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Morality and Equality from Rationality Alone - A repeated game approach of contractarianism

Author

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  • Alexis Louaas

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract
This paper highlights the role that equality and reciprocity play in preserving peace and cooperation among individuals with conflicting interests. Following the contractarian tradition, I model a mutually beneficial interaction as a prisoner's dilemma and using repeated game theory, I show that a mutually beneficial joint venture may be undertaken only if the final distribution of incomes is sufficiently egalitarian. From a pre-moral context, the model allows to derive endogenous bounds on the income of each individual that reproduce Moehler (2018)'s weak universalisation principle. Contrasting with the well-known equity-efficiency trade-off, the model also produces an equity-efficiency complementarity.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexis Louaas, 2021. "Morality and Equality from Rationality Alone - A repeated game approach of contractarianism," Working Papers hal-02948051, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02948051
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02948051v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Matthias Blonski & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Prisoners’ other Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 61-81, February.
    2. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "Optimal Taxation of Labor Income," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00944881, HAL.
    3. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    4. JP Messina & David Wiens, 2020. "Morals from rationality alone? Some doubts," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 19(3), pages 248-273, August.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa & Eve Caroli & Philippe Aghion, 1999. "Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1615-1660, December.
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    8. Andrew Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry & Charalambos G. Tsangarides & Yorbol Yakhshilikov, 2018. "Redistribution, inequality, and growth: new evidence," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 259-305, September.
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    11. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contractarianism; morality; equity; efficiency; game theory; norms;
    All these keywords.

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