Science and Values

The idea that political debate should be resolved through knowledge —by deferring to those with more knowledge— recurs persistently in discussions of governance. In these turbulent times, in which democracy faces increasing skepticism, it is worth critically examining the proposals that “epistemize” democracy. In this contribution, I discuss epistemological as well as philosophy of science arguments against epistocracy, defending that democracy remains superior even on purely epistemic terms. In doing so, I also highlight the surprising parallels between technocracy and so-called (...) populism. On the basis of a good understanding of scientific pluralism and the role of values in the sciences, we can elaborate an alternative to epistocracy, technocracy and populism: one that calls for a deeper democratization of both science and policymaking. This approach revitalizes political, democratic debate as a space where competing interests, values, and visions for society are deliberated and weighed —rather than framing societal problems as mere knowledge deficits to be solved through more knowledge and expertise. In an attempt to make the best possible use of (scientific) knowledge in shaping policy, epistocrats overlook a fundamental feature of democratic politics: the clash of worldviews and the necessity of negotiating provisional compromises among divergent values and interests. (shrink)

NASA and the CNSA have both released plans for lunar human exploration. This paper reviews those plans through the lens of strategic capability development. It examines the history of NASA’s development of bioregenerative space habitation systems and shows how past research and policy decisions, including funding cuts and program discontinuations, have led to critical gaps in current NASA capabilities. These gaps pose a strategic risk to US leadership in human space exploration that must be addressed urgently to sustain international competitiveness. (...) It concludes with recommendations for program investments crucial for the deployment of mature bioregenerative technologies in the coming decade. (shrink)

That science is value-dependent has been taken to raise problems for the democratic legitimacy of scientifically-informed public policy. An increasingly common solution is to propose that science itself ought to be ‘democratised.’ Of the literature aiming to provide principled means of facilitating such, most has been largely concerned with developing accounts of how public values might be identified in order to resolve scientific value-judgements. Through a case-study of the World Health Organisation’s 2009 redefinition of ‘pandemic’ in response to H1N1, this (...) paper proposes that this emphasis might be unhelpfully pre-emptive, pending more thorough consideration of the question of whose values different varieties of epistemic risk ought to be negotiated in reference to. A choice of pandemic definition inevitably involves the consideration of a particular variety of epistemic risk, described here as ontic risk. In analogy with legislative versus judicial contexts, I argue that the democratisation of ontic risk assessments could bring inductive risk assessments within the scope of democratic control without necessitating that those inductive risk assessments be independently subject to democratic processes. This possibility is emblematic of a novel strategy for mitigating the opportunity costs that successful democratisation would incur for scientists: careful attention to the different normative stakes of different epistemic risks can provide principled grounds on which to propose that the democratisation of science need only be partial. (shrink)

Many scientists, philosophers, and commentators of science have argued that science ought to made responsive to the public, or ought to be “democratized”. This chapter begins by showing that the case for making science responsive to the public compares favorably to the case for making other critical institutions - such as a society’s educational or health care system - responsive to the public. It then shows several ways that science is not currently responsive to the public. It concludes by discussing (...) three unresolved philosophical questions that must be answered in order to determine what it would mean for science to be appropriately responsive to the public. The first comes from the importance of looking at science as a complex system; the second and third arise from considering diversity within the public and within the scientific community, respectively. (shrink)

We humans are diverse. But how to understand human diversity in the case of cognitive diversity? This Element discusses how to properly investigate human behavioural and cognitive diversity, how to scientifically represent, and how to explain cognitive diversity. Since there are various methodological approaches and explanatory agendas across the cognitive and behavioural sciences, which can be more or less useful for understanding human diversity, a critical analysis is needed. And as the controversial study of sex and gender differences in cognition (...) illustrates, the scientific representations and explanations put forward matter to society and impact public policy, including policies on mental health. But how to square the vision of human cognitive diversity with the assumption that we all share one human nature? Is cognitive diversity something to be positively valued? The author engages with these questions in connection with the issues of neurodiversity, cognitive disability, and essentialist construals of human nature. (shrink)

This paper proposes a fundamental hypothesis: the basic reality of the universe is not constituted by passive matter and fixed physical laws, but by a universally existing "Intrinsic Agency" (IA). This agency is considered to be prior to and constitutive of the basis for the physical laws we observe, and the cornerstone for the existence, evolution, and maintenance of order in non-equilibrium structures within the universe. While traditional physics tends to exclude value and purpose from its core descriptions, this paper (...) argues that introducing the concept of Intrinsic Agency can reintegrate an "intrinsic evaluation mechanism," based on existence and order, into the foundational framework of physics. Within this framework, stable physical quantities and laws are regarded as relatively stable and recurring behavioral patterns or "tools" formed by this intrinsic evaluation mechanism during cosmic evolution. This paper will explore the potential explanatory power of this hypothesis for existing physical concepts (such as quantum fluctuations, symmetry breaking, non-equilibrium thermodynamics) and envision its profound implications for updating physical laws, bridging the fact-value gap, and understanding complex phenomena (such as the origin of life and consciousness). Concurrently, the paper will also examine the immense conceptual challenges faced by this hypothesis and potential future research directions. (shrink)

