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Selection Criteria for Roll Call Votes

Author

Listed:
  • Krehbiel, Keith

    (Stanford U)

  • Woon, Jonatahn

    (Carnegie Mellon U)

Abstract
On grounds of inclusion of undesirable votes (type I errors) and exclusion of desirable votes (type II errors), we question the convention of selecting only finalpassage votes for roll call analysis. We propose an alternative selection method based on the estimated salience and strategic significance of roll calls and argue that this method reduces type I and type II errors. We demonstrate that selection of roll calls based on alternative criteria has a major bearing on the asymmetry of partisan roll rates and, we conjecture that its application will also be substantively significant in other modes of inquiry.

Suggested Citation

  • Krehbiel, Keith & Woon, Jonatahn, 2005. "Selection Criteria for Roll Call Votes," Research Papers 1943, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1943
    as

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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1943.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    2. Keith Krehbiel & Adam Meirowitz & Jonathan Woon, 2005. "Testing Theories of Lawmaking," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: David Austen-Smith & John Duggan (ed.), Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, pages 249-268, Springer.
    3. Barnett,William A. & Schofield,Norman & Hinich,Melvin (ed.), 1993. "Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521428316, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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