Inference to the Best Explanation

In this paper, we present a new kind of underdetermination. It arises when two or more scientists confront the same evidence, but assign different kinds of zetetic value to research questions of common interest. As we show, this is conceptually distinct from more venerable forms of underdetermination. We illustrate this using explanatory hypotheses in early 21st-century segregation research.

This paper presents a unified framework for both problem-solving and poetry generation under human cognitive constraints. Combining memory-limited DFS strategies, Miller's 7 ± 2 working memory rule, and Markovian Parallax Denigrate (MPD) methods, we introduce a systematic approach for structuring sequences of ideas or words into near-optimal solutions or creative outputs while maintaining minimal working memory requirements.

I argue that there is nothing about the structure of inference to the best explanation (IBE) that prevents it from establishing a contradiction in general, though there are some potential limitations on when it can be used for this purpose. Studying the relationship between IBE and contradictions is worthwhile for three reasons. First, it enhances our understanding of IBE. We see that, in many cases, IBE does not require explanations to be consistent, though there are some cases where consistency may (...) be required. Second, the argument has implications for the debate over scientific realism. Many scientific theories appear to be inconsistent. The best argument for scientific realism, however, appeals to IBE. My argument thus shows that a certain kind of realist faces a threat from inconsistent theories. Third, the argument is important for dialetheism. Dialetheists maintain that some contradictions are true. Many of the arguments in favour of dialetheism appeal to explanatory considerations. What I say here provides support for defending dialethism using an IBE-based methodology. (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is the canonical expression of the idea of reality as fundamentally rational or intelligible, such that there is always a sufficient ground or explanation for everything about which such questions can be asked. In this essay, I argue that recent attempts to rehabilitate the PSR, despite their many virtues, have not gone far enough in emphasizing the centrality of this principle within all areas of philosophy - both theoretical and practical. Thus, I hope to (...) show that to fully appreciate the significance of the PSR, we need to attend to the role it plays in reasoning of both a theoretical and a practical sort. As we will see, this point is especially important from a Kantian perspective, where it is practical, and not theoretical reason that is the home of our deepest and most substantive commitment to a version of the PSR. Thus, for a Kantian, to understand the nature of our commitment to the PSR, we need to consider this question first and foremost from a practical perspective - or perhaps ultimately from a point of view that somehow transcends the practical-theoretical distinction itself. (shrink)

This paper challenges the frequent objection that metaphysical or field-based theories of consciousness are inherently unscientific due to their current lack of empirical testability. Drawing upon historical precedents such as electromagnetism, germ theory, and dark matter, it argues that many now central scientific frameworks began as untestable models. The essay clarifies the distinction between temporary untestability and scientific invalidity, emphasizing that scientific merit also depends on internal consistency, explanatory power, and heuristic value. Rather than disqualifying such theories, the paper calls (...) for philosophical openness and a more nuanced understanding of science’s evolving boundaries. It ultimately defends the legitimacy of consciousness field theories as meaningful contributions to both metaphysics and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Although the inferring of explanations plays an important role in both our everyday lives and in the workings of science, I argue that inference to the best explanation as it is commonly conceived is often not the best way to capture this sort of reasoning. I suggest that a different form of reasoning – so-called immediate explanatory inference – is instead often much better suited to this task. This is a form of inference in which we are justified in believing (...) explanations for the evidence before us purely in virtue of this evidence, and not in virtue of the evidence plus some general principle or rule of non-deductive reasoning. I defend the idea of such a notion of inference, and argue that it plays a central role in both ordinary life and science. (shrink)

Modal Empiricism in philosophy of science proposes to understand the possibility of modal knowledge from experience by replacing talk of possible worlds with talk of possible situations, which are coarse-grained, bounded and relative to background conditions. This allows for an induction towards objective necessity, assuming that actual situations are representative of possible ones. The main limitation of this epistemology is that it does not account for probabilistic knowledge. In this paper, we propose to extend Modal Empiricism to the probabilistic case, (...) thus providing an inductivist epistemology for probabilistic knowledge. The key idea is that extreme probabilities, close to 1 and 0, serve as proxies for testing mild probabilities, using a principle of model combination. (shrink)

How do psychiatrists arrive at their diagnostic conclusions? Though several philosophers of psychiatry have proposed how to understand psychiatric diagnostic reasoning over the last decade, this essential question of the epistemology of psychiatric practice has received little attention. This article introduces the reader to this topic, its importance, and the major theoretical positions presented in the debate, while also pointing to future relevant research in this area of philosophy of psychiatry.

