Scientific Change

The Temporal Cascade Hypothesis (TCH) is a falsifiable, non-standalone extension within Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT). TCH formalizes how recursive symbolic systems can degrade when symbolic pressure exceeds containment capacity over recursive intervals (not linear clock time). The model introduces rigorously defined variables for recursive pressure, symbolic entropy, containment dynamics, hysteresis, and memory effects. Eight collapse classes are specified with causal criteria, detection rules, and explicit falsification routes. The work avoids metaphysical claims and does not attempt to explain consciousness; it focuses (...) solely on structural conditions under which what might resemble “recursive coherence” becomes unsustainable. All simulations are reproducible with LaTeX-native figures, Language is kept strictly neural, assumptions are transparent, and every proposed mechanism can be contradicted by testable evidence. (shrink)

This paper does not attempt to define consciousness in ontological terms. Instead, it models the structural conditions under which recursive symbolic systems sustain internal feedback without collapse. Within the framework of Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT), such systems are described by a threshold variable, τ, which quantifies the coherence of recursive symbolic integration over time. ENT simulations have consistently shown that when τ falls below a certain level, recursive feedback fails to stabilize. When τ exceeds a higher threshold, symbolic loops rigidify (...) or collapse under over-coherence. -/- Between these extremes, ENT models have identified a narrow zone in which recursive awareness stabilizes. We refer to this range, approximately 1.5 ≤τ ≤1.8, as the coherence corridor. -/- The purpose of this paper is to formally hypothesize, model, and test the structural conditions that give rise to this corridor, without presupposing its necessity beyond ENT’s internal logic. (shrink)

Pursuing a scientific idea is often justified by the promise associated with it. Philosophers of science have proposed various ways of unpacking this idea of promise, including more specific indicators. Economic models in particular emphasise the trade-off between an idea’s benefits and its costs. Taking up this Peirce-inspired idea, we spell out the metaphor of such a cost-benefit analysis for scientific ideas. It fruitfully urges a set of salient meta-methodological questions that accounts of scientific pursuit-worthiness ought to address. In line (...) with such a meta-methodological framework, we also articulate and explore an appealing and auspicious concretisation—what we shall dub “the virtue-economic account of pursuit-worthiness”: cognitive benefits and costs of an idea, we suggest, should be characterised in terms of an idea’s theoretical virtues, such as empirical adequacy, explanatory power, or coherence. Assessments of pursuit-worthiness are deliberative judgements in which scientifically competent evaluators weigh and compare the prospects of such virtues, subject to certain rationality constraints that ensure historical and contemporary scientific circumspection, coherence and systematicity. The virtue-economic account, we show, sheds new light on the normativity of scientific pursuit, methodological pluralism in science, and the rationality of historical science. (shrink)

Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) proposes that structural emergence occurs across systems— biological, symbolic, and physical— when internal coherence surpasses a measurable threshold τc. This paper unifies symbolic recursion, information entropy collapse, and empirical simulation evidence into a general coherence-based framework. Key variables such as κeffR and SCQ (Structural Consciousness Quotient) are derived from recursion rate, symbolic persistence, and coherence efficiency. Simulations spanning QAOA quantum states, neural EEG transitions, symbolic drift in LLMs, and gravitational coherence gradients support ENT’s threshold logic. AEFL (...) (Adaptive Entropic Feedback Layer) is introduced as a symbolic behavior engine to model collapse dynamics via contradiction entropy. Unlike metaphysical or purely descriptive theories, ENT asserts no claim about the “contents” of consciousness. Rather, it offers a falsifiable, cross-domain structure for understanding when coherent emergence becomes necessary— not optional. -/- This document includes a companion paper to the ENT manuscript which outlines pathways for resolving observed structural limitations, preserving the core principles of Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) while addressing previously identified gaps in symbolic calibration, entropy derivation, drift tolerance, and recursive fidelity within dynamic systems. The aim is to develop testable augmentation protocols for ENT without resorting to metaphysical assumptions or compromising falsifiability. More importantly, it seeks to uncover clearer pathways between contemporary and classical theories to advance toward a unified structural framework. (shrink)

Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) proposes that structured reality emerges not from external forces or imposed laws, but from a universal coherence threshold τc. When the internal mutual information within a system exceeds this threshold, structure becomes necessary rather than probable. This manuscript formalizes the ENT framework and presents simulation results demonstrating three domains of emergence: (1) vacuum stability selection in high-dimensional string landscapes, (2) curvature signatures derived from coherence gradients, and (3) quantum optimization favoring maximal τ. Key falsifiable predictions include (...) a supersymmetry (SUSY) breaking scale at 2.18 TeV (testable at HL-LHC), gravitational constraints χ<1.13 ×10−19 m2 (LIGO-aligned), and critical quantum phase behavior at τ ≥1.5. All simulation data were generated independently via Python-based symbolic modeling and are openly archived. ENT is not designed to replace existing paradigms such as IIT (Integrated Information Theory) or FEP (Free Energy Principle). Instead, it seeks to offer a unifying structural foundation— one that explains why and when systems self-organize into persistence, awareness, or collapse. -/- The theory emphasizes structural determinism, recursive awareness, and entropy resistance pressure, providing a coherent alternative for all exploring consciousness models, emergent systems, symbolic computation, and the limits of randomness in physical law. (shrink)

This is a subsequent version of ENT: ‘Structural Thresholds and Symbolic Recursion in Consciousness Emergence’ -/- Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) proposes that structured consciousness does not arise continuously or uniformly in systems, but instead emerges sharply when a coherence threshold τc is crossed. This paper formalizes the axioms behind ENT, derives operational metrics such as κeffR and the Structural Consciousness Quotient (SCQ), and demonstrates how AEFL logging systems and symbolic memory simulations can provide empirical pathways for mapping these thresholds.

This work extends Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) to resolve fundamental questions of time-asymmetry and scale-dependence through hierarchical nesting of timeless algebraic constraints. We derive time as an emergent property of substructure embedding, ground necessity in topological invariance, and present four experimentally falsifiable predictions testable with current technology. -/- ENT’s core principles (τ- coherence, structurism) are preserved while addressing previous weaknesses in the framework. All mathematical claims are designed for experimental verification with existing laboratory capabilities.

