Figure 6 to be recorded and carried to South Afri- own a satellite transmitter which could
Related Figures (32)
1 The appointment of the new board members has in fact violated the newly endorsed media law, specifically article 9 that describes the process of appointments to the board. While the law stipulates in the country, but are selected because This chapter reviews the relationship between LPtlo eh EE! ed FOULCWD LPC ee I UCLWCCIL media and religion in Ethiopia in historial perspective and discusses the differences in policy between the Ethiopian empire, the Derg regime, the EPRDF, and the PP. Studies of journalists’ religious view in Ethinnia are few hit a airvev candiuc_ Programme hosts on EBC The Federal Democratic Republic of Et- hopia nevertheless remains a secular sta- te according to the constitution of 1995, but the secular state principle is no lon- ger seen by the nation’s leadership as a formal restriction for expression of reli- gious commitment involving the state. — Ps 1 cr qe. of the process was that the new 2021 me- dia proclamation for the first time in the country’s history gave religious organi- zations the right to apply for television broadcasting licences, though not for radio. The reason given for the continu- ed ban on religious radio stations is that the radio spectrum is limited and the government wants to reserve the airwa- ves for programme content with broader public appeal (Yonatan Tesfaye, EMA deputy director, personal interview 12 Dec 2022). Religious television broadcas- ting, on the other hand, is allowed, but the terrestrial television network is not made available for this purpose and the owner of the channel must secure their own transmission, which is usually done through rented space on NileSat or Et- hioSat. and other religious sym- signal belonging to the Orthodox faith. within EOTC tried to establish an Oro- mia Region Synod in 2023 (see chapters 2 and 4 of this report). As with any other potentially sensitive topic, the state-affi- liated media are cautious in their covera- ge of religious conflict, often resulting in negligence of the issue altogether. The programmes only lasted for about two months, but at that point they had already made a lasting change in the sta- te media’s treatment of religion. Religion was no longer an area only to be cover- ed distantly within a cultural frame, but a topic which could also involve trans- mission of religious practice. As sug- gested by one of the informants in this study, the Covid-19 incidence created public acceptance for religious broadcas- ting. The formerly strict policy against showing religious practice in the official media had eroded. By Mulatu Alemayehu Moges 4 Although the recent violence in the northern part of Ethiopia (the war between TDF and ENDF) is prima- rily perpetrated on the basis of ethnicity, the conflict also has an important religious dimension, see https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/religion-and-the-tigray-conflict-in-ethiopia, On the contrary, Abbink (2022) argues that religious differences rarely add fuel to ethnic animosities, with some excepti- ons, and religious identities did not become part of the conflict in the war between the Ethiopian forces and TDF, see https://canopyforum.org/2022/10/26/has-religion-been-fueling-the-politics-of-conflict-in-et- hiopia-a-cautionary-tale/. ethnopolitical agenda without due con- sideration of the public interest. This has been seen in the digital media during the recent chaos in the Orthodox church. The digital media, including TikTok, have become a platform for religious groups and followers, and are now a center for religious discourse in the country. Reli- gious polarization tends to be higher on these platforms than in the mainstream media. claims to embrace democratic principles, professional commitment, continuous learning, public interest, and free speech as guiding principles. FBC also claims to focus on public-centered, timely, intri- guing, and solution-driven news covera- ge. The editorial policy also indicates that the broadcaster will not report on inter-regional conflicts if it believes that reporting the incident exacerbates the conflict. If a conflict is covered, FBC will only focus on the causes of the conflict and its solutions. Moreover, the editorial policy states that FBC will not report any form of conflict that appears to be ethn- ic-related. TATIY ay i oat ye There are between 40 and 50 legally registered There are between 40 and 50 legally registered religious broadcasters in Ethiopia today. They are not allowed to transmit on the local airwaves irr Llanes Thnnndnnat’ Llpynansnrrh nranhaadtaca ae | without a licence, but having a licence gives a certain status and is believed to bring some sense of resilience against in- terference from the authorities. Without a licence, organizations suspect that they can be prosecuted if they continue to produce and distribute media content on a systematic basis for an Ethiopian audience. The licence also has a practi- cal function and works as a ticket to get access to events such as government press conferences. cation. The licence is terference from the authorities. Without The reason given by EMA for the ban on religious radio is that the airwaves should be reserved for public interest media, and since Ethiopia apparently has more limitation in radio frequen- cies than other countries, the authorities have decided to exclude religious broad- casters from radio operations (Yonatan Tesfaye, personal interview, 12 Decem- ber 2022). The explanation is strange. FM transmitters in Ethiopia use the same te- chnology as in other countries, and the radio receivers are no different than elsewhere. The regular FM band can accommodate a range of stations - it is common for different countries to divide tically. In the absence of a radio licen- the local Christian stations, characteris- The Muslim production company Africa TV started around 2010, before religious broadcasting was allowed in Ethiopia. ganizations have got licences by the end have moved to Addis Ababa, specifi- Today the headquarters of Africa TV week, and it went on for many years. The studios of Africa TV are located in the cally to the al-Aqsa moque not far from Sidist Kilo. Africa TV produces content not only for Muslims in Ethiopia, but for audiences in many Sub-Saharan Afri- can countries. The company has three different tv channels. Africa TV 2 uses Swahili (for East African audiences), and Africa TV 3 uses Hausa (for Nigerian au- diences). The content for these two chan- nels are mostly produced abroad. The original channel Africa TV 1, however, is for Ethiopian audiences, and has content in Amharic, Afaan Oromo, Tigrinya and Afar languages. The station produces close to 20 hours of live broadcasting per