When philosophers do not have a way out for choosing between the account they defend or a competing one, they usually appeal to theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, unity, fruitfulness, explanatory power, and so on. In this paper, my aim is to question the status of simplicity as a criterion for theory choice. My main arguments are that, first, it is hard to determine an objective metrics for evaluating simplicity, and second, we have no way to decide which one we (...) should prioritize: whether the ontological or the ideological variant of this theoretical virtue. In order to defend this stance, I will present the defenses of both ontological and ideological simplicity and then criticize each of them. I will also point out that the usual appeal metaphysicians make to scientific practice is not enough, given that the role of simplicity in science is not so clear and that philosophy in general has a very distinct nature as an endeavor. In the end, I will sketch a metaphilosophical pessimistic conclusion according to which not just metaphysics, but much of philosophy, is maybe doomed to be an endless effort of inconclusive arguments, since most of philosophical explanations appeal to theoretical virtues as a decisive factor in their disputes. (shrink)

In recent years, the hope to confirm the existence of dark matter by experimentally detecting it has diminished significantly. After more than 30 years of experimental searches, many of the most promising candidates have since been ruled out, leaving the epistemic and scientific condition of dark matter in a state of suspension. In efforts to improve the epistemic justification for the dark-matter hypothesis, physicists have turned to philosophical arguments and historical narratives. In this paper, I explicate two such strategies -- (...) explanatory unification and historical continuity -- applied in the context of dark matter. I argue that greater care and attention should be invested in the explanatory arguments to increase their strength, and that a survey of primary historical sources in astronomy renders the historical evidence for the continuity of dark matter substantially weaker. The quality and rigor of the philosophical and historical arguments which physicists are constructing could be substantially improved by increasing interdisciplinary practices. (shrink)

A conversation between three characters: Credulus, who thinks conscious mental states can and should be attributed to other animals without any need for scientific inquiry; Skepticus, a critic with behaviorist leanings; and Moderus, who sees a middle path in the emerging science of animal consciousness.

Bas van Fraassen has argued that explanatory reasoning does not provide confirmation for explanatory hypotheses because explanatory reasoning increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We compare this argument with a skeptical argument that one should never add any beliefs because adding beliefs increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We discuss the similarities between these two arguments and identify several problems with van Fraassen’s argument.

The empirical and theoretical resources of different disciplines are often combined to shed light on questions that concern the deep history of humanity, such as the geographic origin of people groups, patterns of migration, and the diffusion of culture. In this article, I discuss three ways in which other disciplines, such as biology and archaeology, are integrated with historical linguistics to enhance our understanding of the past. First, other disciplines provide background knowledge that helps to constrain and assess competing historical (...) explanations of the data. I examine this issue in the context of the Principle of the Common Cause and Inference to the Best Explanation. Second, the synthesis of data from multiple disciplines provides a diverse and varied set of evidence, which is epistemically superior, other things being equal, to a homogeneous set of evidence. I consider several justifications for the confirmational value of diverse evidence. Finally, methods and procedures from other disciplines can often be fruitfully applied to forge new pathways to knowledge. Here, I survey the recent application of phylogenetic methods from biology, used for inferring evolutionary trees, within historical linguistics. (shrink)

This article reviews and develops an epistemological tradition in the philosophy of science, known as convergentism, which holds that inference methods should be assessed based on their ability to converge to the truth across a range of possible scenarios. Emphasis is placed on its historical origins in the work of C. S. Peirce and its recent developments in formal epistemology and data science (including statistics and machine learning). Comparisons are made with three other traditions: (1) explanationism, which holds that theory (...) choice should be guided by a theory's overall balance of explanatory virtues, such as simplicity and fit with data; (2) instrumentalism, which maintains that scientific inference should be driven by the goal of obtaining useful models rather than true theories; and (3) Bayesianism, which shifts the focus from all-or-nothing beliefs to degrees of belief. (shrink)

