Supererogation

The all-or-nothing problem, formulated by Joe Horton, presents us with a situation in which you can do nothing or save one child or save two. It is dangerous to save any, making doing nothing morally permissible, but there is no extra danger in saving two, so it seems wrong to just save one. But then doing nothing is morally better than saving one. I present a solution in response to this problematic result, which is that doing nothing is not an (...) accurate description of a permissible option. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a metaphysical solution to the all-or-nothing problem, which rejects the description of the choices in favour of lower-level descriptions.

This is a brief handout summarizing Doctor Joe Horton's problem (which relies on an example from Derek Parfit in its initial formulation), his solution, problems with it, and nine solutions of mine.

The question of the moral demands that humans, posthumans, and nonhumans in the Anthropocene put up on persons now living generally takes the form of supererogatory demands—that is, moral obligations with a perfectionist structure leading to obligations “above and beyond the call of duty” and extreme individual and collective sacrifice. David Roden construes this by deontology; Toby Ord, following Derek Parfit, by consequentualism. Such obligations are akin to the martyrdom of saints: but must our expectations of the Anthropocene necessarily lead (...) to this kind of moral obligation? Can it be mitigated and how? Meta-ethically, it is a highly externalist form of motivation with no concurrent rewards. In this respect, the inquiry is to be pursued through understanding how to align horizons of experience and of expectation. Normatively, it very much concerns how we define and regard persons—present and future, human and non-human, organic or artificial, conscious or not, intelligent or otherwise—since personhood and moral obligation are deeply connected concepts. In my conference paper I want to open and provoke discussion of the current and possible views of the supererogatory moral obligations in and toward the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The question “Why should I be moral?” has long haunted normative ethics. How one answers it depends critically upon one’s understanding of morality, self-interest, and the relation between them. Stephen Finlay, in “Too Much Morality”, challenges the conventional interpretation of morality in terms of mutual fellowship, offering instead the “radical” view that it demands complete altruistic self-abnegation: the abandonment of one’s own interests in favor of those of any “anonymous” other. He ameliorates this with the proviso that there is no (...) rational basis for morality’s presumption of precedence, leaving it up to each person to decide when and whether they prefer self-interested concerns to more stringent moral requirements. I counter Finlay’s radical altruism with fair egalitarianism, a more congenial interpretation of moral normativity that repudiates self-abnegation and holds instead that ceteris paribus everybody’s interests are equal. As a result, supererogation and moral sainthood become more intelligible, and the choice between self-interest and morality becomes one between different decision procedures, the particular advantage of morality being others compatible results. (shrink)

Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.

This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to (...) promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement. Furthermore, I argue that given that an act’s deontic status of both moral and non-moral reasons, the consequentialist must adopt dual-ranking act-consequentialism. I then defend dual-ranking act-consequentialism against a number of objections. (shrink)

According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason to accept a (...) radically demanding view of morality. We argue against this view by appealing to similar testimony from aesthetic exemplars. If we accept that the testimony of moral exemplars gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality, then we should accept that the testimony of aesthetic exemplars supports a radically demanding view of aesthetic normativity. We argue that we should reject both arguments for radically demanding views, and instead see the testimony of exemplars as having something important to tell us about the nature of ideals. What we learn about morality and aesthetics from attending to the lives of moral exemplars is that those who embody an ideal are subject to obligations that others are not. (shrink)

In moral philosophy, it is common to accept that some acts are beyond the call of duty, or supererogatory. Recently, it has been argued that there are also distinctly sporting forms of supererogation (Archer 2017). These arguments have been criticized by Stefan Borge (2021), who argues that they fail to establish the need to make room for supererogation. In this paper, we will defend the existence of acts sporting supererogation against Borge’s critiques. Key to Borge’s argument are the claims that (...) all purported acts of supererogation are luxury phenomena and that luxury phenomena cannot be supererogatory. We will argue against both claims and show that Borge’s arguments give us no reason to reject the existence of sporting supererogation. (shrink)

