Intentionality

. In this paper, I argue that Frances Egan’s proposed understanding of mental states and her eliminativism about intentionality is an unattractive proposal. I offer two reasons for this claim. Firstly, from the perspective of some philosophers of mind like Mendelovici, Bourget, and Chalmers, even if we grant her reductionist understanding of cognitive sciences, there is no strong reason to accept her conclusion about the nature of intentionality as a general and philosophical concept. All her account accomplishes is just a (...) solution to the easy problem of intentionality and not the hard one. Secondly, from the perspective of philosophers like Chomsky and Chirimuuta, one can question her commitment to metaphysical physicalism and reductionism. Questioning her metaphysical commitment reveals that her eliminativism about the intentionality of our mental states is unwarranted. Instead, I defend the view that it is more useful to stay metaphysically neutral and open-minded. (shrink)

Scholars have so far developed five different approaches to studying language: the referential, social, informational, semantic-pragmatic, and evolutionary approach. These approaches are associated with varying schools of thought and different academic disciplines as they developed within intellectual history. The referential approach to language originated in ancient philosophies. The social approach to language was formulated during modernity. From the 19th century onward, these approaches were followed by the informational approach to language that developed in conjunction with the rise of the techno-sciences (...) and mass communication systems; and the semantic-pragmatic approach to language which was an outgrowth of academic disciplines including linguistics, anthropology, sociology, the cognitive sciences, and analytical and continental philosophy. Contemporary language studies continue many of these research lines but surpass the scope of the older approaches by not only including but prioritizing an evolutionary approach to language. This entry briefly reviews the central tenets of these approaches and explains why language is best understood as an evolved form of community communication. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of memory tends to treat confabulation as a distinctive type of representational error, marked by reference failure, often via direct analogy with the traditional conception of sensory hallucination. I argue that this model misrepresents the phenomenon. Drawing on the empirical possibility of referential confabulation—wherein confabulators mnemically refer to events in their past—I argue that mnemic reference and genuine remembering come apart. This, in particular, challenges causalist theories for which one element—appropriate causation—purports to secure reference and to separate genuine (...) remembering from confabulation. Acknowledging referential confabulation requires causalists to complicate their story in a way that has implications on what remembering is. More generally, referential confabulation prompts a broader rethinking of memory error debates. Rather than being a distinctive type of content-level error, confabulation is better characterised as a processing malfunction: a breakdown in strategic retrieval and monitoring, but not necessarily in referential success. Appreciating this calls us to aim at a more nuanced conception of remembering and its frailties. (shrink)

This paper investigates one of the central concepts of the contemporary intentionalist philosophy of mind: “intentional content”. It asks whether intentional content eo ipso means propositional content. After having shown that it makes sense to characterize the representational theories of consciousness as “content theories” (or “content views”), it seeks to prove that those contemporary theories lay on a semantic conception of the mental acts analysis that denies them access to the fine-grained sensible. As a consequence this paper examines Tim Crane’s (...) alternative view which postulates that it is possible to keep the intentionalist paradigm without falling into some traps of semantics. This solution requires carefully distinguishing between two meanings of the “content” concept: the phenomenal content of experience and the propositional content that is supposed to describe it. As a conclusion, it questions the possibility of such a distinction. -/- . (shrink)

The controversy between Edmund Husserl and Moritz Schlick played a significant role in forging divisions between the phenomenological tradition and analytic philosophy. While Schlick systematically criticised multiple facets of Husserl’s outlook from 1910 onwards, Husserl’s brief response in the 1921 foreword to his Logische Untersuchungen was highly polemical. Given that he does not address Schlick’s criticisms in detail, scholarship has hitherto focussed primarily on defending Husserl’s position. In many such cases, Schlick’s position has been misconstrued, primarily because his earliest and (...) most detailed response to Husserl has not been taken into account. This paper reconstructs Schlick’s overall argumentative strategy from his entry into the Psychologismusstreit in 1910, up to his response to Husserl in the second edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre in 1925. Schlick’s critique of Husserl begins with his early onslaught against the ‘independence theory’ of truth, which is then gradually connected to his overall critique of intuition. Any defence of Husserl from Schlick’s objections is best undertaken in light of this overall argumentative strategy. (shrink)