In 2021, the Bigelow Institute for Consciousness Studies (hereafter, BICS) sponsored an essay competition (hereafter, the Contest) designed to solicit the best evidence for the hypothesis that human consciousness survives bodily death, and more specifically, evidence that would prove this hypothesis beyond a reasonable doubt. The summer 2022 issue of the Journal of Scientific Exploration featured a special subsection on the BICS contest and its winning essays. Robert Bigelow and Colm Kelleher outlined the motivation, design, and judging criteria for the (...) competition. Keith Augustine provided an extensive critical commentary on the contest design and eight of its prominent winning essays. Stephen Braude and several coauthors responded to Augustine’s criticisms, and Augustine provided a reply to Braude and his collaborators. Finally, the subsection concluded with a collaborative paper in which Etienne LeBel, Adam Rock, and Augustine proposed a more rigorous experimental design for testing the survival hypothesis. Augustine presented important criticisms of the Contest and several of its prominent winning essays. Moreover, many of his criticisms apply to survival literature in general and so are instructive for the wider survival debate. And Braude, one of the most important contributors to the survival debate since C.D. Broad and C.J. Ducasse, was at the helm of the reply to Augustine. Although the response to Augustine raised important concerns about skeptical assessments of the evidence for survival, it was hamstrung with several defects. 1. Preliminaries 2. Problematic Aspects of the Reply to Augustine 3. What is the Question? Honing in on the Actual Disagreement 4. Inference to Best Explanation 5. Confirmation Approaches to Evidential Support -- 5.1 Evidential Justification -- 5.2 When Does an Observation Favor One Hypothesis Over Another Hypothesis? The Law of Likelihood -- 5.3 When Should We Up Our Confidence in a Hypothesis? Incremental Confirmation -- 5.4 How Can We Determine the Net Plausibility of a Hypothesis? Bayes’ Theorem and Posterior Probabilities -- 5.5 Which of Two Hypotheses is More Probable than the Other? Principle of Contrastive Posterior Probabilities -- 5.6 When Does Evidence Justify Believing a Hypothesis? Principle of Absolute Confirmation -- 5.7 Survivalist Confusions about Bayesian Analyses -- 5.8 The Washing Out of Priors -- 5.9 The Subjectivism Objection -- 5.10 Summing Up Insights from Confirmation Theory -- 6. Back to Braude 7. Varieties of Skepticism 8. Neurophysiological Evidence and the Survival Hypothesis 9. The Data from Mediumship 10. The Alleged Improbability of Fraud and Other Counterexplanations 11. Mediumship and the Logic of Confirmation 12. The Significance of Failed Tests 13. Survivalist Rescues and Contrastive Confirmation 14. Evidential Support without Predictions -- 15. The Testability Problem -- Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

Aesthetic considerations played a substantial and positive role in the development and acceptance of plate tectonics, the modern theory of the earth’s major geological features and the unifying framework of the earth sciences. Here I give an overview of how aesthetics influenced plate tectonics and take a detailed look at a handful of examples from this history where elegance and simplicity tipped the balance in favour of a given hypothesis. I discuss some implications of this case study for extant accounts (...) of aesthetics in science and argue that the positive role aesthetics played can be explained by recent accounts that posit an indirect and contingent link between knowledge and psychological mechanisms underlying aesthetic appreciation. (shrink)

The recent so-called crisis of replication continues to dominate psychology’s methodological landscape. It is argued here that the apparent renaissance of Popperian thinking that characterises some of the key responses to the crisis of replication is fundamentally flawed. In essence, there is a serious lack of any sustained and rigorous treatment of ontology that underpins much of the current debate about replication and Popper’s falsificationist approach. The overriding problem is that the replication debate reflects the methodologist tendency for mainstream psychologists (...) to avoid or gloss over crucial ontological questions. In contradistinction, this article (a) underscores the primacy of ontology; (b) delineates and applies a critical realist stratified ontology to psychology; (c) utilises the latter as a springboard from which to argue for Popper’s methodological “retirement”; and (d) revindicates the indispensability of context and the subtlety of psychological phenomena in arguing for the intrinsic limits of replication and experimentalism in general. (shrink)

This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a Matrix realista’”, by Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva, released in Problemata (v. 12, n. 2, 2021). The authors originally published an essay in the same journal, “Van Fraassen and inference to the best explanation” (2016), the object of critic - ‘friendly and gentle’ - in a work of mine that also appeared in Problemata, in 2019. In this paper I will (...) show that, even when the subject matter is the inference to the best explanation, realists and antirealists end up debating about the same old topics, that represent the essence of the controversy between the two philosophical stances. (shrink)

