Wiener v. United States
 | |
| Wiener v. United States | |
| Reference: 357 US 349 (1958) | |
| Term: 1957 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: November 18, 1957 Decided: June 30, 1958 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Federal Claims reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Earl Warren • Hugo Black • Felix Frankfurter • William Douglas • John Harlan II • Tom Clark • Harold Burton • WIlliam Brennan • Charles Whittaker | |
| Dissenting | |
| None | |
Wiener v. United States is a case decided on June 30, 1958, by the United States Supreme Court. It involved the power of the President to dismiss officers from Executive Branch entities outside the core Executive departments. Applying the precedent set in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, the court ruled unanimously that the President did not have the power to remove a member of the War Claims Commission, since it was an independent federal agency. This reversed the decision of the Court of Claims, which had ruled against Wiener.[1]
In brief:
President Eisenhower removed Mr. Wiener from his position as a member of the War Claims Commission, though the War Claims Act of 1948 had not included guidelines for removing members. The commission was dissolved by Congress the next year, after which Mr. Wiener sued to recover the back pay he felt he was owed. The Court of Claims rejected his petition, but the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the President did not have the power to remove an officer of an independent federal agency for a cause that was not listed in the agency's enabling statutes.
Why it matters: The ruling solidified the precedent set in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) that the President could not remove officers of independent federal agencies for causes other than those listed in the enabling acts of those agencies.
Background
| Administrative State |
|---|
| Five Pillars of the Administrative State |
| • Judicial deference • Nondelegation • Executive control • Procedural rights • Agency dynamics |
| Click here for more coverage of the administrative state on Ballotpedia |
The War Claims Act of 1948 created the War Claims Commission, a three-member body with a mandate "'to receive and adjudicate according to law" claims for compensating internees, prisoners of war and religious organizations who suffered personal injury or property damage at the hands of the enemy in connection with World War II."[2] Congress had intended the commission to exist only temporarily, and so the act included no provision for the removal of its members. Instead, it was expected that the members' terms would end when the commission was dissolved.[1]
Mr. Wiener was confirmed as a member of the War Claims Commission on June 2, 1950 under President Harry Truman. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked for Wiener's resignation and when Wiener refused, Eisenhower had him removed on December 10, 1953. Eisenhower then tried to appoint new members to the commission, but the Senate had not approved them when the commission was abolished on July 1, 1954. Wiener then brought suit in the Court of Claims for the back pay he felt he was owed for the time between his removal and the commission's end. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court took up the case because it presented a variant of the constitutional issue decided in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.[1]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on November 18, 1957. The case was decided on June 30, 1958.[3]
Decision
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that according to the precedent set in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, the President did not have the power to remove Wiener from his position on the War Claims Commission, reversing the decision of the Court of Claims.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, John Harlan II, Tom Clark, Harold Burton, WIlliam Brennan, and Charles Whittaker.[3]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for the court, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted that the ruling in Humphrey's Executor v. United States had set a precedent that the President's power to remove officers of independent agencies was limited by the relevant statutes. The War Claims Act of 1948 had not set guidelines for removing members of the War Claims Commission, since it had intended that commission to be temporary.
| “ | The Court explicitly 'disapproved' the expressions in Myers supporting the President's inherent constitutional power to remove members of quasi-judicial bodies.
... |
” |
Frankfurter then applied the logic from Humphrey's to determine whether it fell into the category of independent agencies described in that decision.
| “ | An analysis of the Federal Trade Commission Act left this Court in no doubt that such was not the conception of Congress in creating the Federal Trade Commission. The terms of the War Claims Act of 1948 leave no doubt that such was not the conception of Congress regarding the War Claims Commission.[1][4] | ” |
His examination of the legislative history of the War Claims Act led him to the same conclusion, that Congress had intended the commission to operate independently of the will of the President. The court thus ruled that since the act had not provided for the removal of members, the President did not have the power to remove them before the dissolution of the commission.
| “ | Judging the matter in all the nakedness in which it is presented, namely, the claim that the President could remove a member of an adjudicatory body like the War Claims Commission merely because he wanted his own appointees on such a Commission, we are compelled to conclude that no such power is given to the President directly by the Constitution, and none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute simply because Congress said nothing about it. The philosophy of Humphrey's Executor, in its explicit language as well as its implications, precludes such a claim.[1][4] | ” |
Concurring opinions
There were no concurring opinions.
Dissenting opinions
There were no dissenting opinions.
Impact
The ruling solidified the precedent set in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935), which had modified the one set in Myers v. United States (1926). Myers had affirmed the President's power to dismiss officers of the Executive Branch (in that case, a postmaster) and had included both members of the main Executive Departments and the independent federal agencies. In Humphrey's, the court modified that precedent and held that while the President could dismiss members of the core Executive Departments at will, the independent agencies (such as the FTC, the subject of that case) could not perform their duties if they served at the pleasure of the President. Thus, the President could only dismiss an officer of an independent agency for the reasons listed in those agencies' enabling statutes.
| “ | And what is the essence of the decision in Humphrey's case? It drew a sharp line of cleavage between officials who were part of the Executive establishment and were thus removable by virtue of the President's constitutional powers, and those who are members of a body 'to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government,' as to whom a power of removal exists only if Congress may fairly be said to have conferred it.[1][4] | ” |
See also
- Humphrey's Executor v. United States
- Independent federal agency
- Nondelegation doctrine
- Separation of powers
- Rulemaking
- Administrative law
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full Text of the Case via Justia
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 FindLaw, Wiener v. United States, accessed November 28, 2017
- ↑ HathiTrust, War claims act of 1948 as amended, accessed November 28, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Oyez, Wiener v. United States, accessed November 28, 2017
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
| |||||||||||