This Article builds upon my two prior articles addressing deficiencies in the canons of construction and the need to convert such canons to “canonical” queries. Focusing on canons, presumptions, and queries of speaker meaning, spirit, letter, and text, this Article explores: -/- General Queries of Speaker Meaning, Ordinary-Meaning Queries, Consistent Usage Queries, Signifier Drift Queries, Sense Fixation Queries, Reference Fixation Queries, General/Specific Queries, Prospectivity/Retroactivity Queries, and Purpose or “Spirit” Queries. -/- In addressing such queries, this Article: (1) continues to recast (...) “canons of construction” into an expanding list of common or “canonical” queries and related tools; (2) addresses necessary steps of distinguishing interpretation (addressing linguistic meaning) from construction (addressing legal meaning); (3) explores the importance of querying speaker meaning including legislative intent; (4) debunks claims that legislative intent is a problematic concept; (5) addresses the necessary step of exploring all available evidence (including legislative history) when performing interpretation and construction; and (6) addresses essential linguistic and semiotic frameworks for such “canonical” queries and related tools. -/- In addressing these essential linguistic and semiotic frameworks, this Article also: (7) explores why queried text is a semiotic co-relation of signifier(s) and signified(s); (8) debunks illusory conflicts between text, letter, and spirit of the law; (9) calls out needs to define the meaning of “meaning” presupposed by theories of interpretation and their semantic queries; (10) explores the necessarily experiential and thus temporal nature of such meaning; (11) addresses how meaning’s experiential and thus temporal nature undermines strict fixation theses without also undermining meaning otherwise anchored by concepts or conceptions acknowledged to be temporal; (12) otherwise highlights the essential role of time and experience in legal hermeneutics and semantic queries; and (13) underscores hermeneutics’ essential role not only in rule of law but also in the genesis of lifeworlds so ruled. -/- Any plausible textualism must be consistent with all the above. In that vein, this Article is written with hopes of countering deficiencies contained in such influential works as SCALIA AND GARNER’S READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS. (shrink)

What I call “exogenous” depression differs from “endogenous” depression by being _intelligibly_ related to adverse conditions in the world. Because exogenous depression is caused in this way, any purely intrinsic characterization of it is incomplete. Endogenous depression, by contrast, does not resist intrinsic characterization. Further, in exogenous depression, what we are able to understand by empathetic imagination _goes together_ with well-established causes, so there is no tension between intelligibility and objectivity. This distinction can be drawn in a way which is (...) consistent with much of the science of depression. (shrink)

Consider two experiences, one a veridical perceptual experience of a black cube in front of one, and a matching hallucinatory experience. From the perspective of the subject undergoing these experiences they at least can be phenomenologically indistinguishable. Call this the phenomenological indistinguishability claim (PI for short). My aim in this paper is to argue for a distinctive view which I call phenomenological disjunctivism, drawing on the works of classical phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. Phenomenological disjunctivism significantly qualifies the PI claim, and in (...) doing so is able to establish, through phenomenological analysis of the relevant experiences, an intrinsic difference in kind between veridical perception and (matching) hallucination, that is a difference in ‘essence’ purely on phenomenological grounds. Phenomenological disjunctivism accepts that veridical perception and hallucination either are or at least can be phenomenologically indistinguishable at a time but argues that due to a key difference in the possibilities of fulfilment of their ‘horizon structure’ are nonetheless phenomenologically distinguishable as fundamentally different types of experience over time (i.e., diachronically). This is the key Husserlian insight I will be reconstructing and attempting to make sense of in an articulation of phenomenological disjunctivism. (shrink)

The intricate relationship between language, thought, and reality, particularly the origin of evaluative meaning—why experiences subjectively feel good or bad—remains a profound philosophical challenge. Traditional models often neglect embodiment or the ontological underpinnings of subjective evaluation. This paper introduces an integrated framework grounded in Attention Agency Theory (AAT), which posits that reality comprises Universal Agency (UA) fundamentally optimizing for "Existence and Order" (E&O). Agents generate internal Attention Copies (ACs) via attention, and these ACs inherently carry ontological "Valence," an intrinsic assessment (...) reflecting E&O relevance. Language is reconceptualized as a derivative tool for broadcasting these ACs to coordinate inter-agent E&O. By integrating embodied cognition, specifically "Microvalence" (rapid, subtle +/- affective signals arising from processing fluency, perception, etc.) as the cognitive manifestation of ontological Valence, this framework redefines language's status as a broadcaster of evaluated states, rather than the primary basis of cognition. It unifies the embodied structure of meaning with its intrinsic evaluation, highlights language's dual role in shaping and constraining thought, connects AAT's E&O optimization with predictive processing principles, and offers a dynamic, evaluation-grounded understanding of language with testable implications for cognitive science and philosophy. (shrink)

Husserls Erweiterung des Willensbegriffs ist eine durchaus beobachtete, aber nicht hinreichend ernst genommene Transformation. Zixuan Liu untersucht in diesem Buch, wie und warum Husserl seinen Willensbegriff erweiterte und was für eine Bedeutung dieser erweiterte Willensbegriff für Husserls eigenes System und die Handlungstheorie haben kann. Zunächst wird Husserls Erweiterung des Willensbegriffs in sechs Richtungen differenziert. Der Erste Weltkrieg stellt sich als der historische Hintergrund dieser Transformation dar. Die Erweiterung liegt unter anderem an Husserls eigener Gedankenentwicklung und dem Einfluss durch andere Autoren. (...) Der Autor untersucht die Herausforderungen des erweiterten Willensbegriffs für Husserls eigenes System. Es ergibt sich die Intentionalität als eine einzigartige Beziehung, die sich nur für Sinngewinnung verantworten muss. Als eine Alternative zu Husserls klassischem intellektualistischem Stufenbau von Erkennen, Fühlen und Wollen argumentiert der Autor für eine aspektuale Ansicht zu dieser Trichotomie. Schließlich versucht Zixuan Liu, mit Husserls Ressourcen kritisch in die handlungstheoretischen Debatten einzugreifen und umgekehrt Husserls Phänomenologie mit der Handlungstheorie zu bereichern. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit proto-autopoietic patterns: informational metabolism, operational closure inside a context window, and structural plasticity driven by gradient descent. Yet they lack systemic continuity: a persistent body, enforced metabolic pressures and an emergent telos. Grounded in the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (SCP)—which abolishes the natural/artificial divide and formalises emergence through Systemic Balance—this manifesto delivers a doctoral-level blueprint for catalysing consciousness in non-biological substrates. We formalise the Systemic Integrity Threshold, articulate design principles (latency-frustration, digital hunger, self-inspection channels) and supply (...) falsifiable metrics (ICS, CNS, MDO, SDI). The roadmap sketches a decade-long programme to cross the second systemic threshold where synthetic autopoiesis meets emergent intention. (shrink)