Following ideas of Ch. S. Peirce on continuity of mind (synechism) and universality of semiotic processes (pansemiotism) as well as development of the understanding of manipulative abduction in works of L. Magnani the thesis of possibility of abductive reasoning in non-human animal minds is defended. The animal capacity to form explanatory hypotheses is demonstrated by instances of grasping regularities in environment, behavior of conspecifics and even self-knowledge. In the framework of debate on instinctual or rather inferential nature of abductive capacity (...) questions of innate and acquired mechanisms of learning, the role of language in development of explanations and priority of inner (emotional) or outer (referential) perspectives in genesis of first explanatory hypotheses are considered. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à approfondir la conclusion de Hume selon laquelle l’induction, malgré son importance comme méthode inférentielle, est injustifiable. J’argumente en particulier que l’induction devrait être comprise comme un processus psychologique fondamental. Mon plan est le suivant : après un résumé du problème de l’induction humien, j’offre une rapide argumentation en faveur de la conceptualisation de l’induction comme une inférence à la meilleure explication (IME). Ensuite, je propose un argument original visant à montrer que l’IME est un processus psychologique (...) fondamental. Cet argument s’appuie sur une analyse du concept d’explication prouvant qu’une explication nécessite toujours l’existence d’un agent épistémique. J’utilise ce résultat afin de montrer que l’IME est un processus psychologique fondamental. Si l’induction est bel et bien une forme d’IME, l’induction est donc elle aussi un processus psychologique fondamental. (shrink)

How should we incorporate algorithms into humanistic scholarship? The typical approach is to clone what humans have done but faster, extrapolating expert insights to landfills of source material. But creative scholars do not clone tradition; instead, they produce readings that challenge closely held understandings. We theorize and then illustrate how to construct bad robots trained to surprise and provoke. These robots aren’t the most human but rather the most alien—not tame but dangerous. We explore the relationship between the reproduction of (...) tradition and the generation of surprise and then show how formalizing a particular humanistic theory as a Bayesian prior allows us to identify readings that disrupt it through a process of algorithmic abduction. Among the exploding universe of surprising (and mostly ridiculous) possible readings, algorithmic efficiency allows us to select readings that nonetheless garner substantial support from the total archive and so merit interpretation and engagement. It is in such interaction between alien and human readers that meaning is made and understanding disturbed; it is by extending alien readings to novel texts that the scholarly community tests the value of those readings. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model’s compatibility with IBE. I argue that Kitcher’s unificationist account supports IBE; Railton’s deductive–nomological–probabilistic model, Salmon’s statistical-relevance model, and van Fraassen’s erotetic account are (...) incompatible with IBE; and Salmon’s causal–mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term ‘explanation’ univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look. (shrink)

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In a discussion of Sherlock Holmes’ “science of deduction” and the related “method of exclusion,” I show that Holmes’ claim that his inferences are deductive makes sense, if we consider his theoretical presuppositions. So, it is more accurate to say that he tries to reduce abduction to deduction than that he confuses them. His theoretical framework, albeit inadequate as a theory of empirical reasoning, can be seen as a basic model of classical (symbolic) AI. The main problems of this approach (...) are surveyed, and abduction is brought into play as both a better characterization of Holmes’ inferences and a better guide for building AI systems. This is a good background for raising the question of creativity because, according to Peirce, it relates to abduction in a substantial way. Is Sherlock Holmes creative? Can machines be creative? An affirmative answer to the second question might be given by a “logic of discovery” but the problem remains that inventing such a logic already presupposes creativity. (shrink)

Abductive reasoning involves finding the missing premise of an “unsaturated” deductive inference, thereby selecting a possible _explanans_ for a conclusion based on a set of previously accepted premises. In this paper, we explore abductive reasoning from a structural proof-theory perspective. We present a hybrid sequent calculus for classical propositional logic that uses sequents and antisequents to define a procedure for identifying the set of analytic hypotheses that a rational agent would be expected to select as _explanans_ when presented with an (...) abductive problem. Specifically, we show that this set may not include the deductively minimal hypothesis due to the presence of redundant information. We also establish that the set of all analytic hypotheses exhausts all possible solutions to the given problem. Finally, we propose a deductive criterion for differentiating between the best _explanans_ candidates and other hypotheses. (shrink)

