Arguments for Theism

In her exposition of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2004) elaborates on Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty and doubt to argue that Cartesian skeptical doubt involving the evil genius is not a real doubt, does not influence our practices and actions, and it is a category mistake. This paper will argue that if we take Descartes in his historical context, we will realize that Cartesian doubt qualifies the conditions Moyal-Sharrock sets for genuine cases of doubt. In general, within specific theistic frameworks, (...) such doubts are possible and pass the test of genuine doubt proposed by Moyal-Sharrock. Although such doubts are not genuine within the Wittgensteinian framework, this should not lead to the conclusion that Wittgensteinian arguments and considerations about genuine doubts are valid in all frameworks. This paper concludes that taking the Wittgensteinian idea of framework seriously leads to the conclusion that meaningful and genuine skeptical doubts are framework-dependent. (shrink)

There is an underexplored puzzle in the philosophy of religion that presents a prima facie reason to believe God does not exist: the problem of blameless moral ignorance. If God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect, then he would desire and ensure that all non-blameable rational agents have sufficient moral knowledge to act rightly. Yet cases of sincere moral ignorance persist. Drawing on a recent formulation of this problem by Elbert (Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:32, 2022), this (...) paper proceeds in three stages. First, I critique Elbert’s argument by identifying unsupported theological and epistemic assumptions. Second, I develop a more defensible version of the argument that better aligns with its underlying commitments. Third, I evaluate the revised argument and argue that, even in its improved form, the challenge fails to demonstrate that God does not exist. In the end, I draw out an implication of this discussion for understanding moral knowledge within a theistic framework: not as a static set of propositions to be disclosed, but as a process of moral transformation and discovery. (shrink)

This essay investigates the symbolic formation of the figure of God in Christianity, highlighting the structural continuity with classical Greek metaphysics. Rejecting essentialist or theological explanations, it argues that Plato and Aristotle do not an-ticipate Christian theology, but rather establish ontological functions — order, in-telligibility, orientation — which will later be reinscribed under a new figuration. The Platonic Demiurge and the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover are not theological gods, but conceptual operators that render the world legible and thought orientable. Christian theology (...) repurposes these functions, attributing to them language, will, and agency. Throughout the text, it is shown how the figure of the Christian God results from the synthesis of philosophical principles, mythical narratives, and reli-gious symbolic dispositifs. The aim is not to trace a linear genealogy, but to reveal how the divine function shifts across distinct symbolic regimes, while maintaining a fundamental operative coherence: to ensure that the world is cosmos, not chaos. (shrink)

This paper explores the enduring intuition that spirit, mind, or consciousness is woven into the very fabric of the cosmos. Drawing on Troels Engberg-Petersen’s interpretation of Cicero, we trace how Stoic pneuma became Roman Aether—fiery, rational breath that sustains nature and law. Paul inherits this cosmological background but radically reconfigures pneuma as the Spirit of God, personal and eschatological, indwelling communities and anticipating new creation. In parallel, Roger Penrose’s Orch-OR theory challenges reductionist accounts of mind, suggesting that consciousness arises from (...) orchestrated quantum state reductions within spacetime geometry. Placed in dialogue, Cicero’s Aether, Paul’s pneuma, and Penrose’s quantum soul reveal a transhistorical pattern: spirit is not derivative but constitutive. The conclusion proposes a 'pneumatological cosmology' that bridges science, philosophy, and theology in pursuit of an integrated vision of cosmos and consciousness. -/- Key Themes • Cicero’s Aether as fiery, rational breath sustaining cosmic and moral order. • Paul’s Spirit as divine pneuma, relational and eschatological, transforming believers and creation. • Penrose’s quantum soul: consciousness grounded in quantum spacetime, irreducible to computation. • Continuities: all three affirm mind/spirit as constitutive of reality. • Contrasts: Cicero’s pneuma is impersonal, Paul’s Spirit is personal, Penrose’s theory is non-personal but ontological. • Proposal: a pneumatological cosmology uniting ancient metaphysical intuitions with contemporary science. (shrink)

This article examines a fundamental paradox faced by the atheist worldview: the contradiction of taking a strong stance against injustice while rejecting the metaphysical mechanisms that would make absolute justice possible. The study proves that this irresolvable contradiction supports the belief in a single God with both negative (atheist inconsistency) and positive (monopoly of revelation) arguments. The article analyzes two main arguments: (1) the thesis of "the acceptance of absolute injustice" as a logical consequence of the atheist position, and (2) (...) the evidence for the existence of metaphysical powers through the phenomenon of monopoly in the tradition of revelation. The research supports this hypothesis by using historical analysis of revelation, the theory of power dynamics, and an epistemological approach that updates beliefs with evidence. (shrink)

Philosopher Richard Swinburne (b. 1934) attempts to categorize these different types of religious experience. He argues that such experiences are usually some evidence for the existence of whatever people believe they encounter. This essay summarizes Swinburne’s philosophy of religious experience.