In this paper we offer an argument against supererogation and in favour of moral perfectionism. We argue three primary points: 1) That the putative moral category is not generated by any of the main normative ethical systems, and it is difficult to find space for it in these systems at all; 2) That the primary support for supererogation is based on intuitions, which can be undercut by various other pieces of evidence; and 3) That there are better reasons to favour (...) perfectionism, including competing intuitions about the good-ought tie-up, and the epistemic preference for theoretical simplicity. (shrink)

Moral latitude is only ever a matter of coincidence on the most popular decision procedure in the literature on moral uncertainty. In all possible choice situations other than those in which two or more options happen to be tied for maximal expected choiceworthiness, Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness implies that only one possible option is uniquely appropriate. A better theory of appropriateness would be more sensitive to the decision maker’s credence in theories that endorse agent-centred prerogatives. In this paper, we will develop (...) and defend a modified version of this view that allows for agent-centred prerogatives and supererogation as part of its verdicts about appropriateness. (shrink)

What is it for an agent to have a moral obligation, or, equivalently, to be overall morally required, to perform an act? In this article, I present an informative account of moral obligations in terms of reasons and show how it can be put to use to solve some pressing problems in moral philosophy. The core idea is that morality is the realm of what we can legitimately expect of one another: for agents to be morally required to F is (...) for them to have reasons to F that are at the same time reasons for everyone to expect them to F. This account is superior to standard rationalist and sentimentalist approaches in capturing both the first-personal deliberative as well as the socio-emotional dimension of moral obligations. Over and above, it provides illuminating explanations of supererogation and the imperatival character of moral requirements. (shrink)

Existing discussions of partiality have primarily examined special personal relationships between family, friends, or co-nationals. The negative analogue of such relationships – for example, the relationship of enmity – has, by contrast, been largely neglected. This chapter explores this adverse relation in more detail and considers the special reasons generated by it. We suggest that enmity can involve justified negative partiality, allowing members to give less consideration to each other’s interests. We then consider whether the negative partiality of enmity can (...) be justified through projects or the value inherent in the relationship, following two influential views about the justification of positive partiality. We argue that both accounts of partiality can be conceptually extended to the negative analogue, but doing so brings into focus the problems with such accounts of the grounds of partiality. (shrink)

Many hold that morality is essentially impartial. Many also hold that partiality is justified. Susan Wolf argues that these commitments push us towards downgrading morality's practical significance. Here I argue that there is a way of pushing morality's boundaries in a partialist direction in a way that respects Wolf's insights.

Clinical Ethics, Ahead of Print. This paper is a response to a recent BMJ Blog: ‘The duty to treat: where do the limits lie?’ Members of the Surrey Heartlands Integrated Care Service Clinical Ethics Group reflected on arguments in the Blog in relation to resuscitation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Clinicians have had to contend with ever-changing and conflicting guidance from the Resuscitation Council UK and Public Health England regarding personal protective equipment requirements in resuscitation situations. St John Ambulance had different guidance (...) for first responders.The situation regarding resuscitation led the CEG to consider ethical aspects of health care professionals’ responses to the need for resuscitation during COVID-19. Members agreed that professionals should, ideally, have the level of PPE required for an aerosol generating procedure. However, there was no consensus regarding professionals’ duty to care when this is not available. On the one hand, it was agreed that the casualty/patient’s interests regarding resuscitation should be prioritised due to professionals’ contract with the public and professional privilege. On the other hand, risk thresholds were considered relevant to individual decision-making and professionals’ duty to care. All agreed that decision-making should not be influenced by rewards or reprimands. It was agreed also that decisions to resuscitate should not be considered as moral heroism or supererogatory - regardless of PPE availability - but rather as ‘minimally decent’. We agreed that it may be acceptable for professionals, with good reasons, to opt out of resuscitation attempts and these should be reflected on and discussed before the event. (shrink)