In this reply, we address a comment on our paper “Combining probability with qualitative degree-of-certainty metrics in assessment” (Helgeson et al. Clim Change 149(3):517–525, 2018). Our original paper proposes an incremental systematization of confidence and likelihood language used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Our goals were to improve consistency across findings and support use of confidence judgments in decision making. The comment critiques our proposal and recommends against its adoption. We argue that this recommendation is based on (...) two misunderstandings. The first concerns trading off confidence against the precision of a finding (our proposal endorses and systematizes the practice). We defend this practice and attribute opposition to an overzealous Bayesianism inapt for the IPCC context. The second misunderstanding concerns our purported commitment to a specific procedure for producing confidence judgements. We clarify that our proposal makes no such commitment. We also note, contrary to the comment’s claim, that a version of the procedure in question has been used in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report. (shrink)

The core of Vincent's ‘Interrogating Incongruence’ is critical of the appeal to the concept of incongruence in DSM-5 and ICD-11 characterisations of trans people, a critique taken to be groundclearing for more trans-positive, psychiatrically-infused medical interventions. I concur with Vincent's ultimate goals but depart from the view developed in the paper on two fronts. The first is that I remain sceptical about the overall prospects for truly trans-positive psychiatry. Trans should follow homosexuality and other categories of sexual orientation that have (...) been abandoned rather than reformed as constituents of psychiatric diagnosis and categorisation. The second is that I think that Vincent's central criticisms of the appeal to incongruence are misplaced. (shrink)

Is it epistemically vicious to be attached to a specific scientific paradigm? Such attachment clearly violates a norm of _impartiality_ that is associated with the value-free ideal of science. I will argue that what Samuel Scheffler (2022) calls ‘evaluative attachment’ is not always epistemically vicious. In section 1, I will present Kuhn’s account of paradigms as embodying not just theoretical positions but also a ‘constellation of group commitments’, that Kuhn came to call a ‘disciplinary matrix’ (2012/1962, postscript). Section 2 evaluates (...) Popper’s and Davidson’s criticisms of Kuhn, drawing on the work of Pablo Melogno (2020). Section 3 evaluates the claim that _impartiality_ is a significant source of the value we accord to science. Section 4 appeals to Samuel Scheffler’s (2022) concept of evaluative attachment to argue that partiality to a specific framework or paradigm is not an epistemic vice. I conclude with brief observations, to be elaborated in future work, on how this argument applies to science in particular. (shrink)

Considerations of realism and pluralism pervade Feyerabend’s later works as they do in his earlier corpus. However, Conquest of Abundance and surrounding papers mark Feyerabend’s first sustained foray into metaphysics. Specifically, he hypothesizes a pluralist realism which incorporates Kantian and constructivist elements (Oberheim 2006; Tambolo 2014; Brown 2016; Chang 2021). This work was composed when the ‘metaphysical disunity’ hypothesis was fashionable among members of the ‘Stanford School.’ After building on previous explorations of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics (‘abundance realism’), we compare Feyerabend’s (...) later works to prominent formulations of metaphysical pluralism in the Stanford School. Here, we point to overlaps and divergences between Feyerabend’s later metaphysical pluralism and the formulations in the Stanford School. Despite significant intellectual overlap, the historical connections between Feyerabend’s later work and the Stanford School remain minimal. We argue that this is largely due to Feyerabend’s self-isolation from academic philosophy in the 1980s and his radical anti-scientism. Moreover, we argue that Feyerabend’s metaphysics naturally extends from his attempts to situate science in diverse, democratic societies with hints of his later metaphysics in earlier writings, suggesting that Feyerabend’s “metaphysical turn” represents a shift in emphasis rather than a substantive change of position. (shrink)

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a large class of chemicals, whose carbon-fluorine bonds allow a wide range of industrial applications but also make them highly persistent. Since there is evidence about only a few of them and their properties may vary, one of the pressing issues regarding PFAS is how to group them for different purposes. In this paper, I aim to show how a recent panel of experts about grouping PFAS was co-opted in a way that favor the (...) fluorine industry. The panel consisted of eleven experts, including authors renowned for views in conflict with fluorine industry regulatory approaches, answering questions through an online application. Its main results along with the experts’ answers were published in 2022 in the journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. Through a detailed analysis of all the material published and in dialogue with the literature about industry-funded research, I will present how choices in the design of the panel (e.g., which kind of consensus the exercise could capture, the ways questions were framed or even changed), in textual analysis (e.g., criteria for assembling opinions) and in the communication of the findings (e.g., what gets included or excluded) were made in an industry friendly way affecting two specific grouping approaches. I conclude with some lessons about this kind of influence of industry funding. -/- . (shrink)