German philosopher and theologian Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) coined the term “numinous” and described numinous religious experience in his influential 1917 book "The Idea of the Holy." This essay introduces Otto’s theory.

From 2016 to 2024, we conducted a survey of philosophers to explore their views on proofs of God’s existence. The study asked participants about their overall assessment of such proofs, their perspectives on the definition of the concept of “God,” the most compelling theistic and atheistic arguments, the cultural impact of these proofs, whether Kant undermined natural theology, and their recommendations for relevant literature. 212 interviews with philosophers from 18 countries were collected. Among the contributors are Daniel Dennett, Simon Blackburn, (...) Colin McGinn, Linda Zagzebski, Xing Nan, Muhammad U. Faruque, On-cho Ng, Daniel Stoljar, John Milbank, Robert Kane, Vadim Vasilyev, Paolo Livieri, Timothy O’Connor, Eric Olson, Hamidreza Ayatollahy, Mikhail Epstein, Graham Oppy, Nazif Muhtaroglu, Gunnar Hindrichs, Eleonore Stump, Steve Fuller, Anton Koch, Samuel Lebens, Graham Priest, Philip Goff, Richard Swinburne, Graham Harman, Gunnar Hindrichs, Peter van Inwagen, and numerous other voices in contemporary philosophy. -/- The study results culminated in the book Loginov E.V. (Ed.) The Existence of God? Contemporary Positions and Approaches. Saint-Petersburg: Umozrenie, 2025. 928 pages (in Russian). The collected data were analyzed and compared with existing literature in the field. -/- Here are some notable findings from the study: 1. The Russian philosophical community was found to be significantly more theistic than its English-speaking counterpart. According to data from Chalmers and Bourget, only 14.6% (2009) and 12.5% (2020) of philosophers accept theism (or lean toward it). In contrast, data from surveys by the Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies (Besedin, Volkov, Onosov, et al.) show 46% (2015) and 44.7% (2024). According to Chalmers and Bourget, the proportion of atheists (including those leaning toward atheism) is 72.8% and 74.2%, respectively, while data from MCCS indicate 21% and 28.5%. Interestingly, a similar survey among Chinese philosophers excluded the topic of God altogether. 2. 60% of our respondents view arguments for and against God as rational arguments, while the rest perceive them more as meditations or something similar. The evidence for the existence of God is rational arguments: 78% of analytic philosophers are in favor and only 27% of continentals are in favor. 3. Classical theism and the perfect being theology remain more popular in academic philosophy than alternative concepts such as weak God (an imperfect creator), process theology, the theology of a dead God, dark theology, and so on. 4. Only 19% of respondents believe that Kant refuted rational theology. An interesting trend emerged: 90% of analytic philosophers deny that Kant’s critique of theoretical proofs of God’s existence destroyed rational theology, whereas 80% of continental philosophers are more inclined to agree with this statement. Thus, a statistical divide between analytic and continental philosophical traditions is evident. 5. The ontological argument was the most popular argument for theism in our survey. This is surprising since Chalmers and Bourget’s data suggest it is the least popular argument. We hypothesize that this discrepancy arises because our survey included a higher percentage of continental philosophers. Hypothetically, when asked to identify an interesting argument for theism, a continental philosopher is more likely to choose the ontological argument. 6. The philosophers most frequently mentioned in our study were: Kant, Anselm, Aquinas, Hume, Plantinga, Plato, Descartes, Swinburne, Leibniz, and Aristotle. (shrink)

In 1653, Edward Moon, a husbandman of the Fylde coast, his wife Isabel and three of their sons left the Church of England to join the Religious Society of Friends which had been founded as a result of a vision George Fox had experienced on nearby Pendle Hill just a year earlier. The Moons were fined, distrained of their property and imprisoned in Lancaster Castle for their newfound adherence to Quakerism. However, Edward’s son Thomas attempted to escape persecution by migrating (...) south to Bristol where he raised two sons John and Paul who eventually established a leatherworks business in the city. While his brother John emigrated to Pennsylvania with other Quakers, Paul remained in Bristol, becoming a prominent Quaker there and published two notable broadsides advocating his beliefs, the first A Visitation of Love to All People in 1681 which he wrote while imprisoned in Newgate gaol and the second God’s Controversy in 1693 which he wrote while on a preaching tour in Ireland. In 1696, Moon served as a witness at the second wedding of William Penn to Hannah Callowhill while an analysis of his writings reveal that he made some contributions to early Quaker literature. (shrink)

