Figure from:Terje Skjerdal and Mulatu Alemayehu Moges The ethnification of the Ethiopian media

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Figure 23 Master control room, Amhara Television, Bahir Dar. (Photo by Terje Skjerdal)

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as ethnic media. ESAT, for example, which was established as a diaspora channel with studios in Amsterdam, London and Was- hington DC, aspired to oppose the Ethiopi- an government's official narratives through satellite broadcasts reaching local audiences back in Ethiopia and had global distribution. The station has never had the limited geo- graphical outreach which is typically associ- ated with ethnic media. sees iat ge ig ‘é or Atl ULE SlOVDaAl Tes€adalCil iUtlerature, Cule media’ is generally used to refer to a diffe- rent type of media than some of the most vocal and popular outlets on Ethiopia's me- dia scene. ‘Ethnic media’ is a category which denotes media outlets targeting immigrant communities in societies where such groups stand out as a minority vis-a-vis the rest of the population (Deuze, 2006; Matsaganis et al., 2011). The term is mostly used to des- cribe immigrant media cultures in the US and Western Europe, and has given birth to a distinct reporting style, ‘ethnic journalism (Yu, 2019). It is a rather blameless activity which comes out of the need to share in- formation and maintain cultural cohesion among people who have settled in a foreign country. Salon Ethiopia, a bi-weekly news- paper published in Amharic for the Ethiopi- an community in Seattle, would thus qualify ae Sathnic media’

Immediately after the fall of the Empire, the Oromo cultural resistance movement had great hopes for their people when Oro- miffa was allowed on state radio, although it lasted only for a couple of years (Kuwee, 1998). In 1976, Bariisaa, the Oromo news- paper which still comes out on a weekly ba- sis, was launched by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The publication was nationali- zed by the Derg the year after. Illustratively, whereas Bariisaa was initially printed with Latin script, the Derg forced it to use Am- haric fidels, as writing Oromo with Latin let- ters was forbidden (Gow, 2004, p. 208; Ke- Sustained discrimination during the Derg The Derg regime (1974-91) continued to view the media as a potential battleground for ethnic conflict. A one-language policy was enforced in the state media in favour of Amharic (Menychle, 2020). The use of other languages was seen as a vehicle for regiona separatism, and Tigrigna in particular faded from the official media scene.

4 The WJS data regarding ethnicity have not been published before. A number of the respondents were stron- gly offended by the question about ethnic belonging. Characteristic responses were, “IT hate this question’, “Is this necessary?” and “I don't care about my ethnicity” (see examples at the bottom of this page). A high number expressed a pan-Ethiopian iden- tity (“There’s no ethnicity, ’'m Ethiopian’). There was also a higher proportion of the journalism students who informed of a dual ethnicity (identifying with two groups) than The question of possible impact of perso- nal background in actual reporting is more difficult to settle, but the overall evidence points in the direction of a strong relation between identity and journalistic priori- ties, both in the global research and in as- sessments of local reporting practices. The Head of the Journalism programme at Ad- dis Ababa University, Mekuria Mekasha, for one, observes that professional journalists have a tendency to report on their own peo- ple group positively, while other groups are covered more critically. The impact of own ethnicity is particularly perceptible in the coverage of conflict issues (Mekuria et al., 2018, p. 40). 2018, p. 40).

Figure 1: Occurrences of inflammatory terms on Twitter, July 2018 to July 2020. Source: Cen- ter for Advancement of Rights and Democracy, CARD (used with permission). Ihe use of legal action to curb hate speech is controversial. Some are of the opinion that ethnic hatred in the media has come to such an extent that it could be equated with Radio des Mille Collines’ role during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and that action therefo- re needs to be taken (Ayele, 2020). Others propagate a more liberal stance and view intervention by authorities, such as the in- troduction of the Hate Speech and Disinfor- troduction of the Hate Speech and Disinfor-

of these three companies pinpoints cases of ethno-nationalistic media polarization. According to the NGO, ethnically-motiva- ted channels such as OMN know quite well how far they can go without overstepping the limit for acceptable speech. However, monitoring agencies suggest that the chan- nels are constantly guilty of ‘indirect incite- ment; in the sense that they let invited guests propagate a one-sided ethnic agenda which feeds activists and demonstrators with ide- as which in turn escalate in the social media as an element of ‘outrage communication’ (Téwodros, 2020). Thus, fairly or unfairly, a few newcomers on the Ethiopian media sce- ne are frequently blamed for the increased aggression observed in the professional part of the media. Who are they, and how do they perceive their own identity? hammed in 2020. Oromo OMN and the influential role of Jawar Mohammed monitoring agencies suggest that the chan- |

$ople groups, demonstrated by the fact that it broadcasts in seven different languages, allegedly more than any other compara- ble media channel. However, all languages except Amharic turn out to be confined to the Oromia region, or to SNNPR zones close to Oromia. The station’s management esti- mates that 90% of its employees are Oromo. coverage, while the station took advantage from the constant sharing of first-hand in- formation about political developments and events. The integration of the social media in the communication strategy was crucial. Thus, in Jawar’s own words, OMN is more of a social movement than a media channel. events. The integration of the social media a social movement than a media channel. Two years into the new government, OMN sees itself as entering a new role. Whi- le the station was established as an activist media channel, it now pretends to weaken its political linkages. Jawar has entered po- litics (Oromo Federalist Congress, OFC) and is no longer the company’s director. He claims to be fully out of the media operation and only has an informal advisory functi- on vis-a-vis OMN. However, it is revealing that when he talks about OMN’s activities, it does not go long until he begins referring to ‘we’ instead of ‘they’ So, in his own percepti- on, he is still an integrated part of the media house’s profile and engagement. Officially, he stepped down from the company in Janu- ary 2020 when Girma Gutema took over as director. SRE eS eeaee s\IENNT mene ner me ns aii” iiine aiid Politically speaking, OMN supports ‘mul- tinational federalism, which for outsiders would seem similar to ethnic federalism, but the latter is a term that the station defies. The perspective contrasts unitarist and secessio- nist positions, which are the other two main political stances found in Oromo politics (@stebo and Tronvoll, 2020).$

ople groups, demonstrated by the fact that it broadcasts in seven different languages, allegedly more than any other compara- ble media channel. However, all languages except Amharic turn out to be confined to the Oromia region, or to SNNPR zones close to Oromia. The station’s management esti- mates that 90% of its employees are Oromo. coverage, while the station took advantage from the constant sharing of first-hand in- formation about political developments and events. The integration of the social media in the communication strategy was crucial. Thus, in Jawar’s own words, OMN is more of a social movement than a media channel. events. The integration of the social media a social movement than a media channel. Two years into the new government, OMN sees itself as entering a new role. Whi- le the station was established as an activist media channel, it now pretends to weaken its political linkages. Jawar has entered po- litics (Oromo Federalist Congress, OFC) and is no longer the company’s director. He claims to be fully out of the media operation and only has an informal advisory functi- on vis-a-vis OMN. However, it is revealing that when he talks about OMN’s activities, it does not go long until he begins referring to ‘we’ instead of ‘they’ So, in his own percepti- on, he is still an integrated part of the media house’s profile and engagement. Officially, he stepped down from the company in Janu- ary 2020 when Girma Gutema took over as director. SRE eS eeaee s\IENNT mene ner me ns aii” iiine aiid Politically speaking, OMN supports ‘mul- tinational federalism, which for outsiders would seem similar to ethnic federalism, but the latter is a term that the station defies. The perspective contrasts unitarist and secessio- nist positions, which are the other two main political stances found in Oromo politics (@stebo and Tronvoll, 2020).