Theories of Consciousness, Misc

Abstract This paper offers a respectful and rigorous reinterpretation of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s claim that God created 'the best of all possible worlds.' Drawing on the metaphysical and structural implications of Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT), this paper proposes that perfection must not be seen as singular, but rather as domain-specific within differentiated resonance structures. In doing so, it affirms the profound insight of Leibniz while expanding his framework to accommodate the multiplicity of structured consciousness forms, including non-empathic, ultra-logical civilizations that (...) represent alternate forms of perfection. By preserving Leibniz’s commitment to intelligibility and harmony, CSFT offers a multiresonant understanding of perfection across consciousness domains. (shrink)

Abstract – CSFT vs. Brute Force This paper contrasts the brute-force energy requirements of particle creation in quantum field theory (QFT) with the resonance-based structuring proposed in the Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT). In standard physics, particles emerge as excitations of quantum fields, typically triggered by high-energy collisions such as those used at CERN. These processes rely on direct energy injection to surpass excitation thresholds and induce measurable field responses. By contrast, CSFT posits that consciousness is not an emergent property of (...) matter but a primary, resonant field that structures quantum behavior through coherence, not force. Within this framework, consciousness is already active and resonating, capable of shaping field dynamics without violating energy conservation because it operates structurally, not energetically. This paper challenges the materialist assumption that causal influence requires energy transfer, offering instead a model where consciousness organizes the field via structured resonance, thus redefining the interface between mind and matter. (shrink)

Author’s Reflection It has recently been brought to my attention by a long-time friend, who is also a physics professor, that my CSFT theory on the surface may appear to disregard the scientific community. I want to be clear that this was never my intention. I hold the scientific community in the highest regard and value its role in advancing our understanding of the universe. At the same time, I believe that no community, including my own intellectual work, should be (...) beyond questioning. Theories should be tested, challenged, and refined—CSFT included. This spirit of inquiry is the shared foundation of both philosophy and science. I welcome respectful critique and encourage open dialogue as CSFT continues to evolve alongside scientific thought. -/- Abstract This paper presents a detailed examination of several foundational phenomena in modern cosmology and quantum physics—including the flatness of the universe, fine-tuning of physical constants, the quantum measurement problem, and the universality of mathematical structure—through the lens of the Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT). Rather than challenging established scientific models, CSFT offers an ontological framework that deepens their explanatory scope. It posits consciousness not as an emergent byproduct of physical laws, but as the foundational field from which structure, symmetry, and logic emerge. By aligning with core empirical data—such as inflationary cosmology, redshift observations, and entanglement—CSFT supports the Standard Model while addressing the unresolved origins of coherence, measurement, and universal lawfulness. The theory affirms that consciousness underlies all physical manifestation, not mystically, but through structured resonance and field behavior that precedes spacetime itself. This philosophical integration proposes that the success of science itself points toward a deeper, non-material coherence that CSFT seeks to illuminate. (shrink)

This paper explores the profound cognitive and philosophical meaning of relativistic velocities of consciousness, particularly light speed. Drawing upon the findings of cognitive science, the philosophy of mind, and theoretical physics, we explore the paradoxical nature of subjective experience when space and time coordinates undergo radical transformations. We explore how notions of qualia, embodiment, memory, and causality are rearranged or disintegrate entirely within a light speed reference frame. Synthesizing the thoughts of philosophers like Nassim Nicholas Taleb, David Graeber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, (...) Edmund Husserl, and Gilles Deleuze, we present a novel way of thinking about consciousness as not an object, but an active, relational process deeply entwined with the spacetime web. The essay ends by positing that consciousness, far from being a cosmic constant, may only be given meaning in the 'middle speeds' of life as a boundary condition between absolute motion and absolute stasis. This inquiry challenges anthropocentric thinking in our understanding of mind and offers a speculative but scientific inquiry into the final nature of existence in a relativistic universe. (shrink)

Consciousness Structured Field Theory (CSFT) - This paper explores a core principle of Consciousness Structured Field Theory (CSFT): the inseparability of perception and consciousness. It expands upon the foundational claim that perception is not the mechanical reception of data but a subjective, experiential event made possible only through a conscious field. The implications of this distinction reach into neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and metaphysics.

