes immediate and delayed contagion, which differ in their temporal duration, and offers an explanation of each. Yet imaginative contagion also poses an ethical concern: troubling attitudes we imaginatively adopt might persist, damaging (...) our moral character. This paper indicates how experiencing imaginative resistance, and our practicing techniques of active quarantine, can help to prevent our acquiring highly immoral attitudes, diminishing the concern about the corruptive influence of imaginative contagion. (shrink)

How can we come to know, be justified in believing, or understand, that something is necessary, possible, contingent, essential, or accidental? This is the central question in the epistemology of modality. After some short remarks on the importance of this question for philosophy and for our everyday life, this chapter briefly summarizes Kripke’s seminal contribution to the field, discusses two different skeptical challenges in the epistemology of modality and briefly surveys some of the most discussed contemporary accounts and answers to (...) the central question. (shrink)

The Shifting Ground is a hybrid philosophical-creative anthology that explores the concept of ontological instability—not through rigid definitions or academic argument—but through fables, poetic reflections, metaphors, and fictional dialogues. In an age where reality is increasingly perceived as fluid, fragmented, and emergent, this collection invites readers to dwell not in certainty, but in becoming. From stories of scholars undone by too much knowledge to metaphors of cracked mirrors and dancing compasses, each piece challenges the fixedness of truth, identity, and morality. (...) The text meanders across shifting terrains of epistemology, ethics, pedagogy, and metaphysics, offering a gentle yet subversive invitation to reconceive reality as process rather than substance. Rather than resolving the tensions of instability, the book embraces them—cultivating a poetics of resonance, responsiveness, and improvisation fit for the flux of our times. (shrink)

Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally (...) epistemic consequentialists about imagination. (shrink)

This anthology presents a series of metaphorical and philosophical fables that explore the concept of ontological instability—the idea that being itself is fluid, unfixed, and always in flux. Through richly imaginative narratives such as The Town of Shifting Streets, The Sculptor and the Cloud, and The Bridge That Built Itself, the collection invites readers to reconsider the assumptions of stable reality, fixed identity, and rigid morality. Each story serves as a pedagogical allegory, illustrating how knowledge, ethics, and purpose might emerge (...) not through static truths but through adaptive, relational, and context-sensitive becoming. Drawing on narrative, aesthetic, and affective modalities, this anthology challenges traditional epistemologies and proposes alternative ways of knowing rooted in openness, improvisation, and entangled interdependence. (shrink)

Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by BertoFrancesco. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 229.

Recently, there has been an explosion of research in philosophy and psychology about conspiracy theories. This chapter explores what this work can tell us about whether conspiracy theorists genuinely believe the theories they engage with. On one hand, it’s natural to assume that anyone who claims to believe conspiracy theories, and who spends a lot of time engaging with them, must really believe them. On the other hand, given that many conspiracy theories seem quite far-fetched and lacking in good evidence, (...) it’s also natural to wonder whether conspiracy theorists are just playing a big game of pretend or make-believe. Philosophers and psychologists writing about conspiracy theorists often simply assume, without argument, that they really do believe (an assumption this chapter calls the “Belief View”). More recently, however, several philosophers have appealed to empirical evidence to argue that conspiracy theorists take a more imaginative cognitive attitude towards their theories (the “Imaginative View”). It’s difficult to conclusively settle this debate without first settling another, highly controversial debate over how to define the term “conspiracy theory.” However, insights emerging from the disagreement between the Belief View and Imaginative View may be able to help us make some progress on this definitional question. (shrink)

I argue that there is an underappreciated threat posed by the emergence of generative artificial intelligence (AI). I call this the threat of creative obsolescence. The threat is that, given the capabilities of generative AI, humans may gradually abandon our creative pursuits, and in doing so, lose something of significant value. To show why the threat is a realistic possibility, I consider three kinds of value philosophers have attributed to creativity: aesthetic value, epistemic value, and practical value. I then offer (...) examples in which contemporary AI models appear to furnish value of each kind. I argue that the fact that AI appears capable of generating products with the same kinds of value for which human creativity has long been prized raises a question: Should humans continue to strive for creativity in the age of AI? I argue for three reasons to think we should. Each reason identifies a value of creativity that AI appears unable to replicate: imagination, originality, and connectedness. If I am right about any of these reasons, AI cannot fully replace the value of human creativity. But if we fail to recognize this and outsource our creative pursuits to AI, we risk a future in which the distinctive value of human creativity is lost. (shrink)

