Privacy

A great deal of common law jurisprudence—especially within criminal and constitutional law—treats an agent’s control as a primary (though not the sole) factor in determining the scope of the agent’s reasonable expectation of privacy. We raise a new philosophical challenge for this ‘control theorist’ approach. The challenge concerns a class of cases in which it seems that an agent both loses control over information and retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to that information. Faced with our challenge, some (...) will abandon the control theorist’s tight link between privacy and control. We instead use the challenge to motivate a more refined account of the relationship between privacy and control on behalf of the control theorists. By refining an existing framework for adjudicating privacy’s scope, we show how the control theorist’s connection between privacy and control, far from being an impediment to robust privacy protections in a digital world, potentially provides an elegant tool for extending privacy’s scope. (shrink)

The concept of privacy is both significant and contested, with ongoing philosophical debate about whether it is best understood in terms of non-access or as involving some form of control. This paper advances the discussion by employing experimental philosophy to examine folk intuitions about privacy. Our findings show that these intuitions favor a control-based concept of privacy. Additionally, we show that the type of information at stake influences privacy judgments, indicating that privacy concerns are sensitive to not only access and (...) control but also to informational content. Our results enable us to make progress on the question of how to understand the concept of privacy and calls for a new research agenda that pays closer attention to different informational distinctions. (shrink)

The costs of privacy losses don’t only come from what others know about us, but also what they don’t know. Living with limited privacy can involve bits and pieces of our lives being observed in isolation: surveillance algorithms may only call attention to activities with certain features, social media followers may scroll past half of our posts, and no observer is likely to experience the full context of our words and actions. And distinctive structural features of being under observation make (...) it difficult to correct misconceptions observers form when they lack context. So, losing privacy can create pressure for us to lead more fragmented lives, lives that seem okay when encountered as isolated sound bites, rather than richer, coherent wholes. But many of the especially meaningful aspects of our lives—lasting interpersonal connections, long-term goals and projects, and personal growth and change—are extended over longer periods of time and woven into our lives in more complicated ways. Focusing on producing good fragments can undermine features of our lives that we usually recognize as meaningful. In this sense, part of privacy’s value is underappreciated: privacy can help us to lead more meaningful lives—or at least reduce one obstacle to it. (shrink)

In today's techno-social environment, it is easy to make, store, and share digital recordings, such as photographs, audio fragments, and video streams, at an unprecedented scale. While there are often obvious immediate benefits to making and sharing digital recordings, serious hazards associated with these practices have thus far gone underappreciated. We contend that today's digital recording practices threaten to radically alter how we perceive and evaluate ourselves and others, producing an ongoing, socially and morally disruptive shift toward unbounded moralized judgment. (...) The shift toward unbounded moralized judgment in turn poses several hazards, including widespread, difficult-to-restore reputation damage, negatively altered self-perceptions, and the stifling of morally right behavior. Our central claim is that in the current techno-social environment, every individual has a pro tanto reason to avoid being recorded and to avoid recording others. On the occasions where the reasons for recording outweigh those against, more must be done to counteract the hazards introduced by recording. We conclude the article by outlining possible avenues for technical, regulatory, and societal approaches to mitigating the hazards of unbounded moralized judgment. (shrink)

Smart wearable technologies have seen an explosive growth over recent years, with some research indicating that the wearable technology industry is expected to grow from USD 24 billion today to over USD 70 billion in 2025. This proliferation has extended across disparate domains, ranging from medical applications and fitness and social technologies to military, industrial, and manufacturing applications. As with any emergent technology, these wearables present opportunities for our moral benefit as well as moral challenges to be addressed. A crucial (...) dimension of this discussion is the ethical evaluation of the impact of smart wearables on the autonomy of human decision-making. Nowhere is this a more pertinent concern than when dealing with persons uniquely vulnerable to autonomy infringement. This contribution, undertaken from an explicitly normative and ethical perspective, investigates the potential impact of smart wearables on various dimensions of the decisional autonomy of vulnerable persons. (shrink)