week, plus reruns. Tha anntant nt Afeica TV farizicoc avril emphasis is on ethics and how to live a spiritual life. Audiences can submit qu- estions to the channel, which happens a lot. The questions are answered by trusted Islamic scholars, like sheikh Mo- hammedzain Zahradin of the al-Aqsa mosque. The sheikh is optimistic about the opportunities the TV medium gives. “Ten years ago, we didn’t have the chan- ce to deliver messages to the wider socie- ty. Now we have millions of people who benefit from our media channel,” he says (personal interview, 12 December 2022). Africa TV has an editorial policy which basement of the al-Aqsa around ETB 40,000 (USD 700) per month to broadcast their content on EBS. worn in the production rooms. The main studio which is used for most of the pro- duction has a series of portable back- drops which will alternate depending on the topic of the programme. Islamic books - in Arabic - are obvious elements amidst the production equipment. Afri- ca TV has a team of 15 fulltime workers, including support staff. The financing of Africa TV’s programme production co- mes entirely from abroad, mostly from ‘Muslim brothers’ in Europe and the US. Africa TV collaborates with almost all anther Telamic madia camnaniec in Ethin_ programmes and children programmes, plus programmes focusing on health, philosophy, and peace and justice, and more. Like the other religious channels, Pax TV will hardly cover any controver- sy. It would perhaps seem strange for a religious station not to mention the ongoing tensions in a congregation next door, but that was exactly what happe- ned during the attempted schism in the Orthodox church in January to February 2023. Pax TV did not mention the issue at all, except when the cardinal prayed for healing of the situation. clearly Yemisirach Dimts Radio, which The Protestant church accounts for the highest number of broadcasting licences in Ethiopia. grammes of YD are distributed through YouTube. It is not a perfect solution for the Mekane Yesus church which has many members in rural areas with no Internet access, particularly in the south- ern part of the country. The radio station wishes that the government could genu- inely open up the airwaves for religious broadcasters and start issuing licences for local radios. are. some of the smaller congregations have a charismatic outlook and preach a ‘prosperity’ type of gospel. Several of the informants interviewed for this stu- dy express frustration with such con- gregations which are often built around a charismatic personality. Some do not even live in the country but belong to the Ethiopian diaspora in the US, from whe- re they produce programmes which are broadcast back to Ethiopia. “They create conflict and do false teaching. They have a lack of vision and experience. Someti- mes they cross the red line. They even name the Orthodox church,” imparts an informant who belongs to one of the Protestant congregations. An informant who has trained Christian media person- nel is optimistic, however, and believes that the irresponsible channels will im- prove over time. Religion has recently become a central topic for politicians and other groups. While religious conflict arise, followers, analysts, experts and other sources are expected to comment on the cases. Ho- wever, as indicated in the data below, in actuality only the voices of religious leaders and the ruling parties are being leaders and the ruling parties are being of the news media relies on the diversity Figure 6: If the story talks about religious politics - rest In showing diversity. It Is a good example to understand how the media, knowingly or unknowingly, publici- ze the calls of different groups and in- dividuals for locational, religious, and ethnic-based clustering. It, in turn, is a breeding ground for further religious polarization given that the media are helping the outreach of the views to a latger group of people. who are supposed to lead the public in Figure 7: Messages against/towards them’ way of thinking about social and religious relationships is a direct form of ‘othering’. Othering also leads to the perception of treating out-group mem- bers differently from the in-group mem- bers. By disseminating offensive messa- ges, the media cannot expose different groups to each other’s constructive vi- ews. It is an act of forging a common culture or stressing differences. Thus, as indicated by the previous discussion, by disseminating offensive messages that can breed othering in the general public, the media might be morphed into tools to stir religious polarization. the effort to manage religious issues. Such forms of antagonism may therefore negatively affect the public trust in the authoritative power of the government and the mediatory roles of religious fath- ers in tackling disagreements. Low trust in the government, in religious groups/ institutions, and in people of other social groups, also entails othering and polari- zation. Thus, here again, either by neg- ligence or deliberate actions or perhaps for a combination of both, the media are at the center of the religious polarization through their messages of othering. Mejlis leaders having discussion with prime minister Abiy Ahmed. (Screenshots from EBC Mejlis leaders having stream media landscape. Journalists of the AMC, Nahoo, and SRTA, for instan- ce, posted their photos in black clothes to show their solidarity with the church and its call. It is also mentioned that the Addis Media Network (AMN) inter- rupted a journalist who was dressed in black clothes from the newscast. Similar- ly, a freelance journalist working in an outsourced program of 97.1 FM station which is owned by EBC was fired after posting his picture on his Facebook page taken in the studio dressed in black cloth. Such instances seem to be simple but public sphere as part of the key actors in the struggle to maintain the church’s he- gemony. By Terje Skjerdal and Mulatu Alemayehu Moges examples of media channels which have ‘exploited’ religious conflicts to advance ethnic agendas (cf. Skjerdal and Mulatu, 2021). Outlets which have obtained a re- ligious ‘broadcasting licence’, however, are careful to avoid any conflict issue in their programmes. Characteristically, a manager of a religious TV station says, “We calm down the people and follow the rules of the government”. The go- vernment, however, has not been willing to genuinely open up for religious broad- casting and continues to prohibit radio stations owned by religious institutions. This is a policy which stands in contrast to that of other Sub-Saharan African co- untries. The Ethiopian government con- tinues to exercise a control strategy vis- a-vis faith-based media outlets and in relation to religious media content. contrast, the exercise of the secular policy