Abstract -/- Imagination did not evolve to create art. It evolved to prevent collapse. -/- This paper reframes imagination not as an aesthetic gift, but as a structural inevitability—an emergent phase emulator evolved by Homo sapiens to stabilize internal coherence in the absence of external structural feedback. We apply the CODES framework (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems) to show that imagination functions as a symbolic buffer: a dynamic rehearsal layer that enables systems under entropy stress to simulate viable patterns before (...) they’re metabolically or cognitively accessible. -/- By tracing recursive memory in coral lattices, whale migrations, and oceanic field behavior, we demonstrate that imagination is not uniquely human. It is a lawful artifact of matter under signal strain—a response to delayed feedback resolution. Human imagination merely formalized, symbolized, and mythologized a deeper planetary recursion already in motion. -/- CODES marks the shift from imagination as fantasy to imagination as post-symbolic coherence mapping. It does not destroy imagination—it completes it. When coherence becomes metabolically available, simulation is no longer needed. What remains is not absence, but clarity. (shrink)

Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) holds that the senses, imagination, and passions aim at survival and the satisfaction of the body’s needs, rather than truth or the good of the mind. Each of these faculties makes a distinctive and, indeed, an indispensable contribution to the preservation of life. Commentators have largely focused on how the senses keep us alive. By comparison, the imagination and passions have been neglected. In this paper, I reconstruct Malebranche’s account of how the imagination contributes to the preservation (...) of the body by compensating for the limitations of the senses. First, the imagination represents non-actual states of affairs, such as probable or possible future states. Second, the imagination forges new and often helpful associations based on past experiences. Third, the imagination (mis)represents that objects will cause pleasure and pain, thereby imbuing them with emotional significance they would otherwise lack. Together, these features flesh out Malebranche’s view that the imagination is necessary for the preservation of life. (shrink)

In recent years, we have seen an abundance of published philosophical work concerning the topic of imagination. Yet, there still seems to be one subset of imagination that has not been widely researched, which is fantasy. My analysis of fantasy concerns its relationship with ethics. I mainly consider whether we can expand the boundaries of applied ethical principles by considering whether fantasies can be evaluated as morally right or wrong. When we discuss the topics of imagination and fantasy philosophically, it’s (...) not easy to see how such mental phenomena could have an ethical component to them. More specifically, I want to propose an account of fantastical ethics for situations where fantasies seem to occur most often, which is within romantic situations. I argue that for a fantasy regarding romantic situations to be unethical, the fantasist has to be imagining the fantasizee in such a way that the fantasizee would not approve of themselves being imagined as, and/or they do not obtain the fantasizee’s consent to fantasize about them in such a way. (shrink)

The publication of Husserliana XXIII "Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung" in 1980 and John B. Brough's translation of it in 2005 increased interest in Edmund Husserl's philosophy of depiction. This volume is the first comprehensive book collection in English that provides a systematic reading of Husserl's theory of depictive image consciousness. The book explains the meaning of various concepts in Husserl's philosophy of depiction-such as f - and examines the range and limits of the application of Husserl's depictive image consciousness to various (...) art practices and media, and to other mental acts, e.g., phantasy, memory. The book discusses, among other topics, empathy, symbolic presentation and the aesthetic experience of depictions. Additionally, the book compares Husserl's theory of depiction with that of other philosophers, notably Franz Brentano, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Roman Ingarden, Leopold Blaustein and Jean Baudrillard. Husserl on Depiction will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of perception, philosophy of art, aesthetics and pictorial representation. (shrink)

