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A computationally efficient characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large entry games

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Abstract
This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew M. Cohen, 2005. "A computationally efficient characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large entry games," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-37, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2005-37
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165.
    2. Federico Ciliberto & Elie Tamer, 2009. "Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1791-1828, November.
    3. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Multiproduct Firms, Product Differentiation, and Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
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    Keywords

    Game theory; Econometric models; Equilibrium (Economics);
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