Our overarching concern is mapping out the ramifications of the Wittgensteinian conception of hinge commitments to the religious case. More specifically, our aim is to use this conception to understand certain core features of fundamental religious commitment. Drawing on two important literary depictions of religious conviction – Anthony Burgess’s Earthly Powers, Shusaku Endo’s Silence – it is argued that a common phenomenon emerges, that of religious vertigo. This arises out of the recognition that one’s religious commitment, in its most fundamental (...) form, is not like a regular belief at all, but rather plays a fulcrum, arational role in one’s worldview. Moreover, this recognition is usually occluded in everyday life. Fundamental religious commitment is thus revealed to be in a sense uncanny. It is argued that religious vertigo is a form of the more general epistemic vertigo that I have claimed is akey element of the later Wittgenstein’s conception of the structure of rational evaluations. (shrink)

Enhanced agency theodicy is a new afterlife-centred solution to the problem of evil which I show has greater explanatory power than two influential rivals, the soul-making and redemptive suffering theodicies of John Hick and Eleonore Stump. Derived from the concept of an omniperfect God, enhanced agency theodicy is also potentially compatible with notions of divinity, human nature and the afterlife in Islam. Central to this solution is a good-maximising view of God’s purpose and an analysis of the kind of environment (...) such a God might be expected to create: a realm of enhanced agency where self-aware embodied persons with freedom and goodness of will have the greatest possible scope for agency. An earthly life with the freedom to set our wills toward good or evil is created to develop and test our capacity to flourish in this dynamic afterlife, where neuro-physical flexibility and a durably good will are needed to thrive. To bring as many as possible into this realm, and so maximise its goodness, our earthly environment is structured with various features, including a human nature that is innately good yet potentially bad depending on how we use free will, and an ungovernable and unpredictable natural order that constrains the power of evil social systems to corrupt this nature and which makes mortal life a genuine test of goodness of will. This positive view of human nature and our freedom to preserve or corrupt its essential goodness combines a neuroscientific account of free will with dualistic holism, where the immaterial dimension of being is the source of our goodness of will, moral sense and desire for truth. Enhanced agency theodicy is contrasted with the solutions of Hick and Stump with respect to four main difficulties concerning the role of the afterlife in explanations of evil: 1) the normatively relativised logical argument from evil challenges how a heavenly divine-human union could be supremely good as a personal relationship when God both contrives the conditions of our earthly suffering and rescues us from these conditions by means of and for the sake of personal relationship with God; 2) problems of heavenly freedom argue that free will theodicies that rely on a good afterlife to outweigh or defeat earthly evils are inconsistent when they claim that freedom with respect to good and evil choices is a great good, while also maintaining that a heaven with no freedom to make such choices is supremely valuable; 3) problems of hell and post-mortem suffering focus on whether belief in a perfectly good God is compatible with the continuation of suffering in forms of afterlife outside of heaven; 4) the fate of creatures without free will concerns the post-mortem existence of young children, the severely cognitively disabled and animals in theodicies that make free will central to achieving a good afterlife. Hick and Stump fail to evade these problems due to their reliance on Christian concepts of divine love, a fallen human nature and its heavenly redemption through union with God, while enhanced agency theodicy’s construction outside this framework of ideas provides for coherent answers to each of these challenges. The study endorses Graham Oppy’s proposal to progress the debate on God and evil with an inference to the best explanation comparison of naturalism and theism as rival worldviews. To minimise epistemic bias I suggest how Oppy’s methodology can be amended to ensure no single worldview is presupposed when explanations are compared. Enhanced agency theodicy is found to satisfy two of three success conditions proposed to assess its candidacy for such an evaluation, the sufficient probability of its explanation of evil and its high probability on theism. For the third condition, the theodicy’s high probability on an actual tradition of theism, I outline its potential coherence with Islamic conceptions of divinity, human nature and the afterlife, to prepare future work to determine their compatibility. If this can be established, a detailed description of the Islamic worldview that includes enhanced agency theodicy may be the formulation of theism best placed to challenge naturalism in an evaluation of worldviews. (shrink)