En este texto se propone una clasificación de hipótesis que, por un lado, permite comprender aspectos relevantes de algunas filosofías de la Modernidad, y en especial de la metodología cartesiana, y por otro, resulta de utilidad en los procesos de investigación actuales en filosofía. Con el fin de profundizar en el sentido de dicha clasificación, se ofrece un breve estudio de metodología cartesiana dividido en tres partes. En la primera se problematiza el vínculo entre la matematización del espíritu y la (...) matematización efectiva de la naturaleza, y se analiza una hipótesis general de Descartes sobre el mundo externo. En la segunda parte se analiza el papel de la imaginación en la matematización del espíritu y en la formulación de hipótesis sobre el mundo externo. En la tercera parte se establece la clasificación de hipótesis a partir de la metodología cartesiana. Finalmente, en la conclusión se ofrece una reflexión sobre el trabajo con hipótesis en filosofía. (shrink)

This paper explores the core characteristics of Vratislav Effenberger’s theoretical system, highlighting his perspective on the significance of imagination in ideological thinking. It provides background and an overview of Effenberger’s concept of ideology, outlines the Surrealist notion of imagination, and presents the author’s methodological connection of Surrealism, psychoanalysis, and Prague Structuralism. Effenberger emerges as a thinker dedicated to bridging the gap between the modernist (primarily avant-garde) interpretation of the world and the postmodern tendencies evident from the mid-20th century onwards. In (...) Effenberger’s terms, ideology is an approach to reality that aims to grasp it as at least a potentially meaningful totality and engages in the actualization of this meaning or totality in social and psychological practice. He argues that such an approach is closely linked with avant-garde thought, which, for various reasons, has diminished in significance since the Second World War. In place of prior unifying perspectives, relativism and skepticism have become more dominant. However, Effenberger contends that integrative inclinations remain alive in human thought in the form of “idea models” found in the field of “psychoideology”—the realm of preconscious thought formation. These idea models play a pivotal role in psychoideology, nurturing the dialectics of imaginative and conceptual reasoning, which are vital for fostering innovation and creative endeavors. (shrink)

G. W. Leibniz on Making Knowledge Sensible · G. W. Leibniz’s contribution to logic and a propositional theory of truth, based on the idea that concepts are composed of definitional notes, has been considered the core of his philosophical system and metaphysics. However, Leibniz thought that there are other forms of knowledge that are perceptual and, therefore, non-propositional and non-conceptual. This essay explores forms of non-conceptual knowledge and argues that they depend on the imagination. Despite the distinction between conceptual and (...) non-conceptual forms of knowledge, there are two senses in which conceptual knowledge depends on non-conceptual knowledge : there is a constitutive sense in which non-conceptual knowledge has a constitutive function because it allows one to conceive of beings in concreto, and thus anchors human knowledge to reality ; there is a second sense in which non-conceptual knowledge has the function of making imaginable intellectual concepts that could not be other- wise represented by the human mind. The essay shows that these functions are interrelated. (shrink)

Balancing a hermeneutic of trust with a hermeneutic of suspicion, this article develops a phenomenological description of imagination that highlights its alethic ambiguity. Imagination is an act of disclosure, without which the world of fiction and pure possibility cannot be constituted. Imagination is also an act of self-indulgence and narcissism, the source of much concealment and untruth. It is not the one or the other, but both at the same time, essentially ambiguous because of its phenomenological constitution. In this article, (...) I will take some steps towards clarifying this essential ambiguity of the imagination by drawing on the insights of Husserl and Sartre. Beginning with Husserl’s parallel treatment of imagination and perception as intuitive, objectifying acts, I will argue, drawing on insights from Sartre, that there is an important discrepancy between them with respect to the role of desire. While the constitution of perceptual presence is inseparable from a desire for truth, the desire involved in the constitution of imaginary presence has an ambiguous character, both epistemic and magical. This duplicity of desire partly accounts for the ambiguity of imagination, which is all the more pronounced the more the imagination demands the full emotional involvement of the imagining subject. (shrink)

This paper explores Ilyenkov’s conception of imagination as it is expressed in his writings on aesthetics and in his 1968 book Ob idolakh i idealakh (Of Idols and Ideals). Ilyenkov deemed imagination and creativity to be central to the character of distinctively human forms of mental activity. After examining the many different contexts in which Ilyenkov sees imagination at work—from the most basic operations of perception to the expression of artistic and scientific genius—I bring his ideas into dialogue with the (...) account of imagination developed in Vygotsky’s writings. I argue that, though there are significant differences, their respective approaches are complementary. Both see imagination not simply as a vehicle of fantasy, but as intimately involved in disclosing reality. Moreover, both thinkers are reluctant to cast imagination as a discrete mental function on a par with reason, memory, will, etc. Imagination, rather, is critical to the way in which mental functions express themselves. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of whether children can be taught to be creative and imaginative. (shrink)