This paper examines trust in science in relation to public health and decisions affecting different groups. I employphilosophical work on trust and distrust, particularly how the perpetuation of injustices leads to warranted distrust, andliterature on science and values to argue that trust in science can increase if justice and equity are taken into account in thedecision-making process. As illustration, I discuss the case of lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, and protectingmaternal and fetal health from metylmercury poisoning by removing fish from (...) the diet. Both examples involve measures thattake a disproportionate toll on the most vulnerable: the economically less-off and historically discriminated groups. More just,and thus trust conducive, decisions would consider the provision of additional support for those affected, alongsideincorporating broader concerns about welfare, or environmental safety. (shrink)

In the United States, when an individual commits a criminal act, there are due processes to assess their responsibility and respective punishment. However, if that individual was unable to conform to the necessary standards due to symptoms caused by a mental illness, they may be excused or exempt from standard legal punishment. While we may not want to hold certain individuals responsible, or in some courtrooms, “not guilty by reason of insanity,” how should they be punished? Should they be considered (...) not legally responsible, but still morally responsible? -/- In this chapter, I explore how to navigate legal and moral responsibility, how the insanity defense operates in a few different contexts in the U.S. legal system, and most importantly, how individuals with mental illnesses are mistreated in the U.S. justice system. I demonstrate that present practices in fact exacerbate the challenges faced by individuals with mental illnesses rather than alleviate them through rehabilitation. It is my hope to contribute to the call for action amongst scholars, clinicians, and arbitrators of the law to work towards more equitable treatment of mental illness inside and beyond the courtroom. (shrink)

Scientists often refer to their experiments, theories, images and instruments as beautiful and report that their scientific work is a source of aesthetic experiences. How do such aesthetic values affect scientific activities, and can aesthetic values play a cognitive role in science? In this chapter, I identify the different levels at which aesthetic values shape scientific products and processes, reflect on how philosophers have justified the cognitive role of such aesthetic values, and draw insights from recent discussions on the aesthetics (...) of scientific practice for the values in science debate. (shrink)

The cognitive sciences are facing questions of how to select from competing theories or develop those that suit their current needs. However, traditional accounts of theoretical virtues have not yet proven informative to theory development in these fields. We advance a pragmatic account by which theoretical virtues are heuristics we use to estimate a theory’s contribution to a field’s body of knowledge and the degree to which it increases that knowledge’s ability to solve problems in the field’s domain or problem (...) space. From this perspective, properties that are traditionally considered epistemic virtues, such as a theory’s fit to data or internal coherence, can be couched in terms of problem space coverage, and additional virtues come to light that reflect a theory’s alignment with problem-having agents and the context in a societally embedded scientific system. This approach helps us understand why the needs of different fields result in different kinds of theories and allows us to formulate the challenges facing cognitive science in terms that we hope will facilitate their resolution through further theoretical development. (shrink)

Climate risks are growing. Research is increasingly important to inform the design of risk-management strategies. Assessing such strategies necessarily brings values into research. But the values assumed within research (often only implicitly) may not align with those of stakeholders and decision makers. These misalignments are often invisible to researchers and can severely limit research relevance or lead to inappropriate policy advice. Aligning strategy assessments with stakeholders' values requires a holistic approach to research design that is oriented around those values from (...) the start. Integrating values into research in this way requires collaboration with stakeholders, integration across disciplines, and attention to all aspects of research design. Here we describe and demonstrate a qualitative conceptual tool called a values-informed mental model (ViMM) to support such values-centered research design. ViMMs map stakeholders' values onto a conceptual model of a study system to visualize the intersection of those values with coupled natural-human system dynamics. Through this mapping, ViMMs integrate inputs from diverse collaborators to support the design of research that assesses risk-management strategies in light of stakeholders' values. We define a visual language for ViMMs, describe accompanying practices and workflows, and present an illustrative application to the case of flood-risk management in a small community along the Susquehanna river in the Northeast United States. (shrink)

Roughly, empirical AI alignment research (AIA) is an area of AI research which investigates empirically how to design AI systems in line with human goals. This paper examines the role of non-epistemic values in AIA. It argues that: (1) Sciences differ in the degree to which values influence them. (2) AIA is strongly value-laden. (3) This influence of values is managed inappropriately and thus threatens AIA’s epistemic integrity and ethical beneficence. (4) AIA should strive to achieve value transparency, critical scrutiny (...) from inside and outside the discipline – involving the public –, and to empower actors without strong commercial interests. (shrink)