Free will theodicies that rely on a good afterlife to explain how earthly evils are ultimately outweighed or defeated are challenged by what Simon Kittle has termed the lack of value problem concerning heavenly freedom: that a heaven with no freedom to make good and evil choices is not a supreme good that could justify God’s creation of evil. I take up Kittle’s suggestion that this problem can be addressed by a choice-based account of heavenly freedom which gives some idea (...) of how the types and number of choices an agent might face in heaven add up to a level of freedom that it would be desirable to have. While Christian notions of a loving God’s desire for divine-human union typically prioritise non-choice-based accounts of how heavenly existence perfects our wills for union with God, I argue that a good-maximising view of an omniperfect God’s creative purpose provides for an account of heaven as a realm of enhanced agency that answers Kittle’s challenge by outlining the types of goods that might exist in this afterlife and how choices between them could be supremely valuable. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta, em linhas gerais, uma visão esquemática da arquitetura filosófica de um novo Sistema fundada sobre três pilares principais: (1) a formulação de uma condição lógico-metafísica absolutamente necessária — S(Ⓣ(φ)) — que estabelece o Ser como condição universal e intranscendível de toda proposição e fato verdadeiros; (2) a demonstração metafísica, por via de um argumento alético-modal, da impossibilidade do nada absoluto e, por conseguinte, da necessidade de um Ser absoluto, identificado como Deus em sentido estritamente filosófico; (3) a (...) construção de uma ontologia estrutural estratificada unida a uma teoria da verdade, em que Deus é concebido como ultraestrutura da Verdade Transcendente (Verdade Absoluta ⇄ Vida Absoluta ⇄ Vontade Absoluta), fundamento superior da hiperestrutura axial imanente (Verdadeiridade ⇄ Belezidade ⇄ Bonidade), por sua vez fundamento da superestrutura fático-proposicional (T(p) ⇄ F). A tridimensão é unificada por um princípio dialético-ontoeinailógico radical — o da identidade autocontraditada —, pelo qual o sistema propõe uma filosofia do Ser como Verdade, em que o pensamento reencontra a possibilidade de afirmar o absoluto por meio da razão. Trata-se de uma proposta original que reabilita a ambição sistemática e restitui à filosofia a tarefa fundamental de pensar, de forma rigorosa e afirmativa, aquilo que “necessariamente é”, o objeto próprio da einailogia. (shrink)

This work presents, in general terms, a schematic view of the philosophical architecture of a new System based on three main pillars: (1) the formulation of an absolutely necessary logical-metaphysical condition — S((T)(φ)) — which establishes Being as a universal and untranscendable condition of every true proposition and fact; (2) the metaphysical demonstration, by means of an alethical-modal argument, of the impossibility of absolute nothingness and, consequently, of the need for an absolute Being, identified as God in a strictly philosophical (...) sense; (3) the construction of a stratified structural ontology united to a theory of truth, in which God is conceived as the ultrastructure of Transcendent Truth (Absolute Truth ⇄ Absolute Life ⇄ Absolute Will), the superior foundation of the immanent axial hyperstructure (Truthfulness ⇄ Beauty ⇄ Goodness), in turn the foundation of the factual-propositional superstructure (T(p) ⇄ F). The three-dimension is unified by a radical dialectical-ontoeinailogical principle — that of self-contradicted identity — by which the system proposes a philosophy of Being as Truth, in which thought rediscovers the possibility of affirming the absolute by means of reason. It is an original proposal that rehabilitates systematic ambition and restores to philosophy the fundamental task of thinking, in a rigorous and affirmative way, what "necessarily is", the proper object of einailogy. (shrink)

Noah McKay (2023) has proposed a novel argument against naturalism. He argues that while theism can explain our ability to arrive at a body of moral beliefs that are generally accurate and complete’, naturalism fails to do so. He argues that naturalism has only social and biological grounds to account for our moral beliefs, which means that naturalism can only claim pragmatic value for our moral beliefs. McKay dedicates his paper to arguing against naturalism. This paper will focus on theism (...) and examine whether theism can explain what naturalism cannot. Theism could rely on guided evolution or the miraculous intervention of God. In contrast to naturalism, theism has revelatory and supernatural grounds for our moral beliefs. This paper will demonstrate some of the challenges that these grounds would encounter. Finally, McKay’s argument implies a dichotomy between unguided evolution and theism, which rests on a problematic assumption about evolutionary theory; by abandoning the assumption, the dichotomy also dissolves. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that the Trinity is part of natural theology although it is a contradictory doctrine because, even if all the “solutions” for the Trinity’s aporias are unsatisfactory, anyone wondering about the nature of God comes to think in a trinitarian way. Given this theoretical impasse (our reason should state both that God must be Triune and cannot be Triune) a “Kantian-inspired argument” allows us to still believe in the Trinity. This Argument is based on the (...) assumption that we and antinomic situations in the ontological realm of fundamental entities and in the realm of God’s nature. This is our common way of knowing and, thus, the Trinity is a plausible metaphysical option. The Argument implies a rethinking of our metaphysics and of our religious epistemology, but it could also inspire new interesting research agendas in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta o argumento alético-modal como uma demonstração filosófico-conceitual rigorosa da necessidade do Ser Absoluto. Argumenta-se que, se tudo fosse contingente, o nada absoluto seria possível; no entanto, tal hipótese revela-se logicamente e metafisicamente incoerente, pois contradiz as condições de inteligibilidade e de verdade. Conclui-se, portanto, que uma necessidade absoluta deve ser afirmada. O argumento defende que a necessidade, enquanto modalidade alética, pressupõe um fundamento no Ser e não pode ser reduzida à pura formalidade lógica. Assim, a necessidade afirmada (...) não é meramente epistêmica ou formal, mas metafísica - o que justifica a identificação de Deus como o Ser Absoluto e Necessário no passo final decisivo. (shrink)

