Sovereignty

As the climate crisis accelerates, ecological degradation is making vast swaths of the planet uninhabitable. This slow-moving disaster is producing a wave of human displacement—millions forced from their homes by sea-level rise, drought, extreme weather, and environmental collapse. Yet those displaced are not being protected by the international legal system, and the countries most responsible for climate change are often the least willing to accept them. This paper argues that current frameworks around climate migration are both ethically and politically insufficient. (...) Legal definitions such as "refugee" and "migrant" fail to capture the structural violence and involuntary nature of climate displacement, leaving people unprotected and stateless. Through a synthesis of philosophical argument, legal analysis, feminist theory, and ecosocialist critique, I propose a reparative, justice-oriented approach to climate migration rooted in the concept of "ecologically displaced people." Building from the failures of adaptation and resilience narratives, this paper explores how the Global North must bear a disproportionate obligation to provide refuge, land, and rights to displaced people—grounded in both needs and culpability. It further examines the capitalist logic of borders as tools of exclusion and labor control, ultimately proposing No Border politics and mutual aid as radical, necessary alternatives to a collapsing global order. In doing so, the paper aligns with red-green political frameworks to advocate a collective, anti-capitalist response to the ecological and moral emergency of climate displacement. (shrink)

Avia Pasternak argues for a right that democracies have to sanction other democracies. This paper reconstructs her argument and objects to one of its premises.

This paper argues that it is prudentially wise to defer to groups about how they are essentially constituted and defined. After a few words situating the paper in my greater research project (§1), I articulate the kind of deference I have in mind (§2). Then I offer two conditional arguments on why it is epistemically desirable to let other people tell you how they ought to be identified (§3). The first argument is that people are owed lexical sovereignty because denying (...) it is absurd; the second is that modest skeptics ought to agree with it on the basis of some relatively anodyne and plausible epistemic considerations. (shrink)

I will outline four justifications of regional ecological obligations calling for different political authorities to collaborate for ecological reasons: through voluntary agreement between political entities united by an ecological region; by a shared regional history or cultural relations to an ecological region; with reference to ‘place-based’ duties with an ecological basis; or by obligations to an extended set of individual right-holders. None are conclusive reasons but show that there are normative grounds for regional collaboration of separate political authorities. The article (...) contributes to discussion on, despite its practical relevance, a much neglected concept in political philosophy. (shrink)

Debate between Dan Demetriou (Philosophy, Minnesota Morris) and Michael Huemer (Philosophy, Colorado), forthcoming in Problems in Applied Ethics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates, Steven Cowan, ed. (Bloomsbury). The main essays are 5000 words or fewer; replies are 1500 words or fewer. This penultimate version is published here with permission from the editor.

In the early iterations of his political thought, The Elements of Law and De Cive, Hobbes proposed a new account of the nature of the people. In Section 2 I describe Pufendorf’s critical response. Pufendorf’s theory of the people is a neglected aspect of the political argument of the De Jure. Just as neglected is Locke’s theory of the people in Two Treatises of Government, though there is better reason for neglect in Locke’s case, in so far as he fails (...) in his major work of political philosophy to present anything resembling a theory of the people at all. In Section 3 I bring Locke’s thinking about the people into clearer focus. In the concluding Section 4 I explore some of the weaknesses of his position. (shrink)

Duties to address global injustices face a large motivation gap, particularly amongst those populations most capable of bearing the financial burdens of fulfiling them. This motivation gap is explained, at least in part, by the structure of the state system, which facilitates group identification with fellow citizens to a greater extent than with outsiders. This structural feature of the state system gives states little incentive to further the cause of global justice. Yet, given that states are the most powerful actors (...) on the global stage today, a more just global order is likely predicated upon the development of more just states. In light of these realities, in this paper I make the case for an approach to furthering global justice which i call inward internationalisation. Inward internationalisation calls for the initially modest structural transformation of domestic states, so as to make domestic governments and their constituents increasingly sensitive to their international obligations. Inward internationalisation involves states giving a public, formal, and institutionalised voice within their own domestic deliberations to other states' representatives. This serves informational, expressive, and dynamic functions. After outlining these functions, thereby showing the attraction of inward internationalisation, I argue for the strategic accessibility of inward internationalisation as a path to reform, by outlining the dynamics which might cause inward internationalisation to spread as a norm of governance amongst states. (shrink)

If the instance of human rights cannot ensure the protection of the rightless, as Arendt famously claimed, how can the rightless struggle for freedom and equality? In this essay, I attempt to answer this question by reconsidering Arendt’s influential critique of human rights in light of the two polar responses it evoked from contemporary French philosophers Jacques Rancière and Étienne Balibar. Rancière, who objects to Arendt’s delimiting of the political, finds her argument excluding and dangerous. Balibar, on the other hand, (...) believes that it conveys an immense potential for politics to come, as it points to the dialectical political truth of equaliberty. In the following, I show the problematics of Rancière’s ingenious formulation of rights, and the answer Balibar’s original interpretation of Arendt’s thought might suggest in response. I contend that working through Rancière’s critique of Arendt’s argument and Balibar’s affirmation of it not only highlights the merits of her critical account but also points to the fundamental relation between Arendt’s work on rights and her later discussions of the human condition of non-sovereignty and the power of promises. I believe that such a reading can contribute to our interpretation of Arendt, and pave new routes of action for non-citizens (such as refugees, stateless persons and subjects of military occupation), who cannot employ the authorities’ strength for their protection. (shrink)

This paper is about whether we can revise the highest rule in a legal system using legal reasoning. HLA Hart and Alf Ross argued that we can’t: either the highest rule is unchangeable, or it can only be changed in a revolution — a merely causal change, not a legal one. I argue, drawing on an idea from Hartry Field about logic and epistemology, that we can. The emergence of the conclusion, within a legal system, that the highest rule should (...) be replaced by something else can provide a legal reason for the change. In making the change, we act for reasons internal to the legal system. This allows us to make sense of the distinction, recognized by legal subjects, between a revolution and a legal change of sovereignty. (shrink)

Appeals to occupancy rights are central to a number of prominent defenses of territorial sovereignty. Occupancy rights are grounded in the importance of people’s located life plans. However, these accounts usually do not consider the global economic practices on which many of our life plans now rely. Most of the stuff in our daily lives is produced within global supply chains. In this paper, I argue that if occupancy interests are grounded in life-plan-based interests, then we have occupancy interests in (...) places far outside our places of residency. I further defend this argument by considering the implications of large-scale foreign land acquisitions. Through our participation in global economic practices, we effectively occupy, albeit not exclusively, land acquired for the use of global supply chains. By construing occupancy as bounded, occupancy-based defenses of territorial sovereignty obscure the highly hierarchical and unequal global structures that emerged from the world-building project of European colonialism. In the contemporary world, we cannot assess territorial sovereignty without assessing these structures. (shrink)

Multicultural Citizenship: Legacy and Critique allows the philosopher an opportunity to consider the evolution and transformation of Will Kymlicka's theories from Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Canonical in the field of multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka's work developed an original way of recognizing and accommodating ethnic groups and national minorities through liberal democratic principles. This new volume brings together expert scholars to evaluate the impact of Kymlicka's book on their own views and the field's general progression over the past (...) three decades and brings Kymlicka to face new questions challenging multiculturalism and re-evaluate the main ideas of his original theory by reflecting on its development. Through engagement with the contributors' chapters, Kymlicka ends this edited collection with proposals for new ways of understanding multiculturalism at a time of rising anti-immigration populism and natalist movements. This book offers a modern outlook on multiculturalism with contributions from a diverse group of authors as well as Will Kymlicka himself and will be of great interest to scholars and students of migration, nationalism, minority rights, sociology, law, and politics. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) has intensified the global tension between digital inclusion, which advocates for equitable access to technology, and digital sovereignty, emphasizing national control over data and infrastructure. This article exam ines how Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) can reconcile these competing im peratives by embedding ethical principles, such as inclusivity, sustainability, precaution, and reflexivity, into technology governance. Through qualitative case studies in educa tion (e.g., Kenya’s eLimu and India’s DIKSHA platforms) and healthcare (e.g., WHO’s pandemic (...) data-sharing protocols), the study demonstrates that RRI fosters participatory design, balances sovereignty with global collaboration, and mitigates systemic biases. Findings reveal that rigid sovereignty policies often exacerbate inequalities, while RRI driven frameworks enable marginalized communities to co-create solutions, ensuring culturally relevant and ethically aligned technologies. The analysis highlights RRI’s po tential to transform geopolitical competition into equitable governance, advocating for its institutionalization through international mechanisms such as the UN’s Global Digital Compact. By prioritizing social justice, RRI redefines sovereignty as a stewardship obli gation, ensuring AI development uplifts, rather than undermines, vulnerable populations. The article concludes that integrating RRI principles into both global and local agendas is crucial for dismantling digital hierarchies and promoting inclusive innovation. (shrink)

In her important book Promoting Justice Across Borders, Lucia Rafanelli offers a detailed account of ‘reform interventions’, seen as ‘any deliberate attempt to promote justice in a foreign society’. Such interventions, she argues, can and should be subject to ethical evaluation, including standards relating to toleration, legitimacy, and collective self-determination. While I am sympathetic to many of Rafanelli's arguments, in this essay I will argue that, for a large number of cases this complex moral machinery is not needed, because the (...) acts in question either are, or could be, morally indifferent when looked at from the perspective of interaction between members of the international community. In particular, I argue that many market or economic interactions between states fall into this morally indifferent zone, and so need not meet the standards set out by Rafanelli to be acceptable. (shrink)

Although there is now a large and sophisticated literature on ethical or moral matters relating to family immigration and immigration enforcement, the intersection of these topics has not been greatly explored. This is unfortunate, as particular and difficult normative issues arise in relation to immigration enforcement when applied to children and to families where some members are unauthorized migrants and others are citizens or authorized migrants (“mixed-status” families). This chapter addresses this deficit, explaining some of these special difficulties and providing (...) suggestions as to how they may be addressed. (the file below is a final pre-publication version. Please cite to the published version.). (shrink)

This article examines the interplay between contemporary algorithmic security technology and the political theory of the state of exception. I argue that the exception, as both a political and a technological concept, provides a crucial way to understand the power operating through machine learning technologies used in the security apparatuses of the modern state. I highlight how algorithmic security technology, through its inherent technical properties, carries exceptions throughout its political and technological architecture. This leads me to engage with Theodor Adorno’s (...) negative dialectics to interrogate the question of ‘ground truth’ in machine learning. I conclude that most machine learning technology asserts identity between itself and bourgeois reality – and thus inherently reinforces and reproduces the relations of domination entailed in that image of the world. However, space still exists for machine learning to operate within spaces of political non-identity, or exceptions to the bourgeois totality, and aid in liberatory politics. (shrink)

This article argues that Machiavelli’s chapters on the Decemvirate ( D 1.35, 1.40-45) advance an internal critique of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. I first contextualize these chapters in relation to several of Machiavelli’s potential sources, including Livy’s Ab urbe condita, Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s Roman Antiquities, and the antiquarian writings of Andrea Fiocchi and Giulio Pomponio Leto. I then analyze Machiavelli’s claim that the decemvirs held “absolute authority” ( autorità assoluta)—an authority that was unconstrained by either laws or countervailing magistrates. (...) I proceed to argue that Machiavelli’s account of the decemvirs’ election contains a web of allusions to the lex regia, the “royal law” by which the Roman people were thought to have conveyed their sovereign power to an emperor. By modeling the decemvirs’ election on the lex regia, Machiavelli reveals the political limitations of the doctrine of popular sovereignty; moreover, he illustrates that even free and fair elections can easily give rise to tyranny. (shrink)

Kantian legalism is now the dominant scholarly interpretation of Kant and an important approach to legal and political philosophy in its own right. One notable feature is its construal of the relationship between law and politics decisively in law’s favour: Law subordinates politics. Political judgment is constrained by and only permissibly exercised through law. This paper opposes this subordination through a close analysis of an ambiguity in Kant’s conception of sovereignty. Understanding this ambiguity requires seeing that, for Kant, law cannot (...) subordinate the sovereign’s political judgment because it is a condition which makes a legal system possible. Kant was not an exacting legalist, but a practical reasoner struggling with the pressures politics imposes on finite beings. Through discussion of a leading contemporary approach, and close engagement with its historical source, the paper raises new considerations about the relevance of political judgment in the relationship of law and politics. (shrink)

This article discusses the relation between colonialism and the sovereignty of peoples through a dialogue between Hegel and the thought of the French Revolution. These two sides are relevant to each other not only because of their historical proximity, but also because of the connections that can be established when we approach the topic of colonialism through these two manifestations. Hegel is explicit that his philosophy of history and his philosophy of right are supposed to be philosophies of freedom. Yet (...) despite the importance that he lends to freedom, Hegel also explicitly defends, in the very same text, colonial domination when he deals with the relation between peoples. A similar problem had arisen in the course of the French Revolution. Following the declarations of war, France is confronted on various occasions with the question of how to deal with other peoples and countries. With the foundation of the Republic in 1792, the relation with other peoples becomes central in the revolutionary debates. The topic of colonialism is part of the constituting debates, and not only because of the uprisings in then Saint Domingue leading to the Haitian Revolution. This article is a part of a larger research project that attempts to reassess the relations between Hegel and the French Revolution, and deals with the question of how we can re-read Hegel's interpretation of the French Revolution based on the evolving historiography of the Revolution. After an introduction of both sides of this dialogue, the paper discusses how Hegel's political philosophy can be applied to understand the debates about the emancipation of colonies that take place during the French Revolution. The next part further analyses some issues, such as the notion of sovereignty and, in the concluding remarks, I summarize my discussion and point to some avenues for further research. (shrink)

To become sovereign, one must be seen as sovereign. In other words, a sovereign must appear-philosophically, politically, and aesthetically-on the stage of power, both to themselves and to others, in order to assume authority. In this sense, sovereignty is a theatrical phenomenon from the very beginning. This book explores the relationship between theater and sovereignty in modern political theory, philosophy, and performance. Arthur Bradley considers the theatricality of power-its forms, dramas, and iconography-and examines sovereignty's modes of appearance: thrones, insignia, regalia, (...) ritual, ceremony, spectacle, marvels, fictions, and phantasmagoria. He weaves together political theory and literature, reading figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schmitt, Benjamin, Derrida, and Agamben alongside writers including Shakespeare, Cervantes, Schiller, Melville, Valéry, Kafka, Ionesco, and Genet. Formally inventive and deeply interdisciplinary, Staging Sovereignty offers a surprising and original narrative of political modernity from early modern political theology to the age of neoliberal capitalism. (shrink)

This article questions the place of the child in the metaphysics and imaginary of Western colonization, racialization, and decolonization. In the last chapter of The Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon, children appear not only as victims but also as a problem for which Fanon struggles to account as a theorist of decolonization as much as a psychiatric practitioner. Through a reading of one of the cases, this article interrogates the ways in which colonization attempts to infantilize colonized populations (...) while erasing childhood, and the ways in which decolonization meets colonization by regarding childhood in the end as a misfortune. The work of decolonization, to proceed, thus would demand us to rethink childhood, and in doing so break free of Western metaphysics. (shrink)

Libertarians tend to noninterventionists on moral grounds, for which the simplest argument is national sovereignty. Yet, as some have argued, national sovereignty sits uncomfortably with libertarians’ moral individualism. I affirm the interventionists’ rejection of national sovereignty, but offer several reasons for why applying libertarians’ moral individualism to actual wars requires noninterventionism. The first is collateral damage that cannot be justified given interventions’ consistently low probability of success. The second is that creating war zones imposes terror and harm on everyone within (...) a given area, regardless of whether they actually get killed or injured themselves. The third is that a general policy of intervention, and the standing army it requires, has recurring perverse effects on both the intervening country’s population and the world more generally. I then argue that the points raised here against intervention apply to all war, not just interventions, albeit weakened, and distinguish the resulting anti-war position from pacifism. (shrink)

Using the two cases of the Icelandic Health Sector Database and Russian initiatives in biobanking, the article criticizes the view of narratives and imaginaries as a sufficient and unproblematic means of shaping public understanding of genetics and justifying population-wide projects. Narrative representations of national biobanking engage particular imaginaries that are not bound by the universal normative framework of human rights, promote affective thinking, distract the public from recognizing and discussing tangible ethical and socioeconomic issues, and harm trust in science and (...) technology. In the Icelandic case, the presentation of the project in association with national imaginaries concealed its market identity and could lead to the commodification of biodata. In the Russian case, framing in terms of "genetic sovereignty" and "civilizational code" offers pretexts for state securitization. Adherence to normative framework of human rights and public discussion of genetics in an argumentative and factual mode can counter these trends. (shrink)

The book takes a hard look at libertarian foreign policy doctrines, especially those of non-intervention, interstate federalism, and non-aggression, and applies new insights to these old doctrines. Classical liberal thinkers such as Vincent Ostrom, James Madison, and F.A. Hayek have all hinted at the idea of world governance from a libertarian standpoint. Yet today, “the libertarian position” on foreign policy is either non-intervention from the US side of the Atlantic or a halfhearted confederation from the European side of the Atlantic. (...) The themes that emerge in this volume (II) are whether or not libertarian alternatives to the status quo are workable and, if so, whatwould they look like. (shrink)

The keenly contested debates over the passage from the Middle Ages to modernity have steadily revealed how this transition was itself characterised by tensions and complexities. Narratives and inte...

Habermas’ theory of popular sovereignty has received comparatively little sustained critical attention in the Anglo-American literature since initial responses to Between Facts and Norms. In light of subsequent work on group agency, this paper argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty—in its denial of the normative force of collective citizen action—is best understood as a renunciation of the doctrine. The paper is structured in three sections. Section 1 examines Habermas’ treatment of popular sovereignty prior to Between Facts and Norms as (...) both (i) a principle of constitutional legitimacy or normative justification for the modern Rechtsstaat and (ii) a concept of legitimation for the rule of the ascendant liberal bourgeoisie. Section 2 then argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty in Between Facts and Norms, by discounting the role of collective citizen agency in the justification of the modern constitutional state, empties the doctrine of its core normative content. The final section briefly elaborates on this claim by reference to Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. (shrink)

Seeking new forms of democracy, progressive politics raises a fundamental question: what is the alternative to the allegedly coherent, self-contained liberal subject that represents the project of modernity? Exploring the themes of nature, race, and the divine, this book identifies the more realistic alternative in the "relational subject": a subject that is inseparable from the global field of relations through which it emerges and yet distinct from that field because it lives a life that no one else ever has. Recognizing (...) ourselves as such subjects allows us not only to rethink politics, but, more profoundly, to envision sovereignty as the means by which we each rejuvenate ourselves and the polities we constitute with others. (shrink)

Spanish translation of Field, S. L. (2014). 'Hobbes and the question of power'. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 52(1), 61-86. Thomas Hobbes has been hailed as the philosopher of power par excellence; however, I demonstrate that Hobbes’s conceptualization of political power is not stable across his texts. Once the distinction is made between the authorized and the effective power of the sovereign, it is no longer sufficient simply to defend a doctrine of the authorized power of the sovereign; such (...) a doctrine must be robustly complemented by an account of how the effective power commensurate to this authority might be achieved. Nor is this straightforward: for effective political power can fluctuate, sometimes severely. In this light, the prevalent juridical reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy is inadequate. (shrink)

“How too, for that matter, could such large populations be fed, without chains of command to organize the masses, formal offices of leadership; full-time administrators, soldiers, police, and other non-food-producers, who in turn could only be supported by the surpluses that agriculture provides? These seem like reasonable questions to ask, and those who make the first point almost invariably make the second. But in doing so, they risk parting company with history. You can’t simply jump from the beginning of the (...) story to the end, and then assume you know what happened in the middle” (Pg. 274). In the monograph The Dawn of Everything from Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, anthropologist David Graeber and archaeologist David Wengrow discuss the consequences of state formation theory, and how countless anthropological and archaeological cases disprove common assumptions regarding the evolution of civilization. (shrink)

This article holds that governmental investments in quantum technologies speak to the imaginable futures of digital sovereignty and digital infrastructures, two major areas of change driven by related technologies like AI and Big Data, among other things, in international law today. Under intense development today for future interpolation into digital systems that they may alter, quantum technologies occupy a sort of liminal position, rooted in existing assemblages of computational technologies while pointing to new horizons for them. The possibilities they raise (...) are neither certain nor determinate, but active investments in them (legal, political and material investments) offer perspective on digital technology-driven influences on an international legal imagination. In contributing to visions of the future that are guiding ambitions for digital sovereignty and digital infrastructures, quantum technologies condition digital technology-driven changes to international law and legal imagination in the present. Privileging observation and description, I adapt and utilize a diffractive method with the aim to discern what emerges out of the interference among the several related things assembled for this article, including material technologies and legal institutions. In conclusion, I observe ambivalent changes to an international legal imagination, changes which promise transformation but appear nonetheless to reproduce current distributions of power and resources. (shrink)

The article retraces three important steps along the path of Derrida’s Heidegger interpretation in The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II. Readings of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Introduction to Metaphysics, and “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” complement and further develop Derrida’s deconstruction of Heidegger, which revolves around the term “Walten” and its role in the world-formation that makes community possible. The analysis of what Derrida calls the hyper-sovereignty of Walten reveals an ethico-political ambiguity in Heidegger’s texts. On the one (...) hand, this hyper-sovereignty registers as a super-sovereign violence that founds theological-political world-constructs through the exclusion of those deemed other. On the other hand, like différance it serves as the condition of impossibility of a common world. Following Derrida’s provocation, I develop this second sense to argue that the dissolution of the common world entails an ethical imperative to carry the other with whom one has nothing in common. (shrink)

Ovaj rad istražuje doprinos jednog od najvažnijeg, a nezasluženo zanemarenog inte lektualca dvadesetog stoljeća, Ernsta Kantorowicza, modernoj debati između političke teologije i liberalnog konstitucionalizma, analizirajući aspekte iz njegovog djela "The Kings's Two Bodies." Možemo smatrati da je Kantorowicz kao filozof sudjelovao u "ti hom dijalogu" o pitanju suverena i političke fikcije s ostalim filozofima njemačkog go vornog područja; s Carlom Schmittom, Ernstom Cassirerom, Erikom Petersonom, kao i s filozofima koji se nisu primarno bavili filozofijom politike, poput Martina Heideggera i Carla (...) Gustava Junga; tihom u smislu da su se navedeni autori poznavali, kritizirali i nadovezivali na radove drugih, premda nisu uvijek direktno citirani. Unatoč tome što je Kantorowicz, poput Schmitta, sudjelovao u reakcionarnoj kritici Weimarske republike, njegovo djelo ne služi kao opravdanje "suverena 20. st.," odnosno nacionalsocijalizma, već kao pokazatelj na naš komplicirani odnos s nacionalnom državom, kao i neuspjeh da joj pobjegnemo. Ovdje možemo spomenuti da Kantorowicz nije samo bio dio debate "starog historicizma" nego je anticipirao i novi historicizam, gledajući njegov utjecaj na biopolitiku i Michela Foucaulta, koji u prvom poglavlju svog djela "Nadzora i kazne" gradi na idejama prikazanim u "Kraljeva dva tijela". (shrink)

В главе представлена попытка всестороннего анализа связей между государственным суверенитетом и заботой об окружающей среде. Данные отношения рассматриваются в работе в контексте активно развивающегося знания об экологическом суверенитете – достаточно новой парадигме, в рамках которой осуществляется намерение интегрировать концепцию традиционного государственного управления с темой экологической ответственности. Автор исследует существующие противоречия между идеями, лежащими в основе государственного суверенитета, и требованиями глобальной экологической ответственности, и высказывает предположение, что суверенитет может быть переосмыслен таким образом, чтобы в это понятие была включена забота об окружающей (...) среде в качестве одного из основных положений. Опираясь на междисциплинарные источники, автор предлагает ряд новых инструментов и стратегий, позволяющих сбалансировать экологическую ответственность с национальными интересами в рамках принятия гармоничных, справедливых и устойчивых норм экологического права. В качестве конкретного примера автор приводит Индонезию, в Конституции которой были закреплены экологические права в качестве основных прав человека. В работе данный факт рассматривается как пример конституционного признания экологического суверенитета, обусловливающего роль государства в обеспечении здоровой окружающей среды для своих граждан. Автор утверждает, что принятие Индонезией «зеленой конституции» знаменует собой сдвиг в сторону экократии, в рамках которой особое внимание уделяется участию человека в управлении окружающей средой. В заключение автор приводит перспективные направления представленной повестки и подчеркивает необходимость создания новой онтологии, предполагающей принципы синергии, которая будет базироваться на экологических ценностях для защиты окружающей среды. // The chapter presents an attempt to comprehensively analyse the links between state sovereignty and environmental care. These relations are considered in the context of the actively developing knowledge of environmental sovereignty – a rather new paradigm, which intends to integrate the concept of traditional state governance with the theme of environmental responsibility. The author explores the existing tensions between the ideas underlying state sovereignty and the demands of global environmental responsibility, and suggests that sovereignty can be redefi ned in such a way that environmental care is included as a core concept. Drawing on interdisciplinary sources, the author proposes a number of new tools and strategies to balance environmental responsibility with national interests, within the framework of adopting harmonious, equitable and sustainable environmental law. As a concrete example, the author cites Indonesia, whose constitution enshrined environmental rights as fundamental human rights. The paper considers this fact as an example of constitutional recognition of environmental sovereignty, conditioning the role of the state in ensuring a healthy environment for its citizens. The author argues that Indonesia’s adoption of a “green constitution“ marks a shift towards an ecocracy that emphasises human participation in environmental governance. The author concludes with promising directions for the presented agenda and emphasises the need to create a new ontology involving synergy principles that will be based on ecological values to protect the environment. (shrink)

The article explores the links between cyborgisation and biopolitics, examining the impact of technology on the mechanisms of power and control in society. The author analyses how the integration of digital technologies into the human body and consciousness transforms traditional forms of biopolitical control. The paper uses the concepts of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze to analyse the transformation of power and its forms in the context of blurring boundaries between man and machine. At the same time, the author analyses (...) existing and promising forms of resistance to total technological control, such as hacktivism and various social movements, particularly for digital rights. The paper also argues for the need for further interdisciplinary research on the social and psychological implications of integrating technological solutions into human nature. // В статье исследуются связи между киборгизацией и биополитикой, рассматривается влияние технологий на механизмы власти и контроля в обществе. Автор анализирует, как интеграция цифровых технологий в человеческое тело и сознание трансформирует традиционные формы биополитического контроля. В работе используются концепции Мишеля Фуко и Жиля Делеза для анализа трансформации власти и ее форм в условиях размывания границ между человеком и машиной. Вместе с этим автор анализирует существующие и перспективные формы сопротивления тотальному технологическому контролю, такие как хактивизм и разнообразные общественные движения, в частности, за цифровые права. Также в работе доказывается необходимость проведения дальнейшего междисциплинарного исследования по вопросам социальных и психологических последствий интеграции технологических решений в человеческую природу. (shrink)