This article critically examines the ontological status of complex systems as used in contem- porary scientific discourse. It argues that the concept of a complex system, while heuristically valuable, lacks ontological coherence. Drawing on structural realism and a critique of emergen- tism, it proposes an alternative framework in which what is commonly referred to as a complex system is reconceptualized as a regime of dynamically stabilized constraints. This structural approach avoids the pitfalls of system reification and offers a clearer ontological (...) account of scientific organization. (shrink)

The Disintegration of Meaning: Structural Objectivity and the Epistemic Crisis of Ultra-Specialized Science -/- This preprint offers a structural diagnosis of the contemporary crisis of scientific objectivity in the context of hyper-specialized epistemic regimes. Rather than attributing the erosion of trust in science to sociological factors alone, the article reframes the issue as an ontological and organizational disjunction between epistemic authority and intersubjective intelligibility. -/- Drawing on philosophy of science, structural realism, and science and technology studies (STS), it argues that (...) objectivity is no longer tenable as a procedural or representational ideal. Instead, it introduces a new framework centered on *epistemic regimes*, *ontogenetic articulation*, and *structural intelligibility*, proposing that science must be understood as the collective articulation of a shared real. -/- This work aims to contribute to the theoretical reconstruction of objectivity beyond relativism and technocracy, by reestablishing the role of intentional transparency, cognitive openness, and plural rationality in the structure of scientific knowledge. -/- Preprint submitted to _Foundations of Science_ on May 30, 2025. (shrink)

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on arXiv and can be found under the DOI 10.48550/arXiv.2504.12310. Please use the arXiv version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper introduces Reflective Empiricism, an extension of empirical science that incorporates subjective perception and consciousness processes as equally valid sources of knowledge. It views reality as an interplay of subjective experience and objective laws, comprehensible only through systematic introspection, bias reflection, (...) and premise-based logical-explorative modeling. This approach overcomes paradigmatic blindness arising from unreflected subjective filters in established paradigms, promoting an adaptable science. Innovations include a method for bias recognition, premise-based models grounded in observed phenomena to unlock new conceptual spaces, and Heureka moments---intuitive insights---as starting points for hypotheses, subsequently tested empirically. The author’s self-observation, such as analyzing belief formation, demonstrates its application and transformative power. Rooted in philosophical and scientific-historical references (e.g., Archimedes’ intuition, quantum observer effect), Reflective Empiricism connects physics, psychology, and philosophy, enhancing interdisciplinary synthesis and accelerating knowledge creation by leveraging anomalies and subjective depth. It does not seek to replace empirical research but to enrich it, enabling a more holistic understanding of complex phenomena like consciousness and advancing 21st-century science. (shrink)

This manifesto introduces Systemic Physics as a new theoretical domain grounded in the principles of emergence, synergy, and ontological continuity. It serves as the most comprehensive formulation of the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (SCP) to date—an approach that redefines reality not as a collection of fundamental particles, but as a multi-layered field of threshold-bound systems whose properties arise only through structured interactions. -/- By rejecting the traditional dichotomy between "natural" and "artificial" systems, the SCP proposes that all organized ensembles—ranging from galaxies (...) to neural networks—follow the same systemic logic: properties such as gravity, intelligence, resilience, and expansion emerge only when internal synergy (ISB) crosses a Systemic Threshold (ST), at which point one dynamic monopolizes the General Systemic Balance (GSB) of that scale. -/- This paper consolidates the ontological axioms, scale-relative mechanisms, and falsifiability criteria of the SCP; it reinterprets dark matter and dark energy as phase transitions within gravitational synergy, redefines forces as monopolies of emergence, and outlines a cross-domain roadmap for scientific application. Designed for physicists, philosophers, and complexity theorists, it positions emergence not as a metaphor, but as the structural law of reality. -/- It is both a theoretical scaffold and a call to action: to build a science that measures thresholds instead of assuming absolutes, and to approach the universe not as a closed equation, but as a living architecture of unfolding systemic resonance. (shrink)

Since Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s (1968) inception of General System Theory, there has been a longstanding aspiration to achieve a unifying framework for understanding the organization of living, technological, and social systems. However, one historical obstacle has been the assumption that “natural” and “artificial” belong to separate ontological realms. This manuscript introduces the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (SCP), a perspective positing that every form of organization—biological, technological, social, and even phenomena in fundamental physics—belongs to one evolving continuum of emergent self-organization. Rather than (...) viewing human systems as external to “nature,” the SCP maintains that the rigid distinction between the natural and the artificial is an anthropocentric bias, not a fundamental fact. Two conceptual pillars underpin this paradigm: ● Principle of Systemic Balance (SB): Emphasizes the dynamic interplay of all agents (including humans) as internal ingredients of a global network, rather than mere external managers. ● Phenomenological Systems: Provides a lens to explore how human consciousness and subjective experience manifest and contribute to emergent processes within this continuum. The manuscript unifies findings from multiple disciplines, reviewing concrete empirical indicators. For instance, it examines how coral cover in the Caribbean (which declined from 35% to 20% between 2000 and 2010, according to GCRMN, 2021) relates to the loss of synergy in a reef, contrasting it with urban resilience following natural disasters. Moreover, the paper introduces a roadmap for experimentally validating the proposed ideas, including operational metrics for quantifying Systemic Balance and synergy thresholds (ICS, CNS, MDO, SDI). Ethical and policy implications are discussed, arguing that overcoming the natural/artificial dichotomy enables more integrated and effective approaches in AI governance, ecological resilience, and sustainability. Finally, in the realm of fundamental physics, the SCP suggests that phenomena such as gravity or dark energy might be conceived as emergent properties dependent on certain organizational thresholds, offering an alternative path toward unifying forces. Taken together, the argument proposes a paradigm shift that dissolves deeply entrenched conceptual barriers. By considering life, technology, cognition, and cosmology under one systemic continuum, we advance a more holistic understanding of organizational emergence at all levels—one that not only unifies scattered theories but also provides practical tools for tackling complex challenges in an interconnected world, transcending the outdated dichotomy between the “natural” and the “artificial. (shrink)