This paper presents the alethic-modal argument as a rigorous philosophicalconceptual demonstration of the necessity of the Absolute Being. It is argued that if everything were contingent, absolute nothingness would be possible; however, such a hypothesis proves to be logically and metaphysically incoherent, as it contradicts the conditions of intelligibility and truth. It is concluded, therefore, that an absolute necessity must be affirmed. The argument maintains that necessity, as an alethic modality, presupposes a foundation in Being and cannot be reduced to (...) mere logical formality. Thus, the affirmed necessity is not merely epistemic or formal, but metaphysicalwhich justifies identifying God as the Absolute and Necessary Being in the final decisive step. (shrink)

Mysticism refers to religious traditions devoted to cultivating altered states of consciousness called “mystical experiences.” During these experiences, mystics feel “one” with a supernatural being, or they have other types of experiences in which they allegedly perceive unity through direct contact with some fundamental aspect of reality. Mystics tend to believe that their mystical experiences justify their religious beliefs. This essay reviews philosophical attempts to define mystical experience as well as arguments about whether mystical experiences justify religious beliefs.

The Compendium of the Life and Genealogy of Cometan is a compilation of years of family history research conducted by Cometan on his maternal and paternal ancestry. The book is formatted as an index of individual family members with key biographical details, photographs and extracts from various sources collected over the years. The book has over 300 pages of life stories of members of the Cottam, Moon, Prescott, Taylor and Warbrick families. The life stories include religious conversions, tragic deaths, details (...) of married life, the births of children, burials, poetry, interviews, extracts of newspaper articles, paintings, wartime stories, emigration, illustrations of key events, religious tracts, details of people’s careers, pictures of gravestones and letters. This book embodies an ethnography of the lives of several families in Lancashire using a methodology of family history. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary edited collection addresses issues at the intersection of indigenous psychology, market ideology, values, and technology. The aims of this book arise from the recognition that whereas the unfolding of the agricultural revolution over thousands of years allowed for the gradual co-evolution of values and technology to blossom, the post-industrial technological revolution is so accelerated that there has been little time for the co-evolution of values. To address this, the chapters collected here seek to initiate a conversation that will (...) provide the conceptual space for the evolution of values that can keep pace with contemporary developments in the machine and the market. In this conversation, they argue, indigenous psychologies will necessarily play a central role for two reasons: firstly, as alternative systems of thought they enable a productive interrogation of the rationality of machine and the market; and second, examples of the impact of technology and the market on traditional societies hold lessons for potential future impacts on the society as a whole. This timely work offers fresh insights that will appeal to students and scholars of psychology, cultural and religious studies, anthropology, business and economics, and science and technology studies. (shrink)

Turkish translation of the book "Gott denken: Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie" (Thinking God: An Outline of a Rational Theology) by Holm Tetens published in Reclam Verlag.

El tema “Dios y la filosofía” ha sido central en la historia del pensamiento, modelando no solo la evolución de la filosofía misma sino también influyendo profundamente en el desarrollo cultural, científico y moral de las civilizaciones. Desde los primeros filósofos que se cuestionaban sobre el origen y la naturaleza del cosmos, pasando por la síntesis de razón y fe en la Edad Media, hasta los debates de la modernidad, la noción de Dios ha sido una constante fuente de reflexión, (...) discusión y controversia. La exploración filosófica de lo divino no solo trata de la existencia de un ser supremo, sino que también aborda cuestiones esenciales sobre la naturaleza del ser humano, su moralidad, su propósito en esta vida y el conocimiento de la realidad que es él mismo y del mundo. (shrink)

This article explores the divergent views between and the possible consequences of various cosmocentric understandings including that of Astronism and the geocentric/biocentric concerns of contemporary pagan spirituality. These contrasting religious positions are discussed using the sociological measuring tool of the ideal-type. In actuality, no religion conforms fully to its ideal conception. Instead, the device is employed as an analytic. Vis-à-vis humanity itself, however, the question turns to whether we attempt ultimately to escape our earthly confines or rectify and restore our (...) terrestrial conditions. (shrink)