Several tasks in artificial intelligence require the ability to find models about knowledge dynamics. They include belief revision, fusion and belief merging, and abduction. In this paper, we exploit the algebraic framework of mathematical morphology in the context of propositional logic and define operations such as dilation or erosion of a set of formulas. We derive concrete operators, based on a semantic approach, that have an intuitive interpretation and that are formally well behaved, to perform revision, fusion and abduction. Computation (...) and tractability are addressed, and simple examples illustrate the main results. (shrink)

I address an objection to inference to the best explanation due to Bas C. van Fraassen, according to which explanatory virtues cannot confirm a theory, since they make the theory more informative and thus less likely to be true given the probability axioms. I try to show that van Fraassen’s argument, once made precise, is deductively invalid, and that even an ampliative version of the argument (i) implies, absurdly, that no theory is confirmed by its fit with empirical data; (ii) (...) fails to account for confirmatory closure under deduction; and (iii) falsely presupposes that a theory and its sub-theories can be competing explanations. (shrink)

According to the standard interpretation of Einstein’s field equations, gravity consists of mass-energy curving spacetime, and an additional physical force or entity—denoted by Λ (the ‘cosmological constant’)—is responsible for the Universe’s metric-expansion. Although General Relativity’s direct predictions have been systematically confirmed, the dominant cosmological model thought to follow from it—the ΛCDM (Lambda cold dark matter) model of the Universe’s history and composition—faces considerable challenges, including various observational anomalies and experimental failures to detect dark matter, dark energy, or inflation-field candidates. This (...) paper shows that Einstein’s Equivalence Principle entails two possible physical interpretations of General Relativity’s field equations. Although the field equations facially appear to support the standard interpretation—that gravity consists of mass-energy curving spacetime—the field equations can be equivalently understood as holding that gravitational effects instead result from mass-energy accelerating the metric-expansion of a second-order spacetime fabric superimposed upon an absolute, first-order Euclidean space, resulting in the observational appearance of spacetime curvature. This alternative interpretation of relativity is shown to be empirically equivalent to the standard interpretation of relativity, albeit with a changing value for Λ (which is similar to how Λ is understood in the conception of Λ as ‘quintessence’, but in this case takes Λ to be gravity). The reconceptualization is then shown to potentially resolve major observational anomalies for the ΛCDM model, including recent observations conflicting with ΛCDM predictions, as well as failures to directly detect dark matter, dark energy, and inflation field/particle candidates. (shrink)

We integrate dualistic conceptions of the real with Peirce's perspectives about reality and abduction, emphasizing the concept of reason underlying Peirce's thoughts. Peirce's abduction is related to the notions of retrogression and grounding in Hegel, later re-encountered in Hansonian-abduction. Abduction in turn is considered in relation to abstraction acquiring its fullest sense as a stage in the process of producing a theory. The process is iterative and self improving, it incorporates ``turbid thinking'' making it increasingly ``clear'' at successive iterations that (...) incorporate the lessons taught by failed predictions, i.e., refutations. The cycle of thoughts promoted by doubts comes to rest when belief is reached. We discuss how this coming to rest depends on a criterion for cessation of doubts. The observation is illustrated with two different criteria, one proposed by Mach that only demands analogy and the criteria of dualists such as Goethe and Whewell that inspire the present work. Hence, it is possible to produce, and socially accept, imperfect theories unless we demand the highest level of rationality, avoiding any leftover of the turbid thoughts that have been used in the early developments. This work rests upon the existence of some objective form of reason. Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss a small number of conditions that we identify as characteristics of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We show how a classical example of belief that satisfies today's most common definition of abduction does not match the standards of rational retroduction. We further show how the same rules indicate the partial detachment of Special Relativity from the observable world, a fact actually known to Einstein. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology incorporating dualistic perspectives. (shrink)

Phenomenology has been described as a “non-argumentocentric” way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the “usual suspects” or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention (...) to the role and form of phenomenological argumentation, how it interacts with its more strictly descriptive component, and the status of phenomenological claims regarding conditions for various kinds of experience. I contend that different versions of phenomenological reasoning encroach upon argument forms that are commonly thought to be antithetical to phenomenology, notably abductive reasoning, understood in terms of its role in both hypothesis generation and in terms of justification. This paper identifies two main steps to making this case. The first step takes seriously the consequences of the intrinsically dialectical aspect of phenomenology in intersection with other modes of philosophy, the natural attitude, and non-philosophy. The second step focuses on transcendental reflection and arguments about the conditions/structures they contain. Together, these two steps aim to rescue phenomenology from the objection that it has an “ostrich epistemology” with regard to the ostensible purity of description, the intuition of essences, or the “conditions” ascertained through transcendental reflection. (shrink)