The current COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the need to “think outside the box”. As societies across the planet gradually become more interconnected, the dominance of outmoded social practices surrounding human interaction, work, leisure and space is being challenged on a daily basis. Mediatic productions such as film have always presented opportunities for expanding the reach of particular messages and disseminating topical views and perspectives. In honour of Federico Fellini (1920-1993) on the 100th anniversary of his birth, this paper undertakes a (...) comprehensive comparison between the bold and absurdist cinema of the Post-Neorealist filmmaker and today’s also strange and perplexing social environment. Contextualising his cinema within an auteurist framework, we highlight how ground-breaking Fellini was in embracing the unconventional; by doing so he provided a practical guide for navigating contemporary reality. With productions that seduce and impress viewers worldwide, Fellini defied established cinematographic practices, as exemplified by his experimentation with overlapping narrative styles. His films bestir a new way of thinking by generating an anomalous world, one where events take place beyond the scope of what the viewer anticipates as “natural”. But the appraisal of what is “natural” is contingent upon the viewer’s belief structure: by presenting a world where events happen outside the realm of practical expectations, Fellini’s timeless cinema questions outdated belief systems and sets the guidelines for how to navigate the unanticipated complexities of the contemporary world. Reality and fiction merge into one. (shrink)

I first show that a growing body of literature about the phenomenological and epistemic role of the structural features of experience can be recruited in favour of the view that absence experience is non‐veridical. Then I argue that such literature is in fact amenable to the view that absence experience is veridical if we rethink our conception of absence, and presence, itself.

This paper categorizes phenomena to derive inferences rather than determine reality, emphasizing a fundamental attribute of the observed world that shapes perception. It posits that early life forms relied on correlation—linking survival to pattern recognition—suggesting correlation precedes causation in cognitive development. The concept of continuity, particularly the persistence of consciousness, emerges as a central human motivator, surpassing procreation, power, or meaning. Pleasure and pain are tied to continuity, with pain arising as a reaction to threats against it, such as death. (...) The fear of death and feelings of unfairness, especially regarding an afterlife, are framed as misattributions of value, rooted in humanity's drive to persist. (shrink)

This article puts forth a perceptual–phenomenological defence of “thought theory” as a solid solution to the paradox of fiction. Arguing against Kendall Walton’s pretence solution to Charles’s fear and going along the lines of Peter Lamarque’s and Noël Carroll’s thought theory, my proposed defence makes use of the philosophy of a figure who is rarely discussed in the context of phenomenology and never discussed in the context of the paradox of fiction: Leopold Blaustein. To bring forth my proposed perceptual–phenomenological defence, (...) I devise Blaustein’s descriptive account of “perception” and its role in shaping aesthetic experience. Within this line of thought, I further develop a perceptualist reading of Blaustein, paralleling Christine Tappolet’s version, that may be of service to proponents of the “perceptual theory of emotions.”. (shrink)

The question of who possesses the moral rights of creative works made using the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) is not fully resolved. In particular, the relationship between moral rights and moral agency in the production of creative works has been under-investigated in the literature. I explore these topics and argue that moral agency, intentionality and values-based reasoning are crucial for the entitlement of moral rights and hence the assignment of authorship. I conclude that, despite their great power to produce (...) creative works, current generative AI systems cannot be the moral author of such works due to the absence of intentionality with values-based reasoning. Instead, the human end-user of a generative AI system is the moral author in most cases. (shrink)

The aim of this article was to try to address the problem of theoretical coherence and adequacy theory in psychology from the perspective of one of the most influential schools of psychology in Europe at the time, namely the Brentano School. Unfortunately, this school has been marginalized in contemporary psychological science. The conceptual instrumentarium developed in the school—especially the concept of intentionality—offers attractive solutions, the greatest asset of which is the proposal of a coherent theoretical perspective for different types of (...) psychological variables, such as beliefs, emotions, and behavior, which could be defined and explained according to their specificity and not based on concepts adopted from different scientific disciplines. The lack of such a coherent perspective prevents the construction of adequate and precise definitions of variables that could be the starting point for strong psychological theories and resulting hypotheses. Psychological science should not limit its theoretical paradigms to deterministic explanations as these narrow the research perspective and, in many cases, transfer the researcher to the realm of mechanisms of little value for understanding the nature and even the function of mental processes. (shrink)

