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The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors

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Abstract

This article analyses the emergence of United Russia (*Edinaya Rossiya*) as a dominant party by examining the behaviour of Russia's governors. Using original data on when governors joined United Russia, the article demonstrates that those governors with access to autonomous political resources were more reluctant to join the dominant party. By showing that Russian elite members made their affiliation decisions on the basis of calculations about their own political resources rather than simply being coerced by the Kremlin, this article provides evidence for a theory of dominant party formation that casts the problem as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and elites.

IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY THE WORLD witnessed an unprecedented number of regime transitions. Most observers greeted these transitions with open arms, but were later disappointed when liberalising reforms were halted or retrenched (Levitsky & Way 2002; Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Balzer 2003). Many were also disappointed when the Third Wave of 'democratisation' failed to reach the shores of certain long-lived autocratic regimes. We know now that many of these regimes failed to democratise because regime leaders successfully appropriated nominally democratic institutions in order to entrench their rule (Schedler 2006; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi & Przeworski 2006; Magaloni 2006; Geddes 1999b). The most significant of these institutions has been the dominant party. A dominant party is one that has the leading role in determining access to most political offices, shares powers over policy making and patronage distribution and uses privileged access to state resources to maintain its position in power. Some authoritarian leaders use a dominant party to secure victories at the ballot box, reduce transaction costs and bind allies to the ruling coalition. Others prefer to rule through a combination of charisma, patronage and coercion, rather than sharing power with a party. This variation goes mostly unexplained in the literature.

Russia presents an ideal case for examining this variation. In the 1990s, Russia's 'party of power' projects failed to attract significant support either from important regional elites or the Kremlin and thus never materialised into a true dominant party.

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This state of affairs changed dramatically in the early 2000s as Vladimir Putin openly sanctioned the creation of a strong pro-presidential party, *Edinaya Rossiya* (United Russia (UR) hereafter). Over a period of six years, most of Russia's governors, *Duma* deputies, regional legislators and other political elites have gradually joined the party ranks. The party now controls a supermajority in the *Duma*, a majority in almost all regional assemblies, and 78 of 83 regional chief executive posts. Overall, the party is increasingly being used as a channel for elite recruitment, a forum for distributing rents and a tool for managing elite conflict. Indeed, the emergence of United Russia as a dominant party is one of the most important developments in Russian politics since the end of the Soviet Union.

This begs two questions. First why did a dominant party emerge in Russia? And, relatedly, what explains the variation in individual actors' decisions to join the emergent dominant party? By explaining variation in the decisions of Russia's elites to join United Russia, this article tests some individual-level implications of a broader argument about why dominant parties emerge in non-democracies.

Elites will not join a dominant party unless they stand to gain more from participating in it than they do from retaining their own autonomous control over patronage networks and political machines. When the value of this autonomy is high, their commitments to the party are far from credible. When elite commitment is uncertain, central leaders will not make their own investments in a dominant party. This was the story of Russia in the 1990s under Yel'tsin and in the early 2000s. As the resources available to elites decline in value, these elites are more likely to make a commitment to the nascent dominant party. A recognition of this fact has driven the Kremlin in its decisions to grant more institutional authority to United Russia over the past several years.

The existing literature implies that dominant parties emerge only when leaders face challenges from social opposition or when they are faced by fiscal constraints imposed by a lack of rent revenues (Smith 2005; Gandhi 2009). In contrast, this article contributes to the argument that dominant party emergence can best be explained as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and elites (Reuter & Remington 2009). A faithful exploration of such a theory requires both a careful examination of elite interests and an examination of whether elites recognise and act upon those interests. This article endeavours to do that. In particular, it examines the claim that elites make dominant party affiliation decisions on the basis of calculations about the value of their own autonomous political resources.

Thus, the main hypothesis tested in this article is that individual elites with significant stores of political, personal and economic resources, that are difficult for state leaders to repress or control, are less likely to commit to a nascent dominant party. In other words, when elites can survive and prosper politically without relinquishing their autonomy to a dominant party, they will not bind themselves to such a party. The article tests this hypothesis with data on the timing of Russian regional executives' decisions to join the now-dominant party of power, United Russia. I argue that regional governors with autonomous resources delayed joining the party for longer than those without such resources. Using original data on the timing of 121 Russian governors' party affiliation decisions from 2003–2007, I test these hypotheses with event history models.

The results show that the resources controlled by governors explain much of the variation in the timing of their decisions to join United Russia. In particular, those who governed complex regional economies, had secured large electoral mandates, had been in their post for long periods of time, or had presided over ethnic regions, were less likely to join the party. If this is how individual elites in Russia decide whether to affiliate with an emerging dominant party, then it is plausible that dominant party formation depends in large part on the types of resources that elites, as a whole, control in a given country.

United Russia as a dominant party

A dominant party is one that has the leading role in determining access to most political offices. It is the site of coordination for a winning coalition of elite actors. It is an institution that successfully supplies certain goods to rulers, elites and voters. The party can reduce transaction costs for elites in bargaining over policy, give career opportunities to ambitious politicians, manage conflicts and succession struggles among elites, mitigate uncertainty for elites over whom to support and coordinate electoral expectations for voters. By providing institutional guarantees about policy making and the distribution of spoils it gives elites an incentive to remain loyal to the regime (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008). It shares some powers over policy making, patronage distribution and political appointments, and uses privileged access to state resources to maintain its position in power. This final point is important, for, in contrast to democracies that are governed by one party over long periods of time, dominant parties place *a priori* restrictions on the ability of opposition forces to compete and win.

Dominant parties also vary in the extent to which they penetrate social and political life. On one end of this scale are communist parties such as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The extent to which the CPSU supervised the state, its high-level of internal centralisation, and its transformative social purpose make the CPSU an anomaly among the universe of dominant party regimes. United Russia's state supervisory functions and level of hierarchical centralisation pale in comparison to that of the CPSU. On the other end of the spectrum, many African dominant parties of the mid-twentieth century acted simply as a forum to distribute patronage; but even these parties granted the regime more institutional backing than most personalist or military regimes enjoyed.

Since its founding in 2001, United Russia has come to exhibit the characteristics of a dominant party. The raw figures suggest that United Russia's position is hegemonic. The party controls 315 of the 450 seats in the State *Duma*, 78 of Russia's 83 regional executive posts, majorities in 81 regional assemblies,[1] and a large percentage of Russia's mayoralties (including eight of the 10 largest cities). The party has a mass membership of over 1.5 million and nearly 60,000 regional, local and primary branches. Although specific figures are not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that the party controls majorities in many (if not most) of the country's city councils. As of 2008, the party has embarked on a strong push to extend its influence into organs of

[1]At the time of writing, Nenets Autonomous *Okrug* and Vladimir *Oblast*' are the only exceptions.

local self-government, devoting considerable resources to win elections at the local level and lobbying regional executives to appoint UR members as heads of local administrations (Ross 2007).[2] Although he is not formally a member as of writing, former president and current prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has repeatedly expressed his unequivocal support for the party and before the December 2007 *Duma* elections, Putin agreed to accept the post of Party Chairman, which had been specially created for him. In numerous other settings, the Kremlin has signalled its commitment to supporting and channelling influence through the party. For instance, in a speech before UR activists in February 2006, then-President Putin's top political advisor and ideological guru, Vladislav Surkov stated that United Russia's task should be to ensure its domination for a minimum of between 10 and 15 years.[3] In a separate speech before activists from another pro-Kremlin party project, Just Russia (*Spravedlivaya Rossiya*), Surkov said that the political system would be 'built around United Russia for the foreseeable future'.[4]

The party is increasingly being used as a forum for distributing rents, patronage, spoils and influencing policy. This is accomplished chiefly through intra-party vote trading. Voting discipline among pro-presidential *Duma* deputies rose precipitously with the creation of the United Russia fraction after the 2003 elections. With ironclad discipline the party has now become the primary channel for patronage distribution in the State *Duma* (Remington 2008; Tolstykh 2008). In the fourth and fifth *Duma*, the party supplanted the 'zero-reading' (a consultative, pre-floor intra-party vote trading mechanism where individual deputies bargained with the government) with closed-door meetings of the fraction Presidium. All legislative bargaining now runs through these Presidium meetings held every Monday when the *Duma* is in session.

The same is true of almost all regional parliaments where intra-party vote trading is carried out most frequently in the United Russia fraction meetings prior to plenary sessions.[5] In most regional parliaments, the party has come to structure the law-

[2]For example, according to a list of United Russia deputies in organs of local self-government provided to the author, 68 of 72 regional administration heads in Sverdlovsk *Oblast*' were party members in July 2007. 'Spisok deputatov predstavitelnykh organov mestnovo samoupravleniya i glav munitsipalnykh obrazovanii Sverdlovskaya Oblast'' Sverdlovskoe Regional'noe Otdelenie 'Edinoi Rossii'. Internal Party Document. For a recent example of the party's sometimes unsuccessful efforts to extend its influence over organs of local self-government, see 'Partiya Vlasti Priznala Vlast', *Kommersant*, 14 October 2008.

[3]Available at United Russia website: http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=111148, accessed 21 March 2007.

[4]Available at United Russia website: http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=114850, accessed 21 March 2007.

