Philosophy of Science, General Works

We develop a new metaphor account where metaphors become surrogate variables for different but related phenomena. As we will argue, subrogation is the result of the interplay between the things inspired by the metaphor and the empirical dynamics that result from such inspiration. In particular, we focus on adaptive radiation, a major concept of evolutionary biology. Our study suggests that there is no distinct phenomenon, process, or pattern in nature than can be identified as adaptive radiation. What we have instead (...) is a grouping variable that has surrogated different evolutionary phenomena into one expansive label. We believe this analysis of metaphors helps better understand the value of metaphors for science not only as a provider of epistemic and cognitive virtues but most importantly, as a crucial research tool that can both help and divert scientific experimentation. (shrink)

In the social sciences, within the explanatory paradigm of structural individualism, a theory of action – like rational choice theory – models how individuals behave and interact at the micro level in order to explain macro observations as the aggregation of these individuals actions. A central epistemological issue is that such theoretical models are stuck in a dilemma between falsity of their basic assumptions and triviality of their explanation. On the one hand, models which have a great empirical success often (...) rest on unrealistic or even knowingly false assumptions; on the other hand, more complex models, with additional more realistic hypotheses, can (trivially) adapt to a wide range of situations and thus loose their explanatory power. Our purpose here is epistemological and consists in wondering to which extent demanding realistic assumptions in such cases is a relevant criterion with respect to the acceptance of a given explanatory model. Via an analogical reasoning with physics, we argue that this criterion seems too strong and actually irrelevant. General physical principles are not just idealized or unrealistic, they can also be formulated in many different yet equivalent ways which do not imply the same fundamental unobservable entities or phenomena. However, the classification of phenomena that such principles allow to highlight does not depend, at the end, on any particular formulation of these basic assumptions. This suggests that some hypotheses in theoretical models are actually not genuine empirical statements that could be independently tested but only substrates of modeling embodying a classification principle. Thus, we develop a structural invariance criterion that we then apply to rational choice models in the social sciences. We argue that this criterion allows to escape from the epistemological dilemma without condemning formal approaches like rational choice theory for their lack of realisticness nor being stuck to any antirealist viewpoint. (shrink)

The recent use of typicality in statistical mechanics for foundational purposes has stirred an important debate involving both philosophers and physicists. While this debate customarily focuses on technical issues, in this paper I try to approach the problem from an epistemological angle. The discussion is driven by two questions: (1) What does typicality add to the concept of measure? (2) What kind of explanation, if any, does typicality yield? By distinguishing the notions of `typicality-as-vast-majority' and `typicality-as-best-exemplar', I argue that the (...) former goes beyond the concept of measure. Furthermore, I also argue that typicality aims at providing us with a form of causal explanation of equilibrium. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the basics of what we shall call "partial model theory", which is an extension of traditional model theory to partial structures. These are a specific kind of structure developed within the partial structures approach, which is a view constituting the semantic approach of theories. And together with other related semantical concepts, like the concept of quasi-truth, partial structures have been used in contemporary philosophy of science for several purposes. Nonetheless, those uses presuppose certain technical results, (...) or could be improved by resorting to certain technical notions and results, that have not been put forward so far. Thus, in the present work, we intend to introduce part of this particular technical apparatus that is still lacking especially in logic, throughout the development of partial model theory. We begin by extending traditional notions of model theory for partial structures, like the notions of substructure and homomorphism, and by proving some results concerning the notion of quasi-truth. Posteriorly, we show how the content introduced can be used to improve a particular application of partial structures and quasi-truth in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Technological understanding is not a singular concept but varies depending on the context. Building on De Jong and De Haro’s (2025) notion of technological understanding as the ability to realise an aim by using a technological artefact, this paper further refines the concept as an ability that varies by context and degree. We extend its original specification for a design context by introducing two additional contexts: operation and innovation. Each context represents a distinct way of realising an aim through technology, (...) resulting in three types (specifications) of technological understanding. To further clarify the nature of technological understanding, we propose an assessment framework based on counterfactual reasoning. Each type of understanding is associated with the ability to answer a specific set of what-if questions, addressing changes in an artefact’s structure, performance, or appropriateness. Explicitly distinguishing these different types helps to focus efforts to improve technological understanding, clarifies the epistemic requirements for different forms of engagement with technology, and promotes a pluralistic perspective on expertise. (shrink)

Epistemological monism and ontological dualism, closely parallel philological Postmodernism and philosophical Modernism. As Social Constructionism seems to be a product of Postmodernism from which roots one of its founders, John Shotter now "backs away", "the edge" brings it closer to Modernism. A model is suggested to describe and explain living chiasmic relations on the edge both in monistic and in dualistic terms.