This article advances three claims about the bindingness of duties to oneself: (1) To defend duties to oneself, one had better show that they can bind, i.e., provide normative reason to comply. (2) To salvage the bindingness of duties to oneself, one had better construe them as owed to, and waivable by, one's present self. (3) Duties owed to, and waivable by, one's present self can nevertheless bind. In advancing these claims, I partly oppose views recently developed by Daniel Muñoz (...) and Paul Schofield. My arguments at least tentatively suggest three general lessons for moral theory: (a) Bindingness is an essential feature of duties in general. (b) The long sought-after explanation of supererogation is not to be found in waivable duties to oneself. (c) The bindingness of duties is a distinctive normative phenomenon which does not crucially depend on some physical, temporal, or psychological distance between the binding and the bound self. (shrink)

Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds (...) of reason for and against. With this account in hand, we’ll see that Dual Scale has no problem weighing any kind of reason against. (shrink)

This entry explains what the issue of weighing reasons is about and then discusses a number of theories concerning weighing reasons. The general issue concerns how reasons (or considerations or pros and cons) systematically interact to determine the normative status of some action, belief, or attitude. For example, it concerns how reasons determine whether an action is permissible, required, or what ought to be done. The general issue also concerns how reasons aggregate or themselves result from systematic interactions with the (...) broader context. Along the way, the entry considers whether reasons can be incommensurable (e.g., be on a par); whether reasons have more than one weight value (e.g., justifying, requiring, and commending); the relation between reasons for and reasons against; conditions (enablers, disablers); modifiers (amplifiers, attenuators); exclusionary reasons; higher order evidence; what happens when, say, morality and epistemic rationality conflict; and so on. (shrink)

We can often permissibly choose a worse self-interested option over a better altruistic alternative. For example, it is permissible to eat out rather than donate the money to feed five hungry children for a single meal. If we eat out, we do something permissibly partial toward ourselves. If we donate, we go beyond the call of moral duty and do something supererogatory. Such phenomena aren’t easy to explain, and they rule out otherwise promising moral theories. Incommensurability and Ruth Chang’s notion (...) of parity can explain certain small improvement puzzles, but they can’t explain permissible partiality and supererogation. On the other hand, Josh Gert’s distinction between justifying and requiring weight can explain all three phenomena: permissible partiality, supererogation, and the relevant small improvement puzzle. Indeed, this chapter provides a reason to endorse the justifying/requiring weight distinction by showing that it provides the only extant explanation of all three phenomena. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are, in some sense, morally better their non-supererogatory alternatives. In this sense, what is it for one option A to be better than an alternative B? I argue for three main conclusions. First, relative rankings are a type of all-in action guidance. If A is better than B, then morality recommends that you A rather than B. Such all-in guidance is useful when acts have the same deontic status. Second, I argue that Right > Wrong: permissible acts are (...) always better than their impermissible alternatives. If Right > Wrong were false, then morality’s deontic verdicts would sometimes conflict with its relative rankings. Such conflict would undermine the thought that morality is a coherent, authoritative guide to action. Third, the All or Nothing Problem is not a counterexample to Right > Wrong as is commonly thought. Instead, it involves an interesting ranking reversal: whether A > B can depend on whether a certain alternative is added as a third option. (shrink)

In recent work, Benjamin Ferguson and Sebastian Köhler take interest in the claim that permissible acts are always morally better than impermissible acts (bop). They argue that bop is both commonsensical and supported by powerful theoretical considerations. They then present a series of cases in which common moral claims appear to conflict with bop. In this paper, I first show that some of the conflicts Ferguson and Köhler identify are merely apparent, as they arise only given theoretical commitments regarding the (...) value of actions that supporters of the relevant claims can and do reject. In the second half of the paper, I address two other cases Ferguson and Köhler discuss. I argue that the conflicts with bop in these cases are genuine, but also to be expected, because these cases involve supererogation, and our best theories of supererogation are in tension with Ferguson and Köhler’s case for bop. (shrink)