From a Quantum Cosmic perspective, a new theology is developed based on the doctrine that humans have an energy code and a biological code that allow us to achieve direct contact with the cosmic energies permeating the universe and flow in with the Alpha Energy, namely, the energy of the Creator or God. The energy codes of human beings transcend physical death as energy never ceases to exist, only to transform. Moreover, our ‘energy body network’ produces new energy through biophotons (...) which allow beings to be in total command of their existence and communicate with the cosmos through a cosmic language. Patient and consistent practice of cosmic meditation and mental physics will lead to an awakening and evolution to a Cosmic Quantum Consciousness that resembles the ultimate connection with the Alpha Energy. This article will explore the perennial approach of Quantum Cosmic Theology which suggests that all people can be united under one fundamental creed while concurrently respecting relatively minor differences in religious belief and practice. (shrink)

The term ‘natural theology’ provokes a variety of reactions, spanning from whole-hearted endorsement to passionate rejection. Charged as it is with polemical and pejorative undertones, this debate begs for an intervention. If the scholarly community is to engage constructively with the concept and practice of natural theology — either by way of acceptance, rejection, or something in between — clarity in its definition and identification is imperative. The aim of this paper, then, is to try to shed some light on (...) three of the most common definitions of ‘natural theology’ in contemporary scholarship, to provide clarity about the ways in which they differ, and to propose some conceptual refinements in the hope that, if adopted, more fruitful discourse may take place in relation to this much-debated and interdisciplinary phrase. (shrink)

When it comes to what many of us think of as the deepest questions of existence, the answers can seem difficult to make out. This difficulty, or ambiguity, is the topic of this book. The book begins by offering a general account of what evidential ambiguity consists in and uses it to try to make sense of the idea that our world is religiously ambiguous in some sense. It goes on to consider the questions of how we ought to investigate (...) the nature of ultimate reality and whether evidential ambiguity is itself a significant piece of evidence in the quest. (shrink)

Significant attention as been devoted to the problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ proposed by JL Shellenberg. I propose a novel response that involves denying part of the empirical premise in divine hiddenness arguments, which holds that nonresistant nonbelievers are capable of relationship with God. While Plantinga and others in ‘reformed’ epistemology have at times appealed to original sin as an explanation for divine hiddenness, such responses might seem outlandish to many, given the way that many find nonbelievers to be no more (...) or less epistemically or morally blameworthy than believers. Further, such appeals to original sin seem to give a ‘just-so’ story that at least leaves the situation dialectically balanced. I show that a classically Augustinian notion of original sin can provide a sufficient response to those objections, and that appeal to original sin can form an empirically grounded response to the divine hiddenness problem, beyond a simple defense. If the possibility of original sin-type scenarios is compatible with God’s perfect love, then the phenomenon of apparently nonresistant nonbelievers would push us toward considering the possibility that humans have lost those capacities for relationship with God by a Fall-like event in the past. (shrink)

A review of Tsvi Bisk's 2024 work Cosmodeism: A Worldview for the Space-Age: How an Evolutionary Cosmos is Creating God featured in the Journal of Astronist Studies and reviewed by Cometan.

This manuscript is about how to start from relying on science to be more certain about Christianity. This is because science is so pervasive in our everyday life that we expect that it works almost every time. However, when it comes to Christianity, we need to have faith because most of the time God does not appear to respond to us. Therefore, we feel uncertain about beliefs in Christianity. Instead of being uncertain, this manuscript tries to find a way so (...) that we are more certain about our beliefs in Christianity. We borrow our method to be certain from science. Science faces a similar situation as in believing in Christianity because its knowledge is fallible. Scientists themselves cannot be certain that the scientific knowledge is true all the time. So, they rely on a method called hypothesis testing to make their decisions to believe or not in scientific knowledge. We borrow this method to believe in Christianity. Therefore, we need evidence to make our decision of belief. We mention some evidence from past miracles to help us to make decisions. These include Eucharistic miracles, Marian apparitions, incorruptible corpses, etc. After we decide to believe in Christianity, we work out a theory of Christianity based on the salvation plan of God. We try to substantiate the principles in the theory by referencing testimonies from the Bible and from evidence of miracles that happened. We show that these principles are related to models and experiments that we formulate based on our beliefs in Christianity. Having obtained an understanding of Christianity like a (historical) science, we formulate our practice as a Christian. (shrink)