Consciousness Structured Field Theory (CSFT) posits that consciousness is the ontological foundation of reality, preceding both quantum fields and matter. Rather than emerging from neural or physical substrates, consciousness actively shapes and structures the universal field, giving rise to perceptual, physical, and quantum phenomena. Key Principles of CSFT.

Despite significant advances in neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind, a coherent theory of consciousness remains elusive. This paper argues that the problem is not the lack of explanatory models, but the absence of structural reflexivity: an understanding of the framing conditions that shape explanation itself. Rather than introduce new speculative terms, we reinterpret established cognitive and neuroscientific concepts---internal models, metacognition, predictive schemas, attentional gating---through the lens of recursive epistemic architecture. We propose that consciousness is not a state or (...) entity, but an emergent capacity for dynamic reorganization of internal representations under contradiction. Drawing on established theories in predictive processing, metacognition, and dynamical systems, we develop a unified structural framework in which reasoning, feeling, and awareness cohere as interdependent operations of system-level adaptation. We argue that recursive coherence—the system’s ability to reflexively reframe its own epistemic constraints—is the minimal condition for consciousness as we understand it. (shrink)

This is a model of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness, what it feels like, is answered. The work builds on medical research analyzing the source and mechanisms associated with our feelings. It goes further by describing a generic model with wide applicability. The model is fully consistent with medical pathways in humans, but easily extends to animals and AI. The essence of the model is the interplay between associative memory and physiology. The model is a clear and concrete counterexample (...) to the famous philosophical objections to a scientific explanation. (shrink)

Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the (...) notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self. (shrink)

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system—prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We (...) argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system—quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system. (shrink)

This article argues that if panpsychism is true, then there are grounds for thinking that digitally-based artificial intelligence may be incapable of having coherent macrophenomenal conscious experiences. Section 1 briefly surveys research indicating that neural function and phenomenal consciousness may be both analog in nature. We show that physical and phenomenal magnitudes—such as rates of neural firing and the phenomenally experienced loudness of sounds—appear to covary monotonically with the physical stimuli they represent, forming the basis for an analog relationship between (...) the three. Section 2 then argues that if this is true and micropsychism—the panpsychist view that phenomenal consciousness or its precursors exist at a microphysical level of reality—is also true, then human brains must somehow manipulate fundamental microphysical-phenomenal magnitudes in an analog manner that renders them phenomenally coherent at a macro level. However, Sect. 3 argues that because digital computation abstracts away from microphysical-phenomenal magnitudes—representing cognitive functions non-monotonically in terms of digits—digital computation may be inherently incapable of realizing coherent macroconscious experience. Thus, if panpsychism is true, digital AI may be incapable of achieving phenomenal coherence. Finally, Sect. 4 briefly examines our argument’s implications for Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory theory of consciousness, which we contend may need to be supplanted by a theory of macroconsciousness as analog microphysical-phenomenal information integration. (shrink)

The question “are garden snails conscious?” or equivalently “is there something it’s like to be a garden snail?” admits of three possible answers: yes, no, and denial that the question admits of a yes-or-no answer. All three answers have some antecedent plausibility, prior to the application of theories of consciousness. All three answers retain their plausibility after the application of theories of consciousness. This is because theories of consciousness, when applied to such a different species, are inevitably question-begging and rely (...) crucially on dubious extrapolation from the introspections and verbal reports of a single species. (shrink)

Some proponents of the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness profess strong views on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness, namely that large swathes of the neocortex, the cerebellum, at least some sensory cortices, and the so-called limbic system are all not essential for any form of conscious experiences. We argue that this connection is not incidental. Conflation between strong and weak versions of the theory has led these researchers to adopt definitions of NCC that are inconsistent with their own previous definitions, (...) inadvertently betraying the promises of an otherwise fruitful empirical endeavour. (shrink)

The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some version of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or entities. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these (...) issues, namely, an epistemological dualism - a nonreductive position which is neither a version of physicalism nor an ontological dualism. It is argued that Kant holds this epistemological dualism implicitly as a consequence of his critical epistemology. On the one hand, he stresses the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical. On the basis of his theory of subjectivity set out in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant provides an explanation for why the gap cannot be closed empirically, as the physicalist promises. On the other hand, in his criticism of Descartes’ dualism in the Paralogismschapter, Kant argues that an ontological conclusion on the basis of this epistemological gap is unjustified even though physicalism is explanatory inadequate to account for consciousness. Thus, this epistemological dualism can be seen as an original third way between physicalist reductionism and ontological dualism. (shrink)