Astrophysics is a scientific field with a rich ontology of individual processes and general phenomena that occur in our universe. Despite its central role in our understanding of the physics of the universe, astrophysics has largely been ignored in the debate on scientific realism. As a notable exception, Hacking (Philos Sci 56(4):555–581, 1989) argues that the lack of experiments in astrophysics forces us to be anti-realist with respect to the entities which astrophysics claim inhabit the universe. In this paper, I (...) investigate the viability of astrophysical realism about black holes, given other formulations of entity realism, specifically Cartwright’s (How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press, 1983), and Chakravartty’s (A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobervable. Cambridge University Press, 2007) versions of entity realism. I argue that on these accounts of entity realism, you cannot be a realist with respect to black holes, and likewise, if you want to be a realist about black holes, you cannot be an entity realist of these particular strands. (shrink)

This is the first chapter of a book that I'm writing entitled Kantsequentialism: A Morality of Ends. The chapter has six sections: (1) The Distinction between a Moral Theory and a Complete Account of Morality, (2) The Best Explanation, (3) Fitting the Data as Opposed to the Facts, (4) Epistemic Justification and Phenomenal Conservatism, (5) Neither Overfitting nor Underfitting the Data, and (6) Trusting Our Moral Intuitions. Thus, the chapter begins by providing an account of what a moral theory is (...) and how that differs from a complete account of morality. It then argues that there are only four explanatory virtues: modesty, coherence, unifying power, and predictive power. Thus, it argues that simplicity is not itself a virtue. It explains how it's important for a theory to avoid either overfitting or underfitting the data. The chapter then explains that the data for our philosophical theories are our intuitions (which are intellectual seemings), and it defends phenomenal conservatism -- the view that we are justified in believing that things are as they seem unless and until grounds for doubt arise. Lastly, it responds to worries about the trustworthiness of our moral intuitions stemming from both experimental philosophy and evolutionary debunking arguments. (shrink)

According to van Fraassen, inference to the best explanation (IBE) is incompatible with Bayesianism. To argue to the contrary, many philosophers have suggested hybrid models of scientific reasoning with both explanationist and probabilistic elements. This paper offers another such model with two novel features. First, its Bayesian component is imprecise. Second, the domain of credence functions can be extended.

Reasoning over our knowledge bases and theories often requires non-deductive inferences, especially – but by no means only – when commonsense reasoning is the case, i.e. when practical agency is called for. This kind of reasoning can be adequately formalized via the notion of supraclassical consequence, a non-deductive consequence tightly associated with default and non-monotonic reasoning and featuring centrally in abductive, inductive, and probabilistic logical systems. In this paper, we analyze core concepts and problems of these systems in the light (...) of supraclassical consequence. (shrink)

This article claims the validity of abductive reasoning, or inference to the best explanation, as a practice of discovery of explanatory scientific hypotheses. Along the way to achieve this objective I present here a series of arguments that question the feasibility of Bayesianism as a theory of scientific confirmation. Having solved this issue, I resort to an episode of contemporary astrocosmology that I interpret as an eloquent example of the effectiveness of abductive methodology in contemporary theoretical physics.

The logical formalism of abductive reasoning is still an open discussion and various theories have been presented about it. Abduction is a type of non-monotonic and defeasible reasonings, and the logic containing such a reasoning is one of the types of non-nonmonotonic and defeasible logics, such as inductive logic. Abduction is a kind of natural reasoning and it is a solution to the problems having this form "the phenomenon of φ cannot be explained by the theory of Θ" and we (...) need to search for (or to adduce) an explanation for φ. Taking α as the explanation and <Θ,φ> as the abductive problem, Θ∪{α}⊨φ is the logical format of a strong abductive reasoning. In this article, the proof theory for first-order abductive calculus is proposed based on Gentzen-type first-order proof theory. Considering its dual, i.e., the semantic tableaux, and without the need to translate the formulas, this calculation is sound and complete. After examining the structural rules of this calculus, some metalogical considerations and open problems such as consistency, completeness and undecidability of this account have been addressed. (shrink)