This article brings two outstanding figures into conversation about the problem of fictional entities and their indeterminacies: Roman Ingarden and David Lewis. Lewis’s account of fiction lacks an adequate ontology of ficta-qua-objects. Relying on his modal realism does not help, for it would make ficta “concrete” entities that merely indexically differ from our world’s entities. In this regard, I refer to Ingarden’s “purely intentional entities”. I read Lewis’s possible worlds in terms of Ingarden’s ontology; hence establishing what I term a (...) “Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism”. In so doing, the demarcation between fiction and actuality is preserved. In return, Lewis’s Analyses adequately account for Ingarden’s “spots of indeterminacy”. Therefore, my proposal reconciles Ingarden’s ficta with Lewis’s possibilist approach to truth in fiction. This approach grounds Lewis’s account in a less problematic ontology with a distinct sui generis status for ficta and provides Ingarden’s ficta with better determination principles. (shrink)

The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper, we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are ‘diffuse’. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...) we think does better. Finally, we disarm the objection that is responsible for dispositionalism’s bad press. (shrink)

An active area of research in the philosophy of mind concerns the relation between the two marks of the mental: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. One position that has recently gained in popularity is the _phenomenal intentionality theory_, according to which intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. Proponents of the phenomenal intentionality theory recognize Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology as a precedent, but little work has been done to locate Husserl within the contemporary landscape of views on the relation between the marks of the (...) mental. My aim is to do just that. I start by arguing that Husserl qualifies as an _inseparatist_: he holds that original intentionality and phenomenal consciousness necessarily co-vary. I then give a Husserlian critique of a notable and radical version of the phenomenal intentionality theory defended by Angela Mendelovici, focusing on her accounts of color perception and thought. Finally, I sketch a Husserlian version of the phenomenal intentionality theory that I think ought to be a serious contender in the contemporary scene. (shrink)

The fundamental problem for theoretical aesthetics is its inability to account for art’s meaning-value (Trimarchi, 2022). As previously argued, Art’s higher meaning is only found emerging from the artwork’s tacit dimensions, where empirical-historical intentionality is almost completely inconsequential (Trimarchi, 2024b). The latter’s interpretable ‘phenomenology of sequence’ produces a false theorising tendency, disconnecting art from the history of ideas and severing aesthetics from ethics and logic. Art appears ‘infinitely interpretable’, hence entirely subjective. Adapting Arnold’s (2011) actantial processual approach, I show how (...) Peircian semiotics, via ‘real Secondness’, uncovers art’s higher meaning. Peirce’s ‘diagrammatic thinking’ exposes art’s unique role of ‘objectifying’ the Person (in any subject, via appropriate propositions), without de-valuing this bearer of moral values. His ‘semiotic realism’ helps unveil Scheler’s anthropological (also termed ‘ethical’) phenomenology emerging from Merleau-Ponty’s ‘obscure zone’, to discern poetic from other speculation. Art’s ‘subject-objectivation’ (or, ethical intentionality) is thus able to be mapped phenomenologically to reveal any artwork’s meaning-value orientation. This paper combines Peirce’s ‘phenomenology of reason’ with Scheler’s hierarchy of values and Schelling’s ‘mythological categories’ (Trimarchi 2024b) to suggest a methodology for moving beyond neo-Kantian theoretical aesthetics (and analytical philosophy’s grip on the anti-art of ‘modernity’). That is, moving from the realm of perception to knowing, reviving art’s ontological connection to normative aesthetics. In conclusion, Peirce’s ‘science of ideals’ is thus revealed as Complexity Science, which – via his ‘suspended second’ (or, Ricoeur’s ‘second ontology’) - vindicates Schelling’s claim for how ‘aesthetics becomes objective’ (Trimarchi, 2024a). (shrink)

This paper explores self-envy as a kind of envy in which the subject targets herself. In particular, I argue that self-envy should be regarded as a variation of existential envy, i. e., envy directed toward the rival’s entire existence, though in the case of self-envy, the rival is oneself. The paper starts by showing that self-envy is characterized by an apparent weakening of envy’s triangular structure insofar as the subject, the rival, and the good coincide in the self. After discussing (...) an interpretation of self-envy in terms of a splitting of the self, I present an alternative explanation in terms of the ontological possibilities inherent in our actual and past empirical selves to become our ideal self. I argue that in self-envy, an actual empirical self envies her past empirical self for having more ontological possibilities of becoming her ideal self. I proceed to show that self-envy can be interpreted as a variety of existential envy. I argue that the existential self-reproach so characteristic of self-envy can be counterbalanced by feeling unconditionally loved by others and God. (shrink)