What is moral heroism? In this book, Kyle Fruh criticizes virtue-centric answers to this question and builds a compelling alternative theoretical view: moral heroism without virtue. Drawing on real-world examples, psychology, and moral philosophy both ancient and contemporary, he argues that in fact the central achievement of moral heroes is the performance of high-stakes sacrifices, so that moral heroism is clearly not a sign of rare moral attainment among an enlightened few, but is instead something enacted by all sorts of (...) people from all walks of life. He also looks at the question of how we respond to moral heroism, both by honoring it and by recruiting it to our efforts at moral improvement and moral education. His book is for anyone interested in moral excellence, the long philosophical traditions which examine it, and contemporary discussions of morally outstanding actions and agents. (shrink)

There has recently been an explosion of interest in rational and moral choice under evaluative uncertainty—uncertainty about values or reasons. However, the dominant views on such choice have at least three major problems: they are overly demanding, they are incompatible with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. The authors propose a unified view that solves all these problems. According to this view, permissible options maximize expected utility relative to permissible preferences, and different (...) kinds of permissibility for options correspond to different kinds of permissibility for preferences. Thus, rationally permissible options maximize expected utility relative to rationally permissible preferences, and morally permissible options maximize expected utility relative to morally permissible preferences. The authors argue that this view has more plausible implications than its rivals not only under evaluative uncertainty but also under ordinary uncertainty. (shrink)

Why do relationships of friendship and love support partiality, but not relationships of hatred or commitments of racism? Where does partiality end and why? I take the intuitive starting point that important cases of partiality are meaningful. I develop a view whereby meaning is understood in terms of transcending self-limitations in order to connect with things of external value. I then show how this view can be used to distinguish central cases of legitimate partiality from cases of illegitimate partiality and (...) how it puts pressure on the traditional way of thinking about partiality. (shrink)

The deployment of privacy-reducing digital products is a well-known contemporary issue. Multiple conceptual, regulatory, and legal approaches have attempted to address it. This article illuminates a complementary approach yet to be explored: supererogatory consumer choices grounded in the human right to privacy. It argues that the operation of privacy is not limited to vertical relations of power under legal frameworks, but can also operate in horizontal relations of power by way of supererogation as it applies to consumer decision-making about digital (...) products. The analysis posits that for privacy to be operationalized in this way, three prerequisites of related supererogatory decisions need to align, which are the discretion to make an unobligated choice, sufficient personal privilege, and a level of care for ‘reciprocal privacy’ that overcomes any applicable bystander effect. Despite the potential to protect privacy by supererogatory consumer choices, there simultaneously exists scope to abuse this idea via responsibilization. (shrink)

This chapter argues that machine ethics has a deontic bias narrowly focusing on the concerns of social morality. This bias distorts the machine morality debate by promoting an impoverished view of moral theory, resulting in three issues. First, it weakens any claims arguing for the possibility of machine morality – the idea that machines can be moral subjects, not just instrumental objects. Second, it overlooks potentially rewarding lines of inquiry for future research. Third, as an interdisciplinary field, it does moral (...) philosophy a disservice by portraying moral theory in an oversimplified light. The example of supererogation is used to demonstrate this point. While supererogatory acts are both familiar and undeniably moral in nature, the idea of machine supererogation (that machines could go beyond the call of duty) is conceptually problematic. This exemplifies the problem with assuming human moral concepts can accommodate artificial intelligence without substantial revision. (shrink)

It is sometimes morally permissible not to help others even when doing so is overall better for you. For example, you are not morally required to take a career in medicine over a career in music, even if the former is both better for others and better for you. I argue that the permissibility of not helping in a range of cases of “compensated altruism” is explained by the existence of autonomy-based considerations. I sketch a view according to which you (...) can have autonomy-based permissions to choose between alternatives when these alternatives differ in terms of the valuable features they instantiate. Along the way, I argue that considerations of moral autonomy do not support rejecting the plausible view that we each constantly face reasons with morally requiring strength to help (distant) strangers. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that we never owe others gratitude in return for their treating us in ways that we are owed. Instead, we owe others gratitude only for treating us in ways that go above and beyond the demands of morality. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken: we sometimes owe others gratitude for treating us in ways that we are owed. In particular, I argue that some moral duties require us to act in ways that express (...) good will to one another, and when we act in accordance with these duties, we trigger duties of gratitude on the part of others. (shrink)