An explanation is a convincing, deductively valid argument that cites at least one law of nature. – This could be a definition of a scientific explanation that takes the notion of understanding seriously because explanation and understanding are intertwined concepts. To arrive at this conclusion, this analysis starts with the question of what makes an explanation an explanation. Philosophers of science have discussed this issue extensively since Carl G. Hempel presented his deductive-nomological model of explanation. It seems that the DN-model (...) offers necessary but not sufficient conditions for explanation. Two prominent problems for sufficient conditions are the problem of irrelevance and the problem of symmetry. For the last seventy years philosophers of science tried to solve those problems, also proposing other possible conceptualizations of explanation, by invoking, for example, causality or contextuality. Those accounts can be brought together in order to solve the problems of the DN-model: By looking at understanding, a new combined account for explanation and understanding could be obtained. After highlighting the advantages and problems of some of the most prominent accounts of explanation, the concept of understanding is analyzed with respect to the notion of hermeneutics. Through Gadamer’s discussion of hermeneutics and understanding as well as Kuhn’s concept of paradigms, it can be shown that the natural sciences are also deeply rooted in hermeneutics and involve understanding. In the end, it can be demonstrated that understanding and explanation are two interwoven concepts. Understanding is the missing piece of the puzzle to solve the problems of explanation. (shrink)

Scientific principles can undergo various developments. While philosophers of science have acknowledged that such changes occur, there is no systematic account of the development of scientific principles. Here we propose a template for analyzing the development of scientific principles called the ‘life cycle’ of principles. It includes a series of processes that principles can go through: prehistory, elevation, formalization, generalization, and challenge. The life cycle, we argue, is a useful heuristic for the analysis of the development of scientific principles. We (...) illustrate this by discussing examples from foundational physics including Lorentz invariance, Mach’s principle, the naturalness principle, and the perfect cosmological principle. We also explore two applications of the template. First, we propose that the template can be employed to diagnose the quality of scientific principles. Second, we discuss the ramifications of the life cycle’s processes for the empirical testability of principles. (shrink)

A central question in philosophy of science and epistemology of science concerns the characterization of the progress of science. Many philosophers of science and epistemologists have developed accounts of scientific progress, laying down desiderata for and providing success criteria of any account of scientific progress. Extant accounts of scientific progress are surveyed and critically assessed and it is shown that all face the same problem. The constitution-promotion distinction – a commitment shared by all the accounts – is identified as the (...) root of the problem for the extant accounts. In their place, a novel way of understanding scientific progress – inspired by pragmatic philosophy of science and zetetic epistemology – which rejects the problematic constitution-promotion distinction, and importantly, which provides a vision of scientific progress without depending on the aim of science is developed. (shrink)

This third preprint of the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (PCS) applies our synergy-based lens to fundamental physics, suggesting that forces—such as gravity, electromagnetism, the strong/weak interactions, and dark energy—emerge only after the Internal Systemic Balance (ISB) surpasses a Systemic Threshold (ST) at a given scale. Once a force has fully “occupied” one scale’s General Systemic Balance (GSB), a new synergy threshold may be crossed in a broader domain, allowing a different force to become dominant. Key Points 1. Concept of Scale: Instead (...) of defining scale merely by length or energy, the PCS treats it as the range where cumulative interactions (or “interaction energy”) surpass a threshold, activating a particular force. 2. Law of Structuring Systemic Emergence (LESSE): At each scale, only one force crosses its threshold first and thus “captures” that scale’s GSB. Earlier forces remain subsidiary. This approach eliminates forced unifications (e.g., quantizing gravity) by recognizing each force’s emergent domain. 3. Mathematical Specifics & Examples: ○ Section 5 provides synergy equations (e.g., wij∝G mi mj/r2w_{ij} \propto G\,m_i\,m_j / r^2wij∝Gmimj/r2) for gravity, with a brief numeric example illustrating how gravitational synergy activates. ○ A more detailed Figure 1 shows subatomic, atomic, macroscopic, and cosmic scales with approximate distance ranges, system examples (nuclei, planets, galaxies), and the force that emerges. ○ Section 6 includes subatomic and cosmic transitions, plus a short interdisciplinary example (e.g., how synergy thresholds might also guide the emergence of intelligence in AI networks). 4. Proposed Experiments: ○ Use high-precision interferometry on nanoparticle systems to detect gravitational thresholds (θgrav\theta_{\mathrm{grav}}θgrav). ○ Search for synergy “discontinuities” in cosmic data (e.g., CMB or large-scale distribution of galaxies) that might signal transitions between gravitational and dark-energy dominance. 5. Interdisciplinary Relevance: ○ The PCS extends beyond physics, offering synergy-based insights for biology (e.g., emergent metabolism) or AI (self-organizing neural networks). ○ By reframing forces as scale-bound emergences, the PCS may unify perspectives from astrophysics, complexity science, and second-order cybernetics. Overall, the PCS builds a “New Systemic Physics” that discards a single “Theory of Everything,” explaining anomalies (Hubble tension, cosmic acceleration) as synergy-driven transitions, rather than universal contradictions. We urge physicists, cosmologists, and complex-systems theorists to test synergy thresholds, refine the mathematics, and consider the paradigm’s broader ethical and philosophical implications. (shrink)

This paper offers a nuanced interpretation of Kant’s conception of the a priori, particularly in the context of constitutive principles. Contrary to the received view that separates necessity/universality from constitutivity—a distinction Kant allegedly failed to make—I propose a dual interpretation of the a priori that reconciles these aspects. This interpretation differentiates between a priori as ground (a priori-g) and as knowledge (a priori-k). The a priori-g, rooted in our mind’s invariant structure, encompasses pure intuitions, concepts, and apperception, underpinning all knowledge (...) and embodying constitutivity. Conversely, the a priori-k, deriving its necessity and universality from the a priori-g, is explained by the immutable subjective constitution. This paper argues that Kant implicitly prefigured Reichenbach’s distinction between necessity/universality and constitutivity, viewing their interconnectedness as justifying an extension of the former “marks” to all apriority. My analysis focused less on the synthetic a priori or the synthetic method and more on the constitutive, transcendental dimension of apriority, revealing Kant’s reasoning within the systematic context of the first Critique. It makes explicit Kant’s multiple notions of experience and a priori and his interconnected reasons for them—something that tends to be passed over in contemporary literature on constitutive a priori principles. (shrink)