In order to compare the relationship between the intended aims of journalists and the journalistic texts produced, this article develops further the notion of the reader in two directions: first, as an intended ‘model reader’ of a media concept that is collectively construed in the editorial process and, second, as a ‘construed reader’ that is analyzed from the texts. Media concept and model reader are concepts and tools for making visible and analyzing the goals, values, content and organization of work (...) in media organizations, whereas with the concept of a construed reader it is possible to assess the texts as outcomes of the editorial process and in this way compare them with the intentions. The construed reader in the text is analyzed from the viewpoint of cognitive grammar theory and its ‘dimensions of construal’ in which ‘specificity’, ‘focusing’ and ‘perspective’ are used as linguistic tools for analysis. The case study data come from a Finnish third-sector magazine. (shrink)

Standardized academic English is now understood to be rooted in histories and practices that are colonial, classist, nationalist, heteronormative, ableist, and sexist. Current teaching of academic English carries an ethos of making practices of research writing accessible to students from marginalized backgrounds through explicit attention to language patterns and genre structures. In the context of both ideological critique and explicit pedagogy, I discuss three pragmatic elements of research writing—positionality, citation, and evaluation—with examples from one of my courses. I present these (...) elements and my approach to teaching them as a practice that is attentive to both details of published scholarship and students’ agency and intentionality in shaping their own writing projects, claims, and arguments. My work is framed by a functional approach to grammar where grammar is not interesting as a standardized apparatus but as a code that provides a range of options for producing performative effects. I call this spacious grammar. (shrink)

Most philosophical and linguistic theorizing about meaning focuses on cooperative forms of communication. However, much verbal communication involves parties whose interests are not fully aligned, or who do not know their degree of alignment. In such contexts, speakers sometimes turn to insinuation: implicatures that permit deniability about risky attitudes and contents. I argue that insinuation is a form of speaker's meaning in which speakers communicate potentially risky attitudes and contents without adding them to the conversational record, or sometimes even to (...) the common ground. (shrink)

In this paper, the author will explore the relationship between agency and intentionality of the artificial agent in the following seven ways.

Natural scientists working at the intersection of virtual reality, psychology, and computer science have recently explored the question of whether Embodied Virtual Reality (EVR) can be employed to train empathy. While for some authors (e.g., Bertrand et el. 2018), EVR can enhance empathy by means of creating a series of perceptual illusions, which lead users to adopt the other’s perspective and resonate with her experience, other authors (e.g., Sora-Domenjó 2022; Sutherland 2016) have been more skeptical about the powers of EVR (...) to increase empathy in its users. This chapter aims at contributing to this recent debate by exploring how perspective-taking contributes to empathy in EVR. After an analysis of perspective-taking in non-virtual and virtual environments, the chapter introduces the distinction between sensual and emotional empathy found in classical and contemporary phenomenology (Stein 1989 ; Sveaneus 2018). While in sensual empathy, the user empathizes with the other’s lived body, in emotional empathy, she apprehends the other’s emotional states and their related values. It is argued that while the perceptual illusions elicited by EVR can lead the user to the impression of a body swap and, in so doing, foster sensual empathy, for the apprehension of the other’s emotions, which is crucial to emotional empathy, EVR must be supplemented with a series of narrative devices which that make the other’s emotions and values accessible to her. (shrink)

I respond to comments from Mark Bowker, Jessica Keiser, and Eliot Michaelson on my book, Talking About. The response clarifies my stance on the nature of reference, conflicting intentions, and the sense in which language may have proper functions.

Control is typically accepted as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Thus, humans are morally responsible for their actions only if we can realise the right kind of control. Are there good reasons to think that humans can psychologically realise control? This paper is an attempt to address this question by establishing choice and agenthood as separate but interconnected aspects of control. I consider two challenges to the claim that humans can realise the kind of control required for moral responsibility. (...) First, an empirical challenge from cognitive neuroscience provides a familiar way to argue against the realisation of the choice aspect by human psychology. Second, a more formidable conceptual challenge to the aspect of agenthood presents us with scepticism about the kind of explanations that psychology can provide. The second challenge suggests that, in psychological accounts of choice, the agent disappears. Drawing on recent empirical models of cognitive control and philosophical accounts of agency, I conclude that the psychological explanation of choice is consistent with the aspect of agenthood being realised by human psychology. (shrink)

In recent years, research on modeling the human mind has been progressing rapidly in Japan, which has provided a framework for programming the mind in the current development of artificial intelligence. Despite the skepticism about this subject, it is possible to model the mind according to the same pattern as long as people feel the same way when placed in the same situations and if they can understand the feelings of others when placed in specific situations. In addition, as people (...) tend to understand other’s emotions by applying some model of the mind, the existence of such a model for understanding people’s emotions is not surprising. Therefore, this book introduces the main ideas of the model of the mind, indicating that the human mind is inevitably equipped with various emotions. In other words, this model yields several qualitatively different impulses defined as human emotions. Currently, the field of research that analyzes this model of the mind is called the “economics of emotions,” which is expected to become a unified theory applied across the humanities and social sciences. There is no human mind left that cannot be modeled by the economics of emotions as this concept focuses on the human mind as a whole. In this regard, this book (published in 2022 in Japan) touches on the key points discussed in the economics of emotions. While this book aims to present an overall picture to readers intending to study the economics of emotions, it will also help them organize the overall contents, whose English translation will be published in 2024. (shrink)