The article explains how the primordial singularity can be understood as a cause having brought the Universe into empirical existence. It also addresses the nonempirical nature of such a cause.

David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons. But I explain how there are epistemic (...) sufficient reasons which are relative to the game of science and how their existence is consistent with Miller's main contentions while avoiding Miller's apparently anarchic account of our knowledge. (shrink)

Edmund Gettier’s three-page article is generally regarded as a classic of epistemology. I argue that Gettier cases depend upon three false assumptions and are irrelevant to the theory of knowledge. I suggest that we follow Karl Popper in abandoning subject-centred epistemologies in favour of theories of objective knowledge.

This is a more detailed version of the original. I argue that Space appears dark, because perceives 'look through' it to the dark Void - the region beyond Space. The Void, as in the black box experiment, emits no electromagnetic rays back to perceivers.

This article argues that actor-network theory, as an alternative to critical theory, has lost its critical impetus when examining commodification in healthcare. The paper claims that the reason for this, is the way in which actor-network theory’s anti-essentialist ontology seems to black box 'intentionality' and ethics of human agency as contingent interests. The purpose of this paper was to open the normative black box of commodification, and compare how Marxism, Habermas and ANT can deal with commodification and ethics in healthcare. (...) Moreover, a new account of 'intentionality' in critical thinking was elaborated. Using Strawson's analysis of 'reactive attitudes and resentment,' the ethical implications of commodification in health care were examined as an assessment of intentions. Synthesizing critical theory with the relational materialism of actor-network theory, this article advances a new approach that seeks to bridge interdisciplinary boundaries, and guide actor-network theory in a critical and humanist direction. Providing new theoretical insights on commodification and 'intentionality' in health care. (shrink)

Recently we proposed “quantum language" (or,“the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics"), which was not only characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics but also the linguistic turn of Descartes=Kant epistemology. Namely, quantum language is the scientific final goal of dualistic idealism. It has a great power to describe classical systems as well as quantum systems. Thus, we believe that quantum language is the language in which science is written. The purpose of this preprint is to examine (...) and assert our belief (i.e.,“proposition in quantum language" ⇔“scientific proposition). We believe that it's one of main themes of scientific philosophy to make such language. (shrink)

Recently I proposed “QL (=quantum language)” (or, “the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory”), which was not only characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics but also as the scientific understanding of Descartes=Kant epistemology. Namely, quantum language is the scientific final goal of dualistic idealism. It has a great power to describe classical systems as well as quantum systems. In this research report, quantum language is seen as a fundamental theory of statistics and reveals the true nature (...) of statistics. I hope the readers to enjoy the beautiful world of dualistic idealism. (shrink)

The problem of demarcating between what is scientific and what is pseudoscientific or merely unscientific - in other words, the problem of defining scientificity - remains open. The modern debate was firstly structured around Karl Popper's falsificationist epistemology from the 1930's, before diversifying a few decades later. His central idea is that what makes something scientific is not so much how adequate it is with data, but rather to what extent it might not have been so. Since the second half (...) of the century, and in the wake of criticisms, such as the Duhem-Quine thesis, that were raised against falsificationism(s), most approaches to the problem of scientific demarcation are now multicriteria and holistic. However, the approach presented in this paper does not follow the same guideline. The present work can be seen as an attempt to adapt Popper's (sophisticated) falsificationism to a model-based view of scientific knowledge. Using formalization and focusing on a particular epistemic unit of analysis (namely, empirical models) allows to properly define the popperian corroboration degree and to view scientificity as the maximization of this degree of corroboration over all available models and data. We eventually recover, in a natural way, well-accepted scientificity criteria: empirical adequacy, Lakatos' progressive problemshifts, balance between strength and simplicity, parsimony, and coherence as special cases of this general scientificity principle. From this viewpoint, the language dependency of our empirical knowledge no longer appears as a limitation of falsificationism but as one more reason to take it as a good epistemological framework. (shrink)