Today, the US pursues the global capture of data (understood as a significant engine of growth) by way of bi- and plurilateral trade agreements. However, the project of securing the global free flow of data has been pursued ever since the dawn of digital telecommunication in the 1960s and the US has made significant legal efforts to institutionalise it. These efforts have two phases: In the first 1970s and 80s “freedom of information” phase, the legal justification (and contestation) of the (...) global free flow of data hinged on imagining data as information, and its exchange as a practice of liberty. The second phase began in the late 1990s and continues today. In this phase, the free flow of data is aligned with a free-trade agenda in the context of first e-commerce and, starting in the 2000s, through attempts at creating a global public domain of personal data for the platform economy. The global free flow of data is an intrinsic aspect of informational capitalism. Assuming a constitutive, but not commanding role for law in informational capitalism, we conclude that the US attempt at ensuring free flow for its informational corporations is neither an entirely contingent nor a necessary outcome. It is a product of legal imagination. (shrink)

Abstract: In The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience - I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre’s exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross-modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a subject can (...) simultaneously imagine and perceive on the condition that either the perceived or imagined objects are not attended to. While this is a philosophically plausible position it fails to do justice to Sartre’s intended position, which suggests a more radical exclusion between perception and imagination. In light of this section 3 develops a supplementary argument to remove one of the possible configurations of attention that the ban on divided attention leaves in place by arguing that the objects of imagining must be attended to, which follows from Sartre’s characterisation of imagination as spontaneous. The resulting exclusion is as follows: attentive perception excludes imagination (and vice versa), given that the latter is necessarily attentive, but attentive imagination can co-occur with non-attentive or background perception (in this sense the exclusion is asymmetric in a way that Sartre fails to recognise). In concluding I detail how from this exclusion we get an important consequence – which Sartre wants the exclusion claim to have – namely that it rules out an imagination-based solution to the problem of perceptual presence. (shrink)

Tarot cards are a rich and fascinating art form. They are also an excellent tool for inquiry. I show why tarot has value, regardless of the user’s beliefs about magic. And I explain how novice or skeptical tarot users can appreciate (and create) that value by focusing on the card’s images, rather than consulting texts or expert guides. This is because, on a naturalistic conception, tarot’s zetetic value—that is, its value to inquiry—stems from its artistic properties.

This paper investigates the concepts of hope, despair and the radical imagination, driven by the following questions: Can we exist beyond the binaries of hope and despair, two key concepts that drive educational practices? What is the radical imagination and what are the conditions for it to be put to work in educational spaces? First, education is explored as a hyperobject that is owned, imagined and practiced collectively. The semiotic square is introduced as a heuristic tool to illustrate the limitations (...) of the binary opposition between hope and despair, and allows for an exploration of what is possible when these binaries are being set aside. The radical imagination then, is described as a collective practice that is radical in the sense that alternative social forms can always be imagined once we acknowledge that every social form is the result of the collective imagination. Finally, the paper explores conceptual as well as practical ideas that underpin Education for Uprising which is understood as the emergence of micro-political, autonomous spaces of direct action where community, solidarity and self-organization are key principles. Education for Uprising allows us to radically reimagine how we view education and to actively engage in alternative world-making. (shrink)

In this commentary on Dustin Stokes’ _Thinking and Perceiving_, I focus on his discussion of perceptual expertise. This discussion occurs in the context of his case against modularity assumptions that underlie much contemporary theorizing about perception. As I suggest, there is much to be gained from thinking about considerations about perceptual expertise in conjunction with considerations about imaginative skill. In particular, I offer three different lessons that we can learn by way of the joint consideration of these two phenomena.

This article offers a reply to commentaries from Amy Kind, Casey O’Callaghan, and Wayne Wu. It features a defense and further analysis of perceptual malleability, as defended in Thinking and Perceiving. In turn, it considers the consequences of malleability for attention and the cognitive penetrability of perception, imagination and perceptual skills, and perceptual content and objectivity.

