12.4.2016
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ETHICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM Almost complete
© Carla Bagnoli
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BOOK REVIEWS
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Bagnoli, C. 2009, “Review of C.M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency”, Notre Dame
Philosophical Reviews, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review, 06/2009
Bagnoli, C. 2009, “Review of Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality”, The
Philosophical Review, 118/4 (2009), pp. 536-540.
Bagnoli, C. 2012, “Review of Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge”,
European Journal of Philosophy, 20/2: (2012): 340-345
Bagnoli, C. 2015, Review of Archard, D., M. Deveaux, N. Manson & D. Weinstock eds
Reading Onora O’Neill, Routdlege. Ethics, 125/4 (2015): 1184-1189.
Campbell, E. 2014. “Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Philosophical Review 123
(3):374-377.
Coleman, M. 2015, Review of Bagnoli C. ed. Constructivism in Ethics, Cambridge
University Press. Mind, 124/496 October (2015): 1231-1235.
Dean, R. 2015, Review of Bagnoli C. ed. Constructivism in Ethics, Cambridge University
Press. Kantian Review, 20 (2015)
Halbig, Christoph 2013, Review of Constructivism In Practical Philosophy – Edited By
James Lenman And Yonatan Shemmer. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (S3):E1-E5.
Liberman, Alida 2015. Review of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Edited By James
Lenman And Yonatan Shemmer. Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (4):557-560.
Lindeman, K. Review of Bagnoli C. (ed.) Constructivism in Ethics, Cambridge University
Press. Ethics 125/3 (2015): 857-861
Scarfone, M., 2015, Review of Constructivism In Ethics Carla Bagnoli, Editors Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Dialogue 54 (2):394-396.
Shemmer, Y., 2014, Review of Bagnoli C. (ed.) Constructivism in Ethics, Cambridge
University Press, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014.03.18
Suikkanen, J. 2013, Review of Lenman, James & Shemmer, Yonatan (Eds.), Constructivism
In Practical Philosophy. Ethics 123 (4):763-768.
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