Special relativity has changed the fundamental view on space and time since Einstein introduced it in 1905. It substitutes four dimensional spacetime for the absolute space and time of Newtonian mechanics. It is believed that the validity of this theory has been fully confirmed empirically for the last one hundred years, and therefore, its status is considered canonical, underpinning all physical principles. However, the spacetime metric is a geometric approach to nature when interpreting natural phenomena. A geometric flaw will be (...) exhibited on this, and an alternative is suggested. The reasonable geometric model of space and time is a three-dimensional space that translates along the time direction. This model accurately represents the true characteristics of nature. (shrink)

The focus in the literature on scientific explanation has shifted in recent years towards modelbased approaches. The idea that there are simple and true laws of nature has met with objections from philosophers such as Nancy Cartwright (1983) and Paul Teller (2001), and this has made a strictly Hempelian D-N style explanation largely irrelevant to the explanatory practices of science (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Much of science does not involve subsuming particular events under laws of nature. It is increasingly recognized (...) that science across the disciplines is to some degree a patchwork of scientific models, with different methods, strategies, and with varying degrees of successful prediction and explanation. And so accounts of scientific explanation have reflected this change of perspective and model-based approaches have flourished in the explanation literature (Batterman, 2002b; Bokulich, 2008; Craver, 2006; Woodward, 2003). (shrink)

A number of general theories of physics provide a model for the fundamental rules that govern our universe, becoming a structural framework to which the new discoveries must conform. The theory of relativity is such a general theory. The theory of relativity is a complex theoretical framework that facilitates the understanding of the universal laws of physics. It is based on the curved space-time continuum fabric abstract concept, and it is well suited for interpreting cosmic events. More so, a general (...) theory based on abstract concepts and imagination facilitates the emergence of countless new extravagant theories. A new simplified theory of the natural world is necessary, a simple theory that provides a verifiable framework on which new discoveries can be integrated. The paper describes a view of the abstract time/space concept, and also a very simple model of our ever-changing universe. Views of physicists, mathematicians, chemists, engineers and of course philosophers have to be all in harmony with such a theory. We leave in a beautiful, uniform, and logical world. We live in a world where everything probable is possible. Contact email: [email protected] . (shrink)

For two reasons, physics occupies a preeminent position among the sciences. On the one hand, due to its recognized position as a fundamental science, and on the other hand, due to the characteristic of its obvious certainty of knowledge. For both reasons it is regarded as the paradigm of scientificity par excellence. With its focus on the issue of epistemic certainty, philosophy of science follows in the footsteps of classical epistemology, and this is also the basis of its 'judicial' pretension (...) vis-à-vis physics. Whereas physics is in a strong competitive relationship to philosophy and epistemology with respect to its position as a fundamental science - even on the subject of cognition, as the pretension of 'reductionism' shows. It is the thematic focus on epistemic certainty itself, however, that becomes the root of a profound epistemological misunderstanding of physics. The reason for this is twofold: first, the idea of epistemic certainty as a criterion of 'demarcation' between physics and metaphysics obscures the view of the much deeper heuristic differences between the two kinds of knowledge. The second, related, reason is that epistemology does not ask the question of the reason for the epistemic certainty of physics; instead, it sets itself the task of 'legitimating' physical knowledge, and this, crucially, with reference to the interpretation of the process of cognition. Thus, as a matter of course, all epistemological assumptions about this process – including the common descriptive understanding of knowledge and its ontological premises – flow into the interpretation of physics as a science. Consequently, this undertaking is not only doubtful from the ground up, because it presupposes for its meaningfulness nothing less than certainty of knowledge concerning (the interpretation of) the process of knowledge, thereby relying on mere convictions; moreover, by projecting the descriptive, 'metaphysical' concept of knowledge onto physics, it leads to unsolvable epistemological problems and corresponding resignative conclusions concerning the claim of knowledge of physics. In other words, epistemology itself builds, due to its basic assumptions, a major obstacle for an adequate understanding of physics. Physics' cross-object, deconstructive approach to knowledge implies a completely different, non-descriptive understanding of its concepts, with consequences that extend far beyond itself due to its status as a basic science. (shrink)