Journalists are often the adult public’s central source of scientific information, which means that their reporting shapes the relationship the public has with science. Yet philosophers of science largely ignore journalistic communication in their inquiries about trust in science. This paper aims to help fill this gap in research by comparing journalistic norm conflicts that arose when reporting on COVID-19 and tobacco, among other policy-relevant scientific topics. I argue that the public’s image of scientists – as depositories of indisputable, value-free (...) facts, trustworthy only when in consensus – makes it particularly difficult for journalists to ethically communicate policy-relevant science rife with disagreement. In doing so, I show how journalists, like scientists, face the problem of inductive risk in such cases. To overcome this problem, I sketch a model of trust in science that is grounded in an alternative image of scientists – what I call the responsiveness model of trust in science. By highlighting the process of science over its product, the responsiveness model requires scientists to respond to empirical evidence and the public’s values to warrant the public’s trust. I then show why this model requires journalists to be the public’s watchdogs by verifying and communicating whether scientists are being properly responsive both epistemically and non-epistemically. (shrink)

Climate science has been deeply affected by social and political values in the last fifty years [1]. If we focus on climate denial and obfuscation, we might see the influence of values as wholly negative and aim instead for objective, value-free climate science. But, perhaps surprisingly, this is at odds with the view of many philosophers who study the influence of values on science. Science cannot and should not be free from values, they argue. Rather, we should be transparent about (...) our values, study their influence, and ensure that the right values play the right roles. But philosophers alone cannot determine what the right values are or what their appropriate use is. Close collaboration between climate scientists and philosophers is required for values in climate science to be accurately studied and appropriately managed. (shrink)

Research on the role of values in science and objectivity has typically approached trust through its epistemic aspects. Yet, recent work on public trust in science has emphasized the role of non-epistemic values in building and maintaining trust. This paper will use a concept of trust that adds concerns about justice to epistemic conditions to investigate this problem in relation to public health. I will argue that trust-conducive values, particularly justice, are relevant in deciding which value influences are legitimate in (...) scientific decision-making. Drawing on public health ethics, I will provide a consequentialist justification for employing trust-conducive values. While several concepts of justice have been explored in the context of public health, I will further draw on public health ethics, focusing on a view that brings together both distributive and procedural aspects. For illustration, I will use the case of cardiovascular disease prevention, particularly how concerns about justice apply when choosing between population-based and individual-based approaches. (shrink)

Numerous societal issues, from climate change to pandemics, require public engagement with scientific research. Such engagement reveals challenges that can arise when experts communicate with laypeople. One of the most common frameworks for framing these communicative interactions is the deficit model of science communication, which holds that laypeople lack scientific knowledge and/or positive attitudes towards science, and that imparting knowledge will fill knowledge gaps, lead to desirable attitude/behavior changes, and increase trust in science. §1 introduces the deficit model in more (...) detail and shows that adhering to this model often fails to achieve its aims, which motivates the main question of this chapter: how can Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thinking collectives address the persistent problem of deficit approaches in science communication? I suggest that it can do so by exposing the deficit model’s implicit assumption of an expert-lay divide. Accordingly, §2 lays out Fleck’s theory and §3 contrasts it with contemporary debates about science communication. Following this descriptive work, §4 draws on Fleck’s ideas to make four concrete suggestions for further questioning the expert-lay divide. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to clarify the nature of the shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking in the 1970s, focusing on issues of realism, relativism, and pluralism. Contra-Preston, I argue that realism-relativism is a misleading variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in the 1970s. Rather, I characterize this shift as Feyerabend’s expansion of pluralism and suggest that this shift appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in the late-1960s (e.g., Feyerabend 1968b, 1969b, 1970a, 1970c). Adopting the terminology of Brown and Kidd (2016), (...) this shift is characterized by a move from arguments for pluralism within science to broader arguments for pluralism in society. I argue that this shift was largely due to: (1) Feyerabend’s rejection of an empiricist demarcation criterion for science in the mid-1960s, and (2) Feyerabend’s incorporation of Mill’s arguments for pluralism into his own publications starting in 1970. This shift can be characterized as a broadening or expanding the scope of Feyerabend’s arguments for pluralism from contexts of scientific knowledge to the broader context of social or cultural (including ethical) knowledge. I articulate this argument with reference to the framework for classifying Feyerabend’s works formulated by Brown and Kidd (2016). Against Brown and Kidd (and Preston), I argue that realism-relativism is a red-herring as a variable for distinguishing Feyerabend’s early and middle works. Brown and Kidd’s distinction between pluralism within science and pluralism in society is a more useful variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in thinking in the 1970s. Whereas Preston (1997) and Brown and Kidd (2016) identify the beginning of Feyerabend’s pluralism in society phase in 1978 with the publication of Science in a Free Society (Feyerabend 1978), I suggest that the relevant shift occurs much earlier, and it appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in 1970 (Feyerabend 1970a, 1970b). On this understanding, Feyerabend’s philosophical shift (c. 1970) should be viewed as an expansion (or broadening) of the scope of application of his pluralist arguments, inspired by Mill’s ethical arguments for pluralism in society (Mill 1859/1977). (shrink)