[5]In interviews with United Russia fraction leaders and deputies from 1–18 July and 10 July–11 August 2008 Permskii *Krai*, Sverdlovskaya *Oblast*', Kurganskaya *Oblast*', Chelyabinskaya *Oblast*' and Kirovskaya *Oblast*', nearly all respondents agreed that the key decisions on legislation were made during the fraction meeting. Indeed, five of the six former independents that were interviewed stated that their decision to join United Russia was motivated primarily by their desire to participate in this fraction meeting. Moreover, regional legislative apparat employees interviewed in these regions as well as additional interviews conducted in Yaroslavskaya *Oblast*' (9 June 2009), Ryzanskaya *Oblast*' (24 July 2009), Ivanovskaya *Oblast*' (7 August 2009) and Nizhegorodskaya *Oblast*' (6 August 2009), all agreed that voting discipline increased immeasurably as soon as United Russia fractions were created after the third regional electoral cycle.

making process in a way that was unthinkable in the early 2000s when almost all regional parliaments were composed of independent deputies (Glubotskii & Kynev 2003). In a study of lobbying in the regions of the Central Federal *Okrug* conducted by the Center for the Study of the Interaction between Business and Politics, experts found that lobbying the executive branch was necessary to 'quickly decide a specific matter of an individual character' while lobbying the legislative branch permitted groups to defend their general, long term interests (Makhortov 2008, p. 4). The report concluded that lobbying via the executive branch was essential, but at the same time, a 'majority of respondents consider membership in a party a key factor in the advancement of one's interests' (Makhortov 2008, p. 5). Naturally, United Russia was the most favoured party among respondents.

The party has been given control over disbursing national project funds and in most regions a special party commission has been created to oversee allocation.[6] In a January 2006 speech before United Russia *Duma* deputies, Putin set out the terms of the relationship between the national projects and United Russia:

> The national projects are not something handed down from above—they are United Russia's projects ... They were developed with your input taken into account. Your proposals and the proposals of the government form their basis ... The realization of the national projects is strictly the work of the party.[7]

Personnel politics are increasingly at the centre of the party's activities. The party now works hard to ensure co-operation by rewarding loyal members and punishing defectors, though this has not always been the case. In 2001, 2002 and early 2003, the Kremlin often failed to support United Russia candidates in gubernatorial elections and when the Kremlin did seek to extend the party's influence into a region it was more often as a way of undermining the strength of the sitting governor (Hale 2004b; Slider 2006). In contrast, from 2003 until mid-2007, the party adopted a strategy of co-opting the most powerful elite figures in the regions. So in a given electoral contest, the party would endeavour to back the strongest candidate and lobby this candidate to join the party ranks. Beginning in late 2007, however, the party began privileging internal party advancement on party lists over co-opting new elite members.[8] According to the United Russia party charter, the Presidium of the General Council confirms lists for all candidates in regional legislative elections and for regional legislative leadership posts. The clients of powerful regional governors objected vigorously to these changes when they were adopted in 2004, indicating that regional leaders expected the rule changes to lead to real changes.[9] The details behind the process of drawing up United Russia's lists are rarely made public, but when scandals boil over, we see that the federal party leadership plays a key role in adjudicating disputes among

[6]Author's interview with member of Presidium of United Russia Political Council in Perm *Krai*, 9 July 2008.

[7]Available at: http://edinros.nov.ru/index.php?mmm=about&id=12, accessed 2 March 2007.

[8]Author's interview with United Russia Political Council Presidium member, Sverdlovskaya *Oblast'*, 22 July 2008 and with United Russia Political Council Presidium member, Perm *Krai*, 9 July 2008.

[9]'Vremenno ostavlenniyi', *Vlast'*, 10 August 2009.

governors and other members of the regional elite.[10] Aside from managing the process of candidate nomination, the United Russia leadership in Moscow also frequently takes the lead in conducting regional campaigns (Ivanov 2008, pp. 266–70). The increasingly active role of the Moscow leadership in the regions is further demonstrated by several statements of high profile regional governors, sharply bemoaning the interference of the party leadership in the regions.[11]

This new strategy has coincided with the party's recent initiatives to bolster party discipline and cleanse the party ranks. The party moved aggressively in 2008 to remove mayors, deputies and executive branch appointees that had broken party rules by discrediting the party in public, repeatedly breaking party discipline in the legislature, or supporting non-party candidates in elections. This campaign not only underscores the party's crucial informational role as a device for monitoring elite commitment, but also demonstrates that loyalty to the Kremlin is sometimes insufficient when it is not accompanied by loyalty to the party.[12]

Moreover, the party has recently been granted the formal right to propose candidates for regional executive posts. First proposed in October 2005, this provision was reintroduced in Dimitri Medvedev's November 2008 address to the Federation Council, was passed into law in March 2009 and came into effect on 1 July 2009.[13] Since 2006, a 'personnel reserve' (*kadrovyi reserv*) system, similar in concept (though not in scope of application) to the Soviet *nomenklatura* system, has formed the basis for many intra-party promotions. Plans are underway to make it one of several routes for the selection of cadres in the executive branch as well as in business.[14] Initial results indicate some notable successes in this area, but efforts are still only preliminary at the time of writing.[15] In sum, while prophecies of a return to monopolistic, CPSU-style, single party rule are likely to prove false, United Russia is now functioning as a dominant party.

[10]See 'Edinaya Rossiya pomirila gubernatora s merom', *Kommersant*, 19 January 2007 and 'Murmanskikh edinorossov pomirila rukha Moskvy', *Kommersant*, 11 December 2006.

[11]The most frank statement of this view came from Baskhortorstan President Murtaza Rakhimov in June 2009 when he declared in an interview, '... I have just heard that United Russia needs to be independent—"not under the paw of governors". ... I am sorry, but the core of the party should be formed from below. But that doesn't seem to be the case right now. The party is being run by people who have never commanded anything more than three chickens. Is that the way it's really going to be?' ('Dissident Respubliki Bashkortorstan', *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 4 June 2009).

[12]See for example 'Edinaya Rossiya kompostiruyet part bilety', *Kommersant*, 18 August 2008 and 'Chekisty "Edinoi Rossii" Otpravilis' v problemniye regiony', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 17 October 2008.

[13]The new law gives the party which controls a majority in regional assemblies the exclusive right to nominate candidates to the president for the post of governor. The first formal application of the new law occurred on 20 August 2009 when United Russia presented President Medvedev with three candidates to fill the governor's post in Sverdlovskaya *Oblast*' ('Presidenta ostavila pered vyborim', *Kommersant*, 21 August 2009). By October 2009, the party had presented Medvedev with candidates for five additional gubernatorial posts.

[14]See for example 'Edinaya Rossiaya Budet Sorevnovatsya c polpredami presidenta', *Kommersant*, 4 September 2008, and 'Kadrovyi inkubator partii vlasti', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 28 July 2008.

[15]Specific examples of programme successes can be found on the project's web portal 'Kadrovyi Reserv: Professionalnaya Komanda Strany', available at: http://profkomanda.edinros.ru/index.php?pageid=about, accessed 24 August 2009.

United Russia and Russia's governors: a puzzle

The motivating question for this article is why dominant parties emerge in some non-democracies but not in others. Within Russia, a related empirical puzzle is the gradual migration of Russia's elite actors into the ranks of United Russia; and nowhere is this puzzle more significant than in the case of Russia's regional executives. In the 1990s, Russia's governors affiliated with various parties of power and regional political blocs, but, with the exception of the *Kommunisticheskya Partiya Rossiskoi Federatsii* (KPRF), they very rarely became full-fledged members, preferring instead to retain freedom of manoeuvre. The situation was no different in 1999, when the governors faced severe coordination dilemmas in deciding which party of power to support ahead of the 1999–2000 election cycle (Shvetsova 2003). Yet even in 1999, very few governors actually 'joined' *Edinstvo* (Unity) or *Otechestvo Vsya Rossiya* (OVR). In fact, some signatories of Unity's founding statement, 'The Announcement of the Thirty-Nine', were actually surprised to learn that they were supporting a political party in signing the document, and many were active members of other political parties (Lussier 2002, p. 66). With the emergence of United Russia, this situation began to change, though only slowly.

Existing literature on the origins of dominant parties provides little guidance on when or why elites would choose to join a dominant party (Smith 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski 2006). Meanwhile, an implicit assumption in some of the literature on Russia's emerging authoritarian regime is that the Kremlin forced all governors to join United Russia, paying little heed to their political resources which were expropriated for use by the party. This is a perspective implied by those recent analyses of Russian politics that privilege the role of coercion and personality as the bedrock of Russia's authoritarian system (Stoner-Weiss 2006; Hanson 2007). Such a view would lead to the prediction that Russia's governors were coerced into joining United Russia *en masse*, but descriptive data on the governor's dominant party affiliation patterns cast plausible doubt on this perspective.

Though United Russia was selected as the sole bearer of the Kremlin standard in the December 2003 parliamentary elections, governors were not forced to join *en masse* at this time. In addition, as Figure 1 shows, there was no discernible rush to join the party. Though 27 governors agreed to be placed on the UR party lists for the December 2003 *Duma* elections, only 15 governors had formally joined the party by that time.[16] Another common misconception is that most of Russia's governors joined the party immediately after Putin's proposal to cancel gubernatorial elections was passed into law in September 2004, implying that Russia's governors were essentially forced into joining the party. This proposition seems intuitive. With no independent electoral mandate, governors appeared wholly dependent on the Kremlin after 2004 and were required to curry favour with the president in order to secure reappointment. In fact, in September 2004, the number of governors in the party was only 23 and while 11 governors did join by January 2005, this was still far short of a majority. It is true that the pace of governors' joining the party slightly increased in the autumn of 2004, but as the figure shows

[16]I discuss these data on governors' membership in United Russia below.