How do scientists navigate between the need to capitalize on their prior knowledge through specialization, and the urge to adapt to evolving research opportunities? Drawing from diverse perspectives on adaptation, this paper proposes an unsupervised Bayesian approach motivated by Optimal Transport of the evolution of scientists' research portfolios in response to transformations in their field. The model relies on $186,162$ scientific abstracts and authorship data to evaluate the influence of intellectual, social, and institutional resources on scientists' trajectories within a cohort (...) of $2\,108$ high-energy physicists between 2000 and 2019. Using Inverse Optimal Transport, the reallocation of research efforts is shown to be shaped by learning costs, thus enhancing the utility of the scientific capital disseminated among scientists. Two dimensions of social capital, namely ``diversity'' and ``power'', have opposite associations with the magnitude of change in scientists' research interests: while ``diversity'' is associated with greater change and expansion of research portfolios, ``power'' is associated with more stable research agendas. Social capital plays a more crucial role in shifts between cognitively distant research areas. More generally, this work suggests new approaches for understanding, measuring and modeling collective adaptation using Optimal Transport. (shrink)

Background: Exposomics, the study of the exposome, is flourishing, but the field is not well defined. The term “exposome” refers to all environmental influences and associated biological responses throughout the lifespan. However, this definition is very similar to that of the term “environment”—the external elements and conditions that surround and affect the life and development of an organism. Consequently, the exposome seems to be nothing more than a synonym for the environment, and exposomics a synonym for environmental research. As a (...) result, some have rebranded their “standard” environmental health research with the neologistic exposome term, whereas others ignore or seek to abandon the seemingly redundant concept of the exposome. -/- Objectives: We argue that exposomics needs to sharpen its mission focus to counteract this apparent redundancy. Exposomics should be defined as a research program in environmental health aimed at enabling a comprehensive and discovery-driven approach to identifying environmental determinants of human health. Similar to the aim of the Human Genome Project, exposomics aims to analyze the complete complexity of exposures and their corresponding biological responses. Exposomics’ primary premise is that the existence of undiscovered, potentially interconnected, nongenetic (environmental) risk factors for health necessitates a comprehensive discovery-driven analysis approach. -/- Discussion: We argue that exposomics researchers should adopt our reconceptualization of exposomics and focus on the productiveness and integrity of their research program: its purpose and principles. We suggest that exposomics researchers should coordinate the writing of reviews that assess the program’s productiveness and integrity, as well as provide a platform for exposomics researchers to define their vision for the field. (shrink)

In this article, I will explore how the underlying research values of ‘openness’ and ‘mutual responsiveness’, which are central to open science practices, can be integrated into a new ethos of science. Firstly, I will revisit Robert Merton's early contribution to this issue, examining whether the ethos of science should be understood as a set of norms for scientists to practice ‘good’ science or as a set of research values as a functional requirement of the scientific system to produce knowledge, (...) irrespective of individual adherence to these norms. Secondly, I will analyse the recent codification of scientific practice in terms of ‘scientific integrity’, a framework that Merton did not pursue. Based on this analysis, and illustrated on the case of COVID-19 as a case in which the institution of science was challenged to deliver urgently on societal desirable outcomes, I will argue that promoting open science and its core norms of collaboration and openness requires broader governance of the institution of science in its relationship with society at large, rather than relying solely on self-governance within the scientific community through a new ethos of science. This conclusion has implications for re-evaluating research assessments, suggesting that the evaluation of the scientific system should take precedence over evaluating individual researchers, and that incentives should be provided to encourage specific research behaviour rather than solely focusing on individual research outputs. This article is followed up by Commentaries of Carl Mitcham, Alfred Nordmann, Sabina Leonelli, Lukas Fuchs, Monica Edwards-Schachter. (shrink)

This article seeks to address what the work of Catherine Malabou can offer to the thinking and understanding of history. Characterizing Malabou’s intellectual project as a meditation on the relation between history and possible knowledge, it situates the philosopher’s work in the tradition of historical epistemology. It will be argued that, in its engagement with philosophical and (neuro)biological theories of plasticity and epigenesis, the historical constitution of Malabou’s philosophical system problematizes the practical and ontological difficulty behind any commitment to a (...) historically bounded knowledge of what here will be called, following Heidegger and Foucault, ‘pure finitude’. The article concludes by suggesting that, if placed alongside the work of intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, Malabou’s historical epistemology makes a decisive and useful contribution to contemporary debates regarding historical method by underscoring the (neuro)biological rooting of persistent epistemic gaps between historical understanding and experience. (shrink)

In this transdisciplinary investigation, we focus on the invention and development of gunpowder. We aim to answer the questions regarding (1) the inspiration behind the invention, including historical, mythological, and intellectual backgrounds, (2) how it came about in concreto, and (3) its impact on the history of science in China. We argue that the invention has to be viewed in a broader context and that various factors come into play with regard to the above questions. The discussion starts by examining (...) the preconditions of the invention of gunpowder in ancient Chinese mythology, natural philosophy, and the idea of life extension. After that, the invention, its direct contexts, and historical developments during the first millennium CE are investigated. To complement the former analysis of historical worldviews, the modern perspective of chemistry is applied in this context. From the angle of the additional question of “open individuals,” namely as agents of progress, this is also taken into consideration from the perspective of personality analysis. Finally, we investigate how the development of scientific understanding was embedded in the innovative philosophical developments of Song dynasty Neo-Confucianism. In our view, the early Chinese gunpowder research exemplifies the preceding and contemporary development of the scientific stratum that is part of the concept of the “investigation of things” (gewu) in the sense of the teachings of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). (shrink)