In an online, participatory class, we interpreted 'The Dream of the Three Orcas' knowing nothing of the dreamer beyond age and gender, and having none of the dreamer’s associations. -/- Our interpretation included nine predictions about the dreamer. When it was complete, we asked the bringer of the dream (who had not been present before our interpretation was complete) to give us more information about the dreamer. Later the dreamer also gave us more information. Our predictions were mostly confirmed. The (...) dreamer is standing on beach when huge orca-like floats appear. -/- This record is another iteration of an experiment that is described more fully in the paper 'The Dream of the Six-Legged Dog: An Experimental System that Tests Symbolic Meaning,' soon to be published. This iteration repeats and confirms the evidence given in that paper. ONLINE AUDIO RECORD OF ENTIRE ORCAS' CLASS : link is on title page of the paper you can download here. (shrink)

In this essay, I will explain why Methodological Naturalism (MN) fails as a demarcating criteria for science. I will argue that MN is not precise enough to be useful for demarcation, unable to follow the evidence where it leads, not theologically neutral (despite its stated goals as such), and difficult to justify (and currently unjustified) as an ontological or epistemic principle.

Through discussing scientific whaling, the paper brings the necessity of retrieving natural philosophy. The paper’s arguments favor an expanded vision of human encounter with nature, through the lens of natural philosophy, with a priority focus of expanding our imaginations to embrace the vast natural world. -/- There is no doubt that both the philosophy and science, two of the three significant areas of cultural and intellectual engagement (the other one is religion), have gone through changes over time. It is also (...) conspicuous that the modern natural science marginalized and suppressed specific concerns which were previously an indefeasible part of natural philosophy. -/- Bringing both historical and critical discussion of natural philosophy, the paper explores prospective retrieval of natural philosophy in contemporary modern science. Emphasizing the significance of natural philosophy’s imperatives both in the intellectual and field application of modern science, the paper reiterates commentary of Nicholas Maxwell, who advocates to correct three loopholes (Maxwell 2017): change the nature of social inquiry; opt aim-oriented rationality methods; and generalize the progress achieving methods of science. (shrink)

Musical metaphors represent a means by which biologists illustrate a particularly complex phenomenon: how organisms regulate their life processes according to their living conditions. This explanatory role can be traced back to the early embryologists and organicism. Also, nowadays, musical metaphors are used by those who resist viewing organic processes as reading (performing) a musical score written in a genetic script. In contrast to this reductionist view, organic processes are presented under a Jazz band view in which organic activities are (...) the result of live improvisations based on various sources of information available. This article explores the philosophical and historical foundations of the Jazz band view in the context of plant phytoacoustics, the field concerned with understanding the regulatory role of sound in plants. The incredible ability of plants to perceive, produce, and communicate sounds is central to various regulatory processes in development, maintenance, and reproduction. Musical metaphors and the place of sound in the life cycle of organisms converge in the same explanatory target, regulation, regardless of whether it is explained metaphorically or literally. This allows us to pose some programmatic questions for phytoacoustics that are motivated by current research topics in the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Contemporary models of perception and cognition remain grounded in empirical materialism or dualist metaphysics, often reducing consciousness to emergent neural states. However, these models struggle to account for phenomena such as self-awareness, perceptual coherence, and the structural limits of observation. While systems theory and quantum analogies offer partial insights, they lack a foundational ontology that explains how experience emerges from non-observable structure. Noumenal Ontology proposes a minimal axiomatic framework in which cognition emerges as a construct between consciousness and its self-reflective (...) function, the observer. Perception is modeled as torsional recursion over a noumenal torus, where cognitive structures arise as phase-based geometries. This approach offers a conceptual bridge between metaphysics, cognitive science, and quantum structures through a unified, non-dual ontology of perception. (shrink)

This paper was written for and presented at a symposium on Multiple Realizability at the Central Division of the APA in 2022. It's in somewhat rough shape, especially the later parts. I hope to be in a position soon to post a revised and more carefully worked out version. The basic argument of the first half is this: Realization of the interesting sort (and thus MR of the interesting sort) requires tidy separation of levels (with realizers being at a lower (...) level than that which they realize). The success of mixed-scale, mixed-resource (i.e., multi-grain) modeling strongly suggests that such a tidy separation of levels is not in the cards. Thus, MR is (likely) not a widespread phenomenon in our universe. The second half of the paper develops a relation of "multiple explainability" that is meant to play the role, in many contexts, of MR, while being metaphysically and methodologically messier than MR. (shrink)