According to one strongly supported view, fiction is a functional kind that communicates imaginings. Combining this definitional thesis with a plausible principle concerning functional kinds leads to the following evaluative thesis: features that contribute to communicating imaginings constitute good-making features as fiction, and features that impede this constitute bad-making features as fiction. However, this thesis is at odds with the actual practice of fiction. Critics can show their admiration for complicated works of fiction by stating, “That’s beyond my imagination!” I (...) argue that in resolving this paradox of hard-to-imagine fiction, we should not deny the observation, but rethink the definitional thesis. Works of fiction that are puzzling, redundant, contradictory, and collapsed can have a unique value that smooth works cannot. They can have value as fiction in that they challenge our imagination or place us in an exotic state of being lost in the imagination. (shrink)

Reflecting on our engagement with fiction has compelled some theorists to expand the domain of the mental. They have posited a novel conative state, so-called “i-desire”. The central thesis of this approach is that i-desire relates to imagination in the same way as desire relates to belief. We formulate principles which are plausible consequences of this thesis. We then put pressure on these principles by focusing on desire concepts such as hoping, and show that the imaginative analogues of these concepts—if (...) such there be—do not satisfy the principles. We conclude by considering what our result suggests about the relationship between i-desire and propositional attitude psychology. (shrink)

We propose a logic of imagination, based on simulated belief revision, that intends to uncover the logical patterns governing the development of imagination in pretense. Our system complements the currently prominent logics of imagination in that ours in particular formalises (1) the algorithm that specifies what goes on in between receiving a certain input for an imaginative episode and what is imagined in the resulting imagination, as well as (2) the goal-orientedness of imagination, by allowing the context to determine, what (...) we call, the overall topic of the imaginative episode. To achieve this, we employ well-developed tools and techniques from dynamic epistemic logic and belief revision theory, enriched with a topicality component which has been exploited in the recent literature. As a result, our logic models a great number of cognitive theories of pretense and imagination [cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (Recreative minds, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002); Nichols and Stich (Mindreading: an integrated account of pretence, self-awareness, and understanding other minds, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003); Byrne (The rational imagination, The MIT Press, London, 2005); Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2007); Langland-Hassan (Philos Stud 159:155–179, 2012, in: Kind and Kung (eds) Knowledge through imaginaion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016]. (shrink)

While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices (...) at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education. (shrink)

This article examines the role of the imagination in Fanon's and Husserl's work in order to rethink Fanon's relationship with Husserlian phenomenology. I begin with an investigation of the oft-overlooked ways in which the imagination appears in Wretched of the Earth. Here, I argue that Fanon puts a great deal of stock in the imagination, ultimately calling upon this faculty in order to presage the novel ways of being, thinking, and acting, which are a recurrent signature of his vision of (...) decolonization. In the latter half of the article, I then offer an account of the decisive methodological significance of the imagination within Husserl's work. Revisiting the methodological infrastructure of phenomenology with Fanonian concerns in mind casts Husserl's project in a surprising new light, bringing to the fore the revolutionary potential of both the epoché and the method of eidetic variation. For at the core of Husserlian methodology lies a resolve to exceed the limits of our present empirical reality—a leitmotiv of Fanon's own thinking. I ultimately show that Fanon's work can thus be imagined as a reactivation, indeed a revolution, inaugurated at the heart of phenomenology and its most basic methodological commitments. (shrink)