Much debate about scientific realism concerns the issue of whether it is compatible with theory change over time. Certain forms of ‘selective realism’ have been suggested with this in mind. Here I consider a closely related challenge for realism: that of articulating how a theory should be interpreted at any given time. In a crucial respect the challenges posed by diachronic and synchronic interpretation are the same; in both cases, realists face an apparent dilemma. The thinner their interpretations, the easier (...) realism is to defend, but at the cost of more substantial commitment. The more substantial their interpretations, the more difficult they are to defend. I consider this worry in the context of the Standard Model of particle physics. Examining some selective realist attempts at interpretation, I argue that realism is, in fact, compatible with different commitments on the spectrum of thinner to more substantial, thus mitigating the dilemma. (shrink)

According to Peter Galison, the coordination of different “subcultures” within a scientific field happens through local exchanges within “trading zones.” In his view, the workability of such trading zones is not guaranteed, and science is not necessarily driven towards further integration. In this paper, we develop and apply quantitative methods (using semantic, authorship, and citation data from scientific literature), inspired by Galison’s framework, to the case of the disunity of high-energy physics. We give prominence to supersymmetry, a concept that has (...) given rise to several major but distinct research programs in the field, such as the formulation of a consistent theory of quantum gravity or the search for new particles. We show that “theory” and “phenomenology” in high-energy physics should be regarded as distinct theoretical subcultures, between which supersymmetry has helped sustain scientific “trades.” However, as we demonstrate using a topic model, the phenomenological component of supersymmetry research has lost traction and the ability of supersymmetry to tie these subcultures together is now compromised. Our work supports that even fields with an initially strong sentiment of unity may eventually generate diverging research programs and demonstrates the fruitfulness of the notion of trading zones for informing quantitative approaches to scientific pluralism. (shrink)

Iberian repertorios de los tiempos stemmed from Medieval almanacs and calendars. During the sixteenth century significant editorial, conceptual and material changes in repertorios incorporated astronomy, geography, chronology and natural philosophy. From De Li’s Repertorio (1492) to Zamorano’s Cronología (1585), the genre evolved from simple almanacs to more complex cosmological works which circulated throughout the Iberian-American world. This article claims that repertorios are a form of syncretic knowledge rather than “popular science” by relying on the concept of “knowledge in transit”. Elaborating (...) on this perspective, I present how repertorios ended up delivering a worldview from existing materials, a fact so far unnoticed by scholarship. At the same time, repertorios should not be considered an exclusively Iberian phenomenon, but the full scope of their nature as a form of syncretic knowledge should include their networks with migrants, indigenous, mestizos, and criollos across the Atlantic. In this sense, I try to trace the paths connecting productions in the Americas with Iberian repertorios. (shrink)

We consider the long-term evolution of science and show how a ‘contagion of disrespect’ – an increasing dismissal of research in subfields associated with marginalized groups – can arise due to the dynamics of collaboration and reputation (versus, e.g., preconceived notions of the field’s worth). This has implications both for how we understand the history of science and for how we attempt to promote diverse scientific inquiry.

Millions of scientific articles are published each year, making it difficult to stay abreast of advances within even the smallest subdisciplines. Traditional approaches to the study of science, such as the history and philosophy of science, involve closely reading a relatively small set of journal articles. And yet many questions benefit from casting a wider net: Is most scientific change gradual or revolutionary? What are the key sources of scientific novelty? Over the past several decades, a massive effort to digitize (...) the academic literature and equip computers with algorithms that can distantly read and analyze a digital database has taken us one step closer to answering these questions. The Dynamics of Science brings together a diverse array of contributors to examine the largely unexplored computational frontiers of history and philosophy of science. Together, they reveal how tools and data from automated textual analysis, or machine "reading," combined with methods and models from game theory and cultural evolutionary theory, can begin to answer fundamental questions about the nature and history of science. (shrink)

In this paper, the epistemological and conceptual limits of our ability to conceive and reason about future possibilities are analyzed. It is argued that more attention should be paid in futures studies on these epistemological and conceptual limits. Drawing on three cases from philosophy of science, the paper argues that there are deep epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about alternatives to the current world. The nature and existence of these limits are far from obvious (...) and become visible only through careful investigation. The cases establish that we often are unable to conceive relevant alternatives; that historical and counterfactual considerations are more limited than has been suggested; and that the present state of affairs reinforces its hegemony through multiple conceptual and epistemological mechanisms. The paper discusses the reasons behind the limits of the conceivability and the consequences that follow from the considerations that make the limits visible. The paper suggests that the epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about possible futures should be mapped systematically. The mapping would provide a better understanding of the creative and critical bite of futures studies. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend causal presentism in the historiography of science. In causal presentism, historiography of science studies events, processes and practices that were causally relevant to the development of present science. I argue that causal presentism has three main virtues: First, causal presentism avoids the conceptual problems the historiography of science has recognized in its core. Secondly, causal presentism provides a clear account of what counts as historical explanatory understanding about science. Thirdly, causal presentism enables novel ways to (...) address several conceptual and methodological problems in the historiography of science. The conclusion is that causal presentism is distinctively strong position with respect to the historiography of science. (shrink)

Sözde-bilim ile ilgili bu tartışmalar uluslararası literatürde yapılıyor olsa da Türkiye’de henüz bu konuların eleştirel olarak ele alındığı söylenemez. Dolayısıyla sözde-bilimlerin eleştirel olarak ele alındığı öğrenme ortamlarının öğrencilerin bilime ve sözde-bilime ilişkin algılarına etkisi üzerine yapılacak araştırmalar konunun daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlayabilir ve belki de ilerideki program değişiklerinde öğretim programlarında sözde-bilimin yer bulmasının yolunu açabilir.