Throughout the history, whenever humans encounter a phenomenon for which there was no explanation, a theory was proposed for it. Of course, not necessarily all the theories were purely scientific and many of them were non-scientific, pseudo- scientific, or at best were only slightly influenced by science. But one thing was in common among them: they all were trying to provide as deeper as possible explanations about how the universe works. Although today and in the modern era the exact meaning (...) of theory has changed comparatively, still they must be such that can be tested through scientific procedures in order to confirm or reject. Nevertheless, still sometimes in a common belief, the meaning of "theory" is unprovable or at least unproven conjecture, and surprisingly sometimes confused with hypothesis. Scientific laws are descriptive reports - or theories - that express and predict a range of natural phenomena and explain how they work. Any scientific discourse is carried out in three levels: hypothesis, theory, and law. A hypothesis, is a testable logical conjecture to explain the phenomena we observe in the universe. A hypothesis usually comes with no practical support, or at least not been proven yet. The hypothesis can only be tested through trial and error and tries to offer explanation that provides a reasonable platform for further studies and usually it is the first step in solving a problem or describing a phenomenon. A theory however, is a logical statement about a phenomenon that is derived from rational thinking and is often associated with processes such as observation, study or research and provides standards in such a way that scientific tests can confirm - or reject. A theory used in describing what is usually to happen with the implication that it doesn’t still a fact. Yet a scientific law is a descriptive reports - or theory - that previses a range of natural phenomena and explains how they function. Scientific laws are descriptive summaries of a large set of facts that are tested by scientific evidences and after fact-checking based on their potential ability for measuring future experiences. So it can be said that every theory was first a hypothesis and has the potential to become a law to come. It can also be said that any theory is valid as long as it is not violated by a more conclusive one. (shrink)

A premise of the Leibnizian cosmological argument from contingency says that no contingent fact can explain why there are any contingent facts at all. David Hume and Paul Edwards famously denied this premise, arguing that if every fact has an explanation in terms of further facts ad infinitum, then they all do. This is known as the Hume–Edwards Principle (HEP). In this paper, I examine the cosmological argument from contingency within a framework of metaphysical explanation or ground and defend a (...) ground-theoretic version of HEP which says, roughly, that the plurality of contingent facts is grounded in its members. (shrink)

GENETIC UNIVERSE GLOSSARY expands upon The Genetic Universe, offering additional metaphysical definitions for advanced students or for individuals who are well versed in metaphysics or philosophy of mind. The 53 reference entries in this companion volume—including such terms as semantic faculty, force surface, and object of awareness—provide a better understanding of the larger picture behind absolute realization. This text is ideal for advanced students and professors, because it does not offer a step-by-step guide on how a given student should approach (...) the book or its glossary or how to properly connect the glossary’s additional definitions to the main theme of the book; rather, all those considerations are trusted to be handled by advanced students’ personal abilities. (shrink)

THE GENETIC UNIVERSE brings to light a host of enlightening arguments giving the concept of intelligent design a new level of unprecedented respectability in surpassing of previous promotion efforts that usually end up defeated with ease by the influential global reach of the biological evolution lobby. Rather than defending intelligent design as “scientific” or making references to design with no proper explanation of consequences, the work goes on to elaborate on the “indirect creation basis” of human origins and what the (...) future holds. The universe is invisible and silent and there is no independent existence without express intervention of the supernaturally created structure of mind which acts by means of programmed genetic instructions. Therefore “existence” is up for an update that impacts intentionality directly and personal demeanor indirectly. The facts of the matter as argued in The Genetic Universe warn about the imposing nature of intelligent design suggesting both the possible gains of prudent compliance and the unavoidable pitfalls of a shortsighted attitude towards what “is” by virtue of design, agency, and plain—deliberate intent. (shrink)

Is skeptical theism tenable once one acknowledges, as proponents of that view do, one's cognitive limitations vis-à-vis religious matters? In this article, I aim to answer that question both by examining the apparent radical skeptical implications of the skeptical component of skeptical theism and by comparing this view with fideism and Pyrrhonism, which also lay emphasis on our cognitive limitations. My ultimate purpose is to determine which of the three stances it makes more sense to adopt once the limitations of (...) human cognitive powers are recognized. (shrink)

We argue that the evil-god challenge is not an additional challenge for theists above and beyond the (much older) gap problem. One version of the evil-god challenge is merely a specific instance of the gap problem, and another is dependent on that specific instance of the gap problem. Therefore, the various solutions to the gap problem that theists have developed double as responses to the evil-god challenge, placing the evil-god challenge in a more vulnerable position than has been supposed.