This article evaluates the political implications of Thomas Hobbes’s extensive treatment of religion by taking up the motif of the Eucharist (and accompanying doctrine of transubstantiation) in Leviathan. Hobbes holds out transubstantiation as an exemplar of absurdity and an historical outgrowth of Christianity’s inauspicious meeting with pagan practices. At the same time, Leviathan contains allusions to eucharistic imagery in its narration of the generation of the “Mortal God,” the commonwealth, as the incorporation of a civil body. These conflicting sentiments are (...) illustrative of a wider tension running through Hobbes’s thought. Although Hobbes’s repudiation of superstition is well-known, it stands in stark contrast to Leviathan’s treatment of Christianity as an exemplar of “true” religion. The varied allusions to eucharistic doctrine illustrate how proper use might be made of a persistent “natural religiosity.” Both in its consonance with reason and its political logic, Christianity remains a politically constructive expression of “power invisible.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the role of phenomenal knowledge in understanding the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. In particular, I argue that understanding that is enriched by phenomenal knowledge is a powerful tool to mitigate hermeneutical injustice. I proceed as follows: Firstly, I investigate the requirements for a full understanding of the experiences at the center of hermeneutical injustice and I argue that phenomenal knowledge is key to full understanding. Secondly, I distinguish between direct phenomenal knowledge and (...) imaginative phenomenal knowledge. Thirdly, I investigate whether one can gain imaginative phenomenal knowledge of the experiences of members of social groups other than one´s own. I consider reasons for pessimism in this regard and show that they are not conclusive. Then, I provide a model of how outgroup members can acquire imaginative knowledge of the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. Finally, I connect the varieties of phenomenal knowledge with different grades of understanding an experience and I outline how understanding that involves imaginative phenomenal knowledge helps to overcome various forms of hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical survey and analysis of empirical studies on creativity, with emphasis on how imagination plays a role in the creative process. It takes as a foil the romantic view that, given features like novelty, incubation, and insight, we should be skeptical about the prospects for naturalistic explanation of creativity. It rebuts this skepticism by first distinguishing stages or operations in the creative process. It then works through various behavioral and neural studies, and corresponding philosophical theorizing, that (...) concern the preparation, generation, insight, and evaluation stages of creative processes. The result is not a complete explanation of creativity, but it identifies an explanatory path towards such an explanation, including the features of creativity that motivate that skepticism. (shrink)

Aristotle's De Anima discusses the psychological causes of what he calls locomotion – i.e, roughly, purpose-driven behavior. One cause is desire. The other is cognition, which falls into two kinds: thought (nous) and imagination (phantasia). Aristotle’s discussion is dense and confusing, but I argue that we can extract from it an account that is coherent, compelling, and that in many ways closely anticipates modern psychological theories, in particular Dual Processing theory. Animals and humans are driven to pursue objects that attract (...) us. Objects take on that power when we cognize them as valuable. If we rely on imagistic, automatic, uncontrolled processing mechanisms – Aristotle’s phantasia, which closely anticipates the modern notion of Type 1 processing – our resulting desires and actions will be impulsive. If we rely instead on rational, critical, deliberative capacities – Aristotle’s thought, which closely anticipates the modern notion of Type 2 processing – our resulting desires and actions will be reflective. Animals are capable only of the first kind of behavior; the human psyche is constituted of an animal psyche united with an intellectual one, so we are capable of both. (shrink)

Science and fiction seem to lie at opposite ends of the cognitive-epistemic spectrum. The former is typically seen as the study of hard, real-world facts in a rigorous manner. The latter is treated as an instrument of play and recreation, dealing in figments of the imagination. Initial appearances notwithstanding, several central features of scientific modeling in fact suggest a close connection with the imagination and recent philosophers have developed detailed accounts of models that treat them, in one way or another, (...) as akin to fictions. This chapter will critically discuss the fictions approach as an epistemology of scientific modeling. (shrink)

Imagination is extremely important for science, yet very little is known about how scientists actually use it. Are scientists taught to imagine? What do they value imagination for? How do social and disciplinary factors shape it? How is the labor of imagining distributed? These questions should be high priority for anyone who studies or practices science, and this paper argues that the best methods for addressing them are qualitative. I summarize a few preliminary findings derived from recent interview-based and observational (...) qualitative studies that I have performed. These finding include: (i) imagination is only valued for use in addressing maximally specific problems, and only when all else fails; (ii) younger scientists and scientists who are members of underrepresented groups express less positive views about imagination in general, and have less confidence in their own imaginations; (iii) while scientists seem to employ various epistemological frameworks to evaluate imaginings, overall they appear to be epistemic consequentialists about imagination, and this holds also for their evaluations of the tools they use to extend the power of their imaginations. I close by discussing the epistemic and ethical consequences of these findings, and then suggesting a few research avenues that could be explored next as we move forward in the study of scientific imagination. (shrink)