FIGURE 1. RUSSIA'S GOVERNORS IN UNITED RUSSIA: 2003–2007

this was only a minor deviation from the linear trend. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, by far the largest increase in governor membership occurred in the autumn of 2005, just after the Kremlin floated the idea of giving the largest party in regional parliaments the right to nominate candidates for regional executive posts.[17] The proportion of Russia's governors that were party members reached 50% only in October 2005. The party continued to grow at a steady pace in 2006, so that 67 governors were members by the end of the year. In 2007, the pace of joining slowed and by November of that year, when this analysis ends, all but eight of Russia's governors had joined. As of November 2008, 78 of Russia's 83 governors had joined the party.[18]

Another intuitive expectation that Figure 1 disproves is that governors developed stronger beliefs about joining the party in response to an increase in the number of 'peer governors' who had joined. Such a phenomenon would be represented in the figure by a curve of increasing slope rather than by the constant upward linear trend depicted. The figure shows little evidence of a classical tipping point, which would be represented by a substantial increase in the rate of joining followed by a tapering off as the critical mass was surpassed (an S-shaped pattern). Part of the reason for this is probably that, unlike legislators, Russia's governors lack an institutional lobbying

[17]'Strana Sovetov "Edinoi Rossii" Gazeta.ru.', 3 October 2005. This move may be interpreted as a coercive move, sending a signal to governors that they were to come under the further control of the Kremlin or it may be seen as an institutional carrot that granted the party (in which governors played a central role) more institutional authority over personnel. Kynev (2006, p. 6) notes the ambiguity over whether this should be considered a carrot or a stick.

[18]The five who did not join were Chukotka Governor Roman Abramovich, St Petersburg Mayor Valentina Matvienko, Dagestan President Mukhu Aliyev, Perm *Krai* Governor Oleg Chirkunov and Zabaikal *Krai* Governor Gennadii Genyatullin.

forum where majorities or supermajorities matter. Instead, as oil prices increased, real incomes grew and the transitional uncertainties waned over this period, the Kremlin was able to offer more to Russia's governors and they were in a better position to commit to the party. The reason why some governors joined early and others later is explained in this article.

Overall, the data reveal a secular linear trend. At a time of great uncertainty about the future of United Russia, some governors were casting their lot with United Russia while others were opting to remain independent. With the benefit of hindsight, it may seem that some joined while others merely postponed, but United Russia's future as a dominant party was by no means certain in this period. While the time span (five years) covered may seem short in historical terms, it is a very long time in the political careers of these governors, who were making key political decisions about the course of their political careers. If this variation in the timing is random, then it tells us little about why dominant parties emerge, but if, on the other hand, some governors joined later for specific reasons, then we can examine those reasons to determine why they opted not to join. As I argue below, this variation is explained primarily by the autonomous political resources under these governors' control. More broadly, I endeavour to show that as the balance of resources shifted between regional elites and the Kremlin more governors could commit to joining (or the Kremlin could induce them to join). That these governors were co-opted by the party rather than coerced is demonstrated both by the enduring political capital held by the governors and the institutional carrots extended to the party.

Why dominant parties?

Dominant parties maintain elite cohesion by providing institutional guarantees that reduce uncertainty over the distribution of spoils and extend the time horizons of party cadres (Geddes 1999a; Smith 2005; Langston 2006; Brownlee 2007). Indeed, this special ability to insure elite commitment is the primary mechanism behind the finding that dominant party regimes are significantly more durable than other types of authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999a; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008). Thus, while the self-enforcing nature of the dominant party institution has been well studied, we still know very little about the conditions under which elite commitment to the party can be achieved in the first place.

Early studies of dominant parties that were inspired by modernisation theories located the origins of such parties in processes of social differentiation, economic development and nationalist struggle, which opened up fissures in society that could only be healed through concession and co-optation (Huntington 1970; Apter 1965; Finer 1967; Emerson 1966; Zolberg 1966). Often edging closer to prescription than theory, however, these early accounts were lacking in their explanatory power and attention to agency. In an important set of correctives to early modernisation approaches, recent work has argued that institutions such as parties are likely to emerge when rulers face strong opposition or fiscal constraints that force them to co-opt social actors (Smith 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski 2006). This logic has advanced our understanding of institutional choice in non-democratic settings, but it neglects

both the incentives for other elites to commit to the party and the strategic dynamic between the two sets of actors.[19]

In many, if not most, situations there are two sets of actors that are important to consider in an analysis of the origins of dominant parties: leaders and other elites. Such elites may include regional political elites, prominent enterprise directors, aspiring politicians and opinion leaders from the professions—or as Joel Migdal calls them 'strongmen' (1987). These elites are important to the extent that they hold or have access to some actual or latent base of political resources that is autonomous from the regime. Such resources might include, but are not limited to, autonomous control over clientelist networks, regional administrative resources or hard-to-tax economic assets. The problem of party-building is a commitment problem faced by a ruler choosing whether to invest in a dominant party and a body of other elites who choose whether or not to cast their lot with the proposed party project.

Dominant parties confer an array of benefits on leaders. The party may serve as a tool for reducing the transaction costs associated with achieving policy outcomes, winning elections and implementing policy (Smyth 2002; Remington 2006; Gel'man 2006; Cox 1987; Cox & McCubbins 1993); a mechanism for co-opting elites and ensuring their loyalty (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008); an information gathering device (Magaloni 2006); and a way to routinise patronage flows and the distribution of political appointments (Rigby 1968; Hough & Fainsod 1979). But dominant parties also impose costs on rulers. The ruler delegates certain rights, privileges and spheres of policy or institutional control to the party. In addition, the ruler may suffer significant agency losses with a party. Indeed, the party itself may grow so independent that it comes to usurp policy, rents and even office from the ruler. This was Yel'tsin's fear when he refrained from investing in *Nash Dom-Rossiya* (Our Home is Russia) in the mid-1990s and it was Putin's fear as he only incrementally granted authority to United Russia in the early 2000s (Baturin *et al*. 2001; Ivanov 2008).

The primary and most obvious benefits of party affiliation are the spoils that elites receive from linking their fates to the party, and, by extension, the regime. In addition, elites receive certain institutional benefits from the party. The party reduces uncertainty over the distribution of spoils (Magaloni 2008) and permits easier monitoring of agreements over this division. The main cost to elites of committing to the dominant party is loss of autonomy. Their commitment to the party precludes them from running their own lists of candidates in elections, habitually voting against the party line in parliament, and rejecting party-backed cadre nominations. If it were possible, they would prefer to retain the flexibility to bargain with opponents, make side payments to supporters, and control their own clientelist networks by not linking them to the dominant party of power.

The leader wants other elites to bind themselves to a ruling party but also wants to retain maximum freedom of manoeuvre for himself. The ruler is also likely to be unwilling to commit himself to the party unless he can be sure that the other elites are

[19]Indeed, existing studies would predict that Putin would undermine efforts to create a pro-presidential party as oil revenues increased throughout the 2000s and the puissance of the communist opposition decreased.

making a complementary commitment. For their part, other elites will not tie their fates to the party unless they can be sure that the centre will make it a mechanism for guaranteeing the supply of careers and resources; nor will they consent to commit themselves when the costs of linking their personal bases of political support to the party organisation are too high.

The costs and benefits described above are determined primarily by the distribution of political resources between elites and rulers. When the balance of political resources is skewed heavily in favour of elites, they will not risk investment in a dominant party because they can secure their own political survival and achieve their goals without relinquishing their autonomy to the party. When the balance of resources is skewed in favour of the leader, (s)he will not commit to the party because elites do not need to be co-opted and the costs of building a party institution are unnecessary. Mutual investment in a dominant party is most likely when resources are balanced in such a way that the benefits of building a dominant party, relative to the benefits of contracting on an *ad hoc* basis, are maximised. When neither side holds a preponderance of resources, the severity of the commitment problem is reduced, and both sides are more likely to risk investment in a dominant party that may develop the mechanisms necessary to formally solve the commitment problem.[20] In other words, an institutional solution to the commitment problem is more likely at certain times. A dominant party will thus emerge when elites are strong enough in political resources (relative to the ruler's supply of political resources) that it is cost-effective to co-opt them, but do not hold so many autonomous resources that they are reluctant to tie themselves to a ruling party (Reuter & Remington 2009).

Individual elite members and dominant party affiliation

The theoretical framework outlined above simplifies reality by positing a bilateral interaction between the leader and a swing group of elites. In reality however 'the elite' is not a single actor. Individual elite members make individual decisions about investment in the dominant party. This theory has clear implications for the behaviour of individual elite members under different circumstances.

At one extreme, in countries where all elites are weak and central rulers control a great preponderance of resources (such as Saudi Arabia), there will be no dominant party. Weak elites would be more than willing to receive the benefits of taking part in an institutionalised party of power, but the centre has no incentive to commit to this arrangement, and thus, there is no reason for elites to subscribe to a party that is not providing institutional benefits. At the other extreme, when all elites are strong (as in Russia in the late 1990s or Brazil in the era immediately after World War II), few or no elite members will be willing to make a commitment to the party and a dominant party will not emerge. But when neither central rulers nor elites hold a preponderance of resources we are most likely to see a dominant party emerging and elite members

[20]I am interested in dominant parties as endogenous institutions. Therefore, I do not offer new theory about how the institution may contribute to solving commitment problems in the long term. This topic is taken up both formally and informally in existing literature (Magaloni 2008; Brownlee 2007; Aldrich 1995).

joining the party. This was Russia's situation in the early and mid-2000s. It is in this 'zone', where central leaders do not dominate elites, and elites, as a whole, are not overly autonomous of the centre, that there will be variation in the decisions of elite members to join the party, and it is here that we can observe a dynamic process of party formation that permits the testing of hypotheses about resources and elite commitment.

The leader's level of commitment to the party may increase (or decrease) over time. Some elite members make commitments to the party quite early while others postpone joining it. Throughout this process, each individual elite member has a decision to make about whether or not to affiliate with the party. The advantages acquired in tying themselves to the regime may be smaller than the share they would receive if they were to maintain their own patronage networks and rent streams that are not under the regime's direct control. If it were possible, they would prefer to retain the flexibility to bargain with opponents and make side payments to supporters. Moreover, they would prefer to maintain direct control over their own patronage networks and political levers of influence by not linking them to the dominant party of power. These costs to joining the party decrease as the political machines and clientelist networks that elites control become less lucrative or necessary for political survival. The benefits of a party for individual elite members include the spoils they receive from the party and the uncertainty-reducing benefits of the party institution. These benefits increase as the commitment from central rulers increases.