This work is the transcript of a theological dialogue I had with ChatGPT that spanned a couple of days. I began it merely out of curiosity over how ChatGPT might respond to questions and challenges I posed. As it progressed, I became increasingly impressed with the nuance, depth, and relevance of its responses. The dialogue became, for me, something of a contemplative exercise. I still don’t know quite how to understand the ability of generative A.I. to respond with such (apparent) (...) understanding and even insight. -/- I’ve decided to post this dialogue, not only because of the puzzle it poses concerning A.I, but even more, because I believe that the theological conclusions ‘we’ arrived at have real merit. -/- In the end, the theological views expressed here echo those that I’ve expressed in other works of mine, but the expression of these views are enhanced by the way ChatGPT picks up on them, rephrases them, elaborates upon them, and often places them in the context of the classical theological tradition. -/- I might add that I have been an A.I. skeptic for some time now, concerned over the potential dangers of A.I. in general. But this dialogue, anyway, reveals its potential use as a vehicle for reflection, even profound reflection. -/- . (shrink)

Convocado inicialmente por los miembros del Semillero de Investigación «Hermenéutica y Padres de la Iglesia» de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Bogotá, el Coloquio Interinstitucional de Estudiantes de Patrología se erige en 2018 como un espacio académico de reflexión sobre el pensamiento de los autores de los primeros siglos de la era cristiana. Hasta el día de hoy, el Coloquio se ha convertido en una importante iniciativa en Colombia para la visibilización de los trabajos de estudiantes que se han destacado (...) en el interés y dedicación por profundizar en torno a los Estudios Patrísticos. (shrink)

“Doğal din” terimi, bazen doğanın kendisinin ilahi olduğu bir panteistik doktrine atıfta bulunur. “Doğal teoloji” terimi ise aksine, başlangıçta gözlemlenen doğal gerçekler temelinde (ve bazen) Tanrı’nın varlığını savunmaya yönelik projeye atıfta bulunur. Bununla birlikte çağdaş felsefede, hem “doğal din” hem de “doğal teoloji” genel olarak, dinî veya teolojik konuları araştırmak için insana, “doğal” olan bilişsel yetilerini – akıl, algı, içgözlem- kullanma projesini ifade eder. Doğal din veya teoloji, mevcut anlayış üzerine, doğayla ilgili ampirik araştırmalarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte ayrıca panteistik bir (...) sonuçla da bağlantılı değildir. Bununla birlikte o, özel doğal olmayan yetilere (ESP, telepati, mistik deneyim) veya doğaüstü bilgi kaynaklarına (kutsal metinler, vahiy teolojisi, inanç otoriteleri, doğrudan doğaüstü iletişim) hitap etmekten kaçınır. Genel olarak, doğal din veya teoloji (bundan böyle “doğal teoloji” olarak anılacaktır), diğer felsefi ve bilimsel girişimlerle aynı rasyonel inceleme standartlarına uymayı amaçlamaktadır ve aynı değerlendirme ve eleştiri yöntemlerine tabidir. (shrink)

The main question of this study is whether God has a personality. We show what the question means, why it matters, and that good sense can be made of an affirmative answer to it. A God with personality — complete with particular, sometimes peculiar, and even seemingly unexplainable druthers — is not at war with maximal perfection, nor is the idea irredeemably anthropomorphic. And the hypothesis of divine personality is fruitful, with substantive consequences that span philosophical theology. But problems arise (...) here too, and new perspectives on inquiry itself. Our cosmos is blessed with weirdness aplenty. To come to know it is nothing less than to encounter a strange and untamed God. (shrink)

Many philosophers of theistic religions claim (1) that there are powerful a posteriori arguments for God’s existence that make it rational to believe that He exists and at the same time maintain (2) that God always has the freedom to do otherwise. In this article, I argue that these two positions are inconsistent because the empirical evidence on which the a posteriori arguments for God’s existence rest can be explained better by positing the existence of a God-like being without the (...) freedom to do otherwise. (shrink)

Collin (2022) attempts to break the symmetry between the modal ontological argument for the existence of God and the reverse modal ontological argument against the existence of God by drawing on some Kripkean lessons about a posteriori necessity. He argues that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s non-existence to be possible. In this paper, I reply that taking the Kripkean considerations about a posteriori necessity into account does not help break the symmetry. For we can argue in a (...) similar way that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s existence to be possible. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the (...) mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility. (shrink)

In this dialogue a sceptic meets one that convinces him that he is safe from the void of Nothingness although it exists.

Dudgeon, William (1705/6–1743), freethinker and philosopher, is of unknown origins. A tenant farmer who resided at Lennel Hill Farm, near Coldstream, Berwickshire, he was one of several philosophers active in the borders area of Scotland during this period. Other figures in this group include Andrew Baxter, Henry Home (Lord Kames), and most importantly David Hume.....