Wesleyan moral theology is often approached teleologically, as a form of either virtue ethics or natural law ethics, and this approach is often motivated by an interpretation of John Wesley’s writings. In this paper, I critically examine this consensus. I argue that Wesley’s writings underdetermine the shape of Wesleyan moral theology because Wesley’s own views are equally consistent with recent developments in the neighborhood of divine command theory. I contend that a crucial case test for Wesleyan moral theology comes in (...) John Wesley’s rejection of supererogation, a rejection which places him at odds with much of the natural law tradition and raises some questions for virtue ethical expositions of his moral theology. I close with the suggestion that perhaps the more important question is not how to interpret John Wesley, but how the contemporary Wesleyan should think about supererogation and what implications this might have for the shape of Wesleyan moral theology. (shrink)

How can moral theorists who reject consequentialism in all its forms explain what we should choose in the presence of uncertainty? A solution is proposed here: decision-theoretic virtue ethics (DTVE). DTVE provides an account of what makes acts subjectively permissible in cases where the agent is uncertain about the morally relevant facts, and also of what makes acts objectively permissible in cases where these facts are themselves indeterministic. More specifically, DTVE is act focused: it focuses on the virtue-properties—such as justice (...) or prudence or beneficence—that are instantiated by the available acts themselves (not by the agents or consequences of those acts). These virtues come in degrees: some acts are more just, or more beneficent, than others. In this way, this kind of virtue ethics is an essentially scalar view: this is what allows it to be united with decision theory in a precise and coherent way. (shrink)

This paper examines three approaches to the relationship between our moral reasons to bear costs for others’ sake before and beyond the call of duty. Symmetry holds that you are required to optimise your beneficial sacrifices even when they are genuinely supererogatory. If you are required to bear a cost C for the sake of a benefit B, when they are the only costs and benefits at stake, you are also conditionally required to bear an additional cost C, for the (...) sake of an additional benefit B, when enough other costs and benefits are at stake that both of your alternatives are presumptively supererogatory. Disconnection rejects the requirement to optimise when your options are presumptively supererogatory and maintains that you have an entirely free hand to choose as you will among them. Asymmetry holds that when acting beyond the call of duty you are entitled to a measure of additional freedom compared to when you are not taking on supererogatory costs—you can prioritise your own well-being and reasons to a greater degree—but places constraints on the options that you may permissibly choose. We defend a version of Asymmetry and explore its implications for recent debates on charitable giving. (shrink)

“The Descartes Lectures” is a biennial event at Tilburg University that invites a distinguished philosopher to deliver a series of three lectures, each followed by commentaries from other experts in the field. In 2022, Tilburg University had the honor of hosting Cheshire Calhoun for a series of talks on the important philosophical question of what it means to be a responsible person. The commentators for the lectures were Gunnar Björnsson, Jules Holroyd, and Heidi Maibom. This book is a compilation of (...) the material of Calhoun’s lectures, the commentaries by Björnsson, Holroyd, and Maibom, as well as Calhoun’s replies to their critiques. (shrink)

Forced choices between rescuing imperilled persons are subject to a presumption of equality. Unless we can point to a morally relevant difference between these persons' imperilments, each should get an equal chance of rescue. Sometimes, this presumption is overturned. For example, when one imperilled person has wrongfully caused the forced choice, most think that this person (rather than an innocent person) should bear the harm. The converse scenario, in which a forced choice resulted from the supererogatory action of one of (...) the imperilled people, has received little attention in distributive ethics. I argue that, sometimes, we need not offer equal chances in these cases either. When the supererogatory act places the initially imperilled person under a reciprocal duty to bear risks for the supererogatory agent's sake in the forced choice, we may fulfil this duty for them if they are unable to do it themselves, by favouring the supererogatory agent. (shrink)