If, as a whole, elites are strong enough to need to be co-opted or appeased in some way, then elites that are weak in resources should be the first to join the party. These elites have the least to lose in relinquishing their autonomy, but they are still strong enough that they need to be co-opted into the party.[21] If the balance of political resources continues to shift in favour of central leaders then elites that are stronger in resources will begin to join the party. Of course, if the balance of resources between the two sides ceases to shift in favour of central leaders then the process of incremental elite affiliation may come to a halt. In any case, elites stronger in autonomous resources should postpone or resist joining the party for longer because they can insure their political survival and extract usable rents without linking their fates to the regime. This hypothesis is consistent with recent scholarship on party development in new democracies, which attributes the decisions of candidates to eschew party affiliation to the accessibility of non-party political resources (Golosov 2003; Hale 2006; Smyth 2006).

Applying the argument to Russia

A dominant party will only emerge when other elites hold enough independent political resources (relative to the ruler's supply of political resources) to make

[21]An important assumption for the Russia-specific analysis here is that most Russian elites were still strong enough in the early 2000s that they needed to be co-opted or appeased. Repressing or sidestepping them would not be a cost-effective governing strategy for the Kremlin. The variance that needs to be explained then is the difference between those elites who were co-opted early into the party and those who postponed joining and continued to maintain relations with the Kremlin bilaterally.

co-opting necessary, but not so many autonomous resources that they are unwilling to commit to the party. Reuter and Remington (2009) show that the preponderance of resources held by Russia's governors and regional elites in the 1990s left them with little incentive to commit to any party project proposed by the Kremlin. In turn, knowing that Russia's regional elites were not in any position credibly to commit themselves to a party, Yel'tsin had every incentive to undermine pro-presidential parties that could restrict his freedom of manoeuvre. In the early 2000s as well, Putin hesitated from investing heavily in United Russia over concerns that it might become a platform for Yuri Luzhkov to challenge him (Ivanov 2008, p. 76). As late as 2003, Kremlin advisor Vladyslav Surkov expressed doubts over whether the Kremlin would be able to control the 'monster' it had created in parliament (Ivanov 2008, p. 136). By the mid-2000s, however, rising oil prices, reduced uncertainty and sustained economic growth shifted the resource balance between the Kremlin and regional elites. Under Putin, regional elites were still strong enough that their co-operation needed to be secured, but not so strong that they were unwilling to commit to a party project (Reuter & Remington 2009). The result has been United Russia.

It is true that regional elites suffered losses of autonomy in the early 2000s as a direct result of the federal reforms implemented by Vladimir Putin, but this is only the most proximate factor. The antecedent factors that gave Putin the political capital to push through these reforms were the exogenous changes outlined above (the increased oil prices, reduced uncertainty and sustained economic growth).[22] Moreover, claiming that the agreement of elites is required for the dominant party to form does not bind one to the argument that the balance of power between the two sides is perfectly equal. It simply implies that elites are still strong enough (even after Putin's federal reforms) that their co-optation is required if the Kremlin wishes to govern cost-effectively.

That Russia's governors were still strong enough to be co-opted in the early–mid-2000s is supported by an array of literature that testifies to the enduring significance of governors' political machines through the early 2000s (Slider 2005; Hale 2006; Turovsky 2006; Gel'man 2009). In the 1990s and early 2000s, regional governors were Russia's kingmakers.[23] In his effort to gain their support first against the Soviet centre and then against communist and nationalist recidivists, Yel'tsin ceded significant *de jure* political autonomy to Russia's regions in the early and mid-1990s (Stoner-Weiss 1997; Treisman 1999). In turn, the governors used this autonomy to expand their own power *vis-à-vis* other political institutions in the regions. The weakness of the Russian central state in this period granted governors the ability to acquire extensive informal, administrative and economic resources that they could use to bolster their own position against the centre. The privatisation processes of the early 1990s favoured *nomenklatura* insiders with access to political elites, and these enterprise directors soon became clients of regional governors. By the mid-1990s the deteriorating fiscal position

[22]These federal reforms are now well-known. In 2004, Putin cancelled direct gubernatorial elections. Since that time, governors have been appointed by the president subject to confirmation by the regional legislature.

[23]For discussions of the governors' power in these years see, among others, Hale (2000, 2003), Slider (2005), Treisman (1999) and Stoner-Weiss (1997, 2001).

of Moscow led the Kremlin to transfer control over regional enterprises to local governments in lieu of budgetary transfers. This control over administrative resources made the governors very powerful players in Russian politics by the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The Kremlin worked hard to recruit governors to lend their names to the United Russia party lists in both the 2003 and 2007 State *Duma* elections. The vote for United Russia depended heavily on governors mobilising their political machines. In regional elections, the total vote for a party depended on the extent to which the governor lent his support to the party and the Kremlin relied on governors to quell elite conflict in the regions (Konitzer 2006; Tkacheva 2009). Those who were successful at this were allowed to keep their jobs after Putin cancelled gubernatorial elections in September 2004 and were able to secure the placement of their preferred candidates in the United Russia *Duma* lists in 2007 (Ivanov 2008). After cancelling gubernatorial elections, President Putin re-nominated incumbents in 34 of 47 regions where the governors' terms expired in 2005 and 2006. Eighteen of those re-nominated were not members of United Russia, indicating that the Kremlin still relied on governors' control over the regions to govern effectively and that 'coercion' into United Russia was not an efficient strategy.[24]

In the early 2000s, the Kremlin was willing to invest some effort and resources into Unity and then United Russia, but was not willing to grant either of them significant institutional or policy control. In response, only the weakest governors would make a formal commitment to the party. As the resource balance (in large part due to sustained oil revenues, economic growth, Putin's personal popularity and reduced uncertainty) continued to shift in the Kremlin's favour after 2003, the Kremlin was able to offer more to governors and these governors had less to lose. More and more governors were ready to make a commitment to the party. The first governors to formally join the party were those with less robust resource endowments while those with larger endowments of resources postponed joining for longer. Those with significant autonomous resources were able to demonstrate their indispensability to the Kremlin and to leverage this against joining the party. As it became clear that more and more governors would commit to the party, the Kremlin was willing to grant the party more control over policy, spoils and careers.

A key assumption I make in this analysis is that the resource balance between the Kremlin and other elites was shifting gradually in favour of the Kremlin over the period analysed here. I do not test here strategic elements of the argument by modelling how the decisions of the Kremlin depended on the decisions of governors and vice versa. The hypotheses under examination here address only the behaviour of governors. As the resource balance between the Kremlin and other elites changed, variance in the decisions of governors to join the party should be determined by the resources under individual governors' control. Thus, the theory above suggests the following hypothesis about the party affiliation behaviour of Russia's governors:

[24]Some have argued that Putin's decision to cancel gubernatorial elections was a boon to governors who were relieved from the term limits they were facing (Titkov 2007).

H1: Governors with significant endowments of political and economic resources that are costly for the Kremlin to appropriate or control will postpone joining United Russia longer than those without such resources.

Alternative explanations

There are at least two alternative predictions about the relationship between resource ownership and the decision of a governor to join United Russia. The first is that there should be no systematic relationship, because governors were simply forced to join United Russia without any attention paid to their power bases or because individual governors saw no costs associated with joining the party and thus joined at random times. If the Kremlin could simply form a dominant party whenever it pleased then there should be no systematic relationship between the resources that elites control and their entry into the party.

A second alternative prediction about the relationship between resources and governors' decisions to join the party is that governors who are strong in resources join the party early. Indeed, a handful of Russia's 'strongest' governors were among the founders of the party. Tatarstan's President, Mintimer Shaimiyev, Bashkiriya's President, Murtaza Rakhimov and Moscow's Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, leaders of the Fatherland–All Russia (*Otechestvo–Vsya Rossiya*) coalition since 1999, were among the nominal founders of the party, though the actual date of their accession to the party is a matter of dispute. One of the benefits that the Kremlin receives through investment in United Russia is votes. Therefore, if the agency of governors played no role, then the Kremlin might enlist the strongest governors first in order to mobilise the most votes. One could also speculate that the strongest governors would join the party first in order to gain control of the party apparatus and secure privileged positions in it. The following sections test whether these alternative predictions are superior to the one I have offered.

The dependent variable

Data on the timing of Russia's governors' decisions to join UR were collected by the author from the United Russia website and online news sources. United Russia publicises the accession of high-ranking officials to the party, so most governors' entry into the party is documented on the site. The data are monthly, stretching from March 2003 until November 2007 and are coded 1 if the governor is officially a member of United Russia and 0 if not.[25] With data missing on six governors, this amounts to 121

[25]The official founding of United Russia took place in December 2001, with the transformation of the *Obsherossiiskoe obshestvennoe organizatsiya 'Soyuz-Edinstvo i Otechestvo'* (All Russian social organisation 'Union-Unity and Fatherland') into the *Vserossiiskaya Politicheskaya Partiya* '*Edinstvo i Otechestvo–Edinaya Rossiya*' (All-Russian Political Party 'Unity and Fatherland–United Russia'). The party then changed its name to United Russia in September 2003. Data on party affiliation date back to 2001, but only five governors were in any way affiliated to the party prior to March 2003 and some of these governors appeared not to be actual party members until some time later. Thus, the analyses in this article begin in March 2003. All models were also run using data stretching back to December 2001 with the same results.

governors serving at some time during this period. These data provide information on the month in which each of Russia's governors joined UR and are shown in full in the Appendix.

