Mistretta v. United States
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| Mistretta v. United States | |
| Reference: 488 US 361 (1989) | |
| Term: 1988 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: October 5, 1988 Decided: January 18, 1989 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Harry Blackmun • William Rehnquist • William Brennan • Thurgood Marshall • John Paul Stevens • Byron White • Sandra Day O'Connor • Anthony Kennedy | |
| Dissenting | |
| Antonin Scalia | |
Mistretta v. United States is a case decided on January 18, 1989, by the United States Supreme Court in which the court upheld a delegation of authority to the United States Sentencing Commission that allowed the commission to issue sentencing rules. The plaintiff argued that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 violated the nondelegation doctrine because it unlawfully delegated rulemaking authority to the commission. The court affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, holding that the guidelines put forth in the act were sufficiently specific and detailed to keep the commission's powers within constitutional bounds.[1]
Why it matters: The case argued that a congressional delegation of authority to the United States Sentencing Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine. As of 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court has not invalidated a congressional action on nondelegation grounds since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States in 1935.
Timeline
The following timeline details key events in the case:
- January 18, 1989: U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
- Oct 5, 1988: Oral argument
Background
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Creation of the United States Sentencing Commission
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 altered the procedures by which federal courts determined sentences for criminal convictions.[2] Previously, the system of indeterminate sentencing had given federal judges flexibility to choose sentences, with Congress setting the maximum length and parole officials often determining the actual date of release. The act came in response to frustration with disparities between the sentences in different cases, as well as a shift away from the philosophy of rehabilitative incarceration. It consolidated much of the power previously exercised by the sentencing judge and parole officers into the new United States Sentencing Commission, though judges retained the ability to deviate from the commission's guidelines in certain cases.[3]
The commission was established "as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States" with a mandate to promulgate sentencing guidelines for all federal courts. It consisted of seven voting members, at least of three of which were to be federal judges (See Independent federal agency). Each member could serve up to two six-year terms and could be removed by the president "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown" (See Humphrey's Executor v. United States).[3] The location of the commission in the judicial branch became a point of contention in the case.[1]
Nondelegation challenge
- See also: Nondelegation doctrine
On December 10, 1987, John M. Mistretta was convicted of conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment followed by 3 years of parole. Mistretta appealed his sentence in the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit on the grounds that the United States Sentencing Commission, and the Sentencing Act of 1984, were unconstitutional. His delegation challenge argued that the act unconstitutionally delegated congressional power to the commission and violated the separation of powers by requiring Article III federal judges to serve on the commission, which was established as part of the executive branch. The case advanced to the Supreme Court.[1]
Question presented
The petitioner presented the following question to the court:[1]
Question presented:
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Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on Oct 5, 1988. The case was decided on Jan 18, 1989.[4]
Outcome
The court ruled 8-1 that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the United States Sentencing Commission were constitutional, affirming the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
Justice Harry Blackmun authored the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, Byron White, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and William Brennan.
Justice Brennan joined in all parts of the court's opinion except n. 11.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.
Opinions
Opinion of the court
The court ruled that both the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the United States Sentencing Commission were constitutional. The justices argued that Congress neither delegated "excessive legislative power" to the commission nor upset the separation of powers.
Writing for the court, Justice Harry Blackmun divided Mistretta's arguments into the following claims related to the delegation of congressional power, and to the separation of powers more generally.
Delegation of power
Blackmun first applied the intelligible principle test to the act. He argued that the guidelines laid down in the act were sufficiently specific and detailed to keep the Sentencing Commission's powers within constitutional boundaries:
| “ | Congress has met that standard here. The Act sets forth more than merely an 'intelligible principle' or minimal standards. One court has aptly put it: 'The statute outlines the policies which prompted establishment of the Commission, explains what the Commission should do and how it should do it, and sets out specific directives to govern particular situations.' United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (ED La. 1988).[1][5] | ” |
Blackmun drew on earlier cases, including Wayman v. Southard, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, and Yakus v. United States, to situate the commission within the history of delegated power:
| “ | Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate. Although Congress has delegated significant discretion to the Commission to draw judgments from its analysis of existing sentencing practice and alternative sentencing models, 'Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers.' Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S., at 425 -426.[1][5] | ” |
Since the Sentencing Reform Act provided sufficient guidance for the commission's actions, Blackmun concluded that the act did not involve an unconstitutional delegation of power.
Separation of powers
In response to Mistretta's arguments that the nature and powers of the Sentencing Commission violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, Justice Blackmun examined the act's decision to situate the commission within the judicial branch and the president's control over the commission. Blackmun argued for a flexible understanding of the separation of powers doctrine, drawing on earlier cases such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and INS v. Chadha:
| “ | 'While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion).[1][5] | ” |
Location of the commission within the judicial branch
Blackmun acknowledged that the commission possessed unique characteristics. Though it was established within the judicial branch, he claimed, the commission did not constitute a court of law and the commissioners did not exercise judicial power. Blackmun argued that the commission was not unconstitutional because Congress did not vest the commission with authority belonging to the other branches of government nor did its placement within the judicial branch violate the integrity of the judiciary.[1]
Blackmun also cited historical precedents indicating similar types of delegations:
| “ | As a general principle, we stated as recently as last Term that 'executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.' Morrison v. Olson, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, citing in turn United States v. Ferreira, supra, and Hayburn's Case.