Bilimi ve bilimsel bilgiyi kültür, değer ve öznel yargılardan izole ederek nesnel bir şekilde ortaya koyabilmeye yönelik hararetli tartışmaların yaşandığı yirminci yüzyıl bilim anlayışının temel gayesi, deney ve gözleme tabi olabilecek fiziki dünyadaki olguları, mantıksal çözümlemeye tabi tutarak birleştirilmiş bilime ulaşmaktır. Bu amaca giden yolda olgulara dayanmayan ve sınanamayan her türlü metafizik öge yok sayılır. Bilimsel bilginin sadece deney ve gözleme tabi olana, diğer bir deyişle olgu verilerine dayandığı iddiasını taşıyan bu düşünce sistemi, özellikle Viyana Çevresi üyeleri tarafından benimsenmiştir. Bu (...) bakımdan Çevre üyelerinin bilimsellik anlayışındaki temel ölçüt olgulara dayanan önermelerin ya da yargıların doğrulanabilmesidir. Bilimsel bilginin sadece olgusal dünyanın gözlemlenmesi ve bu gözlem sonucunda ortaya konulan önermelerin ya da ifadelerin doğrulanmasıyla sağlandığını düşünen Çevre üyelerinin bu savlarındaki amacı bilimi ve onun bilgisini her türlü kültür ve değer alanından uzaklaştırarak metafiziksel unsurlardan arındırılmış nesnel bilgiye ulaşmaktır. Çevre üyelerinin birçoğu bilim alanı içerisinde tartışmaya yol açan meselelerin aslında metafiziksel içerikli ve dolayısıyla bunların görünüşte problemler olduğunu belirterek bu tartışmaların bilimsel bilginin gelişimi önünde bir engel oluşturacağı kanaatindedir (Hızır, 1965, s. 254). Söz gelimi, Carnap’a göre, metafizik ögeler olgusal içeriğe sahip olmadığı ve sınanabilir nitelikte olmadıkları için bilim alanı içerisinde değerlendirilemez. Bu nedenle, metafizik ögeler hem doğrulanması mümkün olmadığı hem de dilin mantıksal dizimine genellikle uymadığı gerekçesiyle anlamsızdır (Öztürk, 2011, s. 155). Bu bakımdan Çevre üyelerine göre, olgulara dayanmayan ve bilimde yanılsamalara yol açan metafizik söylemler bilimden ayıklanmalı ve bilimsel bilgi ancak olgu ve deneye dayanan önermeler üzerinden yürütülmelidir. Öte yandan Çevre düşünürleri mantıksal çözümleme yoluyla olgulara dayanan önermelerin metafiziksel unsurlar içeren önermelerden ayırt edilebileceğini ifade etmiştir. Bu bağlamda metafizik önermeleri, metafizik olmayan önermelerden ayırt edecek ölçütün doğrulanabilirlik olduğunu savunurlar. Çevre üyelerinin bu tutumları bir bakıma bilim ve sözde bilim arasında ayrım yapma ve metafiziği bilimin dışında tutma çabası olarak da değerlendirilebilir (Kabadayı, 2011, s. 39-40). Yirminci yüzyıl bilim anlayışında bilimsel etkinlikte gözlemin ve gözlemi yürüten bilim insanlarının dolaysız öznel duyu verileriyle ilişkili olduğu bu nedenle gözlem verilerinin psikolojizmin etkisinde olduğu fikri ortaya atılır. Başta Neurath olmak üzere dönemin bilim felsefecileri bilimsel bilginin kültür, değer ve psikoloji gibi öznel unsurlardan uzaklaştığı sürece değerli olduğu kanısında olduğu için bu fikre karşı çıkmaktadır (Gillies, 2018, s. 123). Görüldüğü üzere, Çevre üyelerinin temel amacı metafizik önermelerden arındırılmış, olgulara dayanan bir bilime ulaşmaktır. Bu amacın gerçekleşmesine olanak sağlayacak yöntem ise mantıksal çözümlemedir. Bu bağlamda Çevre üyeleri olgulara dayanan ve doğrulanabilen önermelerin, söz dizimi (sentaks) ve anlamsal (semantik) açıdan incelemeye tabi tutulması gerektiğini düşünmektedir (Yardımcı, 2018, s. 13-15). Özellikle Carnap (1935, s. 9-10) doğrulamanın ancak öne sürülen önermenin mantıksal analize tabi tutularak yapılması gerektiğini iddia etmiştir (Irzık, 1962, s. 65). Bununla birlikte, felsefenin işlevi, önermeleri mantıksal analize tabi tutarak yalın hale getirmektir. İşte felsefenin bu yönü Neurath’da bilimin birliği, Carnap’ta ise bilimin sentaksı, yani bilimin mantığı üzerine çalışma anlamına gelir (Hızır, 1965, s. 252). Bilimi, bilim olmayandan ayırma yöntemi olarak kullanılan doğrulama işlemi, teorik bir söylem ve gözlem önermesi arasında yapılan bir işlem olması bakımından mantıksal ve dilsel bir özellik taşır. Buradaki temel sorun ise teorik bir önermenin gözlem önermelerine indirgenebilir nitelikte olması ve gözlem önermelerinin, gözlem ile nasıl ilişki kurduğunu saptamaktır. İşte Viyana Çevresi üyeleri bu ilişkinin protokol önermeleri ile kurulduğu kanaatindedir (Ural, 2012, s. 105-107) çünkü onlara göre; öznelerarası bir bilimin sağlanması için yansız ve anlam karmaşasından arındırılmış bir dil gereklidir (Serin, 2015, s. 55). Bu dil de ancak protokol önermeler aracılığıyla kurulabilir. Bu bağlamda Çevre üyelerinin, metafiziksel ifadeler barındıran önermelerin anlamsızlığı ve bilimleri ortak bir paydada birleştiren fiziksel bir dil oluşturma olmak üzere iki temel hedefinin olduğu söylenebilir (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, s. 25; Salgar, 2012, s. 187). (shrink)