It is widely presumed that privacy is ‘factive’, i.e. that it cannot be diminished by accessing or disseminating falsehoods. But if this is so, what wrongs are committed in cases where others access documents of ours (letters, medical records, etc.) which contain false information? In this article, I examine various ways of explaining the wrongfulness of accessing and dissemination falsehoods (defamation; that privacy can be violated without being diminished; ‘control’ accounts of privacy; downstream revelations of truths; that falsehoods diminish ‘propositional’ (...) or ‘attentional’ privacy). I lay out what each of these accounts misses about accessing falsehoods, about privacy, and/or about the right to privacy. I then propose two alternative ways of accounting for the intuitive wrongfulness of accessing and disseminating falsehoods: viewing them as merely ‘attempted’ privacy violations and weakening the truth condition of privacy diminishments. (shrink)

Climate change is one of the most important issues we are currently facing. There are many ways in which states can fight climate change. Some of them involve interfering with citizens’ personal lives. The question of whether such interference is justified is under-explored in philosophy. This paper focuses on a specific aspect of people’s personal lives, namely their informational privacy. It discusses the question of whether, given certain empirical assumptions, it is proportional of the state to risk its citizens’ privacy (...) or to risk infringing its citizens’ right to privacy to fight climate change. The main claim this paper argues for is that if fighting climate change and protecting our privacy conflict, we have good reason to fight climate change rather than protect our privacy. (shrink)

Training artificial intelligence (AI) systems requires vast quantities of data, and AI developers face a variety of barriers to accessing the information they need. Synthetic data has captured researchers’ and industry’s imagination as a potential solution to this problem. While some of the enthusiasm for synthetic data may be warranted, in this short paper we offer critical counterweight to simplistic narratives that position synthetic data as a cost-free solution to every data-access challenge—provocations highlighting ethical, political, and governance issues the use (...) of synthetic data can create. We question the idea that synthetic data, by its nature, is exempt from privacy and related ethical concerns. We caution that framing synthetic data in binary opposition to “real” measurement data could subtly shift the normative standards to which data collectors and processors are held. And we argue that by promising to divorce data from its constituents—the people it represents and impacts—synthetic data could create new obstacles to democratic data governance. (shrink)

The promise and ambition of emotion recognition software is to provide a technological tool to access the inner self of others; their feelings, apprehensions, joys and passions. For several years now, the demand for emotion recognition software (ERS) has been increasing drastically in both countries and private companies, especially in the areas of security and consumer profiling. Exploring the relationships between emotion recognition software (ERS) and humans, and its impact on privacy is thus imperative. In doing so, we are forced (...) to question the prominent frameworks of privacy in terms of their current ability to protect our inner affective states. -/- The main challenge is to use the tools and knowledge that philosophy of technology, mind and morality offer me to test and specify the limits, if there are any, to the use of this technology so that it remains within the scope of what we consider morally acceptable in our society. The idea is to develop a comprehensive solution, within the boundaries of a normative framework, so it can be a useful guide for political legislators to draw upon when legal decisions on this matter will be required. (shrink)

The aim in this chapter is to explore the similarities and differences between the city symphony film genre of the 1920s and 1930s and the contemporary virtual city walking tours that are popular on YouTube these days, eventually discussing the change in representation of the individual in daily life over a century. The city symphony was born with modernism in the early 20th century initially to present an interpretation of the city with daily activities, human beings, their interaction with industrial (...) technology and the urban environment. A significant and pioneering film of the genre is by Walter Ruttmann titled Berlin: Symphony of a Metropolis (1927) which I will try to analyze its filmic elements in order to draft a summary of the style and vision of the director and his contemporaries. On the other hand, the virtual city walking tours on YouTube represent a very different representation of urban exploration. These videos show various cities through the act of simple walking recorded in a long one-take POV shot with a gimbal-camera. Despite minor differences in terms of commentary and music use, these videos are quite similar to each other when compared to city symphony films in general. The methodological approach for analyzing and interpreting these films and videos is guided by the neoformalist approach proposed by Bordwell and Thompson in the 1980s, along with Noël Carroll’s view on critical evaluation. Since this post-theoretical approach is non-formulaic in terms of its methodology, it fits the two examples I will provide that are stylistically very distant. After establishing the form and style of the works, I will try to follow Carroll’s suggestions in order to critically interpret, analyze and evaluate the works. The comparison between the city symphony film and virtual city walking tour reveals a complex interplay between continuity and change in regards to the individual. While both share a rather common goal of capturing the essence of urban life their differences are to be found in their stylistic choices and their interpretations of the goal itself. The city films of the 1920s and 30s were avant-garde expressions that combined artistic innovation with socio-political commentary. They were often experimental, using montage sequences, juxtaposition and abstract imagery to convey the ever changing industrialized modern city life. Ruttmann’s Berlin is emblematic of this approach, offering a poetic and critical reflection on urban existence. In contrast, the virtual city walking tours on YouTube are more accessible and immediate. They provide a first-person perspective that allows viewers to virtually traverse different cities, experiencing sights and sounds without the mediation of artistic abstraction. The similarity in these videos suggests a standardized format that prioritizes immersion over critique. This article offers a valuable contribution to the understanding of urban representation of the individual in film and digital media. By comparing the city symphony film with virtual city walking tours, I try to illuminate the evolving relationship between art, technology and urban life. I argue that not only is there a completely different representation of the individual within the frame, but there is also ethical considerations to be put forth regarding the one that makes the frame, or the camera. In the end I argue that the human-ness of a work of art or any type of video is more important than immersiveness. (shrink)