The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in the contemporary literature. We will argue that this solution, which is in its general form independent of virtue (...) ethics, provides a plausible explanation of what makes some acts supererogatory and faces two important advantages over the most popular response to the problem of supererogation, The Sacrifice View. Unlike The Sacrifice View, The Cautionary Account can class acts of benevolence that advance the agent's own interests as supererogatory and easily explain why certain acts of sacrifice are neither permissible nor praiseworthy. (shrink)

Several authors have recently argued that knowledge is not the aim of inquiry since it can make sense to inquire into a question even though one knows the answer. I argue that this a faulty diagnostic for determining whether one has met the constitutive standard of success of an activity type. The constitutive standards of success tell us when an activity is successful, but such standards can be exceeded and exceeding them can be reasonable. To back this up I develop (...) an account of zetetic supererogation and argue that subjects who continue to inquire into a question while knowing the answer do what is zetetically supererogatory. (shrink)

In this article, I confront Jessica Flanigan’s recent attempt to show not merely that women have a right to commit prenatal injury, but also that women who act on this right are praiseworthy and should not be criticized for this injury. I show that Flanigan’s arguments do not work, and I establish presumptive grounds against any such right—namely, prenatal injury, by definition, involves intentional or negligent harm and, as such, may be subsumed under a wider class of actions that are (...) presumptively wrong. (shrink)

We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call (...) Morality’s Harmonious Propensity. According to this principle, morality has a propensity toward preserving positive relationships and dissolving negative ones. (shrink)

The article presents the most important systematic philosophical questions and problems regarding altruism, outlines various answers to these, discusses them, develops precise definitions of ‘altruism’ / ‘altruistic’, 'self-interested', 'egoistic', etc. and develops a normative theory of altruism. The starting point is an assumption about the ethical function of the normative concept of altruism, namely that it captures an ideal: acting for the benefit of others beyond one's moral duty. On this basis, the normative concept of altruism is defined. This is (...) followed by an overview of the ethics that explicitly or implicitly advocate altruism. The subsequent discussion of psychological altruism centres on the question of whether and, if so, which human motives may be intrinsically aimed at the good of others. The most important such motive is acting out of empathy. The final section addresses whether and how altruistic action can be rational. (shrink)

Losing an arm to rescue a child from a burning building is supererogatory. But is losing an arm to save two children more supererogatory than losing two arms to save a single child? What factors make one act more supererogatory than another? I provide an innovative account of how to compare which of two acts is more supererogatory, and show the superiority of this account to its chief rival.

The book develops, defends, and applies a "Dual Scale" model of weighing reasons to resolve various issues in ethics. It tells you everything you ever wanted to know about weighing reasons and probably a lot of stuff you didn't want to know too. It addresses, among other things, what the general issue of weighing reasons is; what it is to weigh reasons correctly; whether reasons have more than one weight value (e.g., justifying, requiring, and/or commending weight); whether weight values are (...) context sensitive; how to tell what the weights of reasons are; how reasons for are related to reasons against; and how the weights of reasons aggregate. After addressing such issues, it explains a number of puzzling phenomena in ethics, such as the All or Nothing Problem, the normative significance of small improvements, and the intransitivity of the makes-it-permissible-to-act-against relation. (shrink)

Dual-role approaches to reasons say, roughly, that reasons can relate to actions in two fundamentally different ways: they can either require conformity, or justify an action without requiring that it be taken. This paper develops a formal dual-role approach, combining ideas from defeasible logic and practical philosophy. It then uses the approach to shed light on the phenomenon of supererogation and resolve a well-known puzzle about supererogation, namely, Horton’s All or Nothing Problem.