This book (edited by Jonathan Y. Tsou, Jamie Shaw, and Carla Fehr) offers eighteen original historical and philosophical essays focused on values in science, scientific pluralism, and pragmatism. These themes have been central in the work of Matthew J. Brown, and the book frames these topics through an engagement with Brown’s broadly ranging work on values in science. The themes of this book are integrated and unified in the pragmatic and value-laden ideal of science defended by Professor Brown in his (...) fascinating 2020 book, Science and Moral Imagination. Brown's ideal of moral imagination prescribes that scientists should recognize the contingencies in their work as unforced choices, examine morally salient aspects of these decisions, recognize the various interests of relevant stakeholders, explore and construct alternative options, and exercise fair and warranted value judgments to guide those decisions. The interdisciplinary essays in this volume engage with different aspects of Brown's philosophical research on scientific values as well as his historical research on figures such as John Dewey and Paul K. Feyerabend. The international contributors to this volume include distinguished and familiar voices from the values in science literature (e.g., Kevin Elliott, Janet Kourany, and Don Howard) as well as newer voices. The resulting book showcases some of the latest innovative research being done on values, pluralism, and pragmatism, and it will be an important resource for researchers working on values in science. Specific topics addressed in the book include: moral imagination, inductive risk, epistemic priority, the value free ideal of science, values in the contexts of artificial intelligence and medicine, varieties of pluralism (e.g., epistemic, ethical, and cultural), and the structure of scientific communities. The book also features novel historical research on important figures in the traditions of pragmatism, pluralism, and values in science, such as John Dewey, John Stuart Mill, Paul Feyerabend, W. V. O. Quine, Ludwig Fleck, among others. The contributions to the volume represent a broad range of contemporary history and philosophy of science perspectives, which have guided Brown's own work, including socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPoiSE), history of philosophy of science (HOPOS), feminist philosophy of science, and philosophy of science in practice (SPSP). The book will be of interest to a broad audience of researchers working in philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, history and philosophy of science, and science and technology studies. (shrink)

Defensores do princípio da precaução propõem com frequência mudanças nas práticas científicas, para que elas facilitem o mesmo objetivo do princípio: evitar ameaças incertas ao ambiente ou à saúde humana. A ciência deveria ser uma ciência precautória. Apesar da importância prática da ciência precautória e da sua proximidade com os debates sobre ciência e valores, ela ainda não foi sistematicamente examinada. Neste artigo, pretende-se contribuir para a literatura sobre a ciência precautória de dois modos: sistematizando sua literatura prévia e propondo (...) uma definição de um de seus elementos principais, a precaução epistêmica, como uma orientação específica para a gestão de riscos indutivos. Conclui-se com algumas objeções que tal definição levanta, bem como caminhos de pesquisas futuras para abordá-las. (shrink)

The weaponizing of scientific expertise to oppose regulation has been extensively studied. However, the relevant studies, belonging to the emerging discipline of agnotology, remain focused on the analysis of empirical corruption: of misinformation, doubt mongering, and other practices that cynically deploy expertise to render audiences ignorant of empirical facts. This paper explores the wrongful deployment of expertise beyond empirical corruption. To do so, I develop a broader framework of morally subversive expertise, building on recent work in political philosophy (Howard, 2016). (...) Expertise is subversive if it sets up its audience to fail morally, either intentionally or negligently. I distinguish three modes of subversive expertise: empirical subversion (the focus of agnotology), normative subversion and motivational subversion. Drawing on these distinctions, I offer a revisionary account of the Trump Administration’s regulatory science as a case study. I show that the Trump Administration’s use of expertise to dismantle climate regulation, contra the standard charge, cannot be explained using the resources of agnotology alone: the Administration produced highly reliable climate assessments, detailing the risks of climate change, candidly admitting the harms of its proposed policies, and still successfully deployed these findings to justify massive climate deregulation. The lesson of the analysis is that dismissing the expertise that underpins climate deregulation as empirically corrupt ‘anti-science’ both obscures its actual role in the politics of climate change and understates its wrongfulness: it misses the breadth of the assault on moral agency that sustains climate injustice. (shrink)