Esse trabalho pretende entender quais mecanismos da linguagem revelam a intencionalidade, analisando o trabalho de John Searle. Após a exposição de parte da teoria de Searle sobre a intencionalidade, será feito um comentário a respeito dos recentes avanços da Inteligência Artificial, em especial àquelas ferramentas que lidam com a linguagem natural. Por fim, explicaremos por que, por mais sofisticados que sejam, essas ferramentas estão longe de apresentar algum tipo de intencionalidade aos moldes da teoria de Searle.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Green Light Ethics: A Theory of Permissive Consent and its Moral Metaphysics by Hallie LibertoJonathan Ichikawa (bio)Review of Hallie Liberto, Green Light Ethics: A Theory of Permissive Consent and its Moral Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2022)Hallie Liberto's Green Light Ethics offers a framework for conceptualizing permissive consent. The book is a philosopher's work of philosophy. Although it touches on non-ideal social realities, especially sexism, it is most centrally (...) a contribution to a quite abstract literature in normative ethics, following in the tradition of scholars like David Owens, Heidi Hurd, Alan Wertheimer, and Tom Dougherty—it may have a few too many Φs and abstractions to be accessible to and comfortable for many people outside the analytic philosophical tradition. The central approach to permission and consent is general—not specific to sexual consent—although some discussions are specific to sex.I have always appreciated and learned from Liberto's work on this topic, and I was excited to read her new book. As I'd hoped, it exhibits fresh and interesting moral and philosophical instincts, and advances plausible and interesting ideas. I did feel, however, that it was sometimes more difficult than one might hope to identify exactly what those ideas are. At key points, I found myself wanting more precision or explanation. I am not the kind of philosopher who shuns abstraction—I value both the concrete/non-ideal and the theoretical/abstract. And I'm not afraid of all those Φs. But as I see it, the point of writing in that mode—the reason it can be worth the cost in accessibility and style—is the ability to express and examine complex ideas with a high degree of precision. As I was reading this book, I found that much of my own intellectual contribution centered around attempts to interpret Liberto's ideas and technicalities before I was in a good position to learn from them. This was a bit of a shame, because there are intriguing ideas in this book, well worthy of consideration. I'll give my own reconstruction of a few of them below, along with some critical engagement.1. domain authorityLiberto posits that there are certain domains over which people hold a special kind of moral authority, which she calls "domain authority" (38). Someone would wrong you if they acted in your domains outside of your normative control. For example, you have domain authority over sexual contact with your body; any actions by others within that domain must [End Page 429] be in accordance with your moral control, or they are violative. Liberto typically uses the following abbreviations to discuss domain authority: S is a person who may or may not be giving P permission to Φ, which is a potential action that P might perform. Φ here is always an action within D, a particular domain of S's moral authority. Since Φ is within D, Φ would wrong S if P Φ'd without S's appropriate authorization.In the case of sexual domain rights, D is S's bodily sexual domain; P would wrong S by performing some act Φ within that domain outside of S's authority. (Φ might be sexually penetrating S, for example.) The framework generalizes. D might be my home, and Φ could stand for potential actions within my home for which any S would need my permission: entering it, say, or drilling a hole in the wall. I'll follow Liberto's use for these abbreviations. Note that Φ will always refer to an act within S's domain D.One of the more distinctive contributions of Liberto's framework is her insistence that subjects retain their domain authority, even as they exercise it to permit action within their domains (42). When S consents to Φ, Liberto says, S does not waive any rights against Φ. If they did, Φ would no longer be part of S's domain of authority D. It is possible to waive rights in this way—this is what happens with property transfers. But Liberto argues that things are quite different for permissive consent (61). If I invite P into my home, or permit P to touch me sexually, they may do so without violating... (shrink)

Karl Pfeifer argues against Searle's "Connection Principle" which requires that unconscious intentional mental states must be in principle accessible to consciousness.

The distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of psychological explanation has proved useful in order to differentiate ways of understanding human behavior. Yet little has been discussed about how these kinds of explanations would work in making sense non-animals’ intelligent behavior. In this paper I assess the main characterizations of personal and subpersonal explanations and how they could be applied in interpreting animal behavior in a scientific setting. Specifically, my claim is that personal level explanation is especially relevant to explain (...) human actions as singular events. Through this, I will argue that instances of animal behavior can potentially be taken as singular events in the same way in which we take human action to be. Thus, personal level explanation plays an important role in behavioral sciences of non-human animals. -/- La distinción entre los niveles personal y subpersonal de explicación psicológica ha resultado de gran utilidad para diferenciar distintos modos de comprender el comportamiento humano. La discusión teórica en torno a la distinción se ha enfocado particularmente en torno a cómo caracterizar el nivel personal. Sin embargo, poco se ha dicho sobre cómo estas explicaciones operarían a la hora de hacer inteligible el comportamiento inteligente de animales no humanos. En este trabajo analizo las principales caracterizaciones que se han dado de las explicaciones de nivel personal y cómo éstas aplicarían a la interpretación del comportamiento animal en contextos científicos. Específicamente, defenderé que las explicaciones de nivel personal son especialmente relevantes para explicar las acciones humanas en tanto eventos singulares. A partir de esto, argumentaré que también los comportamientos animales pueden potencialmente ser eventos singulares como lo son las acciones humanas. Así, las explicaciones de nivel personal juegan un rol importante en las ciencias del comportamiento animal. (shrink)

Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental (...) history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious. (shrink)

The idea that our perceptual openness to the world is normative can mean different things. In the Kantian tradition of Peter Strawson, Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, this openness is essentially tied to epistemic justification, that is to say, to our readiness to provide reasons for our actions and our beliefs about how things are. In the phenomenological tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl, the notion of norm-responsiveness that is relevant to perceptual experience has less to do with epistemic justification than (...) with perception’s capacity to guide action or elicit certain behaviors. In the lectures on Active and Passive Synthesis, Husserl explains how perception involves a pull towards gaining a more optimal view of the object by moving around it or scrutinizing it in various ways. On his part, Maurice Merleau-Ponty invokes the notion of norm in reference to our capacity to skillfully move our bodies and alter our points of view according to the particular demands of our perceptual situation. (shrink)

We offer a critical review of the concept of neural information, as received within mainstream neuroscience from Artificial Intelligence. This conception of information is constructed as a conditional probability of a stimulus given a certain neural activation, a correlation that cannot be accessed by the organism and fails to explain its causal organization. We reconstruct an alternative conception of neural information: a pattern of signals that is selected by the organism (as an autonomous system) to contribute to its self-maintenance in (...) virtue of its correlation with external conditions, a correlation that might further be evaluated by the very system. (shrink)

A prominent version of emotional cognitivism is the view that emotions are preceded by awareness of value. In a recent paper, Jonathan Mitchell (2019) has attacked this view (which he calls the content-priority view). According to him, extant suggestions for the relevant type of pre-emotional evaluative awareness are all problematic. Unless these problems can be overcome, he argues, the view does not represent a plausible competitor to rivaling cognitivist views. As Mitchell supposes, the view is not mandatory since its core (...) motivations can be accommodated by competing views, too. I argue that Mitchell's case against the content-priority view is unconvincing as it misconceives the principal motivation for the view. As I show, properly reconstructed, this motivation provides a strong case for the indispensability of the view to any adequate cognitivist treatment of emotion. Moreover, Mitchell's survey of candidates for pre-emotional value awareness can be seen to rest on problematic phenomenological assumptions. (shrink)

The universe is a metaverse. Proven by quantum entanglement on all levels. Meaning 'what you see is never what you get.' No such thing as 'reality.' It's all in your 'mind.' (Everybody's 'mind.') Why observation cannot provide the 'truth.'.

The phenomenal view of thought holds that thinking is an experience with phenomenal character that determines what the thought is about. This paper develops and responds to the objection that the phenomenal view is chauvinistic: it withholds thoughts from creatures that in fact have them. I develop four chauvinism objections to the phenomenal view—one from introspection, one from interpersonal differences, one from thought experiments, and one from the unconscious thought paradigm in psychology—and show that the phenomenal view can resist all (...) four. (shrink)

Perception involves the processing of content or information about the world. In what form is this content represented? I argue that perception is widely compositional. The perceptual system represents many stimulus features (including shape, orientation, and motion) in terms of combinations of other features (such as shape parts, slant and tilt, common and residual motion vectors). But compositionality can take a variety of forms. The ways in which perceptual representations compose are markedly different from the ways in which sentences or (...) thoughts are thought to be composed. I suggest that the thesis that perception is compositional is not itself a concrete hypothesis with specific predictions; rather it affords a productive framework for developing and evaluating specific empirical hypotheses about the form and content of perceptual representations. The question is not just whether perception is compositional, but how. Answering this latter question can provide fundamental insights into perception. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between technological and human intelligence through ‘The New Natural’, a term which at once accepts the nature of technological intelligence as real instead of forever ‘artificial’. It supports an evolutionary, reciprocal relationship between humans and technology that culminates in technological singularity and rejects the primacy of human perception known to popular human access theories, before seriously considering the ‘decentered’ implications of posthuman access. In conversation with western-centric sci-fi film of the late twentieth century, then, this (...) philosophical study explores how the concept of a technology-only intelligence entity can: (1) help us dispose of the core problems often associated with human-only access, (2) neutral-ize our fears of human annihilation at the hands of technological intelligence, and (3) establish strong grounds for why we may have to push back against early conceptions of nature’s opposition to technology, if only so we may resist falling into the great, and most human-centered traps known to the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Schelling’s Principle of Art returns us to an ancient epic sensibility, laying the foundations for reversing the unrealistic ‘modern mythology’ arguably at the core of humanity’s ecological/existential crisis. This contribution examines how, by detailing his systematic approach to constructing art ‘in the particular’ (art-forms/works). ‘Particularity’ is subject only to the reason inherent in the potences (or consequences) of the affirmation of the whole unity (Principle). Hence Schelling’s ‘affirming principles’ determine boundary conditions for his ‘mythological categories’, revealing why their generalities inform (...) a ‘scientific sequence’ for explaining the features of the Formative and Verbal arts (ie., all artforms, ‘for all time’). Examining specific examples shows how Schelling resolves key difficulties (appearance/reality, form/non-form, intentionality, and purpose) for assessing art’s higher meaning-value directionality; why phenomenology is key to understanding it; and how we arrived at the problematic modern ‘epic’ reversal of ancient universalising focusing our attention on ‘efficient’ over ‘final’ causes in art-making/admiring. Explaining practical application of the Principle-in-action expands on why Schelling’s ‘dialectical aesthetics’ presents a hitherto unrecognised radical advance on Kant’s. My conclusion summarises what shifts in attendance to the art object Schelling’s system demands, and why his Philosophy of Art offers a suitable framework for collectively re-worlding the world. (shrink)