The concept of imperfect duty has become increasingly prominent in a wide range of debates in moral philosophy. However, many problems related to imperfect duties remain underdiscussed. This thesis aims to fill some of these gaps. Specifically, I focus on three issues. One is the compatibility of imperfect duties with supererogation. It has been argued that due to their limitless nature, if we accept imperfect duties in our moral theory, then we should abandon the category of supererogation. Contrary to this, (...) I argue that imperfect duties are compatible with supererogation. The second issue is the connection between latitude permitted by imperfect duties and demandingness of morality. It is often claimed that this latitude implies that morality is moderately demanding. I argue, however, that there is no interesting connection between latitude and demandingness: the implication is true only if we already assume, on independent grounds, that morality is not overly demanding. The third issue is that imperfect duties seem to help us solve the ‘inefficacy problem’. I argue that imperfect duties fail in this respect. They fail primarily because judgments about one’s compliance with the requirements of an imperfect duty can only be made by assessing one’s life overall. However, on such a scope, it is overwhelmingly unlikely that agents who act in collectively harmful ways violate any imperfect duties in virtue of so acting. But the fact that imperfect duties do not solve the inefficacy problem might not be too regrettable. To demonstrate this, in the final part of my thesis, I discuss the nature of cases that generate the inefficacy problem. It is thought that in some such cases, individual agents make no moral difference whatsoever to the outcome. I argue that when the harms in question are purely experiential, there are good reasons to think that cases of this kind are impossible. Individual agents in such cases have at least a chance of making a morally significant difference. (shrink)

While moral philosophers have paid significant attention to the concept of moral supererogation, far less attention has been paid to the possibility that supererogation may also exist in other areas of normativity. Recently, though, philosophers have begun to consider the possible existence of prudential, epistemic, aesthetic, and sporting supererogation. These discussions tend to focus on aspects of our practices in these areas of normativity that suggest an implicit acceptance of the existence of supererogation. In this chapter, I will offer a (...) different kind of defense of non-moral supererogation. I will begin by considering a particular kind of argument made in support of moral supererogation. According to this line of argument, we should accept the existence of moral supererogation because a moral code which makes room for supererogation is likely to be more effective at promoting morally desirable behavior than a moral code which leaves no room for the supererogatory. I will begin by outlining this argument. I will then develop a similar line of argument for prudential, epistemic, aesthetic, and sporting norms. (shrink)

In this entry I will introduce two such puzzles that relate to the heroic actions and testimony. I will first introduce the basic idea of supererogation and why some heroic actions give us reason to accept the existence of supererogatory actions. I will then introduce the problem that supererogation raises for moral theory and explain the main responses that have been offered to this problem. I will then explain two related problems that arise from the way that heroes describe their (...) actions and explore how moral philosophers might respond to these problems. (shrink)

We argue that supererogation cannot be understood just in terms of reasons for action. In addition to reasons, a theory of supererogation must include prerogatives, which can make an action permissible without counting in favor of doing it.

Supererogatory actions must go beyond duty not only by being optional, but also by being good to do. Understanding the evaluative condition that supererogatory actions must meet is vital in order to understand the very concept of supererogation. I argue for two key features of the goodness of supererogatory actions: firstly, that they are comparative, and secondly, that they are relative. Specifically, I argue that an action meets the evaluative condition of supererogation if and only if it is (i) better (...) than some permissible alternative and (ii) better than (or at least as good as) all permissible alternatives that are (a) as costly or (b) less costly; where the sense in which it is better is relative to a particular beneficiary. Seeing why this is so reveals the complexity of our notion of the supererogatory and captures our intuitions on core and complex cases. Furthermore, it makes room for supererogation’s mirror: the suberogatory. (shrink)

“Taking responsibility” has different senses, referring most prominently either to something which has already happened or to something to be done. Taking backward-looking responsibility is a manner of relating to earlier actions, for instance, properly seeing them as one’s own, accepting their consequences, or appropriately discharging duties arising from them. Taking forward-looking responsibility concerns the acquisition, distribution, and execution of responsibilities regarding something which should be done, for example, by adopting certain roles, taking initiative, or optional action such as volunteering.