I code a governor as joining the party when he or she formally accepts a party card as a fully fledged member (*chlen partii*). I do not count the following as indicators of membership (unless, of course they are accompanied by formal party membership): heading the United Russia party list in regional or federal elections; accepting the party's support in gubernatorial elections; or professing support for UR candidates in elections. Also, I do not count party supporters (*storonniki*) as members. Becoming a *storonnik* requires little in the way of verification or vetting. Membership in the party, on the other hand, requires the member to abdicate membership of other political parties. Governors sometimes are awarded membership in the party by the regional Political Council (*politsovet*), though in certain cases they are awarded membership at meetings of the Presidium of the General Council.

Party membership is clearly a more credible signal of commitment than the other signs of support listed above. Joining the party requires the governor to give up other party affiliations. Entry into the party is widely reported in the news media, making it difficult for the governor to deny his membership. Other possible indicators permit governors too much leeway in making provisional commitments. In the 1990s, governors frequently supported more than one party or accepted the support of several parties in elections. Party membership, thus, represents a conscious decision to signal one's commitment that goes above and beyond other indicators of party support. In itself, the act of joining the party is not likely to incur heavy costs, aside from the public signal it sends, but it is the most practical proxy for other costly commitments that are likely to accompany membership such as only supporting party candidates in elections and relinquishing partial control over the nomination of personnel and candidates. There may be more valid indicators of commitment to the party that could be gleaned from detailed case studies, but party membership is the most reliable measure that is also sufficiently valid.

A particularly difficult hurdle in deciding whether a governor is a member of United Russia is presented by the Higher Council (*Vyshii Sovet*). Before 2005, governors were prohibited by law from belonging to any political party, though press reports and the party's own website report that dozens of governors nonetheless became members (*chleny*) of the party in 2003 and 2004. United Russia leaders created the Higher Council as a parallel advisory council where governors could sit without being party members (Slider 2006). Only in November 2005, at the Fifth Party Congress, did United Russia leaders amend the party charter to stipulate that all newly initiated members of the Higher Council be party members. This Higher Council is separate from the central decision-making structures of the party, the General Council and its Presidium, and there are no provisions in the party's charter for when it should meet. Sources close to the party confirm that the Higher Council is not 'a governing body' (Ivanov 2008, p. 81). As one high ranking party official put it to me, 'membership of the Higher Council is more an honour than a privilege'.[26] The problem is that some governors chose to join the Higher Council and only later chose to formally join the

[26]Author's interview with United Russia Party Advisor, Moscow, 8 July 2009.

party, while others joined the Higher Council and, to the best of my knowledge, never formally joined the party.[27] This problem is made even more acute by those governors who joined the Higher Council (but not the party) only to flout party discipline subsequently. For example, Kemerovo Governor Aman Tuleev was a member of the party's Higher Council (but not a party member) in 2003 and on United Russia's *Duma* party list, but he ran his own list of candidates, *Sluzhu Kuzbassu* ('I Serve the Kuzbass') in the *Oblast'* regional election of the same year (Slider 2006). By the time regional elections were held again in October 2008, however, Tuleev had become a party member and threw his full support behind the United Russia list, helping it secure 35 out of 36 seats in the regional assembly.

For the reasons above, I do not count joining the Higher Council as joining the party unless a governor joined the Higher Council after November 2005 (when the party charter was amended to require party membership for Higher Council members). Sixteen governors joined the Higher Council before being party members (mostly in 2003). Four governors later joined the party formally, so I code them as joining on the date they accepted their party card. For the other 12, I code them as joining the party when they are first documented as serving on the party's Political Council in their region. According to the party's charter, party membership is required to serve on the council and it is the leading decision-making body in the regional branch. Almost all United Russia governors hold posts in the regional Political Council since that is the primary political organ of the party in the regions. Official membership in this organ indicates a clear signal of commitment to party activities and association with the party. To ensure the robustness of my results, I also report results where governors who join the Higher Council are coded as party members from that time.

One further difficulty with the coding rules mentioned above is that the three governors who, as noted above, were instrumental in the party's founding, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev and Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov, appear to have never formally accepted formal party nomination, though they have been members of the party Higher Council since the beginning. (Shaimiyev and Luzhkov have also been members of the Bureau of the Higher Council since the beginning.) More significantly, none of these three figures serve on the United Russia's Political Council (*politsovet*) in their region. Instead, their role in the party appears more akin to the symbolic leadership post that Prime Minister Putin enjoys than it does to the leading cadre positions that most governors occupy. One way to approach this problem is to code these governors as never joining the party, but this would seem to bias against their role in the party. Alternatively, coding them as joining from the beginning denies the 'arms-length' relationship they appear to have developed with the party by not participating in regional leadership organs and denying themselves the title 'party member'.[28] Thus, in the baseline

[27]For example, Orel Governor Yegor Stroyev joined the party's Higher Council in March 2003, but then received his party membership card in November 2005. 'Egor Stroyev zavyazal s bespartiinost'yu', *Kommersant*, Voronezh, 26 November 2005, available at: http://www.ancentr.ru/data/media/arch_media_1948.html, accessed 20 November 2007.

[28]For another example, see 'Edinaya Rossiya potrebuyet obysnenii ot Rakhimova', *Kommersant*, 5 June 2009.

models, I omit these governors from analysis. For robustness I also present several other models that code these three governors as joining when they joined the Higher Council and in November 2005 when the party charter was amended to require party membership for all Higher Council members. I also present results categorising these governors as never joining the party. As we will see, these changes have only a minor effect on one substantive variable, length of tenure in office, for which these governors are significant outliers.

Independent variables: the governors' resources

The primary hypothesis tested in this article is that governors with significant stores of autonomous resources will postpone joining the party. The resources that matter for this analysis are those that allowed governors to leverage their personal political machines and clientelist networks against inducements to join the party of power. Those with such resources were able to demonstrate to the Kremlin that they were indispensable. If the Kremlin wished to govern a particular region cost-effectively, they would need to deal with that governor. Indeed, the very act of appropriating a governor's political machine by means of repression is costly, and so the Kremlin had an interest in co-opting and using these governors. But those governors who were very strong in resources could not credibly commit to the party because the benefits of maintaining their own autonomous political machines outweighed the benefits of linking their fates to the centre. Thus, the Kremlin opted to negotiate with them bilaterally. I divide the resources that governors have at their disposal into several categories: inherited political resources, economic resources, administrative and geographical resources, and ethnic resources.

Inherited political resources

In an extensive study of the determinants of governors' political machines in the 1990s, Henry Hale (2003) shows how the legacies of the transition gave governors the ability to build strong political machines. One direct way to measure this is with the governor's length of tenure in office. Thus, governors who have enjoyed longer tenures in office are likely to have had the time to develop strong political machines and extensive clientelist networks and will be more likely to postpone joining United Russia. This variable, called *Tenure*, is the number of years that a governor has been in office. Similarly, large electoral mandates may be both the cause and consequence of strong political machines, so the margin of the governor's most recent electoral victory is included. This variable is called *ElectoralMargin*.

Another inherited political factor that I include as a control variable, but do not expect to have an effect on governors' decisions to join UR, is population. While larger regions may have more bargaining capacity, largely because they have more representatives in the State *Duma*, it is difficult to see how this could translate into the governor's ability to build a political machine that would make him or her indispensable (Suderland 2005). It is also possible that larger subjects could threaten secession or withhold tax transfers, but for the period under analysis, decreased uncertainty and increased central state capacity make these threats non-credible, so it

is not clear how governors in larger regions would have inherently more resources to leverage against party affiliation.

Economic resources

Governors in post-Soviet Russia have been able to draw upon the economic resources in their region to pursue political gain. The ability to exert influence and distribute patronage has depended heavily on their ability to control regional economies. Henry Hale (2003) has argued that the complexity of a region's economy translates into the strength of the governor's political machine. Single-industry or 'single company' regions are likely to generate strong competition between the governor and that enterprise or sector, but since the region is dependent on that enterprise or sector, governors have neither the incentive nor the resources to subdue their economic opponent. When the economy is diversified, on the other hand, governors could more effectively exploit collective action problems among economic actors and had both motive and opportunity to create complex clientelist networks that relied on divide and rule tactics. Diversified economies place the governor in a strong position to mediate interests and play kingmaker. On the other hand, concentrated economies give the governor few resources with which to oppose a unified elite, thereby weakening his machine.

A second reason that diversified economies translate into a resource for governors has to do with the expropriability of those resources. Greene (2007) argues that levels of party dominance depend largely on the state's control of the economy. When mobile, inexpropriable assets fuel a region's economy, the Kremlin's threat of taxation and predation is less credible. Therefore, governors in these regions will be less likely to relinquish autonomy over those rent flows and link their fates to the Kremlin's party. Highly concentrated economies are more likely to be built on immobile assets from resource extraction or heavy manufacturing.[29] Single-sector regions are thus more vulnerable to taxation and control and the governor's political machine is vulnerable from the bottom up. The more complex the regional economy, the more complex the political machine of the governor and the more costly it would be for the Kremlin to govern a region cost-effectively without keeping the machine intact. Governors who preside over diversified regional economies are thus more likely to leverage this resource against party affiliation.

To measure the concentration of the economy, I employ several variables. The first, *IndustrialConcentration*, is a Herfindahl index of the proportion of GRP (Gross Regional Product) comprised by the main industrial and extractive sectors of the economy in 2005.[30] This index measures the extent to which a region's economy is diversified across multiple sectors, and ranges from 0 to 1, with larger values indicating greater concentration and lower values indicating more diversification. Governors in

[29]For a comparable use of economic diversification measures as a proxy for asset mobility, see Boix (2003).

[30]$IndustryConcentration = \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2$, where s is the share of regional GDP comprised by the ith industrial sector. This was calculated from data in Federalnaya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennyi Statistiki (2007). All economic variables are gleaned from the *Region Rossii* volumes.

regions with concentrated economies should join United Russia earlier. To ease interpretation, this variable is rescaled to range between 0 and 100.

