Michael H. v. Gerald D.
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| Michael H. v. Gerald D. | |
| Reference: 491 US 110 | |
| Term: 1989 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: October 11, 1988 Decided: June 15, 1989 | |
| Outcome | |
| California Second District Court of Appeal affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| John Paul Stevens • Anthony Kennedy • Sandra Day O'Connor • Antonin Scalia • William Rehnquist | |
| Dissenting | |
| Thurgood Marshall • William Brennan • Harry Blackmun • Byron White | |
Michael H. v. Gerald D. is a case decided on June 15, 1989, by the United States Supreme Court holding 5-4 that a California law aiming to allow a possible biological father the chance to establish paternity of a child up to two years after birth was constitutional. The justices found the law did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court affirmed the decision of the California Second District Court of Appeal.[1][2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision found that California's paternity law did not violate Michael’s right to due process incorporated under the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. The case established the precedent that a biological father is unable to obtain parental rights of a child after the presumptive father has established significant parental responsibility. To read more about the impact of Michael H. v. Gerald D., click here.
Background
Carole D. gave birth to Victoria D. in May 1981, whom she shared with her husband Gerald D. However, Carole had an extramarital partner named Michael H. who obtained blood tests indicating that he was likely the biological father of Carole's child. Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court, which Gerald argued had no ground under California Evidence Code 621. According to the California statute, it is presumed a child belongs to their parent's marriage and another man can only challenge paternity within two years of the child’s birth.
The court ruled in favor of Gerald and suspended Michael's visitation rights indefinitely. Michael challenged Gerald's claims by arguing the California statute violated his right to due process incorporated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The California Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the lower courts and upheld the legality of Code 621.[2]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on October 11, 1988. The case was decided on June 15, 1989.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to affirm the decision of the California Second District Court of Appeal. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the court. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens wrote concurring opinions, while Justices William Brennan and Byron White authored dissenting opinions.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined in part by Justices William Rehnquist, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Anthony Kennedy, argued that due process applies to interests traditionally protected in our society, and that Michael H.'s case fails to prove that his interest in his relationship with his child supersedes breaking up the traditional family unit:[2]
| “ | Michael raises two related challenges to the constitutionality of § 621. First, he asserts that requirements of procedural due process prevent the State from terminating his liberty interest in his relationship with his child without affording him an opportunity to demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing. We believe this claim derives from a fundamental misconception of the nature of the California statute. While § 621 is phrased in terms of a presumption, that rule of evidence is the implementation of a substantive rule of law. California declares it to be, except in limited circumstances, irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived during, and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than the husband and had a prior relationship with him. As the Court of Appeal phrased it:
'The conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law based upon a determination by the Legislature, as a matter of overriding social policy, that given a certain relationship between the husband and wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child, and that the integrity of the family unit should not be impugned.'[3] |
” |
| —Antonin Scalia, majority opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D[2] | ||
Concurring opinions
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, concurred in part with Justice Scalia's opinion, delineating from his belief that a natural father should be denied parental rights in order to uphold the traditional family unit.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part with Justice Scalia's piece. He argued that he does not believe the California statute violates the Constitution; however, he disagrees with Scalia's premise that a natural father should be denied parental rights in order to uphold the family unit:
| “ | On the first issue, I agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that the Federal Constitution imposes no obligation upon a State to 'declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges upon the requested declaration.' Ante at 491 U. S. 126. 'The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.' Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 463 U. S. 261 (1983).
On the second issue, I do not agree with JUSTICE SCALIA's analysis. He seems to reject the possibility that a natural father might ever have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child's conception and birth. I think cases like Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), demonstrate that enduring 'family' relationships may develop in unconventional settings.[3] |
” |
| —John Paul Stevens, concurring opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.[2] | ||
Dissenting opinions
Justice William Brennan wrote a concurring opinion along with Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun, arguing that a natural father should have constitutional rights, and that the idea of tradition should be rather limited when interpreting the role of the Constitution:
| “ | The plurality's interpretive method is more than novel; it is misguided. It ignores the good reasons for limiting the role of 'tradition' in interpreting the Constitution's deliberately capacious language. In the plurality's constitutional universe, we may not take notice of the fact that the original reasons for the conclusive presumption of paternity are out of place in a world in which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt who sired a particular child and in which the fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and stigmatizing role it once did. Nor, in the plurality's world, may we deny 'tradition' its full scope by pointing out that the rationale for the conventional rule has changed over the years, as has the rationale for Cal.Evid.Code Ann. § 621[3] | ” |
| —William Brennan, dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.[2] | ||
Justice Byron White wrote a dissenting opinion along with Justice William Brennan, arguing that Michael H., as the natural father, should have the right to due process:
| “ | California law, as the plurality describes it, ante at 491 U. S. 119, tells us that, except in limited circumstances, California declares it to be 'irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived during, and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than the husband.' This I do not accept, for the fact that Michael H. is the biological father of Victoria is to me highly relevant to whether he has rights, as a father or otherwise, with respect to the child. Because I believe that Michael H. has a liberty interest that cannot be denied without due process of the law, I must dissent.[3] | ” |
| —Byron White, dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
|---|
| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
Michael H. v. Gerald D. held that California's paternity law did not violate the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment The case established the precedent that a biological father is unable to obtain parental rights of a child after the assumed father has established significant parental responsibility.[1][2]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "Michael H. v. Gerald D.," accessed August 5, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 Justia, "Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)," accessed August 5, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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