What is the proper role for scientists in policymaking? This paper explores various roles that scientists can play, with an eye to questions that these roles raise about value-neutrality and technocracy. Where much philosophical literature is concerned with the conduct of research or the transmission of research results to policymakers, I am interested in various non-research roles that scientists take on in policymaking. These include raising the alarm on issues, framing and conceptualising problems, formulating potential policies, assessing policy options for (...) expected efficacy, and more. I consider examples from climate change and Covid-19 policymaking. My intention is to encourage philosophers to expand their interest in values in science out from the conduct of research to the wide array of roles that scientists play in policymaking. The paper is therefore an overview of the landscape of potential research questions, rather than a presentation of a single argument. (shrink)

There seems to be an emerging consensus among many philosophers of science that non-epistemic values ought to play a role in the process of scientific reasoning itself. Recently, a number of philosophers have focused on the role of values in scientific classification or taxonomy. Their claim is that a choice of ontology or taxonomic scheme can only be made, or should only be made, by appealing to non-epistemic or social values. In this paper, I take on this “argument from ontological (...) choice,” claiming that it equivocates on the notion of choice. An ontological choice can be understood either in terms of determining which taxonomic scheme is valid, or in terms of deciding which taxonomic scheme to deploy in a given context. I try to show that while the latter can be determined in part by social values, the former ought not to be so determined. (shrink)

In the science and values literature, scholars have shown how science is influenced and shaped by values, often in opposition to the ‘value free’ ideal of science. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the science and values literature by showing that the relation between science and values flows not only from values into scientific practice, but also from (allegedly neutral) science to values themselves. The extant literature in the ‘science and values’ field focuses by and large on reconstructing, (...) post hoc, how values have influenced science; our reconstruction of the case studies, instead, aims to show that scientific concepts and methods _too, because of specific identifiable characteristics,_ can promote some values rather than (or at the expense of) others. We explain this bidirectional relation in analogy to debates on the normativity of technical artifacts and on feminist approaches in science, and we illustrate our claims with cases from the health sciences and machine learning. While our arguments in this paper also draw on post hoc reconstructions, we intend to show where, in the science in the making, we should engage not only with the question whether a practice is value-laden, but also how specific conceptual and methodological choices can influence values down the road. All in all, these considerations expand the ways in which philosophers can contribute to more value-aware scientific practices. (shrink)

Mainstream views of medical research tell us it should be a fact-based, value-free endeavor: what a scientist (or her funding source) wants or cares about should not influence her findings. At the same time, we also sometimes criticize medical research for failing to embody certain values, e.g. when we criticize pharmaceutical companies for largely ignoring the diseases that affect the global poor. This chapter seeks to reconcile these perspectives by distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate influences of values on medical research. It (...) divides this broad question into two narrower ones, the Role Question (at what points in the research process is value influence potentially acceptable?) and the Content Question (when value influence is potentially acceptable, what specific values should researchers use?), and then draws on the philosophical literature on values in science to explore answers to each of them. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 5-41, Winter 2024.

Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness. This is, as far as we are aware, the best reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk in the existing literature. However, there is a small flaw in this reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk which appears to render the argument invalid. (...) This flaw is superficial, and a small amendment to it rescues the claim of validity. (shrink)

How confident does the history of science allow us to be about our current well-tested scientific theories, and why? The scientific realist thinks we are well within our rights to believe our best-tested theories, or some aspects of them, are approximately true.2 Ambitious arguments have been made to this effect, such as that over historical time our scientific theories are converging to the truth, that the retention of concepts and claims is evidence for this, and that there can be no (...) other serious explanation of the success of science than that its theories are approximately true. There is appeal in each of these ideas, but making such strong claims has tended to be hazardous, leaving us open to charges that many typical episodes in the history of science just do not fit the model. (See, e.g., Laudan 1981.) Arguing for a realist attitude via general claims – properties ascribed to sets of theories, trends we see in progressions of theories, and claimed links between general properties like success and truth that apply or fail to apply to any theory regardless of its content – is like arguing for or via a theory of science, which brings with it the obligation to defend that theory. I think a realist attitude toward particular scientific theories for which we have evidence can be maintained rationally without such a theory, even in the face of the pessimistic induction over the history of science. The starting point at which questions arise as to what we have a right to believe about our theories is one where we have theories and evidence for them, and we are involved in the activity of apportioning our belief in each particular theory or hypothesis in accord with the strength of the particular evidence.3 The devil’s advocate sees our innocence and tries his best to sow seeds of doubt. If our starting point is as I say, though, the innocent believer in particular theories does not have to play offense and propose sweeping views about science in general, but only to respond to the skeptic’s challenges; the burden of initial argument is on the skeptic.. (shrink)