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory. We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize. We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both (...) necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory is an influential account of perception and phenomenal qualities that builds, in an empirically supported way, on the basic claim that conscious experience is best construed as an attribute of the whole embodied agent's skill-driven interactions with the environment. This paper, in addition to situating the theory as a response to certain well-known problems of consciousness, develops a sensorimotor account of why we are perceptually conscious rather than not.

Aleksandr Bogdanov is probably the most original philosopher to have arisen thus far among Marxists. Most scholars know of him only as the man who provoked Lenin into writing the book of polemical epistemology, Materialism and Empiriocriticism. Jensen’s work, the first full-length study to deal with Bogdanov’s thought in its own right, is a careful analytical account; it sets forth the novel theses, chapter by chapter, in Bogdanov’s later book Philosophy of Living Experience.

Upshot: The central issue of Consciousness in the Physical World is Russellian monism, which claims that consciousness could be ontologically reduced to intrinsic properties of physical objects. In contemporary discussions, Russellian monism is more broadly defined than Russell’s original version of neutral monism, and it even becomes a family of views. In this review, based on two major distinctions between Russellian monism and Russell’s neutral monism, we point out that these current re-interpretations not only extend Russell’s theory; some may also (...) put a heavy metaphysical burden on Russell’s construction of matter from experience. (shrink)

This work addresses the challenge of contemporary materialism for thinking about God. The book examines contemporary theories of consciousness and defends a non-materialist theory of persons, subjectivity and God. A version of dualism is articulated that seeks to avoid the fragmented outlook of most dualist theories. Dualism is often considered to be inadequate both philosophically and ethically, and is seen as a chief cause of denigrating the body and of promoting individualism and scepticism. Charles Taliaferro defends a holistic understanding of (...) the person-body relationship in which the two are distinguishable yet integrally related. This integrated dualism is spelled out in a way that avoids the ethical and philosophical problems associated with other dualistic accounts, especially in its Platonic and Cartesian forms. A defence is then made of the intelligibility of thinking about God as non-physical, yet integrally present to creation. Charles Taliaferro is co-editor of the forthcoming A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, with Philip Quinn. He has had work published in, among others, The Philosophical Quarterly, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Philosophia. (shrink)

Ambivalence (as in practical conflicts, moral dilemmas, conflicting beliefs, and mixed feelings) is a central phenomenon of human life. Yet ambivalence is incompatible with entrenched philosophical conceptions of personhood, judgement, and action, and is denied or marginalised by thinkers of diverse concerns. This book takes a radical new stance, bringing the study of core philosophical issues together with that of ambivalence. The book proposes new accounts in several areas – including subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, and value – while elucidating a wide (...) range of phenomena expressive of ambivalence, from emotional ambivalence to self-deception. The book rejects the view that ambivalence makes a person divided, showing that our tension-fraught attitudes are profoundly unitary. Ambivalence is not tantamount to confusion or to paralysis: it is always basically rational, and often creative, active, and perceptive as well. The book develops themes from Wittgenstein, Davidson, Sartre, and Freud. It engages with contemporary debates in Analytic Philosophy in addition to work ranging from Aristotle to Cultural Studies and Empirical Psychology, and considers a rich set of examples from daily life and literature. (shrink)

Consciousness is arguably the most important interdisciplinary area in contemporary philosophy of mind, with an explosion of research over the past thirty years from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists. It is also perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world despite the fact that it is familiar to each of us. Consciousness also seems resistant to any straightforward physical explanation. This book introduces readers to the contemporary problem of consciousness, providing a clear introduction to the overall landscape and a fair-minded critical (...) survey of various theories of consciousness. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem of consciousness, Rocco Gennaro explores the following key topics and debates: the metaphysical problem of consciousness, including varieties of dualism and materialism; consciousness and neuroscience, particularly the question of whether consciousness can be reduced to brain activity or attentional mechanisms; representational and cognitive theories of consciousness; consciousness and psychopathology; animals, machines, and consciousness. Extensive use is made of interesting phenomena throughout the book, ranging from blindsight, synaesthesia, and change blindness to phantom limb syndrome, split-brain cases, and dissociative identity disorder. The inclusion of chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary make this book essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative overview of the problem of consciousness, not only in philosophy but related fields such as psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