The taxability of enterprises in a region is a function of size, ownership structure and sector. Less taxable economic assets in a region are likely to constitute autonomous economic resources that governors can leverage against relinquishing their autonomy to the party. The service sector is less taxable than the manufacturing sector so I include a variable, *ServicesShare*, that is the percent of regional GDP accounted for by the services sector. Governors in regions with large service sectors should postpone joining United Russia for longer. Firms operating in the export sector are also more difficult to tax (Gehlbach 2006), so I include *ExportShare* which measures non-CIS exports as a share of GDP in 2005. One way to measure the ownership structure of the regional economy is to compute the share of enterprises in a region that are state-owned. Unfortunately, *Goskomstat* data do not discriminate between federally and regionally owned state enterprises. While both are probably easily taxed, regionally owned enterprises may contribute to the strength of the governor's political machine, and thus expectations about this variable are ambiguous.

Two further economic variables are included. First, GRP per capita is included, *GRPCap*. This variable is scaled in thousands of rubles. Hale (2000) finds that, during the transition, wealthy regions were more likely to make declarations of sovereignty because, as he argues, they have more to lose from exploitation by other regions and are presumably more viable as separate states. This is no doubt true, but as noted in my discussion of a region's population size, the analysis at hand assumes that threats of secession were not credible by 2003–2007, so it becomes more difficult to envision a relationship between wealth and a governor's machine. Finally, I include the share of a region's budget revenues comprised by federal subventions, *FederalTransfers*. Presumably, governors in regions that are more 'dependent' on the centre should be more inclined to join United Russia. However, there are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, *FederalTransfers* is, in large part, a simple proxy for GRP per capita and governors in wealthy regions may not be any more or less inclined to join UR than those in poor regions. Second, as Daniel Treisman (1999) has shown, much of the remaining variance in the share of a region's revenue provided by federal transfers is explained by the centre's attempts to use those subventions to buy support in oppositional regions. As we will see below, this makes it quite likely that this variable will be highly collinear with other important variables in the analysis.

Ethnic resources

Soviet nationalities policy codified ethnic diversity in the form of state-administrative divisions. During the transition and early 1990s, Russia's ethnic republics were among the leaders in making declarations of sovereignty and securing writs of autonomous authority. Throughout the 1990s, these leaders leveraged their ability to mobilise nationalist or ethnic opposition in order to accrue greater autonomy from the centre and build strong political machines. Moreover, the 'ethnic minority social networks' inherited from the Soviet federal system and bolstered during the

transition provided a ready-made basis for strong political machines (Hale 1999, 2000); and most importantly for this analysis, with the disappearance of the CPSU, the organisation of these networks became highly personalised and informally complex, making the governors who headed ethnic regions more indispensable and less likely to join UR.

I employ several indicators of political ethnicity. The first is the percent of a region's population that is ethnically Russian, *PctRussian*. Since Muslim regions exhibited more separatist activism in the 1990s and were more likely than regions with Buddhist, Christian or Shamanist populations to be headed by members of the titular ethnic group, I include a dummy variable for Muslim ethnic republics, *Muslim*.

Geographical and administrative resources

Russian rulers since Peter the Great have invested enormous energy into controlling their vassals across the country's expansive territory. This continues to be true. As a legislator in Nenets Autonomous *Okrug* said about federal proposals to reform local election rules in October 2008, 'we are located in the far north. It takes a long time for the Federal winds of change to blow our way'.[31] Governors in far-flung regions may be less likely to join United Russia, so I include each region's logged distance from Moscow, *Distance*. Second, republics may have accrued the administrative capacity in the 1990s to resist federal incursions and governors in these regions may postpone joining UR for longer. So I include a dummy variable, *Republic*, coded 1 if a region is a republic and 0 if not.

Controls

I also include a set of controls. First, to control for factors that may make the region's population more ideologically disposed to United Russia and, therefore, give the governor some impetus to join the party in order to please his former constituents, I include the share of the vote received by Unity in 1999, *UnityVote*. I use Unity's vote share in 1999 as opposed to the UR vote share in 2003 or 2007, in order to ensure that the vote share is not endogenous to the governor's dominant party affiliation. Second, a casual look at the raw data reveals that KPRF governors waited longer to join United Russia. One could be inclined to count this as a resource, but I list it here as a control. KPRF governors postponed joining the party for longer, and I include a dummy variable, *KPRFGovernor,* coded 1 if the governor is or was a member of the KPRF. Lastly, I include a region's unemployment rate in 2003, *Unemp*.

I also include a variable to test for the 'bandwagoning' process noted above. As more elites join the party, the opportunity costs of remaining outside the party for intra-party vote trading could become higher. *NumberGovsJoined* is simply a count of the number of governors that have joined the party at time *t*. To test whether this hypothesis exhibits a tipping dynamic, such that the impact of the 41st governor joining on the propensity of other governors joining is higher than the marginal impact

[31]'Edinuyu Rossiyu ogradili bar'erom', *Kommersant*, 12 November 2008.

of the 8th governor joining, we will want to square this term (without its constituent linear term if we expect the relationship to be monotonic, as we do). Note however that the two-sided nature of the commitment problem prevents the party from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy; that is, the centre's reluctance to commit to a party that it cannot control or trust prevents the party from growing without bound as more elites join. If governors join the party purely because they observe their peers joining, while the distribution of resources between centre and elites remains fixed, then the Kremlin runs the risk of channelling resources to an increasing number of elites that can challenge the Kremlin.

Finally, I included a temporal dummy variable, *CancelGubernatorialElections*, that captures the September 2004 decision to cancel gubernatorial elections. This variable is coded 1 in September, October and November 2004.

Statistical method

This study examines the relationship between resource endowments and the timing of Russian governors' decisions to join UR. Event history models are ideally suited to analyse data of this nature.[32] These models take as their dependent variable the amount of time that some object is in a state before it experiences some event. In these data, joining United Russia is the event. Much has been written about these models and they are now common in applied political science, so I will not discuss their technical details here (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004).

One of the most divisive issues in event history analysis is the choice of how to characterise the nature of the baseline hazard rate.[33] Political methodologists have rightly warned that the underlying nature of the hazard rate is highly sensitive to included (and omitted) covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). Without strong theory to guide assumptions about the true underlying hazard (and the full range of appropriate covariates), they argue for semi-parametric approaches, such as the Cox proportional hazards model,[34] which make no assumptions about the shape of the underlying hazard rate. A pitfall of the Cox model, however, lies in how semi-parametric models use the information contained in the data. Semi-parametric models compare subjects at risk to other subjects that are still at risk (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). For this reason, semi-parametric models require a great deal of data points with which to compare subjects at risk. When subjects experience the event, their information is lost as a reference point for other subjects still at risk.

[32]An OLS model of the amount of time it takes for a governor to join United Russia would be sub-optimal because of its inability to account for right censoring. An example of a right censored observation in these data is one in which a governor leaves office without joining United Russia. This occurs frequently in the data. The governor should not be coded as joining the party when he leaves office, nor should we omit these cases from the analysis. Event history models account for right censoring by allowing the subject to contribute information only up to the known censoring point (in this case when a governor leaves office).

[33]The hazard rate is the rate at which subjects end at time t, given that they have survived until time t. The baseline hazard rate is that which is not directly modelled by covariates included in the model.

[34]The Cox proportional hazards model is a form of survival analysis.

Such comparative estimates are not necessary for parametric models. Parametric models estimate probabilities of what occurs to the subject given what is known about the subject (the covariates) during its time at risk (Cleves *et al*. 2004). In short, less data are required for a well-specified parametric model to produce efficient estimates. Parametric models can produce more precise estimates of covariate effects when the underlying hazard rate is specified correctly (Collett 1994; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, p. 21).

Given the small size of the dataset used here, I employ a parametric Weibull which assumes a monotonically increasing or decreasing (or flat) baseline hazard.[35] The Akaike information criterion, based on the log-likelihood and the number of parameters in the model, was used to rule out other parametric models that allow for non-monotonic hazards.[36] The results of these tests showed the Weibull to best fit the data.[37]

Results and discussion

The results of the models are shown in Table 1. The full model with controls is in the first column. The reduced model, shown in the second column, excludes non-significant controls and non-significant substantive variables that are inducing severe collinearity. The substantive quantities of interest discussed below are taken from this model. The results show hazard ratios and their standard errors.[38] Models 3, 4 and 5 are robustness checks using the variables in Model 2 to check the robustness of results across different codings of the dependent variable introduced above and discussed in further detail below.

Inherited political resources

In the model with all variables and controls, we see that *Tenure* and *ElectoralMargin* have the expected effect, though only *Tenure* is statistically significant. In the reduced model, both are significant. The size of the effects is substantial. To make this hazard ratio more interpretable, we may consider that the change in the hazard of a governor joining UR is as his margin of victory in the most recent election goes from the 25th percentile in the data (12% margin) to the 75th percentile (58% margin). The probability that this governor joins United Russia in any given month would decrease by 52% relative to the baseline hazard. For *Tenure*, a governor that has been in office

[35]Parametric survival models are a form of survival model that makes assumptions about the underlying nature of time dependency.

[36]The Akaike Information Criterion is a standard measure of goodness of fit used in survival models.

[37]Cox models reveal similar results for all models, though, for the reasons discussed here, the standard errors are larger for some variables.

[38]Hazard ratios provide an easily interpretable exposition of event history results. Hazard ratios should be interpreted relative to a baseline of 1, such that a hazard ratio of 1 means that the particular variable has no effect on the likelihood a governor joins. A hazard ratio of 2 means that a one unit change in the variable doubles the baseline probability that a governor will join the party in a given month. A hazard ratio of 0.75 indicates that a one unit change in the variable decreases the hazard of a governor joining by 25%.