Epistemic pluralists in the philosophy of science often argue that different epistemic perspectives in science are equally warranted. Sandra Mitchell – with her Integrative Pluralism (IP) – has notably advocated for this kind of epistemic pluralism. A problem arises for Mitchell however because she also wants to be an epistemological pluralist. She claims that, not only are different epistemic perspectives in science equally warranted in different contexts, but different understandings of these epistemic perspectives in science are also equally warranted in (...) different contexts. The problem is that Mitchell argues that her understanding of epistemic perspectives in science (IP) is the correct one, and it is dilemmic to then claim that there is more than one such understanding. As solution, I suggest that we abandon epistemological pluralism and instead follow Feyerabend in being opportunistic pluralists. We can adopt pluralism as a short-term strategy in the pursuit of a long-term unitary goal. This unitary goal is what philosophers of understanding call objectual understanding, the kind of understanding that Integrative Pluralism tacitly aspires to anyway. (shrink)

Straightening the current ‘value-laden turn’ (VLT) in the philosophical literature on values in science, and reviving the legacy of the value-free ideal of science (VFI), this paper argues that the influence of extra-scientific values should be minimised—not excluded—in the core phase of scientific inquiry where claims are accepted or rejected. Noting that the original arguments for the VFI (ensuring the truth of scientific knowledge, respecting the autonomy of science results users, preserving public trust in science) have not been satisfactorily addressed (...) by proponents of the VLT, it proposes four prerequisites which any model for values in the acceptance/rejection phase of scientific inquiry should respect, coming from the fundamental requirement to distinguish between facts and values: (1) the truth of scientific knowledge must be ensured; (2) the uncertainties associated with scientific claims must be stated clearly; (3) claims accepted into the scientific corpus must be distinguished from claims taken as a basis for action. An additional prerequisite of (4) simplicity and systematicity is desirable, if the model is to be applicable. Methodological documents from international institutions and regulation agencies are used to illustrate the prerequisites. A model combining Betz’s conception (stating uncertainties associated with scientific claims) and Hansson’s corpus model (ensuring the truth of the scientific corpus and distinguishing it from other claims taken as a basis for action) is proposed. Additional prerequisites are finally suggested for future research, stemming from the requirement for philosophy of science to self-reflect on its own values: (5) any model for values in science must be descriptively and normatively relevant; and (6) its consequences must be thoroughly assessed. (shrink)

[OPEN ACCESS] Commentaries on the ethics of Covid lockdowns nearly all focus on offering substantive guidance to policy‐makers. Lockdowns, however, raise many ethical questions that admit of a range of reasonable answers. In such cases, policy‐making in a liberal democracy ought to be sensitive to which reasonable views the public actually holds—a topic existing bioethical work on lockdowns has not explored in detail. In this essay, I identify several important questions connected to the kind of influence the public ought to (...) have on lockdown decision‐making, including how policy‐makers ought to handle misinformed or morally suspect viewpoints, and how policy‐makers ought to respond to minority viewpoints. I argue that questions like this, concerning the appropriate influence of the public on decision‐making, will be central to the field of bioethics as it increasingly focuses on policy and population‐level issues and therefore ought to be priorities for future work. (shrink)

Although science is our most reliable producer of knowledge, it can also be used to create ignorance, unjustified doubt, and misinformation. In doing so, agnotological practices result not only in epistemic harms but also in social ones. A way to prevent or minimise such harms is to impede these ignorance-producing practices. In this paper, I explore various challenges to such a proposal. I first argue that reliably identifying agnotological practices in a way that permits the prevention of relevant harms is (...) more difficult than it might appear. I focus on an identifying criterion that many find apt for the task: bad faith motives. I then consider an objection—that reliable criteria are unnecessary to successfully address the concerns raised by agnotological strategies—and I show that it fails. I conclude by exploring other ways of conceptualising the problems attributed to agnotological practices. In particular, I challenge the focus on misinformation as the main problem of concern. (shrink)

Beauvoir’s The Second Sex stands out as a master class in the accommodation of conceptual and inferential practices to real, objective gender kinds. Or so I will argue. To establish this framing, we will first need in hand the kind of scientific epistemology that correctly reconciles epistemic progress and error, particularly as pertains to the unruly social sciences. An important goal of the paper is to develop that epistemological framework and unlock its ontological implications for the domain of gender. As (...) we will see, the real gender kinds that contemporary social scientists successfully identify and track are very much the same kinds to which Beauvoir was coordinating reference in The Second Sex. The correct identification of those kinds endures as a moral and political priority, regardless of one’s other gender-related normative agenda. (shrink)

According to Kuhn's speciation analogy, scientific specialisation is fundamentally analogous to biological speciation. In this paper, we extend Kuhn's original language-centred formulation of the speciation analogy, to account for episodes of scientific specialisation centred around methodological differences. Building upon recent views in evolutionary biology about the process of speciation by genetic divergence, we will show how these methodology-centred episodes of scientific specialisation can be understood as cases of specialisation driven by value divergence. We will apply our model of specialisation by (...) value divergence to an episode of methodology-centred scientific specialisation: the emergence of molecular biology. (shrink)