Moral philosophy is often said to be about what we owe to each other. Do we owe anything to ourselves?

An issue about the privacy of the clustered groups designed by algorithms arises when attempts are made to access certain pieces of information about those groups that would likely be used to harm them. Therefore, limitations must be imposed regarding accessing such information about clustered groups. In the discourse on group privacy, it is argued that the right to privacy of such groups should be recognised to respect group privacy, protecting clustered groups against discrimination. According to this viewpoint, this right (...) places a duty on others, for example, private companies, institutions, and governments, to refrain from accessing such information. To defend the idea that the right to privacy should be recognised for clustered groups, at least two requirements must be satisfied. First, clustered group privacy must be conceived of as either a collective good or a participatory good. Since these forms of good are of the type from which no member of a group can be excluded from benefiting, the right to them is defined as a group right. Second, there must be group interests on which to base a group right. Group interests can be either the interests of those members that are a result of their being in the group or the interests of the group as a whole that transcend the interests of its members. However, this paper argues that clustered group privacy cannot be conceived of as either a collective or a participatory good because it is possible for some individuals to be excluded from benefiting from it. Furthermore, due to the lack of awareness among individuals that they are members of a clustered group and the nature of a clustered group itself, such groups cannot have the group interests necessary to establish a group right. Hence, the group right to privacy cannot be recognised for these groups, implying that the group right cannot be considered a means to protect clustered groups against discrimination. Instead, this paper suggests that moral principles need to be articulated within an ethics of vulnerability to identify the moral obligations of protecting vulnerable clustered groups. The duty owed to the vulnerable should involve refraining from accessing certain information about clustered groups in specific contexts. This duty is not engendered by the right to privacy of such groups; it is the duty owed to the vulnerable. The findings highlight the need to articulate moral principles regarding privacy and data protection to protect clustered groups in contexts in which accessing information about them could constitute a reason for discriminatory targeting. (shrink)

This booklet on Active Assisted Living (AAL) technologies has been created as part of the GoodBrother COST Action, which has run from 2020 to 2024. COST Actions are European research programs that promote collaboration across borders, uniting researchers, professionals, and institutions to address key societal challenges. GoodBrother focused on ethical and privacy concerns surrounding video and audio monitoring in care settings. The aim was to ensure that while AAL technologies help older adults and vulnerable individuals, their privacy and data protection (...) rights remain a top priority. This booklet is designed to guide you through the role that AAL technologies play in improving the quality of life for older adults, caregivers, and people with disabilities. AAL technologies offer tools for those facing cognitive or physical challenges. They can enhance independence, assist with daily routines, and promote a safer living environment. However, the rise of these technologies also brings important questions about data protection and user autonomy. (shrink)

Privacy matters because it shields us from possible abuses of power. Human beings need privacy just as much as they need community. Our need for socialization brings with it risks and burdens which in turn give rise to the need for spaces and time away from others. To impose surveillance upon someone is an act of domination. The foundations of democracy quiver under surveillance. -/- This book is intended to contribute to a better understanding of privacy from a philosophical point (...) of view-what it is, what is at stake in its loss, and how it relates to other rights and values. The five parts that compose this book respond to five basic questions about privacy: Where does privacy come from? What is privacy? Why does privacy matter? What should we do about privacy? Where are we now? (shrink)