TABLE 1
EFFECT OF GOVERNOR'S RESOURCES ON PROPENSITY TO JOIN UNITED RUSSIA

	Coefficients				
Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Inherited political resources					
Tenure	0.915**	0.939*	0.958	0.939*	0.962
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.031)
ElectoralMargin	0.992	0.987**	0.992*	0.987**	0.989**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Population in Region	1.000				
	(0.000)				
Economic resources					
FederalTransfers	0.547				
	(0.566)				
ServicesShare	0.206				
	(0.393)				
ExportShare	0.945				
	(0.067)				
IndustrialConcentration	1.049**	1.054**	1.042**	1.054**	1.046**
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
GRP/Capita	0.997	0.997*	0.998	0.997*	0.998
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ethnic resources					
PctRussian	1.029*	1.027**	1.022**	1.027**	1.022**
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
MuslimRegion	0.529				
	(0.439)				
Territorial resources					
Distance	0.886				
	(0.104)				
Republic	1.221				
	(0.676)				
Dynamics and Kremlin signals					
NumberGovsJoined	1.050**	1.048**	1.046**	1.047**	1.049**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
CancelGubernatorialElections	2.732**	2.832**	2.368**	2.790**	2.718**
	(0.845)	(0.869)	(0.722)	(0.857)	(0.831)
Controls					
KPRFGovernor	0.250**	0.292**	0.288**	0.293**	0.270**
	(0.134)	(0.153)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.141)
UnityVote	1.026	1.025**	1.012	1.025**	1.017
	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Unemployment	1.045*				
	(0.027)				
Shape parameter *P*	0.729	0.770	0.550	0.776	0.765
	(0.179)	(0.184)	(0.104)	(0.186)	(0.184)
Log likelihood	−61.560	−66.403	−102.739	−66.222	−67.365
Number of subjects	117	118	118	118	118
Failures	82	83	88	83	86
Time at risk	2,665	2,684	2,332	2,687	2,615

Notes: Entries are hazard ratios with standard errors in parentheses.
**$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

for eight years (the 75th percentile in the data) is 42% less likely to join in any given month than a governor who has been in office for one year (the 25th percentile). This difference is depicted in Figure 2 which shows differences in the hazard rates (the



FIGURE 2. EFFECTS OF KEY VARIABLES ON GOVERNORS' HAZARD OF JOINING UNITED RUSSIA

propensity of a governor to join) for governors at the 25th and 75th percentiles of the given independent variable.

Economic resources

Few of the variables measuring economic resources are significant with the notable exception of *IndustrialConcentration*. In such a small dataset, collinearity plagues the inclusion of these variables but *IndustrialConcentration* stands out. In fact, the effect of *IndustrialConcentration* is large, robust and in the expected direction. Governors in regions with diversified economies are less likely to join the party early. This is a key finding. Recalling that *IndustrialConcentration* is rescaled to range between 0 and 100, Figure 2 shows the difference in the hazards of joining for two levels of industrial concentration. These two illustrative levels were chosen to be roughly equivalent to the 25th and 75th percentile of *IndustrialConcentration*, though for clarity's sake I chose to make examples of two well-known regions: Chelyabinsk, with its heavy dependence on steel production and related heavy industry has a more concentrated economy than Irkutsk, with its well developed light and heavy manufacturing sectors as well as raw material extraction and processing.

ServicesShare has the predicted effect, such that in regions with large service sectors governors are likely to postpone joining, but this effect is not statistically significant. *Exportshare* also has the predicted effect, but it is statistically insignificant. *FederalTransfers* appears to have no demonstrable effect. *GRP/capita* is close to

significance in Model 1 and attains significance in some later models, such that governors from wealthy regions were more likely to postpone joining, though the substantive magnitude of the effect is quite small.

Ethnic resources

Governors of ethnic regions appear to be more likely to postpone joining the party. *PctRussian* and *Muslim* are highly collinear, however, and either of the variables on its own is significant, but likelihood ratio tests confirm a better model fit when only *PctRussian* is included. A single percentage increase in the proportion of a region's population that is ethnically Russian increases the hazard of a governor joining by over 2%, a significant result.

Geographical and administrative resources

Distance is in the expected direction, such that governors in far-flung regions are more likely to postpone joining, though this effect appears insignificant. Also, when one controls for the ethnic resources outlined above, republican administrative status has no independent effect on the propensity of governors to join United Russia. *Republic* is highly collinear with *PctRussian* but AIC tests suggest that the model with *PctRussian* is the better fit.

Controls

As expected, former KPRF governors have a lower hazard of joining. They are less likely to join UR early. The effect is substantial. A former communist governor is 73% less likely to join in any given month than a non-communist governor. In addition, the higher the percentage of the vote received by Unity in the 1999 *Duma* elections in the region, the more likely the governor is to join United Russia early. One may wonder whether other party affiliations may have influenced decisions to join United Russia. Table 2 presents the results of an analysis that shows the effects of prior party affiliation on a governor's propensity to join United Russia.[39]

As Table 2 shows, KPRF affiliation has by far the largest deterrent effect. Governors affiliated with the other blocs that existed in 1999 were not significantly different from each other in their United Russia affiliation patterns, with the possible exception of All-Russia governors. Perhaps counter-intuitively, former CPSU members were less likely to join United Russia. This suggests the professional norms and cultures cultivated while in the CPSU may not have been a driving force in deciding whether to affiliate with United Russia. The reluctance of CPSU members to join is likely to be explained by the fact that in 2003, governors who were CPSU

[39]Data on the CPSU membership of governors were collected by the author from official biographies. Data on the party affiliation of Russia's governors were taken from a report compiled by the East West Institute in October 1999. 'A List: The Political Affiliation of Russia's Governors', *Russian Regional Report*, 4, 37, 7 October 1999. The baseline category is the unaffiliated governor.

TABLE 2
PRIOR PARTY AFFILIATION AND UNITED RUSSIA MEMBERSHIP

Variables	*Coefficients*	*Standard errors*
CPSU Membership	0.498**	(0.114)
Our Home affiliated	1.612	(0.944)
Unity affiliated	0.801	(0.375)
All-Russia affiliated	0.459*	(0.214)
Fatherland affiliated	0.980	(0.511)
SPS/Golos affiliated	1.154	(0.840)
KPRF member	0.276**	(0.144)
Number of governors joined	1.030**	(0.009)
Shape parameter *P*	0.945	(0.203)
Log likelihood	−88.396	
Number of subjects	118	
Number of failures	83	
Time at risk	2,682	

Notes: Entries are hazard ratios with standard errors in parentheses.
**$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

members were also more likely to be older and have had a longer professional career in the region.[40] This may have given them more material for their political machines.

NumberGovsJoined is significant in its linear form. In analyses not shown here I also tried the square term, with and without the linear term, to test for tipping dynamics, but this does not improve model fit. This result must be treated with caution, however. The number of governors joining the party is almost perfectly collinear with time and with the baseline hazard as it turns out. In the models shown here, the shape parameter *p* is less than one, indicating a declining baseline hazard of party affiliation. However, if one removes *NumberGovsJoined* from the analysis this shape parameter indicates a steeply increasing baseline hazard. If it is true that the resources of the Kremlin increase monotonically across time, as I argue, then this result is unproblematic and we are free to conclude that there is no contagious process in which governors use the behaviour of other governors in deciding whether or not to join. If, on the other hand, the resources of the Kremlin are unchanged across time then the entire baseline hazard could be determined by peer membership dynamics. Without more data we cannot adjudicate among these two alternatives.

Lastly, governors were more likely to join in the wake of the Kremlin's decision to cancel gubernatorial elections in the autumn of 2004. That more governors joined after Putin cancelled direct gubernatorial elections is not surprising, but what may be surprising in the light of conventional wisdom is that not all governors joined at this point. In fact, the enduring significance of other variables is testament to the fact that many governors still commanded significant autonomy and bargaining leverage *vis-à-vis* the Kremlin even after 2004.

[40]Controlling for the *Tenure* in this analysis does significantly reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on *CPSU Membership*, but *CPSU Membership* remains significant, probably due to age and time in politics.

Robustness checks

Model 3 presents the results of models when the 16 governors who joined the Higher Council prior to joining the party are coded as joining the party from the date on which they joined the Higher Council. Model 4 uses the same rules for coding party membership applied in the baseline model, but adheres to a strict interpretation of those rules by coding Shaimiyev, Luzhkov and Rakhimov as never joining the party. Model 5 codes these three governors as joining the party in November 2005, when the party changed its charter to require party membership for Higher Council members. The results on the controls, *IndustrialConcentration, Electoral Margin* and *PctRussian* remain robust across these specifications. Only the statistical significance of *Tenure* appears to dip slightly below statistical significance. This is understandable given that these three governors are significant outliers for their length of tenure in office.

Summary discussion

In sum, the main empirical findings are as follows. First, governors in regions with more concentrated economies were significantly more likely to join United Russia early. This effect is robust. Governors who presided over diversified regional economies are more likely to be in control of complex patronage machines that could be deployed as an autonomous political resource and leveraged against dominant party affiliation. Second, long-serving governors, and those who have dominated elections in their regions, were more hesitant to join the party. Long-serving governors were more likely to have deep roots in their regions, and governors who won large election victories, often had predominant personal control over levers of political influence in the region. Both of these factors were resources that permitted governors to postpone joining the party. Third, leaders of ethnic regions were also more likely to postpone joining the party. These leaders sat atop ethnically based clientelist networks that often provided the governor with important political resources. Fourth, and not unsurprisingly, KPRF governors did not rush to join the party.

These results provide evidence for the proposition that governors with autonomous resources were less likely to join United Russia. The Kremlin was unable to force certain governors to join the party, at least not at first. These governors controlled political machines that could ensure their survival without linking their fates to the centre. These findings demonstrate that elites have interests in retaining their own autonomy and act on those interests. This indicates that dominant parties will not emerge when elites have autonomous political resources that give them incentives to eschew commitment to the party.