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Blackmun claimed that some forms of judicial rulemaking fell within the "twilight area" in which the activities of the three branches of government come together. Moreover, existing case law did not prevent judicial branch entities from performing that function. On the contrary, Blackmun pointed to the ruling in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., which had affirmed that function using logic from Wayman v. Southard:
| “ | We observed: 'Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States.' This passage in Sibbach simply echoed what had been our view since Wayman v. Southard, decided more than a century earlier, where Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch may be 'conferred on the judicial department.'[1][5] | ” |
Blackmun also used Chief Justice John Marshall's logic from Wayman v. Southard regarding the flexibility provided by the necessary and proper clause to Congress to delegate power to federal courts to set their own rules and procedures.
Though the Sentencing Commission was located within the judicial branch, Blackmun argued that its powers were not united with the powers of the courts, thus keeping it within constitutional bounds. The power of Congress to set its guidelines, and the power of the president to dismiss its members, made it accountable in a way that courts were not.
| “ | Whatever constitutional problems might arise if the powers of the Commission were vested in a court, the Commission is not a court, does not exercise judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch.
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Presidential control
- See also: Appointment and removal power
The act gave the president power to appoint all seven members of the commission with the advice and consent of the Senate. Three of the seven positions were to be filled by federal judges, selected by the president after considering a list of six judges recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The president could remove any members of the commission, but "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown."
In response to Mistretta's argument that this presidential control undermined the independence of the judicial branch, Justice Blackmun argued that the president had no actual power to "affect the tenure or compensation of Article III judges," since any judges removed from the commission would retain their judgeship. Furthermore, the president could not remove a judge for political reasons, only for the good causes mentioned in the act.
Article III judges serving as commission members
Mistretta's nondelegation argument claimed that requiring federal judges to serve on the commission, which the majority opinion agreed was not a court, undermined the impartiality and integrity of the judicial branch by conscripting federal judges for political service. Justice Blackmun disputed the assertion that this kind of service was explicitly unconstitutional, arguing that "the text of the Constitution contains no prohibition against the service of active federal judges on independent commissions."[1]
The Constitution did contain an incompatibility clause that prevented Senators and Representatives from holding other offices while serving in Congress, but Blackmun found no such restriction for judges. He did note that while the Constitution did not prevent judges from assuming extrajudicial duties, not all such duties would be compatible with their position. He also pointed out that no judges were required to serve on the commission against their will, so the argument that they were conscripted was, in his view, an exaggeration.
Blackmun concluded that the involvement of judges in the commission, which performed only an administrative function, did not undermine the impartiality of the judicial branch.[1]
Concurring opinions
There were no concurring opinions.
Dissenting opinions
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia disagreed with the majority's assessment of the Sentencing Commission on the grounds of both the nondelegation doctrine and separation of powers:
| “ | While the products of the Sentencing Commission's labors have been given the modest name "Guidelines," ...they have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive. A judge who disregards them will be reversed...I dissent from today's decision because I can find no place within our constitutional system for an agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws.[1][5] | ” |
Scalia also disagreed with the court's use of the precedent set in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, arguing that the concept of an independent agency defined in that case applied to the executive branch and that the court was now expanding the definition to justify the commission's place in the judicial branch. The location of the commission in the judicial branch coupled with the legislative nature of its power convinced Scalia that the act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the commission. He expressed concern for the future implications of the court's ruling:[1]
| “ | The delegation of lawmaking authority to the Commission is, in short, unsupported by any legitimating theory to explain why it is not a delegation of legislative power. To disregard structural legitimacy is wrong in itself - but since structure has purpose, the disregard also has adverse practical consequences. In this case, as suggested earlier, the consequence is to facilitate and encourage judicially uncontrollable delegation.
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Impact
The court's decision in Mistretta upheld the constitutionality of the federal sentencing system established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. However, the sentencing system was later ruled unconstitutional in United States v. Booker on the grounds that the ability of judges to enhance sentences based on facts not reviewed by a jury violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.[6][7]
Future applications of the intelligible principle test
Justice Blackmun's opinion drew on the precedent set in Yakus v. United States and offered guidance for applying the intelligible principle test:
| “ | In Yakus, the Court laid down the applicable principle:
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” |
Interpretation of the separation of powers
The court's decision to accept the location and composition of the Sentencing Commission reflected a more flexible and less literal interpretation of separation of powers doctrine. Blackmun's opinion also downplayed the importance of the semantic description of the commission's function, arguing that the court's "separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity as 'substantive' as opposed to 'procedural,' or 'political' as opposed to 'judicial.'"[1]
In the court's view, the appearance of commingling of the three branches did not necessarily indicate a violation of the separation of powers:
| “ | We are drawn to this conclusion by one paramount consideration: that the Sentencing Commission is devoted exclusively to the development of rules to rationalize a process that has been and will continue to be performed exclusively by the Judicial Branch. In our view, this is an essentially neutral endeavor and one in which judicial participation is peculiarly appropriate. Judicial contribution to the enterprise of creating rules to limit the discretion of sentencing judges does not enlist the resources or reputation of the Judicial Branch in either the legislative business of determining what conduct should be criminalized or the executive business of enforcing the law.[1][5] | ” |
See also
- Wayman v. Southard
- Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
- A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
- J.W. Hampton Jr. & Company v. United States
- Whitman v. American Trucking Associations
- Separation of powers
- Rulemaking
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions via Justia
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 FindLaw, Mistretta v. United States, accessed November 25, 2017
- ↑ Government Publishing Office, Sentencing Act of 1984, accessed November 25, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Legal Information Institute, 28 U.S. Code § 992 - Terms of office; compensation, accessed November 25, 2017
- ↑ Oyez, Mistretta v. United States, accessed November 25, 2017
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ American Criminal Law Review via SSRN, Parole: Corpse or Phoenix? accessed November 26, 2017
- ↑ Case Briefs, "United States v. Booker," accessed September 24, 2019
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