I attempt to present an argument to suggest how the empirical framework and effective philosophies of science and metaphysics in particular can be practiced to bring out the best in both enterprises. I propose that there exists a natural marriage between these disciplines that can be complimentary. A particular focus is upon the role of metaphysical speculation in providing frameworks that may guide scientific studies, suggest areas of scientific research, search for connections between the realms of logic, mathematics, and empirical (...) discoveries within numerous disciplines of science. Some attention is upon how metaphysical speculation remains indispensable to the foundations of many empirical endeavors, but if not carefully examined it may inadvertently block scientific discovery and advancements that it should facilitate. (shrink)

MuFSEL (Multiframe Filtered Search for Extraterrestrial Life) proposes a frame-based model for SETI rooted in Intelligence Frame Theory (IFT). Traditional SETI approaches have privileged anthropocentric assumptions—radio leakage, planetary colonization, or artifact construction—yet such signatures are likely transient. IFT conceptualizes intelligence as recursive interactions of three Universal Intelligence Operators (UIOs)—Information Transfer, Competition & Collaboration, and Finding Limits—guided by a Selector (Eureka). These operators manifest differently across substrates, producing successive frames: Cosmic, Biological, Cognitive, and Generative. MuFSEL applies this framework to hypothesize when (...) and how intelligences become observable, why their visibility windows are vanishingly brief, and how multi-factor selectors determine survival or silence. This reorients SETI toward detecting selector imprints and frame artifacts rather than expecting dialogical communication. (shrink)

This paper develops an Existential Realism (ER) account of transitional dynamics: the lawful process by which entities and events manifest (enter into present existence) and demanifest (depart from existence into reality). Within ER’s two-tier ontology, existence denotes the presently actual and empirically accessible domain, while reality encompasses the past and future—structures, causal potentials, and informational traces that are real but not currently existent. We examine how something becomes existent from being merely real, and how it returns to reality once its (...) present existence ends. By articulating these transitions, we operationalize ER’s core insight that time is the ongoing migration of the actual present through a scaffold of real but non-present structures. We argue that manifestation and demanifestation are governed by natural lawfulness without invoking static time-slices or a block universe. Examples from physics (cosmic cycles of formation and dissolution), biology (life’s emergence and death’s aftermath), and phenomenology (memory and anticipation bridging past and future) illustrate the framework. The result is a dynamic ontology of becoming: time’s “transitional edge” is the ever-shifting present where reality continuously actualizes and, having existed, recedes back into the real. ER thus avoids both presentist exclusivity and eternalist stasis, explaining temporal continuity as a lawful crossing between ontological modes. (shrink)

We explore how Existential Realism (ER) – a present-centric, two-tier ontology – addresses the extreme limits of cosmological time: the beginning and end of time, cosmic inflation and multiverse scenarios, causal horizons, and the emergence or collapse of temporal order. In ER’s framework, existence is confined to the present moment while reality spans past and future structures beyond the present. We apply these principles to cosmology, arguing that events like the Big Bang and any ultimate end of time are not (...) static “edges” of a block universe but transitions in ontological status – moments where time switches on or off. We consider how cosmic inflation and multiverse hypotheses can be reframed such that each causally isolated “bubble” universe has its own present (its own existent content) with others remaining real but not existent. We interpret causal horizons (e.g. the observable universe’s edge) as demarcating the boundary of what can exist for us, without denying the reality of what lies beyond. Bounce cosmologies and time-symmetric models are discussed to show how ER handles a possible “before” the Big Bang or a reversal of the arrow of time. Throughout, we emphasize ER’s conceptual toolkit – collapse, transition, and migration of events – instead of spatial or block metaphors. This approach integrates philosophical and physical perspectives, suggesting that time’s boundaries are not absolute cut-offs but lawful ontological transformations within a present-centered reality. The result is a cosmological picture that engages both physicists and philosophers: one where the present remains central even at the universe’s temporal extremes, and where the flow of time is understood as the continuous becoming of reality. (shrink)

Renormalization group (RG) theory, while proposed to study particle physics, has found its usage in a large variety of topics over the years, including other physics branches like solid state physics, fluid mechanics, cosmology, machine learning and even non-physics fields like biology, epidemiology, economics, psychology, sociology and so on. The omnipresence of renormalization group theory thus raises the philosophical question of what are the common features of the systems that enable the employment of RG theory and what can be revealed (...) by using the RG method, why renormalization group theory is the naturally approach to deal with these problems and what is the essential point that leads to organizing the system according to renormalization group flow, i.e., order and disorder. These question are addressed in this paper. (shrink)

The recent progression in AI, nanomedicine and robotics have increased concerns about ethics, policy and law. The increasing complexity and hybrid nature of AI and nanotechnologies impact the functionality of “law in action” which can lead to legal uncertainty and ultimately to a public distrust. There is an immediate need of collaboration between Central Asian biomedical scientists, AI engineers and academic lawyers for the harmonization of AI, nanomedicines and robotics in Central Asian legal system.