This article starts an engagement on the aesthetics of experiments and offers an account for analysing how aesthetics features in the design, evaluation and reception of experiments. I identify two dimensions of aesthetic evaluation of experiments: design and significance. When it comes to design, a number of qualities, such as simplicity, economy and aptness, are analysed and illustrated with the famous Meselson-Stahl experiment. Beautiful experiments are also regarded to make significant discoveries, but I argue against a narrow construal of experimental (...) aims. By drawing on the plurality of goals experimenters have and diversity of aesthetic responses, I argue that experiments are aesthetically appreciated both when they discover and when they produce disruptive results. (shrink)

The present paper proposes three desiderata that methodologies for collaboration between philosophy and ethnobiology should satisfy. The account considers that a focus on a sentimentalist virtue epistemology is necessary to effectively address problems and challenges in such collaborations. Our focus on sentimentalism is further elaborated through three desiderata: (D1) The context of the collaboration should encourage receptivity among practitioners; (D2) collaborations should aim to produce knowledge that addresses the problems faced by stakeholders; and (D3) relevant communities and collaborators for each (...) case should be included by attuning to the conditions of the collaboration. To support our argument, we present the methodology of Field Environmental Philosophy as a case study in which attention to these desiderata is thoroughly present, resulting in a successful collaboration. We argue that these desiderata are crucial for understanding collaborations between philosophy and ethnobiology. (shrink)

When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, these problems are often due to a specific psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the (...) research on science communication: many people tend to conform to ‘descriptive norms’, that is, norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel. Because of this tendency, science communication may frequently produce significant social harm. I contend that scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this potential harm and consider adopting strategies to mitigate it. I introduce one such strategy and argue that its implementation is independently well motivated by the fact that it helps improve scientific accuracy. (shrink)

Decision-makers increasingly invoke equity to motivate, design, implement, and evaluate strategies for managing flood risks. But there is no objective definition of equity. This pluralistic setting calls for transparency about underlying values, but this practice is uncommon. Here, we review how equity is measured by surveying peer-reviewed publications that explicitly state an interest in equity in the context of flood-risk management. We develop a simple taxonomy for how transparent measurements can be defined. We map reviewed measurements to this taxonomy. Finally, (...) we offer guidance on how the pursuit of a clear and consistent quantitative evidence base about equity can become more widespread in flood-risk research and beyond. (shrink)

The setting of evidential standards is a core practice of scientific assessment for policy. Persuaded by considerations of inductive risk, philosophers generally agree that the justification of evidential standards must appeal to non-epistemic values but debate whether the balance of non-epistemic reasons favours varying evidential standards versus maintaining fixed high evidential standards in assessment, as both sets of standards promote different and important political virtues of advisory institutions. In this paper, I adjudicate the evidential standards debate by developing a novel (...) argument from justice, drawing on the IPCC’s assessment of climate impacts as a case study. I argue that in assessments marked by background evidential inequality, maintaining fixed high evidential standards results in an unequal distribution of ‘epistemic power’ among stakeholders, producing a ‘powerful assessment’ for the data-rich (a high rate of findings) and a ‘weak assessment’ for the data-poor (a low rate of findings). Where such inequalities of epistemic power disadvantage those in data-poor regions with respect to fundamental interests, such as basic human rights, we have decisive reasons of justice to vary evidential standards. (shrink)

The notion of grand challenges has become popular in research governance to support the allocation of research funding to societally beneficial topics. This article illustrates the flexibility and usefulness of grand challenges for university rectorates and project leaders when communicating with policy makers, research funders, and local industries and companies. The flexibility is beneficial to researchers and rectorate during the design stage of research projects. However, their utility diminishes in the later stages as other targets take precedence, particularly the need (...) to demonstrate academic excellence. First, I explore the definitions of grand challenges in United States and European Union. Second, I provide a case study demonstrating the use of grand challenges in one technical research university. Last, I propose that if the aim in research policy is to orient research more towards societal benefit, more specific processual or outcome-oriented targets should be introduced to supplement grand challenges. (shrink)

AI tools such as ChatGPT appear to magnify some of humanity’s worst qualities, and fixing those tendencies will be no easy task.

Given that values influence the scientific process, including when doing economics, we should be asking under what conditions this influence is justifiable. In this paper, I argue that citizen engagement could be the best way to scrutinize and justify value influences in economics. To do so, I analyze a number of citizen engagement initiatives in economics and discuss how they contribute to value scrutiny. Next, I look at the rationales that have been formulated for such a citizen economics, like, e.g., (...) increasing economic literacy, democratization, and, strengthening the legitimacy of economics, and I evaluate their benefits for the scrutiny of values. Overall, the paper concludes that citizen engagement is a promising way to address value judgments in economics and to make economics epistemically more robust even though there are still some challenges to be addressed for it to become part of a broadened economic methodology. (shrink)