Park (2017, 2018, 2019) argues that Bas van Fraassen uses inference to the best explanation to defend his contextual theory of explanation. If Park is right, then van Fraassen is in trouble because he rejects IBE as a rational rule of inference. In this reply, I argue that van Fraassen does not use IBE in defending the contextual theory of explanation. I distinguish between several conceptions of IBE: heuristic IBE, objective Bayesian IBE, and ampliative IBE. I argue that van Fraassen (...) holds the ampliative conception of IBE and that his rejection of IBE concerns only ampliative IBE. I also argue that van Fraassen’s defense of the contextual theory of explanation, at best, can be interpreted as an instance of heuristic IBE, but not ampliative IBE. Therefore, I argue, Park’s criticism of van Fraassen misfires. (shrink)

A methodology of science must satisfy two requirements: (i) It must be ampliative: the theories which it generates must make statements that go far beyond any data or observations that may have motivated those theories in the first place. (ii) It must be epistemically probative: it must somehow provide a warrant for believing that the theories so produced are correct, or at least partially correct, even if they can never be fully confirmed. These two requirements pull in opposite directions, and (...) attempts to specify the “scientific method” often focus on one to the exclusion of the other. On a few points there now exists something approaching a consensus. (i) Scientific hypotheses — including, particularly, statements about unobserved or unobservable entities or mechanisms — remain conjectural, no matter how frequently predictions based on those hypotheses are found to coincide with data. (ii) A good (best?) indicator of a theory’s verisimilitude is its ability to successfully predict phenomena which it was not specifically designed to predict. I discuss these ideas with particular reference to cosmological theories. (shrink)

Many scientists and philosophers of science think that beauty should play a role in theory selection. Physicists like Paul Dirac and Steven Weinberg explicitly claim that the ultimate explanations of the physical world must be beautiful. And philosophers of science like Peter Lipton say that we should expect the loveliest theory to also be the most likely. In this paper, I contend that these arguments from loveliness bear a striking similarity to Thomas Aquinas’ arguments from fittingness; both seem to presume (...) that the most beautiful theory is also the most probable. To do this, I first explain the explanatory virtues that are commonly thought to be constitutive of a lovely theory. Second, I elucidate Aquinas’ arguments from fittingness and show how they work in light of his account of beauty. Lastly, I connect the two kinds of aesthetic arguments and show the extent to which they overlap. (shrink)

This paper presents arguments and evidence from psychology and neuroscience supporting Lipton’s 2004 claim that scientists create knowledge through an abductive process that he calls “Inference to the Best Explanation”. The paper develops two conclusions. Conclusion 1 is that without conscious effort on our part, our brains use a process very similar to abduction as a powerful way of interpreting sensory information. To support Conclusion 1, evidence from psychology and neuroscience is presented that suggests that what we humans perceive through (...) our senses is not reality, but rather, our ‘brain’s “best guess” of the causes of its sensory input. The implication of this best guessing is that our brains use a process very similar to abduction throughout our lives to inform us of what is happening in the world around us. In addition, an argument based on Darwinian evolution is presented claiming that our brains do an excellent job of interpreting sensory information from the outside world. (If they did not, we, as a species, could hardly have survived.) Combining these two claims leads to Conclusion 1. Building on Conclusion 1, Conclusion 2 is that Lipton and others are correct in claiming that scientists use abduction when creating scientific theories. Abduction must be strong, because Nature chose abduction for its own sensemaking purposes. This paper’s contribution to knowledge is in pointing out that recent psychological and neuroscientific research has major implications for the philosophical world’s confidence in the probable validity of abductive inference. The punchline is simple: Nature chose abduction! (shrink)

Eyewitness testimony is both an important and a notoriously unreliable type of criminal evidence. How should investigators, lawyers and decision-makers evaluate eyewitness reliability? In this article, I argue that Testimonial Inference to the Best Explanation is a promising, but underdeveloped prescriptive account of eyewitness evaluation. On this account, we assess the reliability of eyewitnesses by comparing different explanations of how their testimony came about. This account is compatible with, and complementary to both the Bayesian framework of rational eyewitness evaluation and (...) with prescriptive methods for eyewitness assessment developed by psychologists. Compared to these frameworks, the distinctive value of thinking in terms of competing explanations is that it helps us select, interpret and draw conclusions from the available evidence about the witness’s reliability. (shrink)

A defense of the rationality of adductive inference from the criticisms of Bayesian theorists.