A speculative concretized framework for understanding relativity and quantum field theory. A thermodynamic time definition with clear time arrow based on the Law of entropy increase. Abstract: Define time as a mapping of the whole universe transformations. In this definition about the whole transformations,the concept of relative time or local time is different from the time of the universe. And this definition is consistent with the most physical phenomena. The physicists of last century excluded the possibility of the existence of (...) Electromagnetic wave conducting medium according to a series of experiments’ result, in which, speed stacking effect over the light speed was not observed. But this deduction overlooked the other possibility that the matters with masses and their movements are the wave on the Electromagnetic wave conducting medium as well. Nothing can really go through the space, light speed is the maximum conducting speed in the space,so it doesn’t exist speed stacking over the speed of light.I assume that the universe is composed of the space elementary quantum,which is the Electromagnetic wave conducting medium. And this article put forward one Definition and analysis of entropy based on space elementary quantum conception. (shrink)

Causal selection has to do with the distinction we make between background conditions and “the” true cause or causes of some outcome of interest. A longstanding consensus in philosophy views causal selection as lacking any objective rationale and as guided, instead, by arbitrary, pragmatic, and non-scientific considerations. I argue against this position in the context of causal selection for disease traits. In this domain, causes are selected on the basis of the type of causal control they exhibit over a disease (...) of interest. My analysis clarifies the principled rationale that guides this selection and how it involves both pragmatic and objective considerations, which have been overlooked in the extant literature. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual conditionals that can exhibit different degrees of contingency. We use the idea of possible worlds to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, it is this structure what helps explain why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful (...) in scientific practice. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa procura investigar o conceito de metáfora raiz na concepção de Stephen C. Pepper a partir de sua obra World Hypotheses (1942) e de artigos relacionados. Além disso, extrapolar o conceito de metáfora raiz a partir de uma possível interlocução com o trabalho filosófico do conhecimento científico de George Lakoff e Mark Johnson, particularmente em Metaphors we live by (1980) e artigos relacionados. Considerando estes objetivos, foi abordado sobre o conceito de metáfora em Stephen C. Pepper, George Lakoff e (...) Mark Johnson, procurando observar como ocorre o processo de formação do conhecimento científico a partir destas visões filosóficas que podem ser consideradas relacionadas. (shrink)

Several developments for diverse scientific goals, mostly in physics and physiology, had to take place, which eventually gave us fMRI as one of the central research paradigms of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. This technique stands on solid foundations established by the physics of magnetic resonance and the physiology of hemodynamics and is complimented by computational and statistical techniques. I argue, and support using concrete examples, that these foundations give rise to a productive theory-ladenness in fMRI, which enables researchers to identify and (...) control for the types of methodological and inferential errors. Consequently, this makes it possible for researchers to represent and investigate cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data and for experimental knowledge to grow independently of large scale theories of cognition. (shrink)

This volume is the first to be dedicated exclusively to the philosophy of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943)—a pivotal yet neglected figure in the male-dominated tradition of analytic philosophy, and the first woman to hold a Chair in Philosophy in Britain. This volume collects eleven new essays that explore central themes of Stebbing’s philosophy: the significance of her work on metaphysical analysis; her contributions to public philosophy, including her work in the philosophy of physics, critical thinking, ethics, and counter-propaganda efforts; and her (...) work in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language. The volume and its contributors seek both to reinstate Stebbing’s place in the analytic tradition by examining her work in context and to highlight the continued relevance of her ideas to contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Despite widespread agreement on the value of interdisciplinarity, significant debate persists about its fundamental nature. We propose a frame- work to address this disagreement by drawing on ideas from philosophy of biology, particularly the work of Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths (e.g., 2004). Our conceptual ecological approach supports a productive pluralism: a pluralism that is organized and can help to address practical issues. Within this frame- work, concepts of interdisciplinarity are viewed as tools shaped by the niches that they occupy. (...) We illustrate this approach by providing a case study on the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, a philosophical method for facilitating interdisciplinary collaboration. Finally, we highlight the theoretical and practical benefits of adopting a conceptual ecological approach to interdisciplinarity. (shrink)