Conclusion

Dominant party regimes are the modal regime type among today's authoritarian regimes, yet little work has been done to uncover why dominant parties form in the first place. If dominant parties do contribute to regime durability as much existing

literature suggests (Geddes 1999a; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008), then it is worth considering how these parties reach equilibrium in the first place. Where existing accounts of dominant party formation have placed the emphasis on the incentives of leaders to form dominant parties, it is also necessary to consider the incentives of elites to commit to a dominant party. When elites, as a group, are too strong in resources to commit to the party, a leader is unlikely to invest resources in a party. A corollary of this is that when elites must be co-opted in some way, individual elite members with significant stores of autonomous political resources will be the most unwilling to commit to the party.

Using data on the timing of Russia's governors' decisions to join Russia's new dominant party, United Russia, this article examined this hypothesis. Russia's governors were not forced to join United Russia instantaneously. Instead they joined incrementally over a period of five years. As the Kremlin became stronger *vis-à-vis* the regions in the early to mid-2000s, more governors opted to join the party. The first to join were those weak in resources, while those with access to significant political resources that could be leveraged against dominant party affiliation postponed joining. In particular, those who governed complex regional economies, had secured large electoral mandates, were long-serving or presided over ethnic regions, were less likely to join the party early. The results of this analysis indicate that governors with more autonomous bases for building political machines and controlling political resources were more likely to postpone joining the party. By showing that elite entry into a dominant party is dependent on the resources under those elites' control, these results provide corroborating evidence for the broader theory of dominant party formation that privileges the incentives of elites to commit to a dominant party.

These results also have important implications for Russian politics. The Kremlin's desire to build a dominant party was a function of calculations about the extent to which elite commitment could be secured. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it had no faith in the ability of elites to commit, while by the mid-2000s, it could be more certain that elites could commit. The Kremlin used carrots and sticks to induce gubernatorial affiliation. The carrots were necessary because Russia's regional elites still wielded vast sums of political capital that needed to be co-opted if the Kremlin hoped to govern the regions cost-effectively. During this period, carrots were channelled primarily through United Russia in the form of seats in legislatures, national project money and policy goods. Simultaneously, as I discuss above in the section 'United Russia as a dominant party', the Kremlin incrementally increased the institutional standing of United Russia, delegating it more authority and influence. Thus, governors were given access to party-governed spoils and the institutional mechanisms of the party reduced uncertainty over the provision of those spoils. Institutional rights granted to the party expanded in step with the commitments made by elites as the strategic commitment game unfolded.

Putin needs the co-operation of Russia's elites just as those elites need his personal and political resources to maintain their careers. He is their creature as much as they are his. Putin's power is such that he can eliminate any one elite actor, but it is not sufficient to fully undermine the system of political control that regional elites command. So while fraud, repression, coercion and patronage are indeed tools that the regime employs to maintain control, elite cohesion is an

intermediate factor that makes authoritarian rule possible. The ruling strategy of Russia's new authoritarian regime depends upon maintaining this elite cohesion so that opposition forces cannot field credible candidates. Once this is achieved, securing high turnout is the only remaining task. Voters need not be swayed by patronage or intimidated by force. And while the resources—personal, symbolic, economic and structural—that permit Putin and the Kremlin to abuse political office are important, they are primarily important as mechanisms that change the balance of power between the Kremlin and other elites, thereby facilitating elite cohesion. Since elite cohesion is predicated, in large part on the concessions, control and autonomy that the Kremlin grants to the party, Russia's authoritarian system is significantly more institutionalised than often depicted.

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Appendix

TABLE A1
MONTH IN WHICH RUSSIA'S GOVERNORS JOINED UNITED RUSSIA

Region	*Governor*	*Term ended*[a]	*Joined UR*[b]
Adygea	Sovmen	11/06	10/04
Adygea	Tkakushinov		12/06
Agin-Buryatiya	Zhamsuyev		N/A
Altai Republic	Lapshin	11/05	–
Altai Republic	Berdynkov		05/07
Altai *Krai*	Surikov	02/04	–
Altai *Krai*	Evdokimov	07/05	–
Altai *Krai*	Karlin		06/07
Amur *Oblast'*	Korotkov	05/07	02/06
Amur *Oblast'*	Kolesov		06/07
Arkhangelsk	Efremov	05/04	–
Archangelsk	Kiselev		06/04
Astrakhan	Guzhvin	11/04	07/03
Astrakhan	Zhilkin		12/04
Bashkortostan	Rakhimov		03/03
Belgorod	Savchenko		10/07
Bryansk	Lodkin	12/04	–
Bryansk	Denin		01/05
Buryatiya	Potapov	05/07	–
Buryatiya	Nagovitsyn		06/07
Chechnya	Kadyrov	05/04	N/A
Chechnya	Alkhanov	02/07	N/A
Chechnya	Kadyrov		N/A
Chelyabinsk	Sumin		11/04
Chita	Gennyatulin		–
Chukotka	Abramovich		–
Chuvashiya	Fedorov		10/06
Dagestan	Magommedov	01/06	–
Dagestan	Aliev		–
Evenki	Zoltarev		09/04
Ingushetiya	Zyazikov		07/06
Irkutsk	Govorin	07/05	–
Irkutsk	Tishanin		07/06
Ivanovo	Tikhonov	10/05	–
Ivanovo	Men'		11/05
Evreiskaya *AO*	Volkov		12/06
Kabardino Balkaria	Kokov	08/05	–
Kabardino Balkaria	Kanokov		09/05
Kaliningrad	Egorov	08/05	
Kaliningrad	Boos		09/05
Kalmykia	Ilyumzhinov		11/04
Kaluga	Artamanov		10/05
Kamchatka	Mashkhovstev	04/07	–
Kamchatka	Kuzmitskii		07/07
Karachaevo-Cherkassiya	Batdyev		–
Karelia	Katanandov		12/04
Kemerovo	Tuleev		11/05
Khabarovsk	Ishaev		06/03
Khakassiya	Lebed		03/05
Khanty-Mansiisk	Fillipenko		09/03

(*continued*)

TABLE A1
(*Continued*)

Region	*Governor*	*Term ended*[a]	*Joined UR*[b]
Kirov	Shaklein		08/05
Komi	Torpolov		12/04
Komi-Permyatsk	Savelyev		N/A
Koryak	Loginov		06/04
Kostroma	Shershunov		02/07
Krasnodar	Tkachev		04/05
Krasnoyarsk	Khloponin		03/03
Kurgan	Bogomolov		11/04
Kursk	Mikhailov		02/05
Leningrad	Serdyukov		11/05
Lipetsk	Korolev		11/05
Magadan	Dudov		03/03
Mari El	Markelov		02/07
Mordoviya	Merkushkin		05/04
Moscow City	Luzhkov		03/03
Moscow *Oblast'*	Gromov		11/05
Murmansk	Evdokimov		03/06
Nenetsk *AO*	Butov	01/05	N/A
Nenetsk *AO*	Barev	05/06	01/05
Nenetsk *AO*	Potapenko		06/06
Nizhnii Novgorod	Khodyrev	07/05	–
Nizhnii Novgorod	Shantsev		08/05
North Ossetia	Dzhasokov	04/05	
North Ossetia	Mamsurov		05/05
Novgorod	Prusak	05/07	02/05
Novgorod	Mitin		06/07
Novosibirsk	Tolokonskii		10/05
Omsk	Polezhaev		06/04
Orel	Stroiev		11/05
Orenburg	Chernyshev		05/06
Penza	Bochkarev		05/05
Perm	Trutnev	09/05	–
Perm	Chirkunov		–
Primoriya	Darkin		11/04
Pskov	Mikhailov	12/04	–
Pskov	Kuznetsov		11/05
Ryazan	Lyubimov	02/04	–
Ryazan	Shpak		11/05
Rostov	Chub		06/05
Sakha-Yakutiya	Shtyrov		07/06
Sakhalin	Farkhutdinov	11/03	
Sakhalin	Malakhov		03/05
Samara	Titov	10/07	11/05
Samara	Artyakov		10/07
Saratov	Ayatskov	02/05	09/03
Saratov	Ipatov		03/05
Smolensk	Maslov		06/05
St Petersburg	Matvienko		–
Stavropol	Chernogorov		12/06
Sverdlovsk	Rossel		10/04
Taimyr	Budargin		03/06
Tambov	Betin		03/03
Tatarstan	Shaimiev		03/03
Tyumen	Sobyanin	10/05	05/03

(*continued*)

TABLE A1
(*Continued*)

Region	*Governor*	*Term ended*[a]	*Joined UR*[b]
Tyumen	Yakushev		11/05
Tomsk	Kress		05/04
Tula	Starodubstev	03/05	–
Tula	Dudka		05/07
Tuva	Oorzhak	03/07	02/05
Tuva	Sholban		04/07
Tver	Platov	12/03	–
Tver	Zelenin		01/04
Udmurtiya	Volkov		N/A
Ulyanovsk	Shamanov	11/04	–
Ulyanovsk	Morozov		12/04
Ust-Ordynskii *AO*	Maleev		03/03
Vladimir	Vinogradov		–
Volgograd	Maksyuta		–
Vologda	Pozgalev		10/04
Voronezh	Kulakov		10/04
Yamalo-Nenets	Neelov		12/06
Yaroslavl	Lysytsin		03/03

Notes: [a]This field is blank for those governors whose term ended after November 2007, when this analysis stops or, for several Autonomous *Okrugs*, when the region ceases to exist.

[b]N/A = missing. Chechnya is N/A even though Kadyrov is a party member. Chechnya is excluded due to the violence and instability that make that republic such an outlier on so many dimensions. The – symbol indicates that the governor did not join UR either in his term or by November 2007, if the term extended until then. Luzhkov, Shaimiyev and Rakhimov are listed as joining in March 2003, though their status remains in question as discussed in the text.