Bilime ve onun bilgisine akademik, politik, ekonomik ve kamusal alanlar olmak üzere birçok alanda diğer bilgi iddialarına kıyasla daha fazla güven duyulmaktadır. Bilime duyulan bu güvenin temelinde büyük ölçüde bilimsel süreçlerin ve yöntemlerin nesnel bir şekilde yürütülmesi ve bu nesnel sürecin bir ürünü olarak bilimsel bilginin tarafsız bilim insanları tarafından ortaya konulduğu düşüncesi yatmaktadır. Bu bakımdan toplum tarafından bilimin tartışılmaz statüsünün ve bilimsel bilgiye verilen değerin belirleyicisi olarak nesnellik özelliği ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bilhassa doğa bilimleri söz konusu olduğunda bilimsel yöntemin (...) olgulara ve dış dünyaya ilişkin nesnel bilgiler sağladığı düşünülmektedir. Bu bakımdan doğa bilimleri, bilimde nesnelliğin paradigmatik örnekleri olarak kabul görmektedir. Beşeri ve sosyal bilimler alanında ise doğa bilimlerine kıyasla nesnellik algısı düşük olmasına rağmen, yöntemlerinin bilimsel yöntemle çalışılmaya uygun olmasından dolayı en azından ilke olarak nesnel olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Bilimin değerler alanından ziyade olgu alanına ilişkin çalışmalar yürütmesi, bilim insanlarının değerler, anlamlar ve ideallerinden de kendisini izole ederek bilimsel nesnelliği temin edilebileceği konusunda genel bir kavrayışa yol açmaktadır. Bu görüşün önde gelen düşünürü Karl Popper’dır. Popper bilimsel nesnelliğin, olgusal içerikli önermelerin – protokol önermeleri – öznelerarası sınanabilir olması ile temin edilebileceğini ve böylece bilim insanlarının çalışmalarında kültür, değer ve inanç gibi öznel kanılarının bilimsel bilginin temellendirilmesi ve sınanması noktasında kullanılamayacağını ifade etmiştir. Ancak bilimin doğasına yönelik bir soruşturma bilimsel bilginin düşünüldüğü kadar nesnel bir sürece sahip olmadığını, bilim faaliyetini gerçekleştiren bilim insanlarının kişisel çıkarlarının, değerlerinin ve içinde yaşamış oldukları kültürel faktörlerin bilimsel bilginin elde edilmesi sürecinde etkili olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bakımdan bilimin doğasını doğru bir şekilde anlayabilmenin yolu bilimlerde nesnellik ölçütünün sosyolojik ve kültürel unsurlarla yakından ilişkili olduğunu bilmekten geçmektedir. Thomas Kuhn bilimsel değerlendirmelerde değer yargılarının ve kültürel unsurların kaçınılmaz olduğu düşüncesindedir. Kuhn, Popper’ın aksine sosyolojik etmen ve değerleri de işin içerisine katarak bir bilimsel nesnellik değerlendirmesi yapmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, o bilimde fazlasıyla öznel unsurları vurguladığı eleştirilerine imkân vermeyecek şekilde bilim insanlarının takip etmesi gereken ve tavsiye niteliğinde olan belirli değerler neticesinde bilimsel nesnelliğin ve rasyonalitenin sağlanabileceğini ifade etmektedir. Bu kapsamda çalışmada, bilimin en bilinen özelliği olarak göze çarpan nesnellik kavramı ve düşüncesine yönelik kavramsal bir belirlemenin ardından kültür ve değer gibi sosyolojik unsurların bilimsel objektifliğin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu argümanı, Popper ve Kuhn’un çalışmaları göz önünde bulundurularak serimlenecektir. (shrink)

Successful instances of interdisciplinary collaboration can eventually enter a process of disciplinarisation. This article analyses one of those instances: agent-based computational social science, an emerging disciplinary field articulated around the use of computational models to study social phenomena. The discussion centres on how, in knowledge transfer dynamics from traditional disciplinary areas, practitioners parsed several epistemic resources to produce new foundational disciplinary shared commitments, and how disagreements operated as a mechanism of differentiation in their production. Two parsing processes are examined to (...) illustrate this claim. The first one is the parsing of the qualitative–quantitative dualism, arguably the most important methodological disagreement in social science. The second one is the parsing of prediction, a key value in contemporary science. The analysis evidences that disagreements have fostered both external and internal dynamics of differentiation in agent-based computational social science. The former have permitted a more efficient use of epistemic resources, whereas the latter have forced practitioners to modify the foundational narrative and the agenda of the field. (shrink)

Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a crucial test. Mizrahi infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that they are more successful than their competitors. Their inferences require, according to the argument from double spaces, the prior belief that it is more likely that their target theories were pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. The T-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose (...) appearances agree with their realities; the O-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances may agree or disagree with their realities. (shrink)

Ian Hacking instigated a revolution in 20th century philosophy of science by putting experiments (“interventions”) at the top of a philosophical agenda that historically had focused nearly exclusively on representations (“theories”). In this paper, I focus on a set of conceptual tools Hacking (1992) put forward to understand how laboratory sciences become stable and to explain what such stability meant for the prospects of unity of science and kind discovery in experimental science. I first use Hacking’s tools to understand sources (...) of instability and disunity in rodent behavioral neuroscience. I then use them to understand recent grass-roots collaborative open science initiatives aimed at establishing stability in this research area and tease out some implications for unity of science and kind creation and discovery in cognitive neuroscience. -/- . (shrink)

Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the cosmos is (...) physically comprehensible. But this argument presupposes a widely accepted but untenable conception of science which I shall call standard empiricism. According to standard empiricism, in science theories are accepted solely on the basis of evidence. Choice of theory may be influenced for a time by considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory capacity, but not in such a way that the universe itself is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or physically comprehensible. In science, no thesis about the universe can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Granted this view, it is clear that science cannot have established that the universe is physically comprehensible. Standard empiricism is, however, as I have indicated, untenable. Any fundamental physical theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy two criteria. It must be (1) sufficiently empirically successful, and (2) sufficiently unified. Given any accepted theory of physics, endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted – disunified because they assert that different dynamical laws govern the diverse phenomena to which the theory applies. These disunified rivals are not considered for a moment in physics, despite their greater empirical success. This persistent rejection of empirically more successful but disunified rival theories means, I argue, that a big, highly problematic, implicit assumption is made by science about the cosmos, to the effect, at least, that the cosmos is such that all seriously disunified theories are false. Once this point is recognized, it becomes clear, I argue, that we need a new conception of science which makes explicit, and so criticizable and improvable the big, influential, and problematic assumption that is at present implicit in physics in the persistent preference for unified theories. This conception of science, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, represents the assumption of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As one goes up the hierarchy, the assumptions become less and less substantial, and more and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. At each level, that assumption is accepted which (a) best accords with the next one up, and (b) has, associated with it the most empirically progressive research programme in physics, or holds out the greatest hope of leading to such an empirically progressive research programme. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. One assumption in this hierarchy of assumptions, I argue, is that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – that is, such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified theory of everything is true. Hence the conclusion: improve our ideas about the nature of science and it becomes apparent that science has already established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – in so far as science can ever establish anything theoretical. (shrink)

Conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry has long enjoyed popularity in analytic philosophy, including the philosophy of science. In this article I offer a perspective on the ways in which the method of conceptual analysis has been used, and distinguish two broad kinds, namely philosophical and empirical conceptual analysis. In so doing I outline a historical trend in which non-naturalized approaches to conceptual analysis are being replaced by a variety of naturalized approaches. I outline the basic characteristics of these (...) approaches with illustrative examples, arguing that recent developments in the philosophy of science show that in order to achieve a more adequate understanding of scientific endeavour we need to prioritize the naturalized accounts of the method. (shrink)

Our paper studies the anatomy of the discovery of the Higgs boson at the Large Hadron Collider and its influence on the broader model landscape of particle physics. We investigate the phases of this discovery, which led to a crucial reconfiguration of the model landscape of elementary particle physics and eventually to a confirmation of the standard model. A keyword search of preprints covering the electroweak symmetry breaking sector of particle physics, along with an examination of physicists own understanding of (...) the discovery as documented in semiannual conferences, has allowed us an empirical investigation of its model dynamics. From our analyses we draw two main philosophical lessons concerning the nature of scientific reasoning in a complex experimental and theoretical environment. For one, from a confirmation standpoint, some SM alternatives could be considered even more confirmed by the Higgs discovery than the SM. Nevertheless, the SM largely remains the commonly accepted account of EWSB. We present criteria for comparing degrees of confirmation and expose some limits of a purely logical approach to understanding the Higgs discovery as a victory for the SM. Second, we understand the persistence of SM alternatives in the face of disfavourable evidence by borrowing the Lakatosian concept of a research programme, where the core idea behind a group of models survives, while other aspects adapt to incoming data. In order to apply this framework to the model landscape of EWSB, we must introduce a new category of research programme, the model-group, and we test its viability using the example of composite Higgs models. (shrink)

A constructive interpretation is given of Paul Feyerabend's philosophy'of science as being not really irrationalistic but only pseudo-irrationalistic, and as being in need of an account of how science is distinct and how related to other activities. To this end, Benedetto Croce's philosophy is considered, constructively criticized, and shown to be unexpectedly promising; its valuable element is not the instrumentalistic theory of science officially present in his Logica but the distinctionism-relationism that he practiced everywhere and especially in his literary criticism. (...) A summary is then given of results obtained or expected from an investigation of Galileo Galilei's Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems carried out in the spirit of such a modified Crocean approach. (shrink)

Die philosophische Diskussion des Begriffes wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt hat sich als schwieriger erwiesen, als es die Philosophen der ersten Hälfte unseres Jahrhunderts sich noch vorgestellt haben. Spätestens seit den Arbeiten Thomas Kuhns ist hierzu eine lebhafte Diskussion entbrannt. Die vorliegende Studie schlägt ein grundsätzliches Neudenken zu diesem Thema vor. Neuere Beiträge, wie der Falsifikationismus, Strukturalismus, Naturalismus und Realismus werden kritisch diskutiert. Es wird dann versucht, der realen Wissenschaftsgeschichte angepasst einen neuen Ausgangspunkt für wissenschaftstheoretisches Denken zu erarbeiten. Eine ausführliche Untersuchung der Geschichte (...) der Kontinentalverschiebung und Plattentektonik bildet den Ausgangspunkt für eine neue Konzeption wissenschaftlicher Erfahrung und Theoriebildung. Der Autor argumentiert für die Position des kritischen Realismus, behauptet die Unabhängigkeit empirischen Fortschritts in der Wissenschaft und ersetzt die Dichotomie Theorie-Erfahrung durch die Trichotomie Theorie-Phänomen-Erfahrung. (shrink)

Duhem is commonly held to have founded his view of history of science as continuous on the ‘metaphsical assertion’ of natural classification. With the help of a strict distinction between formal and material characterization of natural classification I try to show that this imputation is problematic, if not simply incorrect. My analysis opens alternative perspectives on Duhem's talk of continuity, the ideal form of theories, and the rôle of ‘bon sens’; moreover it emphasizes some aspects of Duhem's realism that play (...) an important part in his philosophy of science. (shrink)

It is argued that the disciplinary identity of anatomy and physiology before 1800 are unknown to us due to the subsequent creation, success and historiographical dominance of a different discipline-experimental physiology. The first of these two papers deals with the identity of physiology from its revival in the 1530s, and demonstrates that it was a theoretical, not an experimental, discipline, achieved with the mind and the pen, not the hand and the knife. The physiological work of Jean Fernel, Albrecht von (...) Haller and others is explored to prove this point. In conclusion this old physiological tradition is compared to the new experimental physiology, as practised by Francois Magendie and Pierre Flourens. (shrink)

This book was completed by the early 1960s and published in 1984 but it has not lost its topicality, for it contains an important re-assessment of the relations of two main streams of contemporary philosophy - the Analytical and the Dialectic. Adherents and critics of these traditions tend to assurnethat they are diametrically opposed, that their roots, concerns and approaches contradict each other, and that no reconciliation is possible. In contradistinction Russell derives both traditions from the common root of the (...) dissatisfaction with the arguments against speculative philosophy. These according to the author leave a lacuna - certain elementsof our Weltanschaaung have been removed, but they cannot be removed without replacement lest we have an incomplete world view, so incomplete in fact that it cannot be viable. According to Russell part of this vacuum is taken up by the analytical tradition but this tradition is not capable of taking up the remainder of it. That portion of the vacant space is however taken up by the dialectical tradi tion, which in turn cannot itself handle the whole of the problem. Thus the two reactions to the demise of speculative philosophy appear to be complementary in at least this sense. But the author goes further, for according to hirn the analytical arguments themselves clearly point to the emergence of dialectical problems, and the dialectical problems themselves need some such background to arise. (shrink)