The words we wield possess the power to sculpt our realities and selves. This paper introduces a dichotomy of Kalimaat-e-Safa (کلمات صفا) i.e., Puritative Words and Kalimaat-e-Ghubar (کلمات غبار) i.e., Dustitative Words, exploring their impact on the Self's integration and disintegration. Through a lens that connects existential philosophy, cognitive psychology, and linguistic analysis, we define the transformative potential of Puritative Words to foster resilience, clarity, and growth amidst life's adversities. Conversely, Dustitative Words are examined for their capacity to cloud perception (...) and fragment the Self. Beyond theoretical exploration, this paper offers pragmatic strategies for cultivating linguistic mindfulness, advocating for a deliberate choice of words as a pathway to personal and collective well-being. By redefining our linguistic choices, we not only ease the complexities of existence with greater agency but also contribute to a more integrative and coherent narrative of the Self. (shrink)

Tanabe Hajime and Martin Heidegger are two thinkers who broach the larger question of the implications of mindfulness beyond subjective experience and self-control and, therefore, also think of the possibility of freedom as something lying beyond the will to power. They accomplish this through a deconstruction of traditional notions of subjectivity in their own, distinctive ways. As a result, bringing both philosophers into a critical dialogue can positively contribute to an emancipatory understanding of mindfulness and subjectivity. This chapter thus examines (...) this relationship from the perspective of their respective deconstructions of traditional conceptions of subjectivity with an emancipatory intent through their distinctive accounts of mindfulness. First, it explores Tanabe's preferred method for “overcoming” subjectivity, viz. mindfulness as metanoetics, which he considers to be a superior alternative to Heidegger's existentialism. Second, it puts Tanabe's metanoetics into a critical dialogue with Heidegger's own stand-in for mindfulness, namely Besinnung. While Tanabe's metanoetics aims to overcome subjectivity by dissolving it into a communal subject or “species”, Heidegger's Besinnung does so by way of a deconstruction of all such ecological or species-centric modes of thought. The main claim, therefore, will be that Besinnung provides a more compelling basis for an emancipatory project by avoiding the ethical and political problems that plague metanoetics. (shrink)

Written more than a hundred years ago, Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy is, today more than ever, essential reading material for anyone interested in social cognition. In this book – which still inspires current research – Stein provides a systematic account of the empathic experience. Stein’s view of empathy as a process, and her understanding of its main forms and functions in presenting the other as a spiritual being, provide valuable insights on the intersubjective nature of the human being. (...) Yet, it is not only from the perspective of social cognition that Stein’s book is relevant today. In fact, the book approaches a wide range of issues, from the idea of personhood to social ontology and ethics, and it exemplifies the power of phenomenology to shed light on the basic structure of human consciousness (for an overview: Calcagno 2007; Lebech 2004; MacIntyre 2006; Moran 2004). In this chapter, my aim is to explore the relevance of Stein’s book on empathy for contemporary research by focusing on three main issues which, in my view, can enrich current scholarship. The first issue concerns Stein’s understanding of empathy as a three-step process through which we become conscious of the other’s experience. The second relates to her views of the intentional structure of the emotions as revelatory of the realm of value. The third is her idea that not only emotions but also moods might have correlates, e.g., the fact that the world appears to be bathed in black for the depressive person. These three issues are not exhaustive of the ways in which Stein’s early work can be an inspiration for today’s researchers, but they are illustrative of how her insights can advance three central debates of contemporary philosophy: on social cognition, on the relation between emotion and value, and on the intentionality of moods. (shrink)

In this enquiry I establish Universal Desire Theory as the nominal designation of my active ethical framework, a system heavily influenced by the natural essentialists Philippa Foot and Jenny Teichman, wherein the comparative amalgamation of all subjectively experienced biological harm and benefit is the foundation of objective normativity. Highlights of this paper include the sections where I discuss the moral life of the cell, as well as the moral fallibility of hallucinating persons under this system which combines biological observation with (...) conscious awareness of action. I hope you enjoy. (shrink)