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An Experiment on the Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value

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Listed:
  • Michela Chessa
  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
  • Aymeric Lardon
  • Takashi Yamada
Abstract
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter’s demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "An Experiment on the Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value," ISER Discussion Paper 1175, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1175
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2022. "The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    2. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2023. "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 589-609, June.

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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