"Doug Campbell lays out a comprehensive and fair-minded account of both the benefits and the drawbacks of social media for our era. He attaches these evaluations to both the individual and to society as a whole. The case studies are compelling and exhibit a keen awareness of the current moment. How should we live, now that many or even most of us are at least partially online? Campbell addresses this question from the point of view of privacy, attention, politics, misinformation, (...) online ostracism, online friendship, and the potential benefits of simply quitting social media or at least some of its more pernicious platforms. Along the way, Campbell ties his discussions back to philosophical concerns raised by Plato, Aristotle, and Xunzi, among others. He also connects his discussion with recent work in feminist philosophy. And each chapter concludes with a succinct definition of key terms and suggested case studies and discussion topics that will engage students at all levels. An impressive accomplishment, and one that deserves a place in the classroom." —Mark Alfano, Macquarie University. (shrink)

Questions of data privacy in Africa are imbued with complexity. We examine a slice of this complexity by putting the concept of contextual integrity into dialogue with Africa's plural-legal contexts to explore data privacy within Africa's emerging digital landscape. The conceptual insights are empirically illustrated based on a case study in Ghana, involving content analysis of policy documents and interviews with a sample of residents, cultural leaders (among the Akan ethnic group), subject matter experts, and digital entrepreneurs (e.g. fintech firms). (...) Our findings illuminate a nuanced and contextually rooted understanding of privacy, focusing on the complementarities and tensions around data anonymization for privacy; the multiplicity of information spheres that result in a complicated terrain of privacy breaches; and the individuality, mutuality, and collectivity of privacy harms and remedies thereof. Our findings challenge prevailing discourses in the literature that either suggests (a) misalignments between locally-rooted privacy norms and European-imported statutory regulations on privacy in African countries or (b) privacy myopia among Africans—underestimating their personal information and the need to protect such information. We suggest shifting away from such privacy discourses from above (meta-narratives, generalizations, and inherent assumptions on African states and societies) to conversations from below. That is, refocusing on the particularities of place, culture, and norms that complicate meta-narratives on privacy. This requires centering the everyday privacy norms that result from co-existing, and sometimes oppositional, customary-informed and state-stipulated information norms within Africa's emerging digital landscapes. (shrink)

The right to privacy extends only to information through which the persons concerned are identifiable. This assumption is widely shared in law and in philosophical debate; it also guides the handling of personal data, for example, in medicine. However, this essay argues that the dissemination of anonymous information can also constitute a violation of privacy. This conclusion arises from two theses: (1) From the perspective of the affected person, judgments by others about anonymous information refer to its originator, even if (...) outsiders do not know who it is; (2) Our self-understanding is co-constituted by the judgment of others about us. This is a consequence of our social nature. There are certain areas of our lives that we do not want to expose to the gaze of others for our own sake. Therefore, the unauthorized dissemination of information concerning these areas can violate our privacy even if they are anonymous. While the question of the extent of privacy poses a general problem, there are reasons to discuss it in the context of digital medicine. (shrink)

Privacy matters because it shields us from possible abuses of power. Human beings need privacy just as much as they need community. Our need for socialization brings with it risks and burdens which in turn give rise to the need for spaces and time away from others. To impose surveillance upon someone is an act of domination. The foundations of democracy quiver under surveillance. -/- This book is intended to contribute to a better understanding of privacy from a philosophical point (...) of view-what it is, what is at stake in its loss, and how it relates to other rights and values. The five parts that compose this book respond to five basic questions about privacy: Where does privacy come from? What is privacy? Why does privacy matter? What should we do about privacy? Where are we now? (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The paper argues (...) that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy. (shrink)

Differential privacy (DP) aims to confer data processing systems with inherent privacy guarantees, offering strong protections for personal data. But DP’s approach to privacy carries with it certain assumptions about how mathematical abstractions will be translated into real-world systems, which—if left unexamined and unrealized in practice—could function to shield data collectors from liability and criticism, rather than substantively protect data subjects from privacy harms. This article investigates these assumptions and discusses their implications for using DP to govern data-driven systems. In (...) Parts 1 and 2, we introduce DP as, on one hand, a mathematical framework and, on the other hand, a kind of real-world sociotechnical system, using a hypothetical case study to illustrate how the two can diverge. In Parts 3 and 4, we discuss the way DP frames privacy loss, data processing interventions, and data subject participation, arguing it could exacerbate existing problems in privacy regulation. In part 5, we conclude with a discussion of DP’s potential interactions with the endogeneity of privacy law, and we propose principles for best governing DP systems. In making such assumptions and their consequences explicit, we hope to help DP succeed at realizing its promise for better substantive privacy protections. (shrink)