This article defends informed preference satisfaction theories of welfare against the most influential objections put forward in the economic and philosophy of science literatures. The article explicates and addresses in turn: the objection from inner rational agents; the objection from unfeasible preference reconstruction; the objection from dubious normative commitments; the objection from conceptual ambiguity; and the objection from conceptual replacement. My defence does not exclude that preference satisfaction theories of welfare face significant conceptual and practical challenges. Still, if correct, it (...) demonstrates that philosophers/welfare economists are justified in relying on specific versions of such theories, namely informed preference satisfaction theories. (shrink)

In recent years, several prominent authors have criticized fine-tuning arguments for failing to show that the universe’s purported fine-tuning for intelligent life calls for explanation. In this paper, I provide a systematic categorization and a detailed evaluation of the proffered critiques. I argue that these critiques cast doubt on various instances of fine-tuning reasoning, but fail to undermine fine-tuning arguments’ conclusion that the universe’s purported fine-tuning for intelligent life can be justifiably taken to call for explanation. I then explicate the (...) implications of this result for the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the merits of fine-tuning arguments and the conditions under which specific events or states of affairs are justifiably taken to call for explanation. (shrink)

I argue that there are two distinct approaches to understanding reduction: the ontology-first approach and the theory-first approach. They concern the relation between ontological reduction and inter-theoretic reduction. Further, I argue for the significance of this distinction by demonstrating that either one or the other approach has been taken as an implicit assumption in, and has in fact shaped, our understanding of what statistical mechanics is. More specifically, I argue that the Boltzmannian framework of statistical mechanics assumes and relies on (...) the ontology-first approach, whereas the Gibbsian framework should assume the theory-first approach. -/- . (shrink)

A brief review of Carnap's formal program in philosophy of science.

Der Erfolg von Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der COVID-19-Pandemie ist abhängig vom Vertrauen der Öffentlichkeit in wissenschaftliche Experten. Zwar ist Vertrauen als Einstellung gegenüber Experten im Zusammenhang mit der Pandemie bereits viel Aufmerksamkeit zuteilgeworden, allerdings meist in Bezug auf das Vertrauen, das Laien Äußerungen wie Behauptungen und Mitteilungen entgegenbringen, die ihnen das Wissen der Experten zugänglich machen sollen. Dieser Aufsatz stellt dagegen eine andere Art der Äußerung in den Mittelpunkt: die Empfehlung. Im Zusammenhang mit der Pandemie haben Forderungen gegenüber der Politik (...) wissenschaftsbasiert zu verfahren zugenommen. Gleichzeitig sind Politikerinnen und Politiker aber nicht das Sprachrohr der Wissenschaft, sondern übernehmen Verantwortung für eine wissenschaftsbasierte Gesundheitspolitik, unter anderem indem sie Bürgerinnen und Bürgern bestimmte Handlungen empfehlen. Damit erhebt die Politik allerdings den Anspruch, dass Bürgerinnen nicht nur glauben sollten, was ihnen von den Experten gesagt wird, sondern auch, dass sie tun sollten, was von ihnen im Rahmen der Maßnahmen verlangt wird. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es daher zu zeigen, dass Empfehlungen eine Konzeption von Vertrauen erfordert, die sich vom Vertrauen im Kontext von Mitteilungen und Behauptungen stark unterscheidet. Es geht nicht nur darum, diese Art von Vertrauen genauer zu spezifizieren, sondern auch darum zu erklären, unter welchen Voraussetzungen es vernünftig ist, wissenschaftsbasierten Empfehlungen der Politik mit Vertrauen zu begegnen. Dazu gehe ich folgendermaßen vor: In Abschnitt 1 analysiere ich zunächst den Sprechakt des Empfehlens. Das dadurch gewonnene Grundverständnis von empfehlenden Sprechakten untersuche ich dann im Kontext von Empfehlungen wissenschaftlicher Experten während der Covid-19-Pandemie (Abschnitt 2) und plädiere dann dafür, dass eine Analyse der an eine breite Öffentlichkeit gerichteten Empfehlungen am besten bei Äußerungen von Politikern ansetzen muss, die sich auf das kompetente Urteil wissenschaftlicher Expertinnen und Experten beziehen (Abschnitt 3). In Abschnitt 4 diskutiere ich dann die Gründe, die ein Hörer haben könnte, eine solche Empfehlung anzunehmen, bevor ich in den Abschnitten 5 und 6 die für Empfehlungen relevante Form des Vertrauens herausarbeite. Abschnitt 7 diskutiert die Auffassung, dass Vertrauen in wissenschaftsbasierte Empfehlungen nur durch die Anerkennung der Sprecherin im Sinne einer guten Ratgeberin als rationale Einstellung ausgewiesen werden kann, bevor ich abschließend argumentiere, dass diese Rationalitätsbedingungen im Kontext der COVID-19-Pandemie nur schwer einzulösen waren. (shrink)