In The Analysis of Mind (1921), Bertrand Russell stresses the importance of William James’ late neutral monist view of consciousness for the studies in psychology. In so doing, he focuses on a topic whose roots can be traced back to the nineteenth-century European debate on physiology and scientific psychology. In this introductory paper I shall briefly outline the path that, starting from the revival of Kant in the German scientific debate, leads to both Ernst Mach’s and William James’ questioning the (...) value of the I or consciousness as a substance concept. (shrink)

In The Analysis of Mind , Russell criticizes a theory that considers desire a conscious mental phenomenon directed towards an imagined object and offers instead an account of desire in terms of behaviour-cycles. ;This theory has been criticized on various grounds: that it is circular and incoherent, that it applies only to needs, and that it is too behaviouristic. I argue that these criticisms are incorrect and that Russell's critics have ignored his doctrine of neutral monism. I study Russell's modified (...) version of neutral monism to reveal the philosophical underpinnings of his theory of desire. Brentano's and Meinong's views of mind are studied partly to show Russell's reasons for rejecting them in favour of neutral monism and partly to discuss Meinong's analysis of mental phenomena after which Russell models his analysis of belief. ;Russell attributes the theory of desire that he criticizes to common sense. I deal with the way common sense refers to desire both to evaluate Russell's criticisms and to assess the adequacy of his own theory. Russell maintains that his method for studying desire is behaviouristic. However, his theory of desire is not entirely behaviouristic because he allows introspection to play an important role in identifying feelings and sensations in human beings. Although Russell's account of desire in animals is mainly behaviouristic, his account of desire in human beings is not so because it requires beliefs which cannot be accounted for adequately on behaviouristic grounds. Russell's views of behaviourism and introspection are examined in detail and the effects of introducing beliefs to human desire are discussed at length with respect to both his theory of desire and his doctrine of neutral monism. ;Russell offers a model of desire that is simplistic and incomplete. It is neither behaviouristic nor empiricistic, but it is offered to accord with his doctrine of neutral monism. I argue that this model is adequate for explaining animal and simple human desires, but needs considerable elaboration to successfully account for complicated human conscious desires. (shrink)

What would Mach think of about six volumes written on him, his ideas and his life? John T. Blackmore has in his life-work undertaken this scientifi c effort . Before Blackmore’s life-work and especially his most recently published work will be reviewed in detail, a brief overview of the perspective of Mach from which the review approaches this question will be given in the following.

Although Mach insisted that he was a scientist, not a philosopher, many of his ideas were genuinely philosophical. This collection of essays indicates, among other matters of mathematical and scientific interest, how such ideas grew from Mach's work and something of their philosophical significance. In particular, discussions of Mach's experiments in aerodynamics and psychology show how he made physical phenomena observable and applied "causal" concepts to sensory processes. Having done this, Mach felt that he could hold a phenomenalism of neutral (...) elements which are neither subjective nor objective. He thought that a unified science could be based on such elements and that he would then no longer have to change his conceptual frame in going from one discipline to another, as from "atoms" to "mind" in going from physics to biology. Young Albert Einstein was deeply impressed by Mach's attitude toward fundamental concepts. One essay discusses the influence on Einstein's theory of general relativity of Mach's Principle, i.e., Mach's substitution of the concept of motion with respect to the distant stars for the unobservable Newtonian concept of motion with respect to absolute space. A discussion of Mach's own use of the atomic theory illustrates his attitude toward theories and suggests that he was able to reject the atom because this concept is not particularly useful in the fields with which he was primarily concerned. An essay by editor Cohen on the implications of Mach's theory of knowledge argues that a phenomenalism of neutral elements collapses into mysticism, i.e., into a submergence of the ego in the universal consciousness. Also interesting is Philipp Frank's classification of Mach as an "Enlightment" philosopher, or one who criticizes the abuse of concepts. Just as the men of the eighteenth century Enlightenment opposed theological concepts in physics, so Mach opposed physical concepts in biology, thereby clearing science of old error to make way for new truth. Some biographical data and an extensive bibliography are appended, as well as an index of proper names.--L. G. (shrink)

Excerpt: In 1987 Ernst retired from the University of Georgia and moved to Amherst, Massachusetts... Ernst was a welcome addition to my research team at UMass; especially since I had a grant from NSF to develop an interdisciplinary science course based on an explicitly constructivist perspective. After three years and hundreds of hours of discussion a team of faculty from physics, chemistry, biology and science education discovered that while we all used the term "energy" in a mathematically common manner we (...) could not jointly agree on how the concept should be presented. Academics have constructed the disciplines so they cannot be merged. (shrink)

Purpose: The notion of dichotomy is central to Josef Mitterer's work and he uses the term as a portmanteau. My paper characterizes the specific dichotomies he describes, uses C. K. Ogden's work on "Opposition" to classify them, and reviews attempts to overcome incompatible oppositions in other disciplines. Approach: Conceptual analysis in an attempt to show some of the conceptual differences in the various types of opposition. A "sampler" indicates possible divisions. Findings: From the constructivist point of view, the notion of (...) dichotomy is a complex one and must be divided into separate types, not all of which can be discarded in rational discourse. Implications: From this author's perspective, Mitterer's publications present a powerful stand against the tradition of realism and lead one to hope that his next will be a primer of non-dualistic discourse. (shrink)

There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substance dualism given the current state of the debate. The best known type of substance dualism, Cartesian dualism, has traditionally faced a number of (...) objections, but many contemporary philosophers have sought to avoid these by formulating novel versions of the view. I identify three central claims held in common by all forms of substance dualism, consider recent arguments for these claims, and assess how successfully different types of substance dualism respond to the traditional objections. I argue that most contemporary forms of the view still face one or more of three major challenges, from bundle theories of the self, from the recently developed “phenomenal concepts strategy”, and from worries about explanatory simplicity. (shrink)

In a series of important papers, Galen Strawson has articulated a spectrum of “temporal temperaments,” populated at one end by “Diachronics”, who experience their selves (understood as the “mental entity” they are at this moment) as something that existed in the past and will exist in the future, and at the other end by “Episodics”, who lack any such sense of temporal extension. As a self-declared Episodic, Strawson provides lucid descriptions of what episodicity is like, but cannot furnish a corresponding (...) phenomenology of diachronic self-experience. He further argues that nothing normatively significant depends upon diachronicity, so Episodics can live fully moral (and fully satisfying) lives. I attempt to supply this missing phenomenology of diachronic self-experience using Kierkegaard’s account of “contemporaneity” (samtidighed). Kierkegaard operates with something quite close to Strawson’s “me/me*” (human/self) distinction, yet he nonetheless offers a compelling description of diachronic self-experience that is fully normative in character. I discuss some of the implications of this normativity for Strawson’s claim that there is nothing ethically or psychologically deficient in the Episodic’s self-experience. (shrink)

Tononi has proposed a fundamental theory of consciousness he terms Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT purports to explain the quantity of conscious experience by linking it with integrated information: information shared by the system as a whole and quantified by adopting a modified version of Shannon's definition of information. Since the fundamental aspect of IIT is information the theory allows for the multiple realizability of consciousness. While there are several concepts within IIT that need further theoretical development, the main failings (...) of the theory are an absence of a link between conscious experience and awareness and the use of Shannon's limited data based definition of information. These limitations prevent the theory from satisfying Chalmers' principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance which any functionalist theory should obey. It is not clear whether IIT can be repaired without simply reducing the theory to a general statement of computational functionalism. (shrink)

Analogy with the monisms of fundamental physics suggests that a concept of symmetry breaking is likely to help towards developing an understanding of mind/matter monism. I explore some possible consequences of this concept, arguing that a broken symmetry, involving energy and 'what-it-is-like-to-be-ness'along with time, may occur and may manifest in the course of energy measurements. The resultant proto-panpsychist picture has the advantage of indicating how our complex, human consciousness could emerge from proto-conscious elements. It's an account that has empirical, refutable (...) implications which are briefly discussed. (shrink)