We place agency front-and-centre in the aesthetics of science via an analysis of experimental design and performance. This first involves developing an account of scientific agency relevant to experiment. We do this via an analogy between experiments and games (as understood by Suits and Nguyen): both involve artificial practical environments designed to enable participants to exercise particular forms of agency. Second, we consider how this account of agency might underwrite an aesthetics of experiment. Experiments are well-designed not only when they (...) generate clear, elegant results, but also when they actively confront the experimenter with experimental phenomena, afford the exercise of agency throughout experimental runs and in iterative design and tweaking, and underlie stable, intersubjective experiences across agents. We apply the account to Newton’s optical work, and contrast this with contemporary experimental practices, where significantly more ‘experimental distance’ holds between the experimenter and the result. Taking the agency of experimental practice seriously enables a richer account of the role of aesthetic values, sensibilities, and judgments in science. (shrink)

The Covid-19 global pandemic had a profound effect on scientific practice. During this time, officials crucially relied on the work done by modellers. This raises novel questions for the philosophy of science. Here, I investigate the possibility of ‘natural models’ in predicting the virus’ trajectory for epidemiological purposes. I argue that to the extent that these can be consideredscientific models, they support the possibility of a continuum from scientific models to natural models differing in artifactual commitment. In making my case, (...) I draw from work on model organisms and natural experiments as well as recent work in epidemiology. (shrink)

Can AI developers be held epistemically responsible for the processing of their AI systems when these systems are epistemically opaque? And can explainable AI (XAI) provide public justificatory reasons for opaque AI systems’ outputs? Koskinen (2024) gives negative answers to both questions. Here, I respond to her and argue for affirmative answers. More generally, I suggest that when considering people’s uncertainty about the factors causally determining an opaque AI’s output, it might be worth keeping in mind that a degree of (...) uncertainty about conclusions is inevitable even in entirely human-based empirical science because in induction there’s always a risk of getting it wrong. Keeping this in mind may help appreciate that requiring full transparency from AI systems before epistemically trusting their outputs might be unusually (and potentially overly) demanding. (shrink)

Astrobiology occupies an unusual position within the philosophy of science. Confronted with the n = 1 problem – having only a single example of life to study – it attempts to investigate life beyond Earth while relying entirely on Earth’s biosphere as its reference point, a constraint that creates unique epistemic challenges. Unlike traditional sciences with clear predictive frameworks, astrobiology operates as what we might call a transient science: a discipline functioning without foundational certainties, relying predominantly on abductive reasoning, and (...) confronting hypotheses that may remain untestable for decades. It is, in essence, a science of absence – of evidence, certainty, and analogy – where progress lies in refining conceptual and experimental tools to recognize unfamiliar forms of life. This positions astrobiology alongside emerging fields like artificial intelligence and cognitive science within a broader transformation of how scientific knowledge is constructed when dealing with phenomena that transcend direct empirical access. (shrink)

This paper presents a new account of pragmatic understanding based on the idea that such understanding requires skills rather than abilities. Specifically, one has pragmatic understanding of an affordance space when one has, and is responsible for having, skills that facilitate the achievement of some aims using that affordance space. In science, having skills counts as having pragmatic understanding when the development of those skills is praiseworthy. Skills are different from abilities at least in the sense that they are task-specific, (...) can be learned, and we have some cognitive control over their deployment. This paper considers how the use of AI in science facilitates or frustrates the achievement of this kind of understanding. I argue that we cannot properly ascribe this kind of understanding to any current or near-future algorithm itself. But there are ways that we can use AI algorithms to increase pragmatic understanding, namely, when we take advantage of their abilities to increase our own skills (as individuals or communities). This can happen when AI features in human-performed science